# Is the Chinese government on its last legs? **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [July 20, 2004, 11:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-the-chinese-government-on-its-last-legs/256083 "2004-07-20T23:27:27Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 1
**Author:** ![BrainGlutton](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/82dd89/32.png) [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)\ **Post date:** [July 20, 2004, 11:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-the-chinese-government-on-its-last-legs/256083/1 "2004-07-20T23:27:27Z")
In his book, _The Coming Collapse of China_ (Random House, 2001), Chinese-American writer Gordon C. Chang argues that the Chinese Communist system can’t last much longer – he gives it until about 2006. Here’s a link to a CNN interview with Chang: [http://edition.cnn.com/2002/BUSINESS/asia/03/25/hk.gordonchang/](http://edition.cnn.com/2002/BUSINESS/asia/03/25/hk.gordonchang/) And to a review of the book by conservative Catholic intellectual John J. Reilly: [http://pages.prodigy.net/aesir/tccc.htm](http://pages.prodigy.net/aesir/tccc.htm) From Reilly’s review: > [@](#): > > The author gives the current regime five years, say about 2006, before it is overthrown. The proximate causes will be economic, as the residual command-and-control economic system crumples under the transparent trading rules required by the WTO. (China joined in December 2001. Most of the transitional rules expire in three years.) The book is particularly valuable for its witty case studies of two private-sector success stories, an Internet entrepreneur and a bowling-equipment manufacturer, and their travails in the not-quite-post-communist China of the late 1990s. Beneath economics are the irreversible corruption and irrelevance of the Communist Party of China. Beneath politics, though, are deep structures of Chinese culture that may distinguish the process from what happened in Eastern Europe in 1989. > > To some extent, the biggest problem of reform that faced China after the turn from Maoist economics in the late 1970s was the same the post-communist European states faced in the 1990s: what to do with the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), which constituted almost all the industrialized economy. In classical Marxist states, SOEs were never just industrial concerns. Social services were functions of the SOEs, from schooling for worker’s children to health care to old-age pensions. In China in particular, SOEs and local groups of SOEs were all encompassing and largely self-sufficient; only in the last few years has there been the beginning of a nationwide market. Chang says that, in a sealed world without much pressure to upgrade technology, Mao’s world of SOEs and comparably self-sufficient peasant collectives might have gone on forever. > > \ > > First the government lent the SOEs money to subsidize modernization. Then the government directed the commercial banks it had created to lend them money. These loans are rarely repaid in more than token amounts. Usually, they are just rolled over and new loans are issued. The money pays workers’ salaries, and the SOEs buy spanking new equipment, but often not to much purpose. The managers haven’t a clue about the cost of capital, or even about the real demand for their products. The SOEs continue to make stuff, most of it unwanted and unsellable to any enterprise that is not ordered to accept it. There are SOEs that have modernized and that can compete with foreign producers. Success is penalized, however. Competent SOEs are promptly saddled with more social-service duties by the authorities in the localities where they operate. Ayn Rand used to write cautionary stories about situations like this. > > China has not only a sick industrial sector, which it dare not downsize for fear of exacerbating the already difficult unemployment problem. It also has an insolvent banking system. How insolvent no one knows. The accounting system is worse than Enron’s, and beyond that there are systemic problems. At least in America, creative accounting eventually catches up with you. In China there is no effective bankruptcy system to clarify the situation. Indeed, modern China as a whole seems to have a “culture of non-payment.” A third of all home mortgages are in arrears. > > \ > > Most Chinese still live in the countryside, far from the lawyers and venture capitalists with whom Chang is chiefly familiar. Nonetheless, he does suggest that something bad is happening there. In the 1980s, immediately after the end of the Maoist era, people in the countryside benefited enormously when they were permitted to farm private plots and run small businesses. More recently, though, farming has become uneconomic, and the cities of the east now host over 100 million refugees from the countryside looking for work. There are several reasons for this flight from rural areas. Part of the problem is mandatory sales of commodities to the government at artificially low prices. A bigger problem, though, seems to be the staggering corruption. > > After Mao, local officials were given far more autonomy, including responsibility for funding local government. Latterly, they have used this power to impose taxes and fees arbitrarily, and even to print their own money. They run public institutions as private businesses. In one appalling case, children at an elementary school were required to made fireworks for sale; many children were killed in an explosion. According to Chang, little uprisings are always happening