Those were the proximate causes but defeat within around a year was inevitable at that point. Austria-Hungary had already surrendered and the Western countries were pushing forward toward Germany and the German lines were so thin and weak that they couldn’t defend everywhere, and they were pressed so hard that they didn’t have time to entrench well.
But of course not physically seeing their country defeated with their own eyes let many people n Germany kid themselves into thinking the country had been stabbed in the back.
Interesting to read the posts dismissing WWI as just those damn Europeans making war on each other as they’d always done with the Americans “foolishly” becoming involved towards the end. This from the nation that had led the world in introducing the savagery and slaughter of modern warfare in the American Civil War. Trust me, the Americans differed not a jot from their European cousins in their capacity for conflict.
Sorry to quote so much from you- I deleted a little but I would disagree with a few points. Firstly, there was no guarantee that the UK would involve itself in the War at all. It indeed had an old agreement with Belgium regarding its neutrality, but my understanding is that it was no guarantee of going to war over it. Even in the last days before the war it was unclear if the UK would enter the war.
And I think the line about an oil war is a bit misplaced. The UK Army was not heavily mechanized (or even very large ) at the beginning of the war. Most of its ships, apart from the newest were coal fired. The air force was largely non existent so there was no real need for fuel. Certainly at the end of the war it was a lot clearer that oil was precious - when the USA sent some battleships over the UK requested they send coal fired units rather than oil burning ones as they had plenty of coal. And Germany certainly suffered from a lack of fuel oil and its Air Force was not as active as it could have been due to this lack of fuel.
The bit about the German Army never being defeated in the field is a bit of a fallacy as well. In 1918 it was falling back everywhere (Check the Battle of Hamel). As you say, the blockade of Germany had resulted in shortages of just about everything- the population was starving (no fertilizer), there was no rubber, no coffee, bandages were made of paper- you get the picture.
The myth of an undefeated army was used by the future Govt to show that the German people had been betrayed.
Little Nemo, as I said, I am in two minds about Haig. The one UK general I think who would have been better is the largely forgotten Herbert Plumer. He had his diaries destroyed upon his death.
I actually wrote a whole essay on whether or not Haig was “The butcher of the Somme”. Unfortunately I can’t remember my conclusion. Just a thought though - if I remember rightly that battle saw the first use of tanks in warfare. How much of the credit for that belongs to Haig?
But was it enough to make the soldiers feel defeated? It must have appeared a lot less certain to some of them than it did at the end of the Second World War.
With Haig and the Somme, I would cut him some slack. He was pressured into fighting a battle he didn’t want to relieve the pressure on the French. Tanks were used in the Somme battles but not in great numbers. (Just to gloat, I have seen the only surviving German tank from WW1 - Mephisto. It is in the Brisbane museum. The Germans only ever deployed 20 in the war).
As to your second point, I agree that it must have been far more obvious to the German Army in WW2 that they had been flogged. In WW1 they were often feted as returning victors.
Or perhaps Rawlinson. But I don’t have a specific individual in mind. My point is that the British cabinet should have emulated Lincoln and kept trying new generals until they found one that could get the job done.
No disagreement from me re Rawlinson. I also think Smith-Dorrien was destroyed by French and could have been a very efficient General if allowed.
As I mentioned before, one of the biggest problems for the British was that the French (the nation, not the General) was the senior partner. They could try numerous generals but unless there was co-operation from the French (which was often lacking) the UK on thier own could not beat the German army.
At least when Pershing arrived he insisted that the US forces fight as a separate unit and not be amalgamated into the French/ British Armies (Although some American forces did fight alongside the Australians under Monash initially).
I believe Haigs greatest failure was not letting go of a campaign when it was going no where. He reinforced failure.
What I mean is does Haig deserve any credit for pioneering what has been such an important part of warfare throughout the century since? Or was it a case of despite him not because of him?
I don’t think Haig was anti tanks, but I don’t believe he was a great advocate either. Depending who you read Haig still believed in cavalry after the war.
I have a copy of The Haig Diaries here which I still haven’t finished reading. It may reveal something more.
According to Johnson (“Modern Times”), General Haig failed his staff course-he also was advanced despite his poor performance at British Army field maneuvers (1912). His promotion was opposed by General Grierson (who died of a heart attack shortly after deployment to France). Haig was able to pull strings because of his wife’s political connections.
A political general and incompetent as well.
Plumer, Rawlinson, Smith-Dorrien - all competent Army commanders but I cannot see any evidence that their strategy - and tactics - for defeating the Germans would have been any different to Haig’s. After all, they were the guys that actually planned the battles. One of the criticisms of Haig is that he stood back too far and allowed his subordinates too much independence.
