# Ju 390 Payload **URL:** \ **Category:** Factual Questions\ **Created:** [October 2, 2014, 1:30am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ju-390-payload/700150 "2014-10-02T01:30:28Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 18\ **Page:** 2
**Author:** ![Asuka](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/dec6dc/32.png) [@Asuka](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Asuka)\ **Post date:** [July 21, 2016, 5:55am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ju-390-payload/700150/21 "2016-07-21T05:55:41Z")
> [@DrDeth](#): > > None that I saw that actually reached prototype stage. > > Maybe some of the ones in planning looked good on paper. :dubious: Here’s one of the sites I saw this claim [http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=216598](http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=216598) \*Original post: The Germans had nothing equal to Superfortress B-29 (or even B-17). Replying Post: The first one is true for service aircraft, but the Ju 390, and Me 264 were more than a match for the B-29, but for the B-17 that’s laughable. The He 177, Ju 290, and even Bomber B medium designs were completely superior in mosts, if not, all respects.\* ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [July 21, 2016, 3:30pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ju-390-payload/700150/22 "2016-07-21T15:30:38Z")
> [@Asuka](#): > > Actually at around exactly that time in 1934 Germany was developed a Ural bomber program exactly for the purpose of bombing Russian factories in the event of a German-Russian War. It was abandoned in 1936 after the death of its main proponent as the Luftwaffe heads felt it was better to impress Hitler by having numerous medium bombers as opposed to using those resources to make a fewer number of heavy bombers. This is what I had come to post. Although the Pacific War is more my thing, my relatively uninformed WAG is that Hitler was just too over confident of the abilities of his armies and completely underestimated the staying power of the Soviets and the UK. The weapon development priorities – in hindsight – were wrong. Had they diverted more resources into the u-boats and naval aircraft, for example, they may have won the Battle of the Atlantic. ---
**Author:** ![DrDeth](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/b487fb/32.png) [@DrDeth](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DrDeth)\ **Post date:** [July 21, 2016, 6:08pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ju-390-payload/700150/23 "2016-07-21T18:08:00Z")
> [@Asuka](#): > > Here’s one of the sites I saw this claim > > [Best american bomber compared to german bombers - Axis History Forum](http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=216598) > > \*Original post: > The Germans had nothing equal to Superfortress B-29 (or even B-17). > > Replying Post: > The first one is true for service aircraft, but the Ju 390, and Me 264 were more than a match for the B-29, but for the B-17 that’s laughable. The He 177, Ju 290, and even Bomber B medium designs were completely superior in mosts, if not, all respects.\* JU390= 314 mph, 6,030 mi (as recon), 1800 kg Me 364=350 mph, 9,500 mi, 3,000 kg B29=357 mph, 4,900 mi (as recon), 9,000 kg B29 is faster and carried more bombs. The Ju & Me both had a excellent range in recon mode. For recon, they had a edge. However, they were bad fliers: Me 364: \*Trials showed numerous minor faults, and handling was found to be difficult. One of the drawbacks was the very high wing loading of the Me 264 in fully loaded conditions… led to performance problems across the whole flight envelope, in particular bad climb performance, loss of maneuverability, and in-flight stability, and the need for high take-off and landing speeds. \* More importantly, neither German aircraft \*was ever operational. \* Some of those numbers may be pure fantasy. ---
**Author:** ![carnivorousplant](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/carnivorousplant/32/3563_2.png) [@carnivorousplant](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/carnivorousplant)\ **Post date:** [July 21, 2016, 7:44pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ju-390-payload/700150/24 "2016-07-21T19:44:39Z")
> [@DrDeth](#): > > More importantly, neither German aircraft \*was ever operational. \* Some of those numbers may be pure fantasy. An excellent point, Sir. ---
