# Is philosophy only about universal truths? Are human perspectives irrelevant? **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [February 17, 2011, 4:02pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-philosophy-only-about-universal-truths-are-human-perspectives-irrelevant/571706 "2011-02-17T16:02:47Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 15\ **Page:** 4
**Author:** ![Acid\_Lamp](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/d6d6ee/32.png) [@Acid\_Lamp](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Acid_Lamp)\ **Post date:** [February 22, 2011, 4:12pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-philosophy-only-about-universal-truths-are-human-perspectives-irrelevant/571706/61 "2011-02-22T16:12:45Z")
> [@MrDibble](#): > > No, it really isn’t. We may quibble about specific varieties of yellow, but the wavelength range is pretty much objectiveI can see what you’re getting here - bananas might reflect IR or UV or something as well. This does not, however, negate the fact that over the part of the ER spectrum we delineate “visible light”, bananas generally reflect at 570–580nm, but not at 420-450 nmOnly if you believe yellowness is inherently a mental property that cannot be delineated as a physical one i.e. qualia exist and you are a phenomenalist…and Mars and Venus don’t have plate tectonics. Doesn’t change the fact that on Earth we do, and that bananas reflect at ~560nm. Both are purely physical properties. “Yellow” is just a semantic shortcut. When we say “The banana is yellow” we are making a statement about the world\* outside\* our minds, just as surely as when we say “plates move” The perception of the wavelength of light is what counts. It takes our eyes, and the brain interpreting what it receives to understand “yellow”. Certainly the wavelength exists independently of human observation, but it is the observation that creates the experience of “yellow”. An intelligent being that does not have our equipment would perceive it differently, (or not at all) and be unable to understand “yellow”. ---
**Author:** ![Acid\_Lamp](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/d6d6ee/32.png) [@Acid\_Lamp](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Acid_Lamp)\ **Post date:** [February 22, 2011, 4:18pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-philosophy-only-about-universal-truths-are-human-perspectives-irrelevant/571706/62 "2011-02-22T16:18:20Z")
> [@Kozmik](#): > > If I show a human child a coloring book with a page with bananas and then show them a Crayola crayon box and ask them to color the bananas, they will all color the bananas with yellow. In this class assignment the bright human children will reason that orange must be for oranges and lemon yellow must be for lemons and yellow probably is for bananas. The human child could theoretically never have seen a banana or even a color photograph of a banana yet with only a coloring book and a Crayola crayon they will all color the bananas yellow. > > So you don’t need to show a human child a banana. There is no need for a concrete banana for them to see. This is empiricism. > > All you need to show a human child is a coloring book. They, literally and figuratively, see the abstract banana in the coloring book. This is rationalism. I’m sorry, I’m not following you. Are you actually saying that humans instinctively will color bananas yellow even if they have never seen one before? Considering that bananas actually come in a variety of colors, including green, brown, red, purplish, and even a pale bluish sort of color depending on geographical region, that is pretty tall glass to swallow. ---
**Author:** ![Kozmik](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/k/8dc957/32.png) [@Kozmik](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Kozmik)\ **Post date:** [February 22, 2011, 4:29pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-philosophy-only-about-universal-truths-are-human-perspectives-irrelevant/571706/63 "2011-02-22T16:29:56Z")
> [@Acid\_Lamp](#): > > I’m sorry, I’m not following you. Are you actually saying that humans instinctively will color bananas yellow even if they have never seen one before? Considering that bananas actually come in a variety of colors, including green, brown, red, purplish, and even a pale bluish sort of color depending on geographical region, that is pretty tall glass to swallow. 😕 [Google Images](http://www.google.com/imghp?hl=en&tab=ii) for banana. ---
