Note the “leaving aside” bit, Kozmik. I don’t think there is very reasonable definition of ‘object’ that would apply to two brains (in this context at least). This should have been clear from my earlier arguments against the notion that the universe as a whole has epiphenomenal complexity.
The brain must be following simpler rules than the universe, because brains exist within the universe, therefore the rules of a brain are a the subset of the rules of a universe.
There is no “subset of rules of a universe.” The universe is a set of rules along with a collection of objects obeying those rules. The microscopic rules followed by the brain are the exact same as the rules followed by the rest of the objects in the universe. From the perspective of primary phenomena everything within the universe, and therefore the universe as an aggregation of its contents, follows the same rules. The rules followed by secondary phenomena are not a subset of the rules followed by primary phenomena.
So the microscopic rules followed by your brain are the exact same as the rules followed by the rest of the brains in the universe?
Obviously all matter and energy in the universe follows the same set of rules, to the best of our knowledge. And the brain is limited to those rules, unless you believe in the supernatural. And even if you do, it’s still limited to those rules.
Do we “understand” the universe not directly because we understand the set of rules, but because we understand the interplay of objects?
Not necessarily - there’s no guarantee that all of the things for which the universe has rules, are all at play in any specific time and place, such as right now, in a human skull. Anyway, it doesn’t matter. Point is, the brain can’t be more complex than the universe if it’s part of the universe
Which means there’s no guarantee that all of the things for which the human brain has rules, are all at play in any specific time and place, such as right now, in all human skulls. It does matter.
Current scientific understanding is that yes, all of those rules are at play. QED, QCD, gravity, do not “turn off” inside a brain, or anywhere else. The rules, as best as we know, are always the same.
It depends on your definitions. Is a jet engine more complicated than a crow bar? Both are part of the universe. And yet, in a very obvious and practical sense, a jet engine is more complicated than a crow bar. Why? Because the principle by which a jet engine or a crow bar works is epiphenomenal. The jet engine has complex internal relationships between macroscopic collections of atoms whose group behavior is most sensibly described in terms of secondary properties; a description of its behavior is most coherent when phrased in terms of secondary properties like pressure and temperature. If someone asks you how a crow bar works, do you say “Quantum Electrodynamics”? There are epiphenomena whose description is less complicated than the primary (PV=NRT) and there are epiphenomena whose description is more complicated (all sorts of emergent phenomena). And there are many definitions of complexity, for instance algorithmic, for which the rules don’t really matter as long as they are turing complete; it is the complexity of the relationships built out of the rules that matter.
Yes… how is that even in question?
I didn’t say we “understand” the universe absolutely. We “understand” the universe better than we understand brains, because we understand the rules, and we understand the interplay of objects (the universe as a whole has no emergent properties that we do not understand as directly derivable from the primary properties). For the brain, we do not understand how the secondary phenomena of cognition and consciousness derives from the primary.
Because of this question.
Could you revise this statement to:
If consciousness is the secondary phenomena then what is the primary phenomena?
That question refers to possible macroscopic (secondary) rule differences, not microscopic rules differences.
Not if you are trying to get me to make a statement about the secondary rules. My statement was clearly and specifically referring to the microscopic rules followed the microscopic constituents of all objects in the universe. Stop paying word games.
The motion and interaction between atoms or perhaps as high level as neuronal activity (technically these are already secondary and tertiary phenomena – fundamental particles and their interactions would constitute the true primary phenomena, but this is beside the point).
I’ll let you know after I’ve examined every object in the universe. Should take a couple of days, 3 tops.
Not even sure what you mean by this.
I’m not claiming that any of the universe’s rules ‘turn off’ in a brain - it’s just that there may be entities in the universe that aren’t parts of a brain - magnetic monopoles, cosmic strings, dark matter, etc - especially that last one - do we know whether the rules underpinning dark matter are unified with those of conventional matter?
Yes, but a component of a jet engine cannot be more complex than the jet engine, including the part. The brain can’t be more complex than the universe if it’s part of the universe.
It depends what you mean by “unified.” Dark matter is just matter that weakly interacts with regular matter, like neutrinos (but probably more massive than neutrinos). But dark matter as well as the other things you mention are just as relevant to a brain as to any other part of the universe. Dark matter, for example, is understood to be spread out everywhere (though most dense around matter-dense areas like galaxies), including in your brain. The rules are the same everywhere, and I don’t see how its relevant that things like dark matter are floating around with different densities in different areas; either way it doesn’t interact with the brain at all (by definition).
The universe is not a jet engine; as a macroscopic aggregate it has no epiphenomenal complexity. It seems you aren’t understanding anything I’ve been saying. At this point all I can do is ask you to read my previous posts, because I’ve explained why your last sentence is not true (depending on your definition of complexity) more than three times so far in this thread, including in the rest of the post you are responding to.
Are you sure you weren’t better off with “My Problems with Relativity?” 
For whatever it’s worth, I liked your response about uniting two brains. You didn’t say “Two brains are more complex than one,” but, rather – I can’t find the exact quote, but it was to the effect – if you could merge two brains into one, it would be more complex than a single brain.
Just as a mega-computer is “more complex” than a single computer, even if built out of simpler components. (Heck, an ordinary computer is built out of VERY simple components!)
I think the question of “what is an object” is Platonic logic-chopping. Yeah, and if you cut off his limbs and organs and most of his bones, is a guy still a “man?” The fallacy of “drawing the line” hits here. If a chair is an object, what about a wheel-chair? Or two wheel-chairs bolted together? Welded together? Built as one from the start? When does “one object” become “two objects?” There can be no meaningful scientific assessment of the question; it’s purely philosophical.
Anyway, I’m finding your posts the most convincing on this thread…
(It echoes strangely of the theological debate about God being the “greatest thing that the human mind can imagine.” I always wondered, “What about two Gods?”)
Everything is built out of the same simpler components in the end. And the increase in complexity of two brains isn’t necessarily any more than a single one except for the number of sub-components. So if we use number of sub-components as a measure of complexity, the brain is pretty simple. No more complex than a rock of the same size.
I think an object can be considered any set of physically joined components without problems. So either of my two brains could be considered an object, as could their subcomponents. But the two cannot be considered a single object because they are located in different parts of my body and aren’t physically joined without intermediate components that are not part of either brain .
Well I did jump into the BBT thread you mentioned, so I do have a backup
But two brains of twins that are connected (there are real world examples), increases the number of states and inputs to various functions. I think that is an example that is more complex than an isolated brain.