# ISIS in the Middle East is growing **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [June 10, 2014, 2:45pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/isis-in-the-middle-east-is-growing/690473 "2014-06-10T14:45:40Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 3
**Author:** ![BrainGlutton](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/82dd89/32.png) [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2014, 3:15pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/isis-in-the-middle-east-is-growing/690473/41 "2014-06-12T15:15:34Z")
In terms of the late Samuel P. Huntington’s [Clash of Civilizations](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clash_of_Civilizations) theory, Iraq is part of the Islamic civilization, which today has no core-state, but the Ottoman Empire (also encompassing some territories within Orthodox civilization) once was its core-state. Any sense of common identity shared by former Ottoman territories probably amounts to that – and only applies to those former Ottoman territories that were/are Islamic territories. Believe me, the Greeks and the Serbs have no sense of fellow-feeling with the Turks. ---
**Author:** ![BrainGlutton](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/82dd89/32.png) [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2014, 3:22pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/isis-in-the-middle-east-is-growing/690473/42 "2014-06-12T15:22:34Z")
> [@Alessan](#): > > And yeah, the Americans fucked up. They may have given the NIA weapons and taught them to fight, but they didn’t bother to make sure they had anything to fight for. Well, the majority of Iraq’s population is Shi’ite. If a radical Sunni faction is marching on Baghdad to take power, which seems to be the goal of ISIS, that’s something they should want to fight **against.** ---
**Author:** ![AK84](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/85e7bf/32.png) [@AK84](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/AK84)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2014, 3:25pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/isis-in-the-middle-east-is-growing/690473/43 "2014-06-12T15:25:12Z")
> [@Alessan](#): > > And who’s going to ride in those helicopters? Who’s going to use the intelligence provide by those drones? Face it - the Iraqi army doesn’t want to fight. Any number multiplied by zero is still zero. > > And yeah, the Americans fucked up. They may have given the NIA weapons and taught them to fight, but they didn’t bother to make sure they had anything to fight for. :rolleyes: Come on. Tell me, how long would even the IDF detachments last in an area which is hostile, with a steady stream of enemy reinforcements, with no real air support to speak off an iffy logistics situation, insecure LOCs and with political leadership in deadlock and paralysis? No matter how brave the individual soldiers were. Not long I bet. And failure would be because of the aforementioned issues, not because there was no desire to fight amongst the rank and file. ANd this leads us to the next point; the US. The US wanted a constabulary when they rebuilt the Iraq army, on lines of old colonial troops. They did not want to make an Army which could actually control the country. As they said, when you intentions are at core rotten, your efforts are bound to fail. ---
**Author:** ![Latro](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/a87d85/32.png) [@Latro](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Latro)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2014, 3:28pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/isis-in-the-middle-east-is-growing/690473/44 "2014-06-12T15:28:33Z")
> [@BrainGlutton](#): > > Well, the majority of Iraq’s population is Shi’ite. If a radical Sunni faction is marching on Baghdad to take power, which seems to be the goal of ISIS, that’s something they should want to fight **against.** Dunno, the last Sunni government wasn’t so bad. At least compared to democracy and freedom. ---
**Author:** ![YogSothoth](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/y/8edcca/32.png) [@YogSothoth](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/YogSothoth)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2014, 4:01pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/isis-in-the-middle-east-is-growing/690473/45 "2014-06-12T16:01:46Z")
More and more I think that the Iraq we all know and love needs to be divided into separate states reflecting the ethnic backgrounds of each region. But I don’t want the US to do it (nor do I think we can). And there’s the pesky problem of oil revenues ---