**Author:** ![Acid\_Lamp](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/d6d6ee/32.png) [@Acid\_Lamp](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Acid_Lamp)\ **Post date:** [February 22, 2011, 4:44pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-philosophy-only-about-universal-truths-are-human-perspectives-irrelevant/571706/64 "2011-02-22T16:44:12Z")
> [@Kozmik](#): > > 😕 > [Google Images](http://www.google.com/imghp?hl=en&tab=ii) for banana. I’m assuming you are serious. Your ignorance of bananas does not alter reality. [red bananas](http://www.google.com/images?hl=en&source=imghp&biw=1653&bih=861&q=red+banana&gbv=2&aq=0&aqi=g8g-m2&aql=&oq=red+bana) Just one example. There are all sorts of others. Certain Asian varietals can be maroon to purple in color, and there are several species that stay green. Many African types are brown. I’m having a difficult time locating an image of the blue ones, though I’ve seen them in person at specialist fruit nurseries. in the meantime here is picture of a buddha’s hand lemon. [lemon](http://www.google.com/images?q=buddha+hand+lemon&hl=en&safe=off&biw=1653&bih=861&gbv=2&prmd=ivns&source=lnms&tbs=isch:1&ei=a-djTYyDJ8zAgQfTj9j_AQ&sa=X&oi=mode_link&ct=mode&cd=2&ved=0CAoQ_AUoAQ). The world is stranger than you might think. ETA [purple bananas](http://www.rarebananas.com/musa-burmese-blue-banana-pi-40.html?osCsid=02711ff8f4eb1b1e1dd4e058efd1c643) ---
**Author:** ![Aswan](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/c68b51/32.png) [@Aswan](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Aswan)\ **Post date:** [February 22, 2011, 4:51pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-philosophy-only-about-universal-truths-are-human-perspectives-irrelevant/571706/65 "2011-02-22T16:51:44Z")
You do realize that the word “empirical” denotes information gained by means of observation or experience, right? Also, there is no such thing as a concrete banana and even if there was, it would be impossible to eat. ---
**Author:** ![Acid\_Lamp](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/d6d6ee/32.png) [@Acid\_Lamp](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Acid_Lamp)\ **Post date:** [February 22, 2011, 4:55pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-philosophy-only-about-universal-truths-are-human-perspectives-irrelevant/571706/66 "2011-02-22T16:55:36Z")
> [@Aswan](#): > > You do realize that the word “empirical” denotes information gained by means of observation or experience, right? > > Also, there is no such thing as a concrete banana and even if there was, it would be impossible to eat. They are however, easy to locate on a GIS [Concrete banana](http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://lh4.ggpht.com/_dAZQEdW1rQk/Sb2r5OgqJKI/AAAAAAAABzI/Zi4mcFZD_Gs/coffs%2B%289%29.JPG&imgrefurl=http://picasaweb.google.com/lh/photo/6XtfaLR4OVIAbVcZzdMYjg&usg=__c2sIekxXjTeorv1zzYf0nVQTQ7w=&h=1200&w=1600&sz=436&hl=en&start=0&zoom=1&tbnid=BBVF8fDMYk_SZM:&tbnh=138&tbnw=188&ei=VupjTfWiFsW9twf99-3XCw&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dconcrete%2Bbanana%26hl%3Den%26safe%3Doff%26sa%3DX%26biw%3D1690%26bih%3D873%26tbs%3Disch:1%26prmd%3Divns&itbs=1&iact=hc&vpx=333&vpy=96&dur=4651&hovh=194&hovw=259&tx=96&ty=84&oei=VupjTfWiFsW9twf99-3XCw&page=1&ndsp=45&ved=1t:429,r:1,s:0) 😃 ---
**Author:** ![Kozmik](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/k/8dc957/32.png) [@Kozmik](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Kozmik)\ **Post date:** [February 22, 2011, 4:56pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-philosophy-only-about-universal-truths-are-human-perspectives-irrelevant/571706/67 "2011-02-22T16:56:08Z")
> [@Acid\_Lamp](#): > > I’m assuming you are serious. Your ignorance of bananas does not alter reality. > > [red bananas](http://www.google.com/images?hl=en&source=imghp&biw=1653&bih=861&q=red+banana&gbv=2&aq=0&aqi=g8g-m2&aql=&oq=red+bana) Google says [banana](http://www.google.com/images?hl=en&source=imghp&biw=1280&bih=1024&q=banana&gbv=2&aq=f&aqi=g10&aql=&oq=) is yellow. 😃 ---
**Author:** ![Aswan](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/c68b51/32.png) [@Aswan](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Aswan)\ **Post date:** [February 22, 2011, 5:02pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-philosophy-only-about-universal-truths-are-human-perspectives-irrelevant/571706/68 "2011-02-22T17:02:17Z")
:smack: Just when you think you’ve seen it all… Um, I don’t guess the philosophical question “Paper or plastic?” is germane, is it? ---
**Author:** ![MrDibble](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mrdibble/32/114_2.png) [@MrDibble](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/MrDibble)\ **Post date:** [February 22, 2011, 6:02pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-philosophy-only-about-universal-truths-are-human-perspectives-irrelevant/571706/69 "2011-02-22T18:02:22Z")
> [@Acid\_Lamp](#): > > The perception of the wavelength of light is what counts. No, the physical properties of the banana skin, that determine what wavelengths it reflects, are what counts. It’s reflecting yellow light whether observed or not. You might as well contend that it is the measuring of the plates moving that counts, or even just the inferring of movement from magnetic stripes, \*not \*the movement itself. But you claim that’s different. Why? both are physical phenomena. You’re