In Canada, a jury verdict can be set aside on a Crown appeal. There is a very interesting case going on right now in British Columbia that raises the issue of a juror who acts improperly, called the Guess case.
The trial was a major drug, and I think, murder case. The accused were several alleged kingpins in the drug trade in the Vancouver area. The Crown was very confident in its case, and was shocked when the jury returned verdicts of acquittal of all the accused.
Then, rumours started circulating that one of the jurors, a Ms. Guess, had had an affair with one of the accused during the trial (he was out on bail). She didn’t deny it, and when asked if she didn’t think it was a problem for her to be sitting in judgment on her lover, she essentially said, no, it wasn’t, and in any event, the judge never told her that she couldn’t have sex with the accused during the trial. (One infers that she thought we have dim-witted judges not to have thought of that as an option in the instructions.)
In any event, she was charged and convicted with obstruction of justice. She’s now appealing.
The Crown is appealing the acquittals from the original trial to the B.C. Court of Appeal, on the basis of the obstruction charge. Last I heard, it was still in the works.
In cases like this, the courts should be allowed to throw out an acquital and re-try a defendant. After all, if a juror was bribed (or was screwing the defendant), then the defendant was never really in danger of being convicted, so how can you claim Double Jeopardy? He/she was never in jeopardy in the first place.
–It was recently discovered that research causes cancer in rats.
I’ve been out snowshoeing in Vermont for the past week (without benefit of my laptop). May I say that this discussion was a treat to return to.
Renee I love this Place!!!
this is one of the points of difference between U.S. and Canadian constitutional law.
our interpretation of double jeopardy allows for Crown appeals from acquittals. Double jeopardy kicks in if the appeal period passes without a Crown appeal.
The Crown has appealed the original acquittals, on the basis that Ms. Guess obstructed justice as a juror. Those appeals are still working their way through the system.
While I don’t practice law east of Death Valley, I will add that if the lawsuit in your example had been filed in California, I would file a Demurrer or Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings instead of a Motion for Summary.
In Californicate, a Demurrer or Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (the two are virtually indistinguishable) says that for the purpose of this proceeding, we will assume that all of the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint are true. Nevertheless, Defendant is still entitled to a dismissal of the lawsuit because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim in law in which relief can be granted. Since alienation of affection is no longer a protectable interest in California, a Demurer to the complaint would, in effect, nip the lawsuit in the bud, ending it at the pleading stage, before the parties spent mega bucks litigating it.
By contrast, a motion for summary judgment, albiet much more expensive to bring, is a more versatile tool in that it can be filed even when the plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently states a claim upon which relief can be granted, so long as no salient facts are in dispute. This motion is designed to effect a prompt disposition of a controversy on their merits and without the necessity of a lengthy trial, if there is no real dispute in facts, or as Bricker points out, where only a question of law is involved. The moving party, either defendant or plaintiff says in effect; “Here are the facts which Plaintiff and Defendant do not DISPUTE, and based on these facts, the moving party is entitled to a judgment in his favor as a matter of law.” Thus, the example of Georgia’s lawsuit, if it had been brought in California, circa, 1948, before the allienation of affection law had been repealed, it would have survived a Demurrer.
But if pre-trial discovery had revealed beyond dispute that that Georgia and Billy had always been faithful to each another were still happily married, a motion for summary judgment could have been brought since those two undisputed facts would have been fatal to Georgia’s claim under the then existing law.
Just adding my two cents.
Yes, I have already beat my breast and mea culpa’ed this one. Summary judgement is not the way to go, and it wasn’t even what I was describing, even though I said it was.
In Virginia, “demurrer” still exists as well, although it’s been replaced in the Federal system by F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) - the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, as jodih so accurately described above.
Virginia also has the common-law “demurrer to the evidence” which is, in substance, the common-law twin to a motion for summary judgement.
In any event, no matter how the pleadings would be styled, I trust we are all in agreement that Georgia’s lawsuit, if I described it accurately, fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
Shockingly, it seems that on Ally McBeal, there will be at least a hearing (if not a trial), with witnesses, on this lawsuit. I can’t understand it. Perhaps Massachusetts has done away with 12(b)(6) motions.
Rick, I didn’t think you needed to “beat your breast” over it; in fact, I assumed you had just mis-spoken. I only pointed it out because, while your explanations were excellent, that one point was not . . . well, correct. I didn’t mean to nit-pick. Really.
For what it’s worth, Montana has done away with the demurrer as a pleading. If you want to have the case decided that early, you can move to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or you can move for judgment on the pleadings – the former used by the defense and the latter usually used by the plaintiff. This is only interesting (to the extent it’s interesting at all) because codified Montana law (including the rules of Civil Procedure) was patterned extensively after the California codes.
I remember being frustrated when I moved to New York in 1994 and started practicing law there that there was no demurrer. It wasn’t the reason I came back to California the following year, but it was weird feeling like a baby lawyer when I had ten years’ of experience.
Back to jury nullification for a moment. There’s a very recent case just decided in California, People v. Engelman (February 1, 2000) 2000 Daily Journal D.A.R. 1285, addressing the issue. The court acknowledges that the jury has the power to nullify, but states that “there is no concomitant right to nullify” (original emphasis). Says the court:
The court accordingly held that there was no error in a trial court’s instruction to the jury that when any juror refuses to deliberate or expresses an intention to disregard the law, it is the obligation of the other jurors to immediately advise the court of this situation.
This precise analysis was followed about a year ago in a Chicago murder case. The only difference was that the aquittal was after a bench trial, so no jury was involved. The defendant (I believe his name was Aleman) was known as a Mob hitman. He was a charged as a result of one of the deaths, and acquitted by the judge.
Later, the judge was convicted of takibg a bribe in the case. Aleman was reprosecuted and convicted. His double jeopardy argument failed, for the reason mentioned by Diceman. I see no reason why this precedent wouldn’t apply to a jury case where a juror was convicted of taking a bribe.
This almost never happens, though. The Aleman case got a a lot of press at the time, and the consensus was that this was the first case of this kind anywhere.