**Author:** ![BrainGlutton](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/82dd89/32.png) [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2014, 4:07pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/isis-in-the-middle-east-is-growing/690473/46 "2014-06-12T16:07:01Z")
[Bob Dreyfuss writes in _The Nation:_](http://www.thenation.com/blog/180197/iraq-syria-civil-war-challenges-both-us-and-iran) > [@](#): > > It’s safe to say that Iran, which is already the strongest backer of Assad in Syria—along with Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed, Shiite militia from Lebanon—won’t look too kindly on the Sunni offensive in Iraq. Therefore, it seems very likely that Iran will enter the fray in Iraq more intensively, with political and military support for Maliki, and that Iran will support Iraq’s majority Shiite population, and probably the Kurds too, in a Shiite-Kurdish assault to retake Mosul. That, in turn, is guaranteed to make the civil war in Iraq look more like the one in Syria, with massive government attacks on civilian strongholds controlled by ISIS, and ever greater resistance against the government and its Iranian allies by Sunni civilians already predisposed to oppose Maliki. So, greater polarization, vastly greater casualties (à la Syria), and more intense sectarianism. (Already, Maliki is reportedly using dog-whistle, Shiite religious-war rhetoric in calling Iraqis to arms.) > > If there’s any solution at all, it’s in the hope that quite without American interference Iran and Saudi Arabia will find common purpose in fighting back against Al Qaeda, ISIS and their allies. Recently, the government of President Hassan Rouhani of Iran has sought better relations with Saudi Arabia, and Iran’s foreign minister has been invited to Saudi Arabia. At the same time, Rouhani has been visiting Turkey, where he signed important accords, and since Saudi Arabia and Turkey are the two most important Sunni-led powers in the region, it could be that Iran and Saudi Arabia can work out an arrangement to stabilize the crisis. It’s a long shot, but it could work. Above all, it would require Maliki to seek a political reconciliation with the non-ISIS-supporting Sunnis, including the remnants of the anti–Al Qaeda Awakening movement of Iraq (2006–08). And it would require Assad, who’s just been re-elected to another term as president, to support a political deal that could eventually create space for another set of elections in which moderate opposition, Sunni-led parties might run. > > \ > > Recently, Obama delivered a major speech in which he criticized the too-easy reach for a military solution, and here’s to hoping that he sticks to that path. But even if the United States doesn’t become directly engaged in the Syria-Iraq civil war, the sentiments expressed by Pollack and Ford are widespread in the State Department and elsewhere in the administration. And Obama himself did seem to fall back, in his speech, on using proxies to fight “terrorism” overseas. To be sure, Al Qaeda and ISIS are terrorists. But fighting them, especially long distance, seems guaranteed to strengthen, not weaken them. Ironically, America’s best ally in the Syria-Iraq civil war is an unlikely one: Iran. ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2014, 5:41pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/isis-in-the-middle-east-is-growing/690473/47 "2014-06-12T17:41:58Z")
> [@Ryan\_Liam](#): > > The point I was making is that the Vietcong were a terrorist organisation in direct opposition to the Diem government, they showed in that battle that they had more will and conviction to fight the war than the American backed ARVN, the fact they fought a fixed battle is a moot point, they mostly fought irregular combat. Then you really don’t have a point; the Viet Cong were not a terrorist organization. It wasn’t even just an irregular army. It maintained a shadow government even in areas it didn’t overtly control and military was divided into local force and mobile forces; the local forces being part time guerillas who would remain in their home areas being farmers by day and laying ambushes by night. The mobile forces were full time and as the name implies operated throughout the country. The fact that they fought a fixed battle was far from a moot point, it was the entire point of Ap Bac. The final phase of any successful guerilla war is when it turns conventional, and the ‘irregular’ army is able to fight and defeat the army of the government in pitched battle. That is why Ap Bac caused such a panic; it showed the ARVN could not even defeat the Viet Cong when they came out in the open and presented themselves for battle. > [@Ryan\_Liam](#): > > Let’s just say before 2003, Iraq had been capable somewhat of maintaining its borders and internal security than now, it’s not an excuse when I say Bremer in 2003 disbanded an entire institution, and expected that there wouldn’t be problems further down the road in result of doing that ridiculous decision, so in part, we’re witnessing the result of that policy. Then the organization you should look to be blaming isn’t the Iraqi Army. Barring some major change, the Iraqi Army will remain sub-par. It has always been sub-par. The institution that was disbanded in 2003 that had been capable of maintaining its borders and internal security wasn’t the Iraqi Army. It was the government of Saddam Hussein. Blaming the ineptitude of the current Iraqi Army on Bremer’s decision to disband it in 2003 worked as an excuse in 2003, it doesn’t work as an excuse in 2014. The truth of the matter is that the Iraqi Army in 2002 wasn’t effective to begin with. It wasn’t effective in 2003, it wasn’t effective in 1991, it wasn’t effective in 1979-88, it wasn’t effective in 1973, it wasn’t effective in 1941… seeing a pattern here? ---
