Yep. Taking the OP at face value it’s a poll of how different people’s different moral systems address the question of eating meat given that killing animals is required to get that meat. In that way it’s an interesting thread where you get to hear about other people’s moral perspectives and compare and contrast them with your own. You can look for flaws and inconsistencies within their logic to see if they hold up to examination, and have debates back and forth.
But when we start facilely dismissing each others’ moral systems entirely, that eliminates the basis for discussion. And as much fun as it is to declare that, for example, god-based morality is based on a lie and therefore all theists are amoral monsters, doing so eliminates debate and discussion in favor of people saying, “no, you’re dumb and I’m right” back and forth at one another.
Erm, what?
I haven’t talked about objective morality, or used the word “objective”.
I said it was a subjective value judgement.
And I am not dismissing your morals.
I am saying we are debating meat eating in general and you have not fully outlined your moral position on the general case.
Let’s consider an analogy. Imagine the debate topic is “Is there a moral defence for physically disciplining children?”. The response “Sure, I never minded it!” isn’t a complete argument or position yet.
Unless we also assert that no children ever mind it, or that people are morally wrong to mind it, then the fact that person didn’t mind being disciplined is irrelevant to forming a position about physically discipling children in general.
More specifically, you said my moral position wasn’t a moral position. That’s you dismissing my morals. Explicitly and unambigously.
If you can’t own what you’re saying, don’t say it.
Of course I have. In my third or fourth post here, I stated that under my moral system I don’t consider animals to be people. Their utility (therefore) doesn’t factor into any utilitarian or other analysis. The only reason not to kill an animal (morally speaking) is if causes a human distress - and even then only if the distress exceeds the utility in doing the deed.
To summarize - in my moral system you are allowed to swat flies and mosquitos, if you want. Because their feelings and right to life do not ‘count’ and thus do not override your desires to avoid annoyance by their presence and actions.
Note that in my moral system, being a vegetarian is also a consistent position, because if eating meat distresses you for empathic reasons, then eating the meat is damaging your utility, which (since you’re a human) matters. Thus nobody should feel compelled to eat meat, and it would be immoral to force or trick somebody into eating meat against their will. However the level of distress a vegetarian feels at the sight of others eating meat is unlikely to override the utility the other people get from eating meat.
Which is to say, nobody is forced to swat flies and mosquitos, but a non-swatter’s choices do not compel you not to swat yourself.
Honestly your supposed analogy doesn’t seem to relate to my position at all. I really don’t follow what you were trying to say. Hopefully now though things are clear enough though.
I’m sure I’m not nearly as good at logic as some other folks here but… although your statement may feel right to many people I’m not sure it holds up as purely logical.
Consider this: “in a situation of nutritional abundance where we can get all the food we need without growing raspberries, growing raspberries for food becomes unnecessary and therefore immoral.”
Not I didn’t; I said that you had not yet given a moral position for the general case. That’s not the same thing at all. If you think I have suggested otherwise at any point then go ahead and quote me.
Ok, then that is a position on the general case then. I didn’t see those earlier posts because I didn’t read the whole thread, I was just responding to what was put to me.
But I am intrigued by this position.
So suffering doesn’t factor in at all?
When considering the morality of actions against humans does suffering enter your utilitarian calculation? And if so, why the hard division between humans and, say, chimps, when all indications are their (at least) physical suffering is the same as ours?
As for your questions, I’ll address them in reverse order.
The division is arbitrary - people’s utility matters; animal utility does not. Making an arbitrary division is necessary because (despite potential appearances) there is no natural division - Humans and chimps and dogs and cows and pigs and crabs and fish and insects are all on a continuum, and there is no non-arbitrary reason to divide the continuum at any point. We are all just mechanical meat computers of varying complexity receiving inputs, adding them to stored information, processing it, and reacting. Thus, if one wants to justify killing annoying flies and not justify killing annoying humans, an arbitrary distinction must be drawn.
Of course. Humans are considered people and their suffering is most definitely part of their personal utility. (A negative part, obviously.)
Animal suffering isn’t a moral consideration. (If it was we’d all look at nature, throw our hands to our foreheads, and faint - it’s a jungle out there.) But it is worth remembering that the division between person and animal is arbitrary, so the type of suffering between a person and, say, a fly could be considered to both be approximately the same, give or take. (Which is just a long way of saying that animals do suffer, even though it’s not a moral issue.)