throughout rural China. Sometimes they are put down by force, sometimes by negotiation. Sometimes, the Party cadres just withdraw until things calm down. In any case, the Party is profoundly unpopular in the countryside these days. It is just tolerated in the cities. > > It’s a paradox. Under Mao, China was a totalitarian state. Some representative of the Party was everywhere, on your block, in your work unit, in every government office. The Party was intrusive and it often enforced policies that were lethally unwise, but at least it was integrated into everyday life. Under Deng and his successors, however, the Party retreated. People could again have largely unobserved private lives. A measure of civil society returned, and not just in the economic sector. The Party has become unpopular because its relationship to this new China is entirely parasitic. People know the Party did not create the new prosperity. Furthermore, despite its continuing efforts to instill communist orthodoxy in the people, the Party does not believe what it says, and neither does anyone else. The Chinese people are not, at the moment, angry enough at the Party to overthrow it. However, if the Party is threatened, the people will not defend it. > > \ > > Of course, even when Chinese governments act, they sometimes seem to rely as much on mimesis as on ordinary administration. Consider this description of how China began its last major bout of real reform: > > “When residents of Kunming in southwestern Yunnan Province heard that Deng Xiaoping was talking economic reform during his Southern Tour of early 1992, the effect was immediate. Like a ‘swarm of bees’ the people took matters into their own hands. Overnight, private vendors put up strings of white lights along roadsides and began selling trinkets from card tables.” > > While this might seem like an odd way to run a country, it does chime with traditional Chinese notions about how societies work. The people are like a force field, or perhaps better, like a fluid in motion. China itself is like a great whirlpool, with the ruler in the still center. The people adapt by shaping their behavior to fit the circumstances, but in the end they sweep all before them. Philosophers can speculate about the causes of the tidal shifts of history and historians can describe them, but they have a dumb inevitability that cannot be resisted. Going with the flow of history has always been the acme of Chinese political theory. > > When a season of deluge approaches, signs appear. The old rulers cease to promote morality. Corruption spreads at all levels. Public order declines. The people no longer support their leaders spontaneously, so the rulers maintain themselves by force and trickery. Wizards and holy men appear in the countryside, working miracles and denouncing the corruption of the times. Often they form cults and mount rebellions, sometimes with success. While of course deploring the suppression of the Falun Gong cult, Chang points out that the current regime is right to be afraid. Master Li Hongzhi “preaches ideas that are even zanier than those of the Party, but at least he appears genuine when he claims to be the incarnation of the supreme divinity.” Delusional sincerity has put people on the throne of China before. > > Chang rehearses scenarios that could end the People’s Republic. The Chinese military talks about a war to acquire Taiwan as “certain” within the next few years. Chang assumes they will lose. This is probable, but not inevitable. Even if China cannot storm the beaches of Taiwan successfully, the military might be able to close down the island’s economy enough to make it come to terms. However, if the war does prove an embarrassment, demonstrations much larger and more broadly based than that at Tiananmen Square in 1989 could occur. The Party probably no longer has the prestige to persuade the army to disgrace itself again by coming to the rescue of the leadership. Lesser disasters could call out a similar response, including even a general run on the state banks. (Runs on local branches occur from time to time already.) So could some particularly egregious piece of official oppression that miscarries. Another industrial accident at a school might do. Could this happen? ---
**Author:** ![BrainGlutton](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/82dd89/32.png) [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)\ **Post date:** [July 20, 2004, 11:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-the-chinese-government-on-its-last-legs/256083/2 "2004-07-20T23:38:31Z")
BTW, a friend of a friend of mine is a PFC in the U.S. Marine Corps and claims he is being trained to fight in China. That could be just a contingency preparation . . . ---
