As defined in the OP, Utilitarianism does not necessarily lead to mob rule. For example, it may be that what is conducive to the greatest happiness for the greatest number is to allow minorities an equal voice.
Possibly the unhappiness that comes with knowing you live in a culture where you might be killed for your organs at any time outweighs the happiness people might get from knowing someone can be killed if they need organs.
No, I’m saying the fact you’re talking about surgery and organ removal would be the main reason for your proposed theoretical distaste of “most people.” Change it to apples, or whatever. Or, if you have to be so macabre, you discuss other moral strategies using organ transplants too, to keep it even.
The organ problem is discussed at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Possible approaches follow:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/
a) You have to add stuff to the example such as the doctor not getting caught or punished, everything is kept secret so as not to set a bad example, the operation works, the operation is known to work, etc. Then you bite the bullet and perform the operation: this example only demonstrates how faulty our moral intuitions are. Say, you wanna get together next weekend?
b) Maybe the act of killing is worse than death. (So I guess with a 10:1 ratio it might be ok.)
c) Don’t look at it so narrowly: compare worlds with murderous doctors and worlds without them. See Sen 1982 , Broome 1991, Portmore 2001, 2003, Frylock 2013.
d) For example, compare the rule “Kill one person if they are a good organ match for 5 others” , to the rule “No, don’t do that.” This is rule-utilitarianism, and it sidesteps some problems with act-utilitarianism while producing others.
There is nothing in Utilitarianism that demands the rights of the few be trampled, nor that accommodations within the system not be made.
You’re arguing that the distaste comes from talking about organ transplants, and not from the utilitarian recommendation itself. But the Kantian recommendation is to not kill the individual for the sake of the five, since this would be to treat him as a means. By your argument, I should feel similar distaste when thinking about this recommendation as I do when thinking about the utilitarian recommendation. But I don’t, and I seriously doubt anyone does. So then, your diagnosis doesn’t work. The distaste has at least something to do with the moral recommendation itself, and not just with the situation described.