trying to create this artificial distinction - which only works if you privilege certain kinds of “facts” - but there is no \*real \*category difference between the classes of facts you are trying to differentiate. So youre effort is in error. > [@](#): > > it is the observation that creates the experience of “yellow”. \*Only \*if you contend that there is something to “yellowness” \*other \*than a label for certain wavelengths. Me, I don’t think qualia exist. > [@](#): > > An intelligent being that does not have our equipment would perceive it differently, (or not at all) and be unable to understand “yellow”. Again, only if you \*assume \*qualia. Otherwise, yellow is just a label for particular combinations of wavelengths of light. Even a being that couldn’t sense it, could be told about it. That is all it takes. You’re trying for a rephrasing of the Mary The Colour Scientist argument for qualia. It’s not new, and I think Dennett did a very good job of demolishing it in _Consciousness Explained_, _[Quining Qualia](http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm)_ and [_What RoboMary Knows_](http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/RoboMaryfinal.htm) ---
**Author:** ![Acid\_Lamp](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/d6d6ee/32.png) [@Acid\_Lamp](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Acid_Lamp)\ **Post date:** [February 22, 2011, 6:36pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-philosophy-only-about-universal-truths-are-human-perspectives-irrelevant/571706/70 "2011-02-22T18:36:23Z")
> [@MrDibble](#): > > No, the physical properties of the banana skin, that determine what wavelengths it reflects, are what counts. It’s reflecting yellow light whether observed or not. You might as well contend that it is the measuring of the plates moving that counts, or even just the inferring of movement from magnetic stripes, \*not \*the movement itself. But you claim that’s different. Why? both are physical phenomena. > > You’re trying to create this artificial distinction - which only works if you privilege certain kinds of “facts” - but there is no \*real \*category difference between the classes of facts you are trying to differentiate. So youre effort is in error.\*Only \*if you contend that there is something to “yellowness” \*other \*than a label for certain wavelengths. > > Me, I don’t think qualia exist.Again, only if you \*assume \*qualia. Otherwise, yellow is just a label for particular combinations of wavelengths of light. Even a being that couldn’t sense it, could be told about it. That is all it takes. > > You’re trying for a rephrasing of the Mary The Colour Scientist argument for qualia. It’s not new, and I think Dennett did a very good job of demolishing it in _Consciousness Explained_, _[Quining Qualia](http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm)_ and [_What RoboMary Knows_](http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/RoboMaryfinal.htm) Interesting. If I’m doing it, I did so without prior knowledge of the argument. My initial impressions though having cursorily read those two papers, is that Dennett is full of hot air. His logic goes in circles and ultimately to nowhere at all. I suppose if that is the end goal to philosophical pursuits, then fine and well, but he assumes so much on his own side that it’s almost ridiculous when placed up against empirical knowledge. “Color” Is both a descriptor of an effect, and a slag term we use to describe a specific set of wavelengths. Without the optical machinery to “see” color, it has no meaning other than as an abstract shorthand for a wavelength. “Yellow” does not exist independently of the mind at all. Without something to view it, there is no Yellow. There is an object reflecting a spectrum of light, but that spectrum is broader than yellow. A being with a wider range of perception would view that object differently. Even if we were quite specific and told that being to ignore other wavelengths and focus in on the ones we determine as “yellow” there is no reason at all to assume that it’s brain would process the data into the same effect we experience. I don’t see how Dennett’s position demolishes this at all. Even as children it takes time, examples and lots of repetition for us to learn to accurately define and identify colors. Our eyes process the wavelength and are certainly displaying “yellow” to the brain, but “yellow” as a concept must be learnt. Even if Mary is deducing the experience of yellow without having ever seen it, she is doing so based upon prior knowledge and experience fed into her, augmented by her new ability to actually “see” the wavelength. If all we gave Mary was information that asserted that “yellow” was “blibblefrop” Then she would call it such. I also want to state that I don’t agree with **Naxo** ’s position entirely. I was only positing my interpretation of what he posted. I do think that there are quantifiable data that can be separated from experiential data, but the difference is moot in most cases since it is really the perceptible data that matters in most cases. ---