**Author:** ![Alessan](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/alessan/32/465_2.png) [@Alessan](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Alessan)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2014, 5:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/isis-in-the-middle-east-is-growing/690473/48 "2014-06-12T17:43:05Z")
> [@AK84](#): > > :rolleyes: > > Come on. Tell me, how long would even the IDF detachments last in an area which is hostile, with a steady stream of enemy reinforcements, with no real air support to speak off an iffy logistics situation, insecure LOCs and with political leadership in deadlock and paralysis? No matter how brave the individual soldiers were. > > Not long I bet. And failure would be because of the aforementioned issues, not because there was no desire to fight amongst the rank and file. Give me a break. How much air support does ISIS have? How advanced are their logistics? 30,000 men broke and ran from an attacking force of 800, with inferior weapons and equipment, without a fight. Maybe your expectations of how soldiers are expected to behave are lower than my, but the only thing I see here is a military force that had no intention of fighting. Air support wouldn’t have changed that. ---
**Author:** ![Steken](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e274bd/32.png) [@Steken](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Steken)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2014, 5:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/isis-in-the-middle-east-is-growing/690473/49 "2014-06-12T17:43:22Z")
Hmmm. About that 800 vs. 30.000 thing, [Prof. Cole writes that](http://www.juancole.com/2014/06/looming-extremist-militias.html): > [@](#): > > It has been pointed out by a number of commentators that ISIS […] is probably too small an organization of cadre fighters actually to have accomplished all this by itself. Sunni tribes and townspeople appear to have joined in the attacks on the Iraqi military, which ran away. The reason would be just what you’d think it’d be: The area around Mosul is largely Sunni, while the army is largely Shi’ite. Now, having been kicked out of Mosul, the Shi’ites seem to be itching for a counteroffensive: > [@](#): > > Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and his colleagues in Najaf, the seat of Shiite religious authority, issued a statement roundly condemning the Iraqi political class for its divisions and wrangling and calling on them to unite to protect Iraqi citizens from the terrorist groups that had taken over Ninevah Province (i.e. Mosul and environs). Sistani also expressed condolences for the Iraqi troops killed by ISIS fighters and pledged the religious authority’s support to the Iraqi army in this struggle. **It is more or less a declaration of Shiite jihad on ISIS.** Both Sayyid al-Hakim, of ISCI / al-Badr, and - surprise surprise! - good ol’ Muqtada al-Sadr have offered to strike back against ISIS, and seem to be maybe sorta kinda hinting that they’ll do so even without Maliki’s and the Iraqi government’s approval. No matter how the Shi’ite power struggle plays out, it goes without saying that Iran will do its best to keep Shi’ite infighting to a minimum, and covertly (and not-so-covertly) “coach” the upcoming Shi’ite counteroffensive. What remains to be seen, is if Iran and the U.S. end up covertly collaborating against ISIS, as they once did - [at least for a while](http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/09/30/130930fa_fact_filkins?currentPage=all) - against the Taliban, sharing intelligence and the like. That would be… Interesting. (And, hey, maybe even a good thing. We’ll see.) Other than that, I’m guessing - and hoping! - the U.S. sits this one out. Ps. In any case, I cannot for the life of me imagine that ISIS will be able to take Baghdad - or, for that matter, _any_ Shi’ite-majority city. If that happens, feel free to go “haha, **Steken** , you were wrong.” ---
**Author:** ![Ryan\_Liam](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/ryan_liam/32/3965_2.png) [@Ryan\_Liam](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Ryan_Liam)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2014, 7:17pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/isis-in-the-middle-east-is-growing/690473/50 "2014-06-12T19:17:35Z")
> [@](#): > > **Dissonance** > Then you really don’t have a point; the Viet Cong were not a terrorist organization. It wasn’t even just an irregular army. It maintained a shadow government even in areas it didn’t overtly control and military was divided into local force and mobile forces; the local forces being part time guerillas who would remain in their home areas being farmers by day and laying ambushes by night. The mobile forces were full time and as the name implies operated throughout the country. The fact that they fought a fixed battle was far from a moot point, it was the entire point of Ap Bac. The final phase of any successful guerilla war is when it turns conventional, and the ‘irregular’ army is able to fight and defeat the army of the government in pitched battle.