What happened with Effective Altruism IMO shows an issue with what often happens with utilitarianism in practice - which is that people who have a savior complex and/or think they’re smarter than everyone else are drawn to utilitarianism, and use utilitarian logic (even if it is often extremely bad logic) to justify their power trip.
I think the worst extremes of utilitarianism arise as some of its more privileged adherents decouple themselves from reality. They start making decisions based on premises that are not supported by empirical evidence, and so their conclusions, however “logical” they may be, are unsound.
But that’s still no reason to abandon consequentialism for deontology. Indeed, if one ever could come up with a rational basis to adopt a deontological approach to morality, it would just become an extension of consequentialism: something to adopt because it has the best outcomes.
Anyway, I actually wrote a paper (unpublished, it was for course work) not too long ago about deontological vs. consequentialist approaches in the context of human dignity and a German court *case that evaluated the constitutionality (under Germany’s Basic Law) of using military forces to shoot down an airliner with innocent passengers and crew aboard to preserve lives on the ground (think something like preventing another 9/11 by intercepting the aircraft prior to their destinations), and I have half a mind to just upload the damn thing as a pdf, because it’s actually pretty on topic. But then I won’t fool myself into thinking anyone would read it.
*The court held that the Act in question was a violation of human dignity, and so contrary to the Basic Law. I actually agree that was the proper outcome, not just under the Basic Law, but as a moral question as well. However, where the court seemed to draw on a deontological/Kantian framework, I felt it was not only possible, but more appropriate, to apply a utilitarian framework to reach that same conclusion: a law designed to make it easier to shoot down airliners to prevent another 9/11 is simply not justifiable.
Oh yeah, I mean most of us are self-aware enough that don’t need to be overly worried that we’re going to turn into Bond villains as a result of the real-world moral dilemmas we face. It’ s also unfortunate that the SBF’s of the world become what people think of when they think of utilitarians because I think most people have more opportunities to think about impacts in their personal choices and also who/what they support in politics and if anything people are overly resistant to utilitarianism.
Very good point.
The real world full of real people is just a lot, well, muddier, than fat-cats are used to dealing with. So even if they avoid the pitfalls of egoism, they can still often fool themselves into solving problems for a world of readily implementable causes with highly predictable effects that doesn’t exist except in their own mind.
I would totally read that. And not just due to my personal connection with the subject matter. You clearly have some fresh knowledge and real understanding of the issues central to this debate.
I don’t understand what you’re getting at. The soldier is deciding whether to storm a city or not. Breaking a promise (which, in case of a conscript, may not have been freely entered into) and keeping a promise but perpetrating violence are both outcomes. He should compare those outcomes. Moral analysis demands that the outcomes are compared, otherwise, in the moral context, the decision isn’t a decision at all.
You must make a certain semantic distinction if you are to entertain an argument in favor of deontology.
The soldier has an obligation to enter the city. The soldier has an obligation to uphold his oath, or promise, to serve the military. But one may not reason that a violation of the former implicates the latter without a connecting premise, to wit, that the consequence of violating his obligation to enter the city entails a violation of his promise to serve the military.
Yes, even deontology must take into consideration the “outcomes” and “consequences”, but not in the same way consequentialism does. The defining trait of consequentialism is its emphasis on ultimate ends - ultimately, what is the utility? the harm? the pleasure? Whereas in deontology, moral weight is given to the duties, obligations, or rules themselves, and the inquiry as to consequence goes no further.
Consider the Oresteia, where Agamemnon was given a choice between sacrificing his daughter or abandoning his campaign on Troy. Consider the binding of Isaac. Though neither sacrifice drew blood, there must be room for a deontologist to reason that a consequence of plunging a knife is to violate his duty to protect his child. Were it otherwise, sophistry would sever all forms of obligation from specific physical acts.
It depends. Let’s not use that hypothetical - I feel like it would poison the debate.
In fact I don’t understand your line of argument at all. What are you looking for in this debate? If I could understand what you’re getting at, maybe I could address it head-on.