**Author:** ![dropzone](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/dropzone/32/7515_2.png) [@dropzone](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/dropzone)\ **Post date:** [July 22, 2016, 12:22am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ju-390-payload/700150/25 "2016-07-22T00:22:32Z")
> [@DrDeth](#): > > Maybe some of the ones in planning looked good on paper. :dubious: I have a whole book about the Amerika Bomber programs. Read it all, even. Most didn’t even look that good on paper. > [@TokyoBayer](#): > > Although the Pacific War is more my thing, my relatively uninformed WAG is that Hitler was just too over confident of the abilities of his armies and completely underestimated the staying power of the Soviets and the UK. He believed in Blitzkrieg above all, which is why he insisted on mediums that could dive bomb. He didn’t plan for defense, even when he needed to. Complete nutter. > [@Asuka](#): > > Here’s a question, I see on numerous websites that discuss the Amerika Bomber program that many of the German examples are far and away better than the B-29 in terms of technical specs and performance. I don’t know if this is just Pro-German propaganda but I find it hard to believe that the often slapped together Amerika Bomber aircraft that only had a few short years in terms of design and production work would out-class a purpose built aircraft developed since 1938 and had the full weight of the American military-industrial complex behind it. Not “Pro-German propaganda” but, I suspect, “Pro-Nazi propaganda.” The Amerika Bomber was an obvious joke and an obvious waste waste of the limited resources the Germans had. It was a pipe dream Der Fuehrer could masturbate over. Had I been in charge of engineering at Focke-Wulf I’d’ve assigned two detailers fresh out of _gymnasium_ to take existing drawings of the FW-290, copy them, and add two more engines. Which, it appears, is what they did. ---
**Author:** ![MarcusF](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/67e7ee/32.png) [@MarcusF](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/MarcusF)\ **Post date:** [July 22, 2016, 12:21pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ju-390-payload/700150/26 "2016-07-22T12:21:54Z")
> [@DrDeth](#): > > Other nations did fine in everything but the heavy long range bomber dept. They didnt think they needed one, to start. > [@carnivorousplant](#): > > They have a plan to conquer the world and don’t figure they need a long range bomber? > [@carnivorousplant](#): > > They never sat around drinking beer, and Goring said, “You know, it would be neat if instead of our guys fighting Russians at 100 degrees below zero, we could fly some big bombers over there and bomb the shit out of them”? The Germans were way more realistic about the potential for 1930s/40s aircraft winning a war than the RAF or USAAF. To “conquer the world” (or even Europe) needed large armies with excellent air support and that is how the Wehrmacht was set up. Flying big bombers over the Soviet Union and bombing the shit out of - say - Moscow would have had zero chance of influencing the course of the war on the Eastern Front - except in so much as a large heavy bomber force would have taken resources that could otherwise have gone into tank, guns, ground attack aircraft etc. Trenchard his successors truly believed the RAF could win the war on its own by strategic bombing with the army just coming in to mop up the shattered remnants - and large sections of the pre-war USAAF had the same mindset. Hence the requirement in 1930s UK and USA to design and build heavy bombers. The Luftwaffe just did not buy these theories - and they were proved right. An argument can be made that the Anglo-American strategic bombing campaigns were cost effective in the damage they did and the German resources they consumed to counter them but no way did they win the war on their own. Massive armies were needed to defeat Germany, armies provided by the USSR and the USA. Britain’s army in WW2 was not on the same scale even allowing for size of population, in part because so many men and resources had gone into Bomber Command. It was only the USA, with it’s extraordinary productive capacity, that could afford a strategic bomber force as well as a really large and generously equipped army. ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [July 22, 2016, 4:10pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ju-390-payload/700150/27 "2016-07-22T16:10:36Z")