**Author:** ![Zagadka](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/zagadka/32/7272_2.png) [@Zagadka](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Zagadka)\ **Post date:** [July 21, 2004, 3:14am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-the-chinese-government-on-its-last-legs/256083/3 "2004-07-21T03:14:30Z")
I was under the impression that China has been undergoing rather massive industrial/commercial upgrading and modernization, has put several ambitious projects into action, and is making good ground in entering the 21st century. But I’m not all that familiar with China, so… I see China as moving more towards how the Soviet Union _should_ have ended before Mr. Reagan decided to make it crash tumbling to the ground in an uncontrolled explosion - progressive economic reforms, slowly easing the Communism social programs away (but not toally), eventual privatization of industries (though with a state-controlled company in each industry), and then the introduction of other political parties, controlled at first to not be too radical a change, and eventually easing into democracy. Of course, that process could take decades, and frankly, the Chinese probably don’t have decades to work with. What I fear happening more is a too-powerful leader coming back to power. I certainly don’t see Americans fighting in China in my lifetime, At least, I really hope not, because that would be catastrophic for everyone involved. ☹ > [@](#): > > “When a season of deluge approaches, signs appear. The old rulers cease to promote morality. Corruption spreads at all levels. Public order declines. The people no longer support their leaders spontaneously, so the rulers maintain themselves by force and trickery. Wizards and holy men appear in the countryside, working miracles and denouncing the corruption of the times. Often they form cults and mount rebellions, sometimes with success.” I’m not sure if I read that correctly. … WHAT? ---
**Author:** ![Sam\_Stone](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/ecccb3/32.png) [@Sam\_Stone](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sam_Stone)\ **Post date:** [July 21, 2004, 3:16am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-the-chinese-government-on-its-last-legs/256083/4 "2004-07-21T03:16:42Z")
> [@](#): > > BTW, a friend of a friend of mine is a PFC in the U.S. Marine Corps and claims he is being trained to fight in China. That could be just a contingency preparation . . . Just a contingency. Soldiers are trained to fight in the conditions of any conceivable foe. The fact that they train for a Chinese engagement really doesn’t mean anything. ---
**Author:** ![BrainGlutton](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/82dd89/32.png) [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)\ **Post date:** [July 21, 2004, 3:19am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-the-chinese-government-on-its-last-legs/256083/5 "2004-07-21T03:19:56Z")
> [@Zagadka](#): > > . . . and then the introduction of other political parties, controlled at first to not be too radical a change . . . I’ve heard nothing of the PRC making even a few tentative steps in the direction of legalizing competitors to the Communist Party. They haven’t even allowed Hong Kong to keep the few feeble elements of democracy it had under the British. > [@Zagadka](#): > > I’m not sure if I read that correctly. … WHAT? Copied that direct from Reilly’s review of Chang’s book; not clear if that’s Reilly’s prose or Chang’s. But what it describes has, indeed, happened many times in Chinese history, or that least that’s the traditional Chinese picture of what happened/happens when dynasties change. ---
**Author:** ![Thaumaturge](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/858c86/32.png) [@Thaumaturge](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Thaumaturge)\ **Post date:** [July 21, 2004, 4:11am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-the-chinese-government-on-its-last-legs/256083/6 "2004-07-21T04:11:40Z")
Since the United States military has nothing better to do, and is extrememly undertaxed at this time, the’ve decided to go play [chicken](http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=domesticNews&storyID=5685376) with China. I can’t find it online, but China in response has said that it cannot defeat 7 carrier groups at once, and would immediately work towards being able to do so, with a target date of 10 years from now. The chickenhawks in the pentagon must think that starting an arms race with China is a good idea. So, can China face its comming economic crisis while playing 'who has a bigger penis?" with the US military? Russia couldn’t handle it, but it was a smaller country, and the effort practically bankrupted the US. I don’t think we can survive such a play again. Seriously, the world is run by idiots. ---
**Author:** ![Abe](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/f1d935/32.png) [@Abe](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Abe)\ **Post date:** [July 21, 2004, 7:02am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-the-chinese-government-on-its-last-legs/256083/7 "2004-07-21T07:02:16Z")
China is not anywhere near collapse, and certainly not by 2006 – an idea I find ridiculous since there is no indication to suggest it in the first place. You have a widening poverty gap, yes, but you also have massive urban migration; what it boils down to is, essentially, that urban dwellers are richer than country folk, which is still better than almost everyone being poor (which was the old China). Rural poverty is being addressed (and largely covered up as well) but it simply does not feature that highly. As for the statements about Deng and Mao, I do not think it is true that under Degn and his successors the communist party retreated in any meaningful way, but I would need specific examples to discuss that. One of the deining characteristics of the Chinese Communist Party is their complete grip on power and communication channels; these have not changed significantly in decades, although authority may have been shuffled and allocated to, e.g., regional officers or bureaucratic heads. Factor in the rampant corruption that is a mainstay of China and you have a really complicated picture, but still no indicators for any kind of collapse. The Soviet Union is being used as a model on how not to go about things; China