# Justification of Epistemology **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [November 10, 2004, 12:09am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934 "2004-11-10T00:09:48Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 1
**Author:** ![Meatros](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/b4bc9f/32.png) [@Meatros](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Meatros)\ **Post date:** [November 10, 2004, 12:09am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/1 "2004-11-10T00:09:48Z")
I’ve been thinking a lot about epistemology and ontology lately and I’m just not knowledgeable enough to come up with anything concrete (is that ironic?). So the question for the Great Debates is, is there a justifiable epistemology out there? If so, what is it and what are the difficulties with it (if there are any)? My current stance is that I’m favoring materialism, but recently I’ve discovered some holes in it-at least some gaps in _my_ knowledge, which stem from (again, ironically enough) knowledge/thought. I don’t perceive these to be huge problems, but I don’t think I fully understand the criticisms of materialism. So I come here and ask all of this to my fellow dopers. I have a suspicion that there is no clear answer, hence the great debate. However the optomist in me wanted to put this in general questions… 😃 ---
**Author:** ![Hamish](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/a5b964/32.png) [@Hamish](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Hamish)\ **Post date:** [November 10, 2004, 3:34am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/2 "2004-11-10T03:34:40Z")
> [@Meatros](#): > > So the question for the Great Debates is, is there a justifiable epistemology out there? If so, what is it and what are the difficulties with it (if there are any)? Nope. None – at least that’s how I view it. There is, for instance, no meta-reason that encourages us toward empirical reason as a method of discovering/producing knowledge. Every justification for reason arrives to us through reason. To explain, empirical study of the world rests on a set of unprovable assumptions – the first that the physical world exists, and the second that it can be known through the five senses, and the third that it plays by a set of rules that aren’t going to change. None of these assumptions can be taken for granted – we, as a culture, have simply decided that they’re useful assumptions to make. But there are people who consider these assumptions going too far. William Blake, for instance, once argued that science will never understand the metaphysical because it only operates through five senses. The sixth is the metaphysical one. You can make similar arguments for other paths to knowledge – there is no argument for subjective knowledge besides the subjective, there is no argument for spiritual/intuitive knowledge besides the spiritual/intuitive. In every case an assumption must be made, and therefore all knowledge is contingent. But the alternative – trying to actually live a life where nothing, not even one’s own existence, can be taken for granted – is too hard, and so most of us make a few assumptions. I personally a balance of the subjective and he objective, because I find that either path alone becomes arid and stagnant. ---
**Author:** ![AHunter3](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/ahunter3/32/368_2.png) [@AHunter3](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/AHunter3)\ **Post date:** [November 10, 2004, 3:46am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/3 "2004-11-10T03:46:32Z")
[Try mine](http://home.earthlink.net/~ahunter/RFvSoc/toc.html). It’s derived from radical feminist theories of French, Morgan, Johnson and Fischer, plus Charles Taylor’s “Hermeneutics” and Robert Pirsig’s (_Zen and the Art of Motorcyle Maintenance_) epistemological theories of Quality (aka _the “feel” in itself_). It’s non-boring 🙂 Give it a whirl! ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [November 10, 2004, 5:15am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/4 "2004-11-10T05:15:28Z")
Asking for justification for epistemology is a little bit like asking how just the justice system is… what exactly can be justified is itself one of the questions of epistemology. If you’re looking for logical arguments, then, you’ll find none… or none that aren’t circular, anyway. Phenomenology is fun for this, though. If you can find some books that summarize the ideas of phenomenologists it might be worth checking out. I’d not recommend delving right into the authors themselves, continental philosophy is not very easy for most folks, but if you’re having problems eliminating the mind from the equation, it might be a good idea to see what others have thought about making it the centerpiece. If you could elaborate a little more about what issues are sticking in your craw, it would help focus the discussion some. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [November 10, 2004, 10:34am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/5 "2004-11-10T10:34:10Z")