\*\* That is why Ap Bac caused such a panic; it showed the ARVN could not even defeat the Viet Cong when they came out in the open and presented themselves for battle\*\*. The Viet Cong were clearly a terrorist organisation against the Diem government, that doesn’t de-legitimise their aims, it’s just convention in relation to how they operated. Terrorist organisations can maintain shadow governments. In relation to what I highlighted in bold is exactly my comparison, the Iraqi Army cannot defeat ISIS in open battle, and has lost a substantial amount of territory as a result. > [@](#): > > Then the organization you should look to be blaming isn’t the Iraqi Army. Barring some major change, the Iraqi Army will remain sub-par. It has always been sub-par. The institution that was disbanded in 2003 that had been capable of maintaining its borders and internal security wasn’t the Iraqi Army. It was the government of Saddam Hussein. Blaming the ineptitude of the current Iraqi Army on Bremer’s decision to disband it in 2003 worked as an excuse in 2003, it doesn’t work as an excuse in 2014. The truth of the matter is that the Iraqi Army in 2002 wasn’t effective to begin with. It wasn’t effective in 2003, it wasn’t effective in 1991, it wasn’t effective in 1979-88, it wasn’t effective in 1973, it wasn’t effective in 1941… seeing a pattern here? The point I’m making is that the military has played a significant role in social stability in Iraq, and social cohesion, once that genius Bremer decided to disband the Iraqi army, he destroyed one of the lynchpins of Iraqi identity, of which it has not been able to recover, and has hampered its effectiveness further, you can quote the previous dates of its ineptitude, but those again are external conflicts, before 2003, the Iraqi army was at least effective in maintaining internal security, and that organisation was subservient to the government of Saddam Hussein. ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2014, 8:30pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/isis-in-the-middle-east-is-growing/690473/51 "2014-06-12T20:30:43Z")
> [@Ryan\_Liam](#): > > The Viet Cong were clearly a terrorist organisation against the Diem government, that doesn’t de-legitimise their aims, it’s just convention in relation to how they operated. Terrorist organisations can maintain shadow governments. Then you are widening the definition of ‘terrorist organization’ to have no meaning. The Viet Cong were not setting off bombs at random or flying planes into buildings; they were overthrowing Diem’s government by military force. > [@Ryan\_Liam](#): > > In relation to what I highlighted in bold is exactly my comparison, the Iraqi Army cannot defeat ISIS in open battle, and has lost a substantial amount of territory as a result. If so, again I’m confused why you consider it “a moot point” that Ap Bac was a fixed battle. **That was the entire point**. It demonstrated that the War for Vietnam was entering its final phase; the Viet Cong were no longer hiding from ARVN in pitched battle. They were standing, fighting, and defeating the ARVN in conventional battle, so if something drastic wasn’t done to change things soon they were going to win the war. > [@Ryan\_Liam](#): > > The point I’m making is that the military has played a significant role in social stability in Iraq, and social cohesion, once that genius Bremer decided to disband the Iraqi army, he destroyed one of the lynchpins of Iraqi identity, of which it has not been able to recover, and has hampered its effectiveness further, you can quote the previous dates of its ineptitude, but those again are external conflicts, before 2003, the Iraqi army was at least effective in maintaining internal security, and that organisation was subservient to the government of Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi Army was not a lynchpin of Iraqi identity, and all of those dates of previous ineptitude that you want to dismiss because they were external conflicts were battles against far tougher enemies than they are now fighting. The Iraqi Army has had over 10 years to get itself together. Saying the problem is its youth is absurd. How long, exactly, do you think they need before youth is no longer their main problem? 50 years? 100? You have inadvertently noted what actually held Iraq together prior to 2003 - the government of Saddam Hussein. That is what made the internal security in Iraq so effective, not the Iraqi Army. When it came to putting down real internal security threats by force that required the application of military force, Saddam didn’t send in the Army, at least not alone. The Army, or deserters from it, are often half of the internal security problem. He sent in the Republican Guard. Who do you think it was that suppressed the [1991 uprisings following Desert Storm](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_uprisings_in_Iraq)? > [@](#): > > Within the first two weeks, most of Iraq’s cities and provinces fell to rebel forces. Participants of the uprising were a diverse mix of ethnic, religious and political affiliations, including military mutineers, Shia Arab Islamists, Kurdish nationalists, and far-left groups. Following initial victories, the revolution was held back from continued success by internal divisions as well as a lack of anticipated American support. Saddam’s Sunni Arab-dominated Ba’ath Party regime managed to maintain control over the capital of Baghdad and soon largely suppressed the rebels in a brutal campaign **conducted by loyalist forces spearheaded by the Iraqi Republican Guard.** ---
**Author:** ![PastTense](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/pasttense/32/14550_2.png) [@PastTense](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/PastTense)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2014, 8:57pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/isis-in-the-middle-east-is-growing/690473/52 "2014-06-12T20:57:05Z")
nm ---