This means that if you find a person that likes seeing things suffer, that’s worrying. The dude who was pulling the wings of flies yesterday and is drowning cats today might start hurting actual human people tomorrow. As a person who’s a human person, that’s a worrying idea, so such people should be watched. It wouldn’t be the only example of moral-but-suspicious actions that could escalate to immoral actions, after all.
Anyone who has ever had a pet mammal knows that non-human mammals are capable of suffering. But I have to say, I’m not convinced that a fly has the capacity to experience “suffering”.
I agree that the exact place we draw the line is arbitrary, but I think we can meaningfully distinguish between worms and grasshoppers and mice and men. With mice somewhere in the middle.
I agree that there’s a continuum but for me that’s a reason not to draw a hard line.
There are organisms I am pretty confident don’t feel pain, there are some that seem to experience pain just like a human and then there’s a huge gray area in the middle. And that’s fine – there are lots of phenomena in this universe that are non-binary.
And in terms of making practical choices, I wouldn’t personally draw a line above all animals, because I think that causing suffering is wrong and there are animals that no doubt suffer physically as much as I would.
The argument that there’s a lot of suffering out there doesn’t give us justification to add more.
Heck, there’s a lot of human suffering out there, but I still try not to be a jerk to people.
The division is arbitrary, but I thought you agreed that the actual phenomenon is a continuum? I don’t believe that flies experience physical pain in the same way as a human.
I think the problem you’re having here comes from looking at a snipped excerpt from my post in isolation. The premise that you left out is not that any action that’s unnecessary must therefore be immoral: the premise is that inflicting unnecessary suffering is immoral.
You may not agree that inflicting unnecessary suffering is immoral, or you may happen to believe that raspberries suffer when grown and eaten, or whatever. But the argument I actually made from the given premises was not illogical.
This has gotten very interesting. Plus minus some quibbles I agree overall w @begbert2’s views. I personally place a vast gulf of value between humans and the highest of the animals, whichever species those might arguably be.
But I also agree with @mijinet al that the line between animals that suffer and animals that (most probably) don’t suffer is a lot farther down the hierarchy of complexity. And therefore humans in their exalted position at the top have a significant duty to minimize human-imposed suffering on the higher animals. Which minimization may include not raising them to be killed and eaten.
Which is what feeds the first sentence of my first post upthread:
Animals are not moral agents, period, amen. But that doesn’t mean humans don’t owe them a moral duty as such. Not because of the slippery slope that a human who hurts animals may graduate to hurting humans. But because there is a moral difference between a lamb being killed by a wolf and being killed by a human. It may not matter to the lamb, but it does matter to the human. Utility is not nothing. But it’s also not everything.
When we consider something suffering to be an actual problem, we don’t just refrain from adding to it, we intervene. If you see a child being beaten by their parent next to you, you feel an obligation to intervene. When you see a person being attacked by a lion you feel an obligation to intervene. When you see a gazelle being attacked by a lion you…take a video of it and sell it to national geographic.
It’s not a question of the attacker’s moral obligation; it’s that the only species whose suffering we (as a society) consider to be an actual problem is our own. Which is okay! A line has to be drawn somewehere. But demonstrably, we as a society draw it at “who we save from lions = humans only”.
I’m not even sure any two humans experience physical pain in the same way. I mean, sure, the physical mechanism is the same, but the subjective experience might not be (and based on what I’ve seen probably isn’t).
There are many reasons not to save the gazelle; saving the gazelle could be causing suffering (starvation) to the lion and its cubs. And saving it now might just be postponing the inevitable; a slow gazelle saved today is just tomorrow’s dinner.
It’s not that the suffering doesn’t matter to me. If I saw, let’s say, a gazelle tangled in some vines, slowly starving to death, I may well cautiously try to free it. Even though its plight was not caused by a human.
I think that’s a bit of a dodge frankly. Yes, you and I may have differences in our subjective experience of pain, but all evidence suggests that we generally find the same stimuli (e.g. being flayed alive) intensely unpleasant. And that there are other responses of our nervous system e.g. the knee-jerk reflex, that have no subjective feeling at all.
The question is, how does this compare to the subjective experience of animals? It’s hard to say of course because they can’t talk. But a chimp shows similar facial expressions, and makes similar cries etc to a human response to the same stimuli. Plus their nervous system is virtually identical to ours.
Meanwhile a fly’s response is pretty simple. It doesn’t seem affected by changes to its body. If attacked, it struggles intensely, but that’s also reason to think it may be more of a knee-jerk reflex since these responses are very predictable. There’s no need for an organism to have subjective anything when the response is hard-wired.