> [@](#): > > **Meatros** : is there a justifiable epistemology out there? Excellent answer from **Hamish** , with which I concur: No, there is no perfectly convincing justification - we must each simply decide what is _most reasonable_. How is _anything_ “justified”? [Logically](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logic)? I’m afraid logic is **itself** an [epistemology](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology). Mathematically? Lo and behold, that’s one too. Empirically (_ie._ “scientifically”)? Yet again, this is an epistemology in itself, invloving **Hamish** ’s three assumed premises if it is not to be as futile an exercise as getting Sisyphus’ boulder up the hill only to see it roll down again, as our senses and memory are endlessly deceived by [Descartes’ Demon](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meditations_on_First_Philosophy) and reality is as trustworthy as the thoughts of a scatterbrain. We cannot _prove_ that the physical exists any more than Neo could prove he _wasn’t_ in the Matrix. We must each ask ourselves whether a physical universe is a _reasonable_ assumption, given the alternatives. I consider that it is reasonable:[ul][li]Because it requires a “level of fundamental _honesty_”, even if we cannot be sure that _this_ particular reality is not, say, a [simulation](http://www.simulation-argument.com/) (after all, even Neo’s simulation machine was still made of _atoms_.) A non-physical universe requires no such ‘safety catch’ at **any** level.[/li][li]Because it proposes an explanation of how **mind arises from _non_-mind** via cosmology, abiogenes and evolution to an organism in which sensory input is sorted into accessible memory, based on language and moderated by chemical emotion. A non-physical universe appears to require “mind” as a fundamental, which I find utterly explanatorily deficient.[/li][li]Because it just fucking _seems_ that way, goddammit. If a **tree falls in the forest** , does a longitudinal variation in pressure propagate, through the mainly-nitrogen medium, capable of being transduced by a human cochlea into an action potential and transmitted via the auditory nerve to the thalamus and on to the primary auditory cortex in the temporal lobe? Does the sun still _exist_ after sunset, even though my mind no longer has anything to do with it? Indeed, does the universe exist over those 13.7 billion years of a **complete absence** of minds in this part of the galaxy? _Of course_ it fucking does.[/ul]We wake up in this beautiful planet of a prison and find that we have the cognitive capacity to ask ourselves how we got here. We thus invent different epistemologies to help us in this quest, with our minds representing the needle of a “Belief-O-Meter” which swings this way and that. [/li] Science is an [inductive](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-inductive/) epistemology: we use it to extract “truth” _from_ reality. Mathematics and logic are [deductive](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logic) epistemologies: we _impress_ their truths _onto_ reality. Science uses mathematics and logic rather like it uses **language** : the rules and internal consistencies of their grammar and semantics say **precisely nothing** about reality _itself_. The grammatical validity of the sentence “the cat sat on the mat” does not tell us anything about the **actual** feline and its sedentary history. > [@](#): > > My current stance is that I’m favoring materialism, but recently I’ve discovered some holes in it-at least some gaps in _my_ knowledge, which stem from (again, ironically enough) knowledge/thought. My personal Belief-O-Meter points very strongly towards materialism (more strictly called [physicalism](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/) since, clearly, more than just _material_ exists: energy, fundamental forces, spacetime itself and _arrangements_ of these entities are all _physical_ even if they are not _material_). I consider that mathematics, concepts, logic, truth, experiences and the like are all **ultimately** physical things themselves, rather like a computer program is ultimately an arrangement in time and space of input electrons, switches and physical memory domains, or magnetic north is a physical thing arising from the Earth’s liquid metal core. I’d be happy to try and fill in some of those holes, **Meatros** , but understand that I do not pretend to have _all_ the answers, just as a geophysicist cannot explain _everything_ about Earth’s magnetism nor a climatologist predict the weather over my house on New Year’s Day. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [November 10, 2004, 11:10am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/6 "2004-11-10T11:10:24Z")
It is indeed a good question, and one that has been hotly debated in philosophy for centuries, beginning, of course, with Plato. In [Theaetetus](http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext99/thtus10.txt), a dialog among Socrates, Theodorus Theaetetus, Eucleides, and Terpsion, it is established that knowledge was “justified true belief”. This was a definition that hung around for so long that it took on its acronym as a name: “JTB”. Despite many nagging counter-examples, it was thought that, framed properly, even they would fit the model. But then, along came Edmund Gettier in 1963 with a brief essay that turned everything upside down. Now, the topic is hot again, and would be an excellent pursuit for the upstart philosopher. See this Stanford article for some background: [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/) ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [November 11, 2004, 5:22am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/7 "2004-11-11T05:22:08Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > Because it requires a “level of fundamental _honesty_”, even if we cannot be sure that _this_ particular reality is not, say, a [simulation](http://www.simulation-argument.com/) (after all, even Neo’s simulation machine was still made of _atoms_.) A non-physical universe requires no such ‘safety catch’ at **any** level. I apologize for not getting back to you in the other thread. My LJ, work, and CivIII keep me busy and I sometimes lose track. However, I do not see how positing a physical universe creates this “honesty” which we might as call “a reliability of phenomena” except by assertion, in which case, the simpler thing to do is not create entities that don’t explain anything and simply suggest that “phenomena are reliable” or “consistent” or whatever you would like to use to characterize “honesty”. Non-mental entities which we nonetheless conceptualize are an ontological