> [@Asuka](#): > > Here’s one of the sites I saw this claim > > [Best american bomber compared to german bombers - Axis History Forum](http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=216598) > > \*Original post: > The Germans had nothing equal to Superfortress B-29 (or even B-17). > > Replying Post: > The first one is true for service aircraft, but the Ju 390, and Me 264 were more than a match for the B-29,\*\* but for the B-17 that’s laughable. The He 177, Ju 290, and even Bomber B medium designs were completely superior in mosts, if not, all respects.\*\*\* Bolding mine. Completely aside from the fictionality of an actual _Amerika_ bomber and its flight characteristics, the bolded bit is so absurd I’d question the credibility of anything else the person said. Of the three aircraft he claims to have been better than the B-17 in most, if not all respects, the [Ju 290](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_290) was never used as a bomber so were left with speculation on a fictional planes characteristics. > [@](#): > > The Ju 290 was also intended to meet the need for large transport aircraft. A bomber version, the A-8, was planned, but never built. [Bomber B](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bomber_B) is even worse, it was a project to replace all operational bombers that was a complete failure that didn’t produce any results, and worse, bolded bit mine: > [@](#): > > Bomber B was a German military aircraft design competition organised just before the start of World War II to develop a second-generation high-speed bomber for the Luftwaffe. The new designs would be a direct successor to the Schnellbomber philosophy of the Dornier Do 17 and Junkers Ju 88, relying on high speed as its primary defence. But the Bomber B would also be a much larger and more capable platform, with range and payload figures far greater than the Schnellbombers, besting even the largest conventional designs then under consideration. The winning design was intended to form the backbone of the Luftwaffe bomber force, replacing the wide collection of semi-specialized designs then in service.\*\* The Reich Air Ministry was so hopeful about the outcome that more modest projects were generally cancelled outright, so when the project eventually failed to deliver a working design the Luftwaffe was left with hopelessly outdated aircraft\*\*. That leaves us with only the abortion known as the [He-177](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_177) as the only real plane to compare to the B-17. On paper it had a similar payload/range capability to the B-17, higher cruising and maximum speed, and a much lighter self defense armament. That’s only on paper though, the He-177 was beset by major problems: > [@](#): > > Designed to a 1936 requirement known as Bomber A, the aircraft was originally intended to be a purely strategic bomber intended to support a long-term bombing campaign against Soviet industry in the Urals. During the design phase, Luftwaffe doctrine came to stress — unrealistically, for a 30-meter (100 ft) wingspan-class bomber airframe — the use of moderate-angle dive bombing in order to improve accuracy, and the design was extensively modified to allow shallow-angle “glide bombing”. This change, along with the demand that it use only two fully nacelled “power system” engines, required to each be of over 1,500 kW (2,000 PS) output levels apiece to allegedly reduce drag for the initially demanded “glide bombing” capability, created numerous problems for the aircraft. Luftwaffe aircrew nicknamed it the Luftwaffenfeuerzeug (“Luftwaffe’s lighter”) or the “Flaming Coffin” due to the serious engine problems on initial versions. Many of these stemmed from the power plants’ inadequately-designed and poorly maintained installation in their wing nacelles,[3] which caused cooling and ventilation problems that were never completely solved. > … > The He 177 had Fowler-type extensible trailing edge flaps, which covered the trailing edge of the wing, including those portions covered by ailerons. Each aileron comprised upper and lower portions, the latter arranged to slide rearwards with flap extension, while the upper part retained its function of providing lateral control for take-off and landing. The original wing design did not fully take into account the stresses resulting from the operation of the Fowler flaps. A Rechlin report dated 9 October 1942 stated: > “The examination has shown that the strength of the He 177’s wings is one-third below that estimated by Heinkel. The reason for this is the uneven rigidity of the individual members with consequent deformation under load. This condition was not recognized by Heinkel at the proper time, the failure tests having been undertaken too late in view of the size of the structure.” > … > During development, the anticipated weight of the He 177 increased so much that a main undercarriage design sufficient to handle the 32 metric tons (35 short tons) loaded weight, was difficult to achieve. The engine nacelles and wings had little room for the main undercarriage members, which needed to be longer than usual, for ground clearance for the large diameter four-blade propellers. After several extremely complex arrangements had been considered during initial design, a novel system was adopted. Instead of a wheel leg under each engine