But of course, we don’t know. If you were to say we don’t know for sure flies don’t feel intense subjective pain, I would agree with you.
You could say all the same things when the lion is munching on the human. Face it, we as a society just care more about about what happens to humans. (Unsurprisingly.)
This is not to say that somebody’s personal morality might be calibrated such that they can’t stand seeing a cat playing with (recreationally torturing) a mouse. Where the line is drawn is a personal thing. But there’s no objective reason not to set it at “humans only”.
I’m not sure that holding a fly’s lack of facial features against it is entirely fair.
But in any case, my point really is that when you say “I arbitrarily declare that fish don’t feel pain because when I cut them and they thrash and squirm, they’re not screaming or frowning”, that’s an arbitrary decision. Perhaps an informed decision, but an arbitrary one. And you’re welcome to it! Feel free not to cut into live fish for recreational purposes, and to make sure your lobsters have properly died in their sleep rather than tossing them alive into boiling water. But your decision that their pain is important enough to mandate a change in your behavior is an arbitrary one, and it seems to be the case that society in general falls more on the side of not assessing fish pain as being an issue.
Sure, and *I* care more about what happens to humans, but that’s not what we were just discussing.
You were saying “we” don’t see animal suffering as “a problem” (in context meaning we don’t care or feel no obligation to aid them), but I am illustrating to you that that’s not the case for many people.
That’s a bit of a glib response. What I said was that the predictability of the response implies it may well operate as a knee-jerk.
Chimps, like us, can withstand painful stimuli if a situation warrants it. Flies, have simple responses and don’t seem to have that kind of discretion. Many neurologists believe that subjective pain only occurs for situations where the organism needs to know something suboptimal has happened and a hard-wired response would be inadequate.
But, and I’ll say it again: we don’t know.
I agree with all of this (apart from asserting that fish don’t feel pain. I think the claim to know one way or the other would be unwarranted).
But it’s interesting that you went down the tree to fish. They are certainly in the “gray area” for me and many people.
We were talking about mammals such as gazelles, and your suggestion that “we” don’t consider their suffering to be a problem. I don’t think that how most people see it actually; going back to my original question to you, I think most people on finding me mutilating a dog would consider me to be doing something morally wrong.
I am not suggesting that morality is decided by consensus, merely challenging your suggestions that your way of drawing a line represents how “we” consider animal suffering.
I consider the whole continuum a grey area. That’s what makes it a continuum.
Before going further, I want to back up a step and address something I thought of while writing my previous post - talking about suffering is, itself, kind of a red herring. It’s only relevant to the meat-eating issue if you assume that the meat-harvesting factories (or however that works) are causing undue suffering, which I’m not sure can be generally assumed. I gather we’ve improved a bit since Upton Sinclair wrote The Jungle.
The primary moral concern that is unavoidably present when eating meat is whether it’s moral to kill the animals in question. And human society does think it’s okay to kill dogs. It’s called “putting them down”, and while a lot of people certainly don’t like that it’s happening (at least when the reason is just that the dog is unwanted), I don’t think that the general impression is that the people doing it are monsters.
Begbert2 is basically arguing my point of view but better. Where I disagree is that I firmly believe that the universe is might makes right and different sets of people construct different sets of moral systems that are typically incompatible with regards to where strict logic would take each system’s conclusions.
I wouldn’t even discount the poster(s) who made references to religion or the divine as the source of moral axioms. That is just as legitimate as making up a set.
And a thread like this is very illuminating. It demonstrates the difficulty in reaching a consensus on certain topics even between reasonable, rational, educated, and empathetic people. Look at the utilitarian perspective. If you agree with that perspective and you give a value for different mental states of a human brain such as joy, pain, horror, ecstasy. Even with all of that agreement, you can logically support quite divergent policy just by tweaking the weight you give each mental state. It’s fascinating. Furthermore, it’s going to become more and more important as we develop strong AI’s. We screw that up and we have huge problems.
Whereas I think that “might makes right” really only means “you’re no more right than they are, but you’re less dead”.
I didn’t either! Though I did note that their morality would be nontransferable to persons who don’t subscribe to the same religious axioms. (Like your proposed “I’m in the moral right if I beat you in a gunfight” types, for example.)
You can also assign different values to the emotions of different species - that appears to be the given reason for it being okay to pull the legs of of spiders but less okay to pull the legs off of dogs.
And it’s interesting that you bring up strong AI - will the anti-meat crowd argue that it’s immoral to ‘kill’ a strong AI? And if so, how strong does the AI have to be? A huge percentage of video games are about killing off AIs…