A promise, under utilitarianism, is only worth its utility. A promise, under deontology, has inherent moral value completely severed from its utility. Sure, we can talk about edge cases like coerced promises or moral dilemmas where the promise commits one to violate some other obligation. I concede these are dilemmas that disappear under utilitarianism. That’s an argument against deontology, one of many.
But if you want to consider any of the arguments for deontology, you must be willing, for the sake of argument, to give moral weight to duties and obligations and rules in their own right. That is the central premise of deontology. You cannot justify deontology from a utilitarian perspective, which I think you are trying to do. The axioms are contradictory. There is no rational argument for deontology which preserves the negative utilitarian axiom of harm avoidance as the ultimate good, because deontology has its own ultimate good, which is to satisfy one’s duties. Hence the deon in deontology.
~Max
Correction: “A promise, under act utilitarianism, is only worth its utility.” I think that’s an important nit to pick. Under rule-utilitarianism promise-keeping as a habit or rule is beneficial only insofar as it promotes happiness. But there are all manner of examples where breaking a promise could narrowly produce a better outcome if you ignore its indirect harms.
Babale appears to argue for something broader, meta-consequentialism. The best way of evaluating a moral system is in terms of their consequences. What else is there? What else could there be aside from divine mandate, or appeal to some authority? In this way consequentialism blurs into deontology, a problem that I suspect all 3 of us sense. Happily, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy provides some help:
In actual usage, the term “consequentialism” seems to be used as a family resemblance term to refer to any descendant of classic utilitarianism that remains close enough to its ancestor in the important respects. Of course, different philosophers see different respects as the important ones. Hence, there is no agreement on which theories count as consequentialist under this definition.
Consequentialism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Hypothesis: You can define consequentialism broad enough so that it embodies all of secular moral philosophy, but that isn’t especially useful or insightful. To make it meaningful, you need to narrow it down some. But even then, the line between rule-utilitarianism and deontology is not a bright one. (I’d be happy to be proven wrong on this last claim: maybe there is a bright line).
OTOH, it’s entirely straightforward to lean heavily towards harm avoidance as an ultimate good, note firmly that an ethic of honesty brings positive utility, and on top of that acknowledge that eg keeping promises has some intrinsic value. The bulk of morality flows from harm avoidance directly or indirectly, but humility demands a certain wariness of over-simplification, according to this view.
For completeness, I’ll give a nod to the 3rd major secular moral family, virtue ethics. I wonder about it.
Well, they serve different ends. A rule utilitarian still strives to act according to rules that maximize utility. A deontologist, however, may respect principles that consistently lead to less happiness. He can refuse to convict and execute an innocent man, no matter the circumstance. He can wear the ring of Gyges yet gain no moral impunity whatsoever.
Have you read The Brothers Karamov?
~Max
How is that a problem? FWIW, I see consequentialism as the only fit mechanism for humans to evaluate morality. To the extent I might admit certain deontological notions into the calculus, it’s only to the extent that human biology demands it. That means an accounting for human empathy and sympathy, for example., which seems common enough to the species, even if there is the odd exception (sociopaths and the like). But as long as the rest of us outnumber the sociopaths, we are free to leverage our greater numbers to build our society as we like it, with an accounting for basic human empathy in our moral calculus. So doing harm to others, for example, must not be considered as if human feelings are irrelevant. Too many utilitarians make that mistake.
Any way, with that lengthy aside, I don’t see how consequentialism entertaining the merits of certain concepts that may bare a facsimile to a deontological position built on hard and fast (or at least fastish) rules (eg: don’t kill people for no reason) is a shortcoming of consequentialism.
Yes , absolutely. In scenario where you are trying to establish checks and balances in democratic society there is a great deal to be said for having a small number of fundamental rights that are considered absolute, and not up for debate.
For the very good reason that in the real world you aren’t dealing with benevolent well informed politicians rationally discussing the pros and cons of every law. You are dealing with whichever malevolent ill informed group managed to scrape together enough votes to control the legislator. The likelihood that such a group would say, for example, “the benefits of banning speech that encourages homosexuality out weigh the costs”, is why it’s a good idea to have unambiguous right to free speech.