**Author:** ![Paranoid\_Randroid](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/paranoid_randroid/32/18_2.png) [@Paranoid\_Randroid](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Paranoid_Randroid)\ **Post date:** [February 22, 2011, 7:15pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-philosophy-only-about-universal-truths-are-human-perspectives-irrelevant/571706/71 "2011-02-22T19:15:07Z")
> [@MrDibble](#): > > \*Only \*if you contend that there is something to “yellowness” \*other \*than a label for certain wavelengths. > > […] > > Again, only if you \*assume \*qualia. Otherwise, yellow is just a label for particular combinations of wavelengths of light. Even a being that couldn’t sense it, could be told about it. That is all it takes. Please clarify something for me here. Are you contending that, when I write about “yellow”, I am referring specifically to certain wavelengths of light? Even without positing the _reality_ of qualia, I’m just not sure that’s right – what I call “yellow” is not wavelength but rather something bound up with my interpretation of wavelength. I could hallucinate yellow; I could dream yellow. If you tinkered with my brain such that I could no longer differentiate between a Granny Smith and a Red Delicious, it seems wrong to deny that the Granny Smith would seem red to me (or the Red Delicious yellow, as the case may be). This really doesn’t have anything to do with the color scientist argument, which posits that the subjective experience would be “new” even to someone who knew _everything_ about color. ---
**Author:** ![MrDibble](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mrdibble/32/114_2.png) [@MrDibble](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/MrDibble)\ **Post date:** [February 22, 2011, 8:16pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-philosophy-only-about-universal-truths-are-human-perspectives-irrelevant/571706/72 "2011-02-22T20:16:07Z")
> [@Paranoid\_Randroid](#): > > Please clarify something for me here. Are you contending that, when I write about “yellow”, I am referring specifically to certain wavelengths of light? Yes. Or more specifically, you are referring to a connection between all previous experiences of those wavelengths and a group consensus on what that experience is named. > [@](#): > > Even without positing the _reality_ of qualia, I’m just not sure that’s right – what I call “yellow” is not wavelength but rather something bound up with my interpretation of wavelength. I agree, but it is not in any way independent of that wavelength, now is it? > [@](#): > > I could hallucinate yellow; I could dream yellow. Could you do that if you had \*never \*seen yellow with your eyes, though? > [@](#): > > If you tinkered with my brain such that I could no longer differentiate between a Granny Smith and a Red Delicious, it seems wrong to deny that the Granny Smith would seem red to me (or the Red Delicious yellow, as the case may be). Dennett addresses this when he offers the alternative - what if I tinkered with your _memory_ of “red”, switching it with “yellow” without affecting your immediate apprehension of colour. You’d react the same as though I had. So where’s the difference? > [@](#): > > This really doesn’t have anything to do with the color scientist argument, which posits that the subjective experience would be “new” even to someone who knew _everything_ about color. The colour scientist bit is just a thought experiment. The heart of the matter is that what we mean when we say “know” - do we fully realise the implications? Dennett was arguing against those who say we can know all about something and yet not experience it fully. ---
**Author:** ![Paranoid\_Randroid](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/paranoid_randroid/32/18_2.png) [@Paranoid\_Randroid](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Paranoid_Randroid)\ **Post date:** [February 22, 2011, 8:37pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-philosophy-only-about-universal-truths-are-human-perspectives-irrelevant/571706/73 "2011-02-22T20:37:35Z")
Well, my inexperience with the philosophy of mind makes me cautious about taking a stand one way or the other on the existence of qualia. I just wonder if it’s any more right to say that yellow _just is_ a certain wavelength of light than that a copy of Pride and Prejudice _just is_ wood pulp stained with ink – “yellow” is not meaningful absent reference to an experiencer. ---