is now introducing economic reforms (has been doing so for the past several years) and there is a rumour that this will eventually lead to greater political reforms. All well and good if it happens, but to me the Communists look more powerful than ever, and I happen to live in their considerable shadow. Foreign investment is booming under the Communist Party reforms, leading to international partnerships that only serve to strengthen the economic base of the Commies. The direction we’re heading now would appear to be capitalist pseudo-communist totalitarianism, if you will. What has been happening is that slightly less autocratic and rather more modern leaders have stepped up; the old guard is still far too powerful to allow any radical changes to the Party structure, _even if anyone signalled any intention to make such changes_. So in the next few years you can easily predict a Chinese economic engine roaring nicely and lots more of the commie propaganda we’ve got so far. That may be an indicator of tight control, but there aren’t any indicators of collapse I am aware of, and if there were – particularly if the indicators were financial-- the first people to know about it and worry would be Hong Kongers (who are presently more concerned with the rather more realistic possibility of being politically crushed and controlled by the mainland). Anything involving the words “Finance” and “China” is automatically hideously complex (even after the reforms of recent years) so I may be unaware of significant trends and predictions, but the point is that Hong Kong – one of the financial capitals of the world – _wouldn’t be_. You would probably have to visit cities like Beijing and Shanghai, or even Shenzen and other less famous centres, to grasp how far China has come in economic terms, and how far it still intends to go. Shanghai in particular is IMO a vision of modern large-scale high-tech urban development, that in my opinion beggars any city in Europe or the Americas. I think you might as well expect New York City to collapse just because there’s an idiot of a mayor in charge at present, or expect the US as a whole to implode owing to the countless blunders of the administration. ---
**Author:** ![Abe](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/f1d935/32.png) [@Abe](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Abe)\ **Post date:** [July 21, 2004, 7:09am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-the-chinese-government-on-its-last-legs/256083/8 "2004-07-21T07:09:11Z")
catastrophic collapse is what I was talking about, by the way. Isolated collapses are not to be ruled out, and, indeed, are to be expected in this part of the world. Even Hong Kong, the most westernized of Chinese cities, has a long history of banking, property, and generally economic collapse. ---
**Author:** ![Abe](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/f1d935/32.png) [@Abe](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Abe)\ **Post date:** [July 21, 2004, 7:29am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-the-chinese-government-on-its-last-legs/256083/9 "2004-07-21T07:29:14Z")
Regarding the Taiwan issue, all one has to do is look at the growing economic integration between Taiwan and the mainland to realize that much of China’s output is (as usual) a whole lot of self-asserting bluster. China does not need to invade Taiwan because Taiwan is increasingly outsourcing to China for its industries, such as microchips and semiconductors, to the point that cross-strait economic cooperation is much too advantageous to both sides to chance ruining it. Both sides will continue to rattle their swords; some (not all) Taiwanese will hope that eventually international scrutiny, alliances and a softening, younger Communist Party will be conducive to some form of secession or independence, while China will continue to thunder about what is its property and all the rest of that crap. The one significant danger is if the Old Guard decides that the Taiwan issue must be resolved before the Old Guard dies off in the next decade, for fear that the new generations of Communists may take a softer approach to the matter. However generally speaking the Chinese have a good thing going on, why would they want to spoil it with war over Taiwan and anger numerous powerful entities for issues that haven’t really changed substantially for years? ---
**Author:** ![E-Sabbath](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/e19adc/32.png) [@E-Sabbath](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/E-Sabbath)\ **Post date:** [July 21, 2004, 11:03am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-the-chinese-government-on-its-last-legs/256083/10 "2004-07-21T11:03:22Z")
My perspective on such things is that, while in large part, China is not modernized, and any collapse will only be truly harmful on the ‘civilized’ part of it, the cities and industrial belts… the traditional farmers will do just fine… there is one coming. Now, I’m not the most familiar with China, but what I’m concerned about is both the pattern of Japan and their demographics. There tends to be, historically, after a great leap… after a massive investment in expansion, a counter-wave of depression, that can be critical or not, depending on governmental planning, as the rate of expansion can not be kept up permanently. Like a man running. Trip him and he’ll fall on his face. The second issue is their eugenics program, the one-child program, with a large percentage of those one-children being male. This results in, apparently, a very spoiled child, the ‘little emperor’ syndrome. I can see many of them in the military, eventually, or in government, with a much more… ah, aggressive, and less restrained perspective on the world. Now, the old guard won’t want to give up power until the new guard are 80 or so, but… Well, when they hit that point, the point where the social tensions are really straining, I’m expecting a war or total collapse of the economy. Maybe 2020, 2030. Not looking forward to it, either. Of course, this is simply my personal analysis, and I may be wrong. Anyone? ---
