Thank you for that. I was seeking information, not trying to derail the thread. And I’m not asserting that my question was based on an accurate assumption, which is why I “asked” rather than “told”.
But JKelly’s reference did lead me to this:
Again, I’m not going to die on the hill defending this thesis, but relations with the Soviets likely had some influence.
Yes, scientists. Not the Military or Political leaders.
I’m not a fan on that article’s emphasis on Byrnes.
Byrnes was a holdover from FDR, though it was in domestic political and administrative work that the had the most experience. Rather than being appointed to Secretary of State by Truman for his diplomatic acumen, he was there largely to provide a sense of continuity and as an advisor who had been present at Yalta. His knowledge of those affairs, his pull with Congress, and a reward to salve his bitter disappointment at not being made Roosevelt’s running mate in 1944 were more what made him the choice for SoS. (Note that as SoS, Byrnes would have become President if Truman had died in office.)
Ultimately, the decision lay with Truman. From his first days as President, he recognized the paramount importance of the strategy to win the war against Japan.
From his diary entry of July 16, 1945:
This weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10th. I have told the Sec. of War, Mr. Stimson, to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children. Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop that terrible bomb on the old capital or the new.
He and I are in accord. The target will be a purely military one and we will issue a warning statement asking the Japs to surrender and save lives. I’m sure they will not do that, but we will have given them the chance. It is certainly a good thing for the world that Hitler’s crowd or Stalin’s did not discover this atomic bomb. It seems to be the most terrible thing ever discovered, but it can be made the most useful.
The retreat to the passive voice is telling. I think it had to do with his contemplation of how “terrible” the bomb was. The use of the bomb against “military objectives” was, by the laws of war at the time, legal, though of course in a practical sense it was impossible to confine the bomb’s effects to such targets, and the bombs killed plenty of women and children.
The “warning statement” here was the Potsdam Declaration, which Japan declared it would ignore (mokusatsu) as a basis for future negotiations.
It should be noted, too, that it was Truman’s policy to involve the Soviet Union in the war against Japan, as a way to share the loss of life among the Allies. His concentration was on winning the war rather than on postwar issues that could be settled after the war was over.
According to the Post story, “On July 16, the first atom bomb was tested successfully at Alamogordo, N.M. On July 17, Truman sat down to talk with Stalin,” as if there were some connection between the two. One second of thinking will make clear that the conference had to be scheduled, and Truman and Stalin had to travel to Potsdam, before the bomb was tested. What was Truman supposed to do if Trinity had been a failure - not talk to Stalin about war in the Pacific?
I thank you for this additional information, but it is interesting that what Truman wrote as the plan is not at all what the plan actually was.
He said they’d avoid targeting women and children - not quite.
He said they’d pick a purely military location - nope.
He said they’d give warning beforehand - nuh uh.
The reporting I read seems to say that 1) the conference was actually delayed (although I can’t figure out why, and don’t know if it had anything to do with wanting to compete testing) and 2) Truman pretty famously told Stalin about this new weapon once he got the news (Stalin didn’t seem to care, but he had secret intelligence that had already briefed him). Historian Michael Beschloss is among those who found geopolitical significance in the bomb test that went beyond merely the war in Japan.
I must say that I find the pushback on the idea that international politics and the impending Cold War impacted the use of the atomic bomb to be strange. I would think it far more incredible to believe that the US wasn’t thinking of the Soviets and/or American hegemony when considering the use of the bomb. It would seem a dereliction of duty not to have factored those elements into the calculus of whether to use it or not.
You are right - it is incredible because your claim that this was a background consideration in the U.S. decision is unfalsifiable.
The relevant question is what were the primary reasons for the decision, and did they justify it? The fact that there may have been some consequent advantage gained in the upcoming Cold War does not alter the morality of an action undertaken for other justified reasons.
The declaration ended by warning of “prompt and utter destruction” if Japan failed to unconditionally surrender.
wiki- For several months, the U.S. had warned civilians of potential air raids by dropping more than 63 million leaflets across Japan. Many Japanese cities suffered terrible damage from aerial bombings; some were as much as 97 percent destroyed. LeMay thought that leaflets would increase the psychological impact of bombing, and reduce the international stigma of area-bombing cities. Even with the warnings, Japanese opposition to the war remained ineffective.
wiki Hiroshima, an embarkation port and industrial center that was the site of a major military headquarters;
20,000 military died in the original blast.
We were bombing the crap out of military targets, Japan chose to keep Military and civilians intermingled.
Why is that the relevant question when the topic is what considerations went into the decision to use the bomb.
The discussion had been on whether, and to what extent, the Japanese had been willing to capitulate.
I think that’s too narrow a focus, when the US plainly had other things to take into account when making its decision.
From your comment, it seems that you are trying to decide whether the bombing was a morally justified decision, and it appears to me that you are invested in providing an ethical basis for its use.
I could care less whether the USA of 80 years ago was acting morally, ethically, or otherwise. Rather, I’m trying to discuss what they were thinking about and how it impacted their actions. If we limit this thread to the sole issue of whether the USA could peacefully dismantle the Japanese monarchy, then we are ignoring some other things that were plainly applicable to the decision to use the bomb.