**Author:** ![MrDibble](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mrdibble/32/114_2.png) [@MrDibble](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/MrDibble)\ **Post date:** [February 22, 2011, 8:54pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-philosophy-only-about-universal-truths-are-human-perspectives-irrelevant/571706/74 "2011-02-22T20:54:55Z")
> [@Acid\_Lamp](#): > > Interesting. If I’m doing it, I did so without prior knowledge of the argument. My initial impressions though having \*\*cursorily \*\*read those two papers, is that Dennett is full of hot air. I have taken the liberty of highlighting where you went wrong. > [@](#): > > His logic goes in circles and ultimately to nowhere at all. You can, of course, give an example of where he did this, right? > [@](#): > > I suppose if that is the end goal to philosophical pursuits, then fine and well, but he assumes so much on his own side that it’s almost ridiculous when placed up against empirical knowledge. You can, of course, enumerate these assumptions? > [@](#): > > “Color” Is both a descriptor of an effect, and a slag term we use to describe a specific set of wavelengths. I’m not seeing a difference here. > [@](#): > > There is an object reflecting a spectrum of light, but that spectrum is broader than yellow. Errm, no. Or else the banana would be orange, or green, or white, instead. If your objection is that we have arbitrarily cordoned off a chunk of the EM spectrum as “visible light”, well, yes, but that doesn’t make the banana’s restricted reflections over that range not happen. > [@](#): > > A being with a wider range of perception would view that object differently. Yes. Agreed. That’s irrelevant to whether the banana is or isn’t yellow, though. “Yellow”, in this context, _means_ “appears to reflect such-and-such visible light,” after all. The restrictions are (implicitly) understood when we’re talking about colours. > [@](#): > > Even if we were quite specific and told that being to ignore other wavelengths and focus in on the ones we determine as “yellow” there is no reason at all to assume that it’s brain would process the data into the same effect we experience. How could you \*possibly \*know? All you would know is that it would self-report that, having restricted itself to only scanning radiation of the visible spectrum as we defined it, it only received radiation of 570–580nm. How is that not “seeing yellow”? What, exactly, is missing. > [@](#): > > I don’t see how Dennett’s position demolishes this at all. By showing that there’s no need for qualia to explain anything. > [@](#): > > Even as children it takes time, examples and lots of repetition for us to learn to accurately define and identify colors. Our eyes process the wavelength and are certainly displaying “yellow” to the brain, but “yellow” as a concept must be learnt. I disagree. Berlin and Kay showed quite clearly that we have an innate physiological colour response independent of cultural influence. > [@](#): > > Even if Mary is deducing the experience of yellow without having ever seen it, she is doing so based upon prior knowledge and experience fed into her, augmented by her new ability to actually “see” the wavelength. If all we gave Mary was information that asserted that “yellow” was “blibblefrop” Then she would call it such. Wait - that’s a completely separate argument - we could call those wavelengths that and it doesn’t change anything I’ve said. Witness the case of[languages](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity#Color_terminology_research)with less colours, or more. Berlin and Kay found that the linguistic framework is still subordinate to the biological sense. > [@](#): > > I do think that there are quantifiable data that can be separated from experiential data Such as? ---
**Author:** ![MrDibble](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mrdibble/32/114_2.png) [@MrDibble](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/MrDibble)\ **Post date:** [February 22, 2011, 9:00pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-philosophy-only-about-universal-truths-are-human-perspectives-irrelevant/571706/75 "2011-02-22T21:00:45Z")
> [@Paranoid\_Randroid](#): > > Well, my inexperience with the philosophy of mind makes me cautious about taking a stand one way or the other on the existence of qualia. I just wonder if it’s any more right to say that yellow _just is_ a certain wavelength of light than that a copy of Pride and Prejudice _just is_ wood pulp stained with ink – “yellow” is not meaningful absent reference to an experiencer. I agree that "yellow’ isn’t \*just \*a wavelength - it’s also the culturosemantic baggage that goes with it. But that baggage is not ineffable, private and yet miraculously also available to introspection. So I have no hesitation in kicking qualia to the kerb. ETA: the issue here isn’t whether there\* is\* an internal cognitive aspect to colour. Of course there is. The question is whether that’s independent of, and seperable from, the physiological experience. and if so, in a way that is provably \*unique \*to each human being [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-philosophy-only-about-universal-truths-are-human-perspectives-irrelevant/571706.md?page=3)