**Author:** ![Cisco](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/ccd318/32.png) [@Cisco](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Cisco)\ **Post date:** [July 21, 2004, 11:23am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-the-chinese-government-on-its-last-legs/256083/11 "2004-07-21T11:23:57Z")
> [@BrainGlutton](#): > > BTW, a friend of a friend of mine is a PFC in the U.S. Marine Corps and claims he is being trained to fight in China. That could be just a contingency preparation . . . Just a slight nitpick: About half or more of the Marines I know _joined_ as PFCs. In other words, they were a signature and a couple pokes in the ass away from a civilian. He’s not going to know anything you (or we) don’t know. ---
**Author:** ![Bryan\_Ekers](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/bryan_ekers/32/183_2.png) [@Bryan\_Ekers](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Bryan_Ekers)\ **Post date:** [July 21, 2004, 11:40am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-the-chinese-government-on-its-last-legs/256083/12 "2004-07-21T11:40:56Z")
Sure, they’ll collapse. Thirty minutes later, though… ---
**Author:** ![China\_Guy](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/779978/32.png) [@China\_Guy](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/China_Guy)\ **Post date:** [July 21, 2004, 1:25pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-the-chinese-government-on-its-last-legs/256083/13 "2004-07-21T13:25:30Z")
Start out by saying I never read the book. People have been sending me exceprts and snippets et al since it was published. I think the author is trying to sensationalize the issues. Also, reading a book published in 2001 means it is waaaaaay out of date (when the economy is growing approximately 8% y/y and means the economy has increased by at least 35% since the author started writing). Dissident and astrophysicist Fang Lizhi always said that China has been on the verge of civil war. He’s a smart guy and I tend to agree with him. But why now or by 2006? Compared to any time since I’ve lived in China in 1985, IMHO see China is being furthest from breaking down and most advanced to entering the middle class. I have the advantage of perspective having first coming to the mainland in 1985 and spending 3 years in the Southwest countryside. As a pretty naive young man, I thought that China was a basket case with no hope in hell of modernizing. Lessee, as I walk to work in the morning I am passed by cars built to international standard by at least 10 makers, many of the 300 million mobile phone users are connected (Siemens just shifted a huge chunk of their mobile phone R&D to China), pass several McD’s/KFC/Pizza Hut’s/Starbucks, work in a modern high rise, live in a building where the power has never gone out and join the 40 million other people using broadband. Now it’s not about consumerism, but historically there’s never been a war between 2 countries with McDonalds. That suggests taiwan, US and Russia won’t be duking it out with China. Couple points usually missed or glossed over by Chinese commentators. Point the first, China is embarking on a huge wave of basic infrastructure development. Roads/ports/railways/airports where none existed before have opened up huge areas for Chinese labor to feed the export machine. This also provides huge economic benefits and ROI that is almost beyond calculation. Point the second, for the first time in recorded Chinese history there is mobility in the countryside. Peasants are coming to the big city (and live in pretty nasty conditions) and have the opportunity for wealth creation for the first time in Chinese history. It’s real trickle down. Country cousins have education and opportunity that never existed before. It’s a tough row to hoe, no doubt about that, but it is a sea change from the status quo of the past couple thousand years. Point the third, the Chinese diaspora. There are educated and successful Chinese around the globe that are coming back to China. Driven by a lot of factors including time to cash in on a piece of the pie. They are the ones opening up China and bridging east to west. I’ve got another biz trip tomorrow, but thought I’d throw out a few scraps. ---
**Author:** ![Bosda\_Di\_Chi\_of\_Tricor](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/bosda_di_chi_of_tricor/32/16845_2.png) [@Bosda\_Di\_Chi\_of\_Tricor](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Bosda_Di_Chi_of_Tricor)\ **Post date:** [July 21, 2004, 1:48pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-the-chinese-government-on-its-last-legs/256083/14 "2004-07-21T13:48:25Z")
China’s economic success is confined to the cities? And the rural areas are poor? Well, economic successes found in _one class/group_ **can** trigger violence by _another class/group_. So, China’s “economic boom” **does not** preclude rebellion & social disorder. One or more provinces trying to secede & become autonomous has been an option throughout Chinese history. ---