**Author:** ![Ryan\_Liam](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/ryan_liam/32/3965_2.png) [@Ryan\_Liam](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Ryan_Liam)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2014, 10:00pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/isis-in-the-middle-east-is-growing/690473/53 "2014-06-12T22:00:55Z")
> [@](#): > > **Dissonance** > Then you are widening the definition of ‘terrorist organization’ to have no meaning. The Viet Cong were not setting off bombs at random or flying planes into buildings; they were overthrowing Diem’s government by military force. [They did both, what part of terrorist organisation don’t you understand?](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1964_Brinks_Hotel_bombing) > [@](#): > > If so, again I’m confused why you consider it “a moot point” that Ap Bac was a fixed battle. That was the entire point. It demonstrated that the War for Vietnam was entering its final phase; the Viet Cong were no longer hiding from ARVN in pitched battle. They were standing, fighting, and defeating the ARVN in conventional battle, so if something drastic wasn’t done to change things soon they were going to win the war. Because the battle tactics itself are not as significant as the eye-raising spectre of the ARVN being utterly incapable of mounting an effective offensive or defence, a force which was heavily trained and supplied by the US, much like the Iraqi army in recent events. > [@](#): > > The Iraqi Army was not a lynchpin of Iraqi identity, and all of those dates of previous ineptitude that you want to dismiss because they were external conflicts were battles against far tougher enemies than they are now fighting. The Iraqi Army has had over 10 years to get itself together. Saying the problem is its youth is absurd. How long, exactly, do you think they need before youth is no longer their main problem? 50 years? 100? You have inadvertently noted what actually held Iraq together prior to 2003 - the government of Saddam Hussein. That is what made the internal security in Iraq so effective, not the Iraqi Army. When it came to putting down real internal security threats by force that required the application of military force, Saddam didn’t send in the Army, at least not alone. The Army, or deserters from it, are often half of the internal security problem. He sent in the Republican Guard. Who do you think it was that suppressed the 1991 uprisings following Desert Storm? Why is it so hard for you to appreciate the fact that the Iraqi Army has ceased to be an effective fighting force due to American incompetence in the beginning of 2003, sure, the Iraqis now are to blame for their debacles, but it was you guys who dismantled the military and government apparatus and expected a capable fighting force to emerge in the middle of an insurgency, even ignoring that most experienced military officers were Sunni and were purged due to De-Baathification. Replace them with Shia or Kurdish officers and you’re not going to see the same kind of results (However poor they currently were before) The Iraqi Army was part of the internal security force of Saddam Hussein, it had a dual role. > [@](#): > > The Iraqi Republican Guard (Arabic: حرس العراقي الجمهوري‎ "“Ḥaris al-‘Irāq al-Jamhūriyy”) was a branch of the **Iraqi military from 1969 to 2003, primarily during the presidency of Saddam Hussein.** > [@](#): > > The Republican Guard were the **elite troops of the Iraqi army** directly reporting to Saddam Hussein, unlike the paramilitary force Fedayeen Saddam, and the ordinary Iraqi Army > **[Republican Guard (Iraq)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republican_Guard_%28Iraq%29)** > > The Iraqi Republican Guard (Arabic: حرس العراق الجمهوري, romanized: Ḥaras al-ʿIrāq al-Jamhūrīy) was a branch of the Iraqi military from 1969 to 2003, which existed primarily during the presidency of Saddam Hussein. Initially a praetorian guard unit tasked with the sole purpose to protect the president of Iraq, it grew exponentially during the Iran-Iraq War, transforming into an elite force of the Iraqi Armed Forces. It later became known as the Republican Guard Corps, and then the Republican Gu... So they were above the ordinary foot soldiers in the Iraqi army, which is to be expected, but they were within the Military structure. They constituted **a part of the Iraqi Army**. ---
**Author:** ![Spectre\_of\_Pithecanthropus](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/spectre_of_pithecanthropus/32/12343_2.png) [@Spectre\_of\_Pithecanthropus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Spectre_of_Pithecanthropus)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2014, 11:18pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/isis-in-the-middle-east-is-growing/690473/54 "2014-06-12T23:18:34Z")
> [@BrainGlutton](#): > > They have oil. Everybody seems to assume it matters who controls it. Of course, whoever controls it is going to have to pump it and export it, because what else is it good for? That’s assuming that the people who control it actually _want_ to make money, build infrastructure, foster education that provides technical understanding and encourages critical thinking, and improve the lot of their citizenry all around. I’m not saying that ISIS is diametrically opposed to these sorts of goals, but it’s not a foregone conclusion that they wouldn’t prefer to simply turn off the tap, if they believe that will get them where they want to be. ---