nacelle, two wheel legs were attached to the main spar at each nacelle, the outboard legs retracting upward and outward into shallow wing wells and the inboard legs swinging upward and inward into similar wells in the wing roots, with all units enclosed by flush fitting wheel and strut doors, which almost met under each engine nacelle when fully extended. During the retraction cycle, the forward-oriented lever-action lower gear strut sections, on which the wheels were mounted onto their axles, pivoted to a 90° angle from 120° when fully extended to the main gear leg, to be able to fit into the wheel wells. > … > The initial production version of the Greif, the He 177 A-1, tended to be unstable in the yaw and pitch axes during flight tests in August 1942, which would have led to poor bombing accuracy. Shortly after these tests, the third production A-1 example (factory serial number 15153, with Stammkennzeichen of GI + BN) had its fuselage lengthened by 160 cm (63 in) just aft of the trailing edge of the wing. The modified aircraft, with the longer distance of the “tail moment”, showed a marked degree of improvement in yaw and pitch axis stability, enough to mandate the construction of the He 177 A-3 and all later models of the He 177 with the lengthened fuselage.[30] > > In early September 1944, the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) was ordered to supply an aircrew for a He 177 that the French Maquis and Allied units in Vichy France would take control of at the airfield at Blagnac near Toulouse, where elements of both the He 177A-equipped KG 4 and KG 100 Luftwaffe bomber wings were based. A transport and two escort fighters from the RAE flew to the area to leave the Royal Aircraft Establishment Chief Test Pilot Roland Falk and a flight engineer with the commando group. On 10 September, as Operation Dragoon was wrapping up in the southeast of France, the aircraft was seized and flown back to the UK by Wing Commander Roland Falk. Soon afterwards, Capt. Eric Brown, an RN pilot then posted to the RAE as a test pilot, flew the He 177.[31] He wrote that the in-flight handling characteristics of the He 177 A-5 were “… positive about all axes, but the controls were all remarkably light for such a large aircraft. Indeed I had the feeling that the elevator was dangerously light and I was all too aware of the intelligence reports of He 177s breaking up in the air so I decided to treat this control very gently… The aircraft had an automatic pull-out device and an acceleration warning apparatus fitted, but it really was nailbiting to have to treat a giant like this immense Heinkel bomber as if it was made of glass. The stalling characteristics with flaps and undercarriage lowered, the aircraft buffeted violently at 140 km/h (87 mph) before the nose dropped at 135 km/h (84 mph). The buffet experienced was so violent that I had some concerns over structural damage. Somehow the He 177 always conveyed an impression of fragility despite its size.”[32] > > He added that it was “one of the very few German aircraft of the period that I tested that I did not enjoy flying”. > … > Beset by technical difficulties in development, the He 177 had a troubled history in service. Overly demanding design requirements of long range, high speed, heavy bomb load, and the formerly required dive bombing capability — itself rescinded only in September 1942 by the Reichsmarschall, as previously stated — did not help. Although the He 177 entered service in 1942, it was far from operational. In an assessment of the aircraft on 9 April 1942, the newly activated Erprobungsstaffel 177 reported that the Greif had good flying characteristics, but had unacceptable engine troubles and problems with its airframe strength. As an emergency measure, it was used to supply the encircled 6th Armee at Stalingrad, where it was found to be unsuited for the transport role, carrying a little more cargo than the smaller, more reliable Heinkel He 111, and proving useless for the evacuation of wounded. As a result, the He 177s reverted to bombing and flak-suppression missions near Stalingrad. Only 13 missions were flown, and seven He 177s were lost to fire without any action attributable to the enemy. > > As the war progressed, He 177 operations became increasingly desultory. Fuel and personnel shortages presented difficulties, and He 177s were sitting on airfields all over Europe awaiting new engines or engine related modifications. Of the 14 He 177 sent out during Operation Steinbock, one suffered a burst tire, and eight returned with overheating or burning engines. Of the four that reached London, one was lost to night fighters. These aircraft were brand new, delivered a week before the operation and not fully flown in, because the air unit had moved to a new airfield the day before, and lacked sufficient maintenance personnel and material. Constant attacks against Luftwaffe long-range combat units in France made continuous operations difficult. One can’t help but draw comparisons to the Panther, an excellent tank _when its engine wasn’t setting itself on fire_. And like the Panther, it wasn’t just teething problems in initial versions; it was plagued by severe operational problems throughout its career. ---
