In short, Will Riker is not Tom Riker
Is it “Think Like a Dinosaur” by James Patrick Kelly?
What makes me me is the pattern of matter within the space currently occupied by my body. That pattern moves microscopically through spacetime, picking up new matter and discarding old mater - but there is only ever one pattern at any one time. If I imagine the path of that pattern through time, there is a single unbroken, unbranching line.
Let’s assuming the process of teleportation takes place over time (time to scan, time to transmit the information, time to reassemble, time to destroy). It is unavoidable that the me-pattern timeline will be both branched and broken.
The discontinuity (the break) doesn’t concern me. It is no more worrysome than the quantum discontinuity that is probably occuring as I naturally propogate the me-pattern through spacetime.
It is the overlapping branch just prior to the discontinuity!! While the me that will continue after the teleportation is waiting to be instantiated, the me that is waiting to be destroyed is still in existence. It is that me that will experience disintegration. That is going to hurt - and it will take time. What if it is excruciating agony for 10 seconds or more? I will experience that agony. The only good news is the memory of that agony will not be in the past of the teleported me that will continue after the process.
But the agonized me is gone. It died a painful death. If I am about to enter the teleporter, that agonizing death is in my future. I will experience it. Is it comfort enough to know that the agonizing death is the price to pay to be somewhere else really quickly, espcially given I will have no way of “remembering” it because the reconstituted me-pattern will never have experienced it?
(And this is discouting the very real possibility that reconstituion is painful too)
Except that if humans are anything more than patters of information, if human beings have something more that makes us us, than you died and produced a totally different person, even if he does act exactly like you and thinks that he is you.
This is a theological debate though, and I’m not sure if it constitutes a hijack… It definitely relates to the topic at hand, but I’m not sure if it’s what the OP is looking for.
No he isn’t.
Imagine that the transporter doesn’t kill the original: you step into Transporter A, then you and your copy step out of Transporters A and B. Do you acknowledge that you possess control of only one of the two bodies, and only receive sensory information from one of the two bodies? Since the two bodies aren’t controlled by any sort of shared hive-mind, this means that the man walking into the machine can only step out of Transporter A, or out of Transporter B. He cannot do both. Now, given this, would you say that the original man is more likely to possess control of his original body in Transporter A, or somehow have his point of view transferred to the body in Transporter B and a changeling created in his place?
Now, let’s go back to the original scenario. Instead of both men stepping out of the machine, the one in Transporter A is killed instantly. Nothing has changed that has any capability of transferring your point of view. If the original man would have been the one to step out of Transporter A, he is now dead. He possesses no control over the new body, and cannot receive sensory information from the new body.
Are you thinking about that Outer Limits (The newer one) episode? It had a lizzard like creature working the controls.
This statement is false. Suppose we make the transporter rooms identical and with a setup like a rotating restaurant, then either of the enclosed transporter rooms can have the same physical exit.
You don’t know the rate of rotation, so there’s no way to tell if you are exiting A or B.
I think the issue is simple. You either think people can be split into identical copies like amoeba or you believe your essence is atomic and therefore you conclude your consciousness cannot branch.
I see no evidence why existence must be strictly linear.
The argument about one duplicate controlling the other does not apply. I don’t think anybody is claiming amoeba A has control over amoeba B after it splits, just that it results in two identical individuals after a split.
Is an amoeba conscious? If so, which resulting individual does its conscious point-of-view transfer to? Both?
Will you be able to see through two pairs of eyes and ears? taste with two tongues? Unless you’re saying that you can simultaneously have the point of view of both of the resulting individuals, Corsican brothers style, then only one of them can be you.
If you’re going to try to manufacture a gotcha like this, at least do it properly. You’re still only exiting one or the other, even if you don’t know which.
No, but a hypothetical Amoeba-Man, a superhero who has the power to split himself, is conscious. After he splits, I say both of them are Amoeba-Man. I understand your argument, but I don’t agree with it. From Amoeba-Man’s POV, both individuals were the original.