**Author:** ![BrainGlutton](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/82dd89/32.png) [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2014, 11:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/isis-in-the-middle-east-is-growing/690473/55 "2014-06-12T23:27:07Z")
> [@Spectre\_of\_Pithecanthropus](#): > > That’s assuming that the people who control it actually _want_ to make money, build infrastructure, foster education that provides technical understanding and encourages critical thinking, and improve the lot of their citizenry all around. I’m not saying that ISIS is diametrically opposed to these sorts of goals, but it’s not a foregone conclusion that they wouldn’t prefer to simply turn off the tap, if they believe that will get them where they want to be. Generally speaking, however, if the oil-controllers do not want to do all those things with the money, then they do earnestly wish to do . . . other things with it. Either way, though, it’s too much money for the ordinary pol/warlord/mullah to pass up. It would take a clutch of **real** fanatics to turn off the tap! And fanatics that fanatical are rare even in the MENA. They don’t come much more fanatical than the Wahhabis, but that has never interfered with Saudi Arabia’s exports. Iran exports too. The Taliban would have exported Afghan oil if there were any. ---
**Author:** ![Oakminster](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/77aa72/32.png) [@Oakminster](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Oakminster)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2014, 11:31pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/isis-in-the-middle-east-is-growing/690473/56 "2014-06-12T23:31:40Z")
Am I the only one disappointed that this thread has nothing to do with the Egyptian goddess of fertility and magic? ---
**Author:** ![BrainGlutton](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/82dd89/32.png) [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2014, 11:36pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/isis-in-the-middle-east-is-growing/690473/57 "2014-06-12T23:36:45Z")
> [@Oakminster](#): > > Am I the only one disappointed that this thread has nothing to do with the Egyptian goddess of fertility and magic? Probably the only one to be disappointed by that as such; but some of up might be a bit disappointed, or at least wistful, that the real-life headlines that inspired the thread have nothing to do with that. ☹ ---
**Author:** ![tagos](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/bbe5ce/32.png) [@tagos](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/tagos)\ **Post date:** [June 13, 2014, 11:18am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/isis-in-the-middle-east-is-growing/690473/58 "2014-06-13T11:18:54Z")
> [@Spectre\_of\_Pithecanthropus](#): > > That’s assuming that the people who control it actually _want_ to make money, build infrastructure, foster education that provides technical understanding and encourages critical thinking, and improve the lot of their citizenry all around. I’m not saying that ISIS is diametrically opposed to these sorts of goals, but it’s not a foregone conclusion that they wouldn’t prefer to simply turn off the tap, if they believe that will get them where they want to be. I think we can safely assume ISIS would want to sell it to buy arms and support for their aims. ---
**Author:** ![Knowed\_Out](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/knowed_out/32/7380_2.png) [@Knowed\_Out](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Knowed_Out)\ **Post date:** [June 13, 2014, 3:11pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/isis-in-the-middle-east-is-growing/690473/59 "2014-06-13T15:11:43Z")
It seems to me that whenever oppressive tyrants like Hussein and Milošević are removed from power, all hell breaks loose. Tribes and sub-cultures were at each others’ throats before oppressive powers took over and kept them from fighting. Now they’re free to fight each other again and national stability crumbles. ---
**Author:** ![BrainGlutton](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/82dd89/32.png) [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)\ **Post date:** [June 13, 2014, 3:15pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/isis-in-the-middle-east-is-growing/690473/60 "2014-06-13T15:15:12Z")
> [@Knowed\_Out](#): > > It seems to me that whenever oppressive tyrants like Hussein and Milošević are removed from power, all hell breaks loose. Tribes and sub-cultures were at each others’ throats before oppressive powers took over and kept them from fighting. Now they’re free to fight each other again and national stability crumbles. Iraq is a lot like Yugoslavia: A multinational state cobbled together out of former Ottoman provinces after WWI, with a lot of unresolved ethnic and religious hatreds that only a strongman government could hold down. When the lid was ripped off, the pot boiled over. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/isis-in-the-middle-east-is-growing/690473.md?page=2) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/isis-in-the-middle-east-is-growing/690473.md?page=4)