Obviously it’s not a perfect system and there a bunch of edge cases and weak points (the current US political system is currently on a tour of all the weak points and downsides of a system based on deontology), but its still better than the alternatives.
Presumably because recognition of fundamental rights would be useful, yes?
Otherwise, how are we to decide which rights should be fundamental? That’s a *problem for deontology, not for consequentialism. Consequentialism’s answer (or at least it’s mechanism for divining and answer) is simple enough: those rights which would be most useful for (or maximize the well-being or flourishing of, if you prefer) actual humans in a human society to have without except are the ones society ought to recognize as fundamental.
Start with an absolute right to due process (or justification) and branch out from there, IMHO. Which, by the way, the US Constitution almost has (if it weren’t for that damn suspending of habeas corpus line and the weakening of the due process right by putting it equal to, rather than greater than, other rights like speech).
*I mean, if we’re going to deontology, we could find ourselves in a society where everyone has a fundamental right to worship Jehovah in public and to have random passersby just wait I silence waiting for any public prayer to conclude before proceeding on to their tasks. We could find ourselves in a society where the right to claim ownership of and exert control over people on the basis of race is likewise fundamenta (or at least incorporated into a fundamental right to property). Consequentialism can get you out of that problem by appealing to and evaluating the harm done to humanity as a whole by such so-called “rights.” But deontology? It’s just whatever idea you happen to pluck from the philosopher’s cloud.
That’s a problem for consequentialism, too. Different flavors of rule utilitarianism are defined by their distinct answers to that question. So, too, are different flavors of deontology. Kant’s answer was the categorical imperative, but Kantian deontology is not the only form of deontology. There’s also traditional deontology, i.e. word of God / divine command. etc.
~Max
If due process is an absolute right that cannot be legislated away regardless of the benefits of doing so, that’s deontology (by the standards of the OP at least).
I certainly wasn’t saying the exact list of fundamental rights listed in the US constitution was perfect or God ordained. But the idea of having a small number of fundamental rights that cannot be torn down just because the benefits of doing so appear to outweigh the costs, is a really good one.
Maybe (we could come back to that) but the point is how you get there. If you get there by concluding it would be useful, based on evaluation of the evidence (to include the weight of historical evidence we have that says depriving people of this basic right leads to really, really bad results) then that’s still consequentialism.
If you get there by saying “I think we should have an absolute right to due process, so we must have an absolute right to due process,” then that’s deontology.
The difference between deontology and consequentialism isn’t the strength of the conclusion, it’s how you get there. Is it really a conclusion, or is it merely a conviction? If a conviction, then on what basis would you dare impose it upon the rest of us? It must be justified. Humans demand justification.
I disagree once you have a fundamental unalterable law that cannot be changed regardless of the consequences, that’s deontology. Whether that law was originally the result of careful rational consideration of the consequences or because it was written on a stone tablet by a deity in prehistory.
Oh, but the right could change.
If humans change.
But they won’t. Not while I’m alive.
Not while you’re alive.
So we can be maximally certain that the right to due process should remain absolute within our lifetimes at least. Beyond our lifetimes… that’s for the next species of homo to worry about.
Who said anything about imposing moral convictions on others? Morality is primarily about decision-making: personally acting one way or another.
A deontological rule may easily represent the conclusion of reasoning rather than an axiomatic belief.
Kantian deontology is explicit in the justification of any moral duty. It identifies intrinsic good (good will), it demands self-legislation of rules as a matter of practicality, and it requires that any rules remain justified if they had universal applicability. There must be justification for every rule - Kant was big on reason.
Even in religious contexts, there are plenty of rules arrived at by logical reasoning (i.e. arguments from analogy, a fortiori, a contrerio, etc). In another thread I’ve been discussing Rabbinical Judaism, which is all about using logical reasoning to derive and clarify deontological rules from biblical text. But Jews do not traditionally believe their rules and duties should apply to gentiles. Even the Catholics during the Spanish Inquisition did not - formally - hold Jews and Muslims accountable to canon law.
~Max