However, love is independent of particle physics’ existence; there could be all kinds of microscopic substructures that support the same macroscopic phenomenology. That’s due to a nearly miraculous property of our universe: that it allows us to formulate effective theories that ignore its microscopic particulars which are nevertheless meaningful within their domain of validity. They possess unanalysed primitives, and all of their assertions are contingent on these primitives, and it’s true that typically, a more fundamental theory exists which can analyse these primitives further – but that’s not a guarantee, and currently, all our theories contain such unanalysed primitives.
In fact, a naive reductionism runs into severe problems trying to find ever more fundamental levels of description: either there always is a more sophisticated microscopic theory analysing the primitives of the previous one, or at some point, there’s a most fundamental level, whose primitives must be taken unanalysable. Both would then contain contingent truths, and, if I understand you right, hence not be fundamental to you, and in principle on par with the description of a world in terms of human-derived concepts.
Actually, in physics, the strategy to overcome this has sometimes been to look back to the macroscopic in order to justify the particulars of the microscopic. Anthropic reasoning provides one example: we find us in a universe that is this particular way because in a universe that was greatly different, we couldn’t exist. This has been sharpened by John Wheeler to the participatory anthropic principle: that the universe is the way it is and we are the way we are is not merely incidental, but one requires the other; humans – observers – are necessary to bring the universe into being.
In a somewhat similar vein, Stephen Hawking has recently made a bit of a splash arguing essentially that the cosmos, to be able to come into existence, must contain gravity, and that, since M-theory is the most general (supersymmetric) theory of gravity, it thus must be the correct microscopic description of the universe; yet gravity is not fundamental in M-theory.
That’s all without going deeply into the ephemera of quantum mechanics, in which (according to, for instance, the relational interpretation) for instance to an observer A, a system might be in some definite state, whereas according to another observer B, that same system S might be in a superposed state, and indeed inextricably entangled with observer A, such that interaction between B and A on a macroscopic level may change B’s microscopic description of S. In other words, the same system may have distinct, but equally correct, microscopic descriptions, dependent on the observer (which may or may not be a macroscopic system), and interaction between the two observers on the macroscopic level (for instance, A telling B the outcome of his experiment), may change the correct microscopic description of S.
Perhaps somewhat less esoteric, falsifiable microscopic predictions have been made, conditioned on features of the human level: Fred Hoyle predicted the existence of the 7.6 MeV energy level of carbon-12 from considerations based on the existence of life on Earth; thus, considerations on a ‘derived’ level can have a direct impact on the ‘more fundamental’ one, and can’t be simply thrown out.
That’s all just to say that it’s hard (if not downright impossible) to formulate a complete theory on the basis of ‘universal truths’. Indeed, for any supposed universal truth, say x = A, one can always ask: why?, and if the theory does not give an answer, then it is hardly complete; but if it does, we weren’t talking about a universal truth in the first place.