Ironic that Lincoln kept trying until he found Grant - a General who used the North’s superiority in numbers to grind the South down through unrelenting battle. Not a General to sit on the defensive or try fancy maneuvers - and not a General noted for his reluctance to accept casualties.
Even assuming your premise, there’s a huge difference. Those tactics worked for Grant.
I didn’t say Haig should have been sacked for high casualties. I said he should have been sacked for a lack of results. The cabinet should have given Haig a reasonable amount of time and then if he failed to show any significant results, they should have replaced him with Plumer. And then if Plumer didn’t produce results after a reasonable amount of time, he’s out and it’s Rawlinson’s turn. And if Rawlinson, doesn’t work, you send in Smith-Dorrien. You keep it up until you find a general who can win the war.
It was possible after all. There were other ideas being floated around: tanks, poison gas, stosstruppen, amphibious attacks, strategic aerial bombing - but headquarters kept insisting on the same plan: launch a frontal attack with the infantry and have the cavalry standing by for the breakthrough. When it didn’t work, you just rebuilt your infantry and tried it again.
Heck, at the very worst, the allies could have just sat in their trenches and waited on the defensive. The allied naval blockade eventually starved Germany to the point of surrender. Ironically, somebody like George McClellan might have been a good commander on the western front.
I agree-except there was great political pressure to “wrap up the war”. The Allies should have sat down and starved the Germans out. Indulging in sideshows like Gallipoli and Mesopitamia cost lives and gained no results worth mentioning.
I’m just speaking generally here, but the problem with that strategy is you waste a lot of time changing things every time there’s a new regime, and you may end up with people trying to deliver results that look good (to keep their jobs) rather than being able to focus on winning the war “properly”.
But again I ask what do you think Plumer, Rawlinson, or Smith-Dorrien would have done different? They all - like every general in every army involved (French, German, and - when they came in - American) - were faced with the same situation in terms of location, relative strength, and military technology. There was no magic bullet a different C-in-C could have used to win the war quicker or with significantly less casualties.
Little Nemo, you say there were “other ideas being floated around: tanks, poison gas, stosstruppen, amphibious attacks, strategic aerial bombing”. taking these in order:
Haig used tanks as soon as he could - four days after their first use (15 Sept 1916) Haig asked London for 1000 tanks asap. Six months later he had 60 for the Battle of Arras. Even in 1918 the maximum available at the start of a battle was less than 500 and less than a hundred of these were available on the second day.
Poison gas was used extensively by the British from 1916 onwards - useful but not war winning.
Stosstrupen - forming separate Storm trooper units was a recognition that a standard of the average German infantry unit was no longer up to that of 1914-15. If you mean infiltration tactics - the leading wave byepassing strong points, this was a standard tactic for the BEF in 1917-18.
Amphibious attacks - on where? An attack on the North Sea or Baltic coasts would have just led to the destruction of the Anglo-French forces landed. D-Day was barely possible in 1944, landing under air superiority, with thousands of specialist landing craft and tanks, and the bulk of the German Army facing the Soviets. Landing on the German coast in 197-18 would have been suicide. Landing somewhere other than the German coast would have done nothing to shorten the war. Look up Salonica at some time.
Strategic aerial bombardment - well that did not defeat the Germans in WW2. With the aircraft of 1917-18 it had no hope of success (although that did not stop the British under Haig trying).
Finally, sitting in their trenches and waited on the defensive until Germany caved in due to the naval blockade. Ignoring that it was Germany that launched the Battle of Verdun in 1916 -causing Haig to attack on the Somme to relieve the pressure on the French - how long do you think it would have taken for Germany to collapse if they had had no threat in the west and had conquered and consolidated an empire in the east? Should the French have just sat back and accepted that their main industrial areas and a large chunk of their population was being systematically exploited by the Germans?
One point to think on regarding replacing the top command. At the end of 1916 the French Prime Minister replaced Joffre with Nivelle because Nivelle assured the politicians he had an infallible method of gaining victory. The result was the fiasco of the Nivelle Offensive in early 1917 which ended with the widespread mutinies in the French army.
I think there were some pretty nebulous ideas about amphibious landings in Coastal Germany to skirt the trenches. Probably fortunately these came to nothing.
I can’t agree that Mesopotamia was a useless sideshow. It was one theatre where there was Allied success and a commander who had some idea what he wanted (Allenby - who interestingly had been more or less sacked from the western Front). If you mentioned Salonika or Gallipoli as total wastes of men/ money I would agree. However, the Allies needed success in Palestine if for no other reason than to protect the Suez Canal.