Agreed. I’m not sure what point you are making; since the Japanese were intermingling, Truman’s vow in his diary didn’t come to pass.
Demonstrating US military power to scare the Commies may have had some unquantifiable impact on Truman’s decision to drop the bomb, but that certainly doesn’t mean that he would have gone ahead and used it even if Japan were actively trying to surrender.
Because, as I said, a claim that something was merely a “consideration” is pretty much unfalsifiable. As you have correctly said, it’s not credible that the impending power struggle with Russia was not on anyone’s mind at all. But I think you need more than this to make a meaningful falsifiable claim - evidence, for example, that Truman said he would act regardless of any other considerations as a demonstration of power to Russia, and that he was just using resolution of the war with Japan as an excuse.
I’m invested in debunking accounts of the motives and jusification for U.S. action that have no basis in fact. These accounts usually originate from people with a motive to condemn the bombings as amoral. If your interest is purely academic, that makes little difference - we’re still talking about what is and is not supported by evidence.
You entered this thread with:
I don’t know any way to interpret that but as an accusation that ending the war with Japan was less an objective than using the bomb. That’s why you’re getting “strange” “pushback”, at least from me.
I have little doubt that how the Soviets would see the bomb was a consideration, but I fail to see what it has to do with this thread.
It was as close as could be.
What considerations went into building new types of aircraft carriers, the B29, Special incendiary bombs, the flamethrower, etc etc etc? It was war. We designed better weapons, built better weapons then used better weapons. That was all the A Bomb was back then.
The term of art, “target” in Truman’s diary, was (in this context) a statement of intent rather than effect. In the context of total war, virtually anything enabling Japan to establish and employ military forces was a valid target. In the case of Hiroshima, the city was the home of the Second General Army, in charge of the defense of southern Japan (the location where Operation Olympic was planned to take place). Nagasaki was a major shipbuilding center. They were both valid targets according to the laws of war at the time.
As DrDeth pointed out, the Potsdam Declaration warned Japan of the intent of the Allies to prosecute the war to its end, using all military power available. That should have been all the warning Japan needed - the firebombing campaign was ample demonstration of Allied capabilities. If you wanted the warning to say “we’re going to atomic-bomb you” - well, I think the specificity is unnecessary.
Yes, my interest is purely academic. Getting the straight dope, and all. I have no interest in praising or condemning the US of the 1940’s. It was a highly racist country, and I have no doubt that many people took delight in seeing “Japs” burn. Hell, Truman himself referred to them as savages in his diary. But it also makes sense to me that dropping the bomb resulted in fewer casualties than a land invasion, so I have no problem accepting that it was the best decision for ending the war.
But to suggest that there is “no evidence” that the US wanted to demonstrate the power of its new invention - when I presented at least some in this very thread - is not a fair criticism. I mean, I presented the thoughts of the nation’s top diplomat (who was 3rd in line for the presidency), but you’re describing this like I am just inventing this line of thought.
Again, for emphasis. I’m not “accusing”. I’m asking, based on information that is available to be read.
But that information does invite a discussion about how the decision making played out : yes, I get that there were some very real concerns about the use such a devastating weapon, and therefore a need to justify why it was a wise, or even humane, decision. But it’s downright naive to think that there weren’t other strategic elements to be considered, especially since we know for a fact that the Americans and Soviets were initiating the Cold War.
And it’s not like this isn’t something that was discussed at the time. I’ve presented some quotes and historians’ takes on the US’ thinking at that time.
A little odd that the latter two sentences would immediately follow your first one.
Of course the U.S. did some things we should be ashamed of - the internment camps, for example. But it’s a little easier to reflect and take an enlightened moral stance that the actions of some Japanese people should not be generalized to an entire racial group when the Japanese nation is not on a mission to destroy yours. And describing the officially sanctioned war crimes of some Japanese soldiers as savagery would be perfectly accurate.
The way I heard it is that Truman told Stalin about the bomb (which Stalin already knew about due to Soviet intelligence efforts) and Stalin told Truman about back channel diplomatic talks with Japan (which Truman knew about because of US code breaking) - but I can’t find a cite at the moment
Perhaps I should rephrase. I am agnostic about the use of the atomic bomb. I see its horrors. I also see its utility. I don’t have any desire to argue it was a mistake, but I don’t believe it was some great ethical triumph, either. Like other things in real life, it’s complicated.
But I do take umbrage at the claim that I am presenting an aspect of the use of the bomb that is lacking evidence. The evidence may not satisfy you, and I’ll accept that, but this is not rank speculation.
No less than the State Department’s Office of the Historian includes this:
(My emphasis)
Failing to address this aspect of the decision to use the bomb is, I believe, missing an important part of American history, akin to not addressing the land invasion concerns.
I"m trying to see how this extended discussion of American intentions is relevant to the OP, which asked if the Japanese would have surrendered earlier if the Emperor guarantee had been given?
I thought that had been pretty comprehensively answered.