You’re basically saying your essence or soul is like a hard walnut that can’t divide or split into two walnuts.
But someone is waving a magic wand and lo and behold, two identical walnuts.
I’m saying that to the person being transported and to the outside world, there is no discernable difference between A or B. Therefore, the same person has walked out of both places.
Yes, this is probably blowing your mind.
No, it is not. However, I am astounded that anyone would actually believe that this is an effective or logical counter-argument.
Forget the teleporter. You walk into one of those two rooms at random, and walk out again. If you are incapable of discerning which room you entered, does this mean you entered both? Of course not.
My mind’s not blown; I simply don’t agree. Or more accurately, I think that the term “same person” is ambiguous and uninformative in this context, and thus I don’t think it can be used to argue your point the way you’re using it.
Suppose I have a document on my computer and print it out twice. A person could look at the resulting pieces of paper and accurately say that that the peices of paper are the same, because they’re physically very similar. And another person could take note that one paper is on one side of the room and the other is on the other, and say that they are different peices of paper, because one thing can’t be in two places at the same time.
Obviously if you mix up these two meanings of the concept “the same thing”, you are begging for trouble and your arguments are likely to be dodgy.
Only because one person leaves one room in your contrived example. It doesn’t apply because two persons leave two rooms in the non-contrived example. If one person enters and the same person exits two rooms, I see nothing wrong with saying the original person has entered both rooms.
Other than the fact that we only saw one person enter one room, right?
Yes, that’s the one. Must go back and re-read it.
nah, didn’t see that - it may have been based on Kelly’s story.
When I opened this thread, I would have said Beam Me UP, until I thought some about the two comments above.
First, I wouldn’t want to go unless I was absolutely guaranteed to come out ok on the other side. IMO, there’s only one way to do that. You create the copy on the other end and and validate the accuracy of the copy before you wipe out the original. Which means that the original and the copy must co-exist for some time period.
But as Der Trihs notes, the two beings start to immediately diverge.
Now, I am left with confusion. I’d have to know more about the process to make a decision.
An author could have it prove that souls do exist within the context of his story. It hinges on comparing simple “fax” teleporters and “fax/shredder” teleporters.
Scenario A (fax):
- Subject is scanned by departure machine and left intact.
- Data are sent to destination machine.
- Destination machine assembles new body based on transmitted data.
- Subject at departure machine remains alive, while the new body at the destination machine is a fresh corpse.
Scenario B (fax/shredder):
- Subject is scanned and disintegrated by departure machine.
- Data are sent to destination machine.
- Destination machine assembles new body based on transmitted data.
- The new body at the destination machine is alive. As far as anyone can tell, it is the subject, body and mind.
The idea is that in scenario B, the subject is killed, and his soul undergoes something akin to an out-of-body experience or near-death (well, early-death) experience. Then his soul “snaps” into the new body. It’s a similar process to when someone “dies” on the operating table (their damaged body is no longer a suitable host for the soul) and then is revived (the body is once more a suitable host for the soul). In this scenario the soul is similarly left without a suitable host (it’s been disintegrated) for a short interval, but then a suitable host is available once again (except it’s a fresh body in a new location).
In scenario A, the soul remains in the subject’s original body, so there is no suitable soul to animate the body at the destination. It could even be possible, if both machines are near one another, for the subject on the departure pad to see the new “dead” duplicate body on the destination pad, draw a random card from a deck of playing cards, take a cyanide pill, die, “snap” into the destination body, and tell us which card he drew.
I can think of a way around that actually; freeze both copies so they don’t change. Then when you know the copy is fine, warm it up and destroy the original (or don’t, and keep it for a backup). That might actually be necessary anyway for a scan-and-reconstruct version anyway.
If you want to play identity games with teleportation, how about this scenario. You get scanned and copied to, say Mars - but the original isn’t destroyed. The copy goes off and explores Mars while you go about your life. Then a year later you and your copy both step into teleporters, and one merge program later one version of you appears on Earth with merged memories. Are you still you? Is your Martian copy still him? Is the merged version a third person?