**Author:** ![DrDeth](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/b487fb/32.png) [@DrDeth](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DrDeth)\ **Post date:** [July 22, 2016, 8:11pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ju-390-payload/700150/28 "2016-07-22T20:11:59Z")
> [@MarcusF](#): > > Trenchard his successors truly believed the RAF could win the war on its own by strategic bombing with the army just coming in to mop up the shattered remnants - and large sections of the pre-war USAAF had the same mindset. Hence the requirement in 1930s UK and USA to design and build heavy bombers. The Luftwaffe just did not buy these theories - and they were proved right. I think that Legal case of Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt etal vs Hitler proved that the Luftwaffe was \*wrong. \* ---
**Author:** ![DrDeth](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/b487fb/32.png) [@DrDeth](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DrDeth)\ **Post date:** [July 22, 2016, 8:15pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ju-390-payload/700150/29 "2016-07-22T20:15:22Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > On paper it had a similar payload/range capability to the B-17, higher cruising and maximum speed, and a much lighter self defense armament. That’s only on paper though, the He-177 was beset by major problems:One can’t help but draw comparisons to the Panther, an excellent tank _when its engine wasn’t setting itself on fire_. And like the Panther, it wasn’t just teething problems in initial versions; it was plagued by severe operational problems throughout its career. Good points. Not to mention that for the price of a Panther the Allies could crank out a dozen T34s or Shermans (maybe both). I’d match a Panther against either tank \*one-on-one \*anytime, but would hesitate to try one Panther vs even 4 of either. ---
**Author:** ![carnivorousplant](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/carnivorousplant/32/3563_2.png) [@carnivorousplant](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/carnivorousplant)\ **Post date:** [July 22, 2016, 8:48pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ju-390-payload/700150/30 "2016-07-22T20:48:17Z")
> [@DrDeth](#): > > Good points. > > Not to mention that for the price of a Panther the Allies could crank out a dozen T34s or Shermans (maybe both). I’d match a Panther against either tank \*one-on-one \*anytime, but would hesitate to try one Panther vs even 4 of either. I believe it was on the SDMB that some one posted that the purpose of tanks was to support infantry, not attack other tanks. That had certainly changed by Desert Storm, probably before. ---
**Author:** ![Musicat](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/musicat/32/20189_2.png) [@Musicat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Musicat)\ **Post date:** [July 22, 2016, 8:56pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ju-390-payload/700150/31 "2016-07-22T20:56:16Z")
> [@DrDeth](#): > > Japan thought it could beat us by stomping our fleet. Japan thought it could beat us by stomping their _feet._ ---
**Author:** ![DrDeth](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/b487fb/32.png) [@DrDeth](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DrDeth)\ **Post date:** [July 22, 2016, 9:17pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ju-390-payload/700150/32 "2016-07-22T21:17:43Z")
> [@carnivorousplant](#): > > I believe it was on the SDMB that some one posted that the purpose of tanks was to support infantry, not attack other tanks. That had certainly changed by Desert Storm, probably before. Rommel, Patton and Guderdain changed that. ---
**Author:** ![carnivorousplant](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/carnivorousplant/32/3563_2.png) [@carnivorousplant](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/carnivorousplant)\ **Post date:** [July 23, 2016, 2:03am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ju-390-payload/700150/33 "2016-07-23T02:03:58Z")
> [@DrDeth](#): > > Rommel, Patton and Guderdain changed that. 🙂 ---