**Author:** ![BrainGlutton](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/82dd89/32.png) [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)\ **Post date:** [July 21, 2004, 2:39pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-the-chinese-government-on-its-last-legs/256083/15 "2004-07-21T14:39:06Z")
> [@Bosda Di'Chi of Tricor](#): > > One or more provinces trying to secede & become autonomous has been an option throughout Chinese history. So far as I’ve heard, the only Chinese provinces interested in independence\* are the historically non-Chinese autonomous regions – Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia. There are independence movements in (or at least for) all of them. Apart from those – even Manchuria, which was barred to Chinese immigration when the Ch’ing dynasty ruled, and was proudly non-Chinese up to the end of WWII, has been so thoroughly sinicized that I’ve been unable to find any evidence of an independence movement there – and I have searched. \*(Well, unless you count Taiwan as a “Chinese province,” and you assume it’s not independent already, but let’s not get into that one!) ---
**Author:** ![Aeschines](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/aeschines/32/16251_2.png) [@Aeschines](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Aeschines)\ **Post date:** [July 22, 2004, 1:21am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-the-chinese-government-on-its-last-legs/256083/16 "2004-07-22T01:21:25Z")
Yeah, sometimes you hear rumblings about China about to be in trouble, but I don’t buy it. China’s not going to stop until it reaches superpower status and wealth rivaling that of any other country. ---
**Author:** ![BrainGlutton](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/82dd89/32.png) [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)\ **Post date:** [July 22, 2004, 2:29am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-the-chinese-government-on-its-last-legs/256083/17 "2004-07-22T02:29:59Z")
> [@Aeschines](#): > > China’s not going to stop until it reaches superpower status and wealth rivaling that of any other country. Why should it stop there? ---
**Author:** ![Abe](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/f1d935/32.png) [@Abe](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Abe)\ **Post date:** [July 22, 2004, 6:27am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-the-chinese-government-on-its-last-legs/256083/18 "2004-07-22T06:27:30Z")
> [@Bosda Di'Chi of Tricor](#): > > China’s economic success is confined to the cities? And the rural areas are poor? > > Well, economic successes found in _one class/group_ **can** trigger violence by _another class/group_. > > So, China’s “economic boom” **does not** preclude rebellion & social disorder. That is true, but the chance seems so remote. According to the Communist Party, rural poverty is being beaten back systematically, although that may have more to do with the Party’s definition of “poverty” than the substance of economic improvements it brings about. Economic success, I should add, is not found is only one class or group. On average, urban residents are significantly wealthier than rural residents, but urbam dwellers themselves range from the street workers, to salary men, entrepreneurs, all the way up to the mega-billionaires. As **China Guy** says, there is a real trickle-down effect taking place here. If rural dwellers in general can’t make the move to an urban centre, they’ll pool resources to send one or two family members, who then send money back home (for example). On the whole, I think the more or less accurate official line is that conditions for Chinese (rural and urban) have been getting better for decades now (although for urban dwellers disproportionately so), so I don’t see any real rationale for rebellion and social disorder – not to mention that the folks in power will not tolerate that kind of behaviour. ---
**Author:** ![Mr.Miskatonic](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mr.miskatonic/32/310_2.png) [@Mr.Miskatonic](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mr.Miskatonic)\ **Post date:** [July 22, 2004, 11:33am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-the-chinese-government-on-its-last-legs/256083/19 "2004-07-22T11:33:04Z")
> [@Zagadka](#): > > (Wizards and holy men appear in the countryside, working miracles and denouncing the corruption of the times. Often they form cults and mount rebellions, sometimes with success.") > > I’m not sure if I read that correctly. … WHAT? Tai Ping Rebellion 2! Industrial boogaloo! ---
**Author:** ![marky33](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/e495f1/32.png) [@marky33](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/marky33)\ **Post date:** [July 22, 2004, 6:37pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-the-chinese-government-on-its-last-legs/256083/20 "2004-07-22T18:37:32Z")
Gotta agree with **Abe** : The view from HK suggests the Chinese leadership is as strong as ever. The Tianaman Square “incident” is well under the carpet and there is no indication of any kind of repeat; the Communist Party is now admitting entrepreneurs, so the transition to a market economy seems to be going smoothly from an ideological pov; the Taiwan tussle is all mouth, no trousers - on both sides; and Hong Kong is merely an amusing experiment in tolerance (maybe one day an amusing experiment in limited democracy). It appears that a serious threat to the status quo in Beijing could only come from outside Greater China (which includes HK, Taiwan).