**Author:** ![Asuka](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/dec6dc/32.png) [@Asuka](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Asuka)\ **Post date:** [July 24, 2016, 8:56am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ju-390-payload/700150/34 "2016-07-24T08:56:52Z")
> [@carnivorousplant](#): > > I believe it was on the SDMB that some one posted that the purpose of tanks was to support infantry, not attack other tanks. That had certainly changed by Desert Storm, probably before. Actually pre-WW2 doctrine of tanks generally had them in two categories, slow heavily armored tanks dubbed Infantry tanks that supported infantry advances and faster lightly armored Cruiser tanks that pushed forward and engaged any enemy armor they encountered. (This was the British and French armored doctrine but the Americans, Soviets and Germans had similar ideas in regards to their armored forces) Both were expected to engage any armor they encountered however and were given the appropriate rounds to do so. It was only post World War 2 into the 1950’s that we began to see tanks that combined both features into what became known as “Main Battle Tanks”. ---
**Author:** ![tomndebb](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/b9e5f3/32.png) [@tomndebb](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/tomndebb)\ **Post date:** [July 24, 2016, 7:34pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ju-390-payload/700150/35 "2016-07-24T19:34:14Z")
> [@DrDeth](#): > > > [@MarcusF](#): > > > > Trenchard his successors truly **believed the RAF could win the war on its own by strategic bombing with the army just coming in to mop up the shattered remnants** - and large sections of the pre-war USAAF had the same mindset. Hence the requirement in 1930s UK and USA to design and build heavy bombers. The Luftwaffe just did not buy these theories - and they were proved right. > > I think that Legal case of Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt etal vs Hitler proved that the Luftwaffe was \*wrong. \* The Luftwaffe was right in terms of the actual concept proposed, (bolded, here). The [United States Strategic Bombing Survey](http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm) certainly noted that the use of long range bombing was “decisive” in winning the war, however, it never made a claim that bombing, alone was going to defeat the enemy. ---
**Author:** ![tomndebb](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/b9e5f3/32.png) [@tomndebb](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/tomndebb)\ **Post date:** [July 24, 2016, 7:52pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ju-390-payload/700150/36 "2016-07-24T19:52:38Z")
The USSBS actually addressed the point I bolded in the post by MarcusF: > [@](#): > > In both the RAF and the United States Army Air Forces there were some who believed that air power could deliver the knockout blow against Germany, and force capitulation. This view, however, was not controlling in the overall Allied strategic plan. The dominant element in that plan was invasion of the Continent to occur in the spring of 1944. Plans called for establishing air superiority prior to the date of the invasion and the exploitation of such superiority in weakening the enemy’s will and capacity to resist. How many were the “some,” is not identified. Fortunately, the actual planners during the war took a more realistic view. ---
**Author:** ![Leo\_Bloom](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/leo_bloom/32/10377_2.png) [@Leo\_Bloom](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Leo_Bloom)\ **Post date:** [July 24, 2016, 8:37pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ju-390-payload/700150/37 "2016-07-24T20:37:22Z")
I understand that undertaking nailing and continuing to support it is just not going to happen if you have sucky hammers–or have perfectly fine other methods of getting results-- but as a matter of record–I’ve just now read about the Ural campaign–what was the record of Nazi strategic bombing? Blitzkrieg and strategic bombing are antithetical, I am guessing, the former certainly was doing quite fine for most of Europe. ---
**Author:** ![DrDeth](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/b487fb/32.png) [@DrDeth](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DrDeth)\ **Post date:** [July 24, 2016, 11:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ju-390-payload/700150/38 "2016-07-24T23:27:45Z")
> [@tomndebb](#): > > The USSBS actually addressed the point I bolded in the post by MarcusF: > How many were the “some,” is not identified. Fortunately, the actual planners during the war took a more realistic view. Well, yes, airpower _alone_ wouldnt do it- not counting nukes of course. But without crushing strategic bombing, D-Day would have failed. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ju-390-payload/700150.md?page=1)