nightmare to which I hope to never return. I will forever be upset with Kant for positing a noumenal realm of “things-in-themselves”, though I can’t strictly hold him accountable. Still. Bastard. > [@](#): > > Because it proposes an explanation of how **mind arises from _non_-mind** via cosmology, abiogenes and evolution to an organism in which sensory input is sorted into accessible memory, based on language and moderated by chemical emotion. A non-physical universe appears to require “mind” as a fundamental, which I find utterly explanatorily deficient. It is fundamental in a totally epistemic way: everything you know, _you_ know. Whether it be an objective fact or not is beside the matter than knowledge per se requires a knowing mind. To know something, you must have grasped it; ergo, everything you know is mind-correlative. It would be strange to suggest that you know of things you don’t know, and yet, here we are. You know what your room is like when you are not in it, yet the conceptual object you grasp as “[your] room” is rooted in sensation from the perspective of a conscious being–you can view or imagine your room from many perspectives, but you cannot do so from no perspective. Even god, in infinite knowledge, must see your room perspectively, or he is not seeing “your room”. No matter how hard you try, you cannot take the scientist out of science. > [@](#): > > Because it just fucking _seems_ that way, goddammit. If a **tree falls in the forest** , does a longitudinal variation in pressure propagate, through the mainly-nitrogen medium, capable of being transduced by a human cochlea into an action potential and transmitted via the auditory nerve to the thalamus and on to the primary auditory cortex in the temporal lobe? Yes. Why wouldn’t it? > [@](#): > > Does the sun still _exist_ after sunset, even though my mind no longer has anything to do with it? Again, as I tried to get across in the other thread, one needn’t go so far as to suggest that reality is constituted by the mind. That is a very extreme position, though some have put it forward (making God the perceiving entity that keeps everything together). Well, Mr OP, you have here two willing guinea pigs for your thoughts. One a physicalist, the other a transcendental idealist. Lots of fun is possible. Like sea monkeys. Shake us up and see what happens! 😉 ---
**Author:** ![Frylock](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/f/ce7236/32.png) [@Frylock](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Frylock)\ **Post date:** [November 11, 2004, 7:57am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/8 "2004-11-11T07:57:56Z")
Just to add quandaries to quandaries, there’s the following problem. I forget the label for it, something like the Pyrrhonian Problematic or something like that. At least some our beliefs seem to be justified by reference to other beliefs. My belief that I can get a coke by going to the fridge is justified by my (presumably true) belief that I put some cokes in there earlier today. Keeping this in mind, at least one of the three following must be the case: 1. Some beliefs are justified by reference to other beliefs, while some other beliefs are justified w/out reference to other beliefs. These other beliefs are to be accepted either on some other basis, or simply on no basis at all–they just have to be assumed. This is called Foundationalism. 2. All beliefs are justified by reference to other beliefs, and this network of beliefs loops back onto itself. Belief A justifies belief B, belief B justifies belief C, and so on to some belief Z which in turn justifies belief A. 3. All beliefs are justified by reference to other beliefs, and there is no loop of justification, and the chain of justification is infinitely long. I can ask “why should I beileve this” and get an answer, then ask “why should I believe _that_” and get an answer, and ask “why should I believe _that_”, and get an answer, and this can continue forever w/out my ever repeating a justification. All three of these options leave us feeling uncomfortably as though there is no firm foundation for belief. In the first case, are we just supposed to accept certain beliefs w/out what we usually think of as rational justification (i.e. inference from other beliefs which we are confident are true)? In the second case, wouldn’t this render all belief systems ultimately circular, which we usually take to be an epistemic vice? And in the third case, we just feel like our concern hasn’t been answered–our desire for an epistemic basis or foundation is answered “there is none! You can never find an ultimate epistemic foundation!” Yet we feel if there can be no ultimate justification for beliefs, there’s really no justification at all for them. One way to try to get out of this problem might be to deny what it assumes–that inference is central to justification. We should evaluate systems of belief-formation not by reference to their inferential structure, but instead by reference to something else. Virtue Epistemology evaluates belief-forming structures in terms of whether they have certain things we might call “virtues.” Different virtue epistemology theorists have different lists of virtues, and I’m not clear at the moment what “epistemic virtues” might be, but I think they would include things such as having sense organs in proper working order, having the habit of seeking coherence in thought, being the sort of person who desires to believe truths, and so on. Anyway, that’s what I’ve got at the moment as far as your question is concerned. (I like infinitism, myself.) -FrL- ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [November 11, 2004, 10:18am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/9 "2004-11-11T10:18:57Z")
> [@](#): > > **erl** :I do not see how positing a physical universe creates this “honesty” which we might as call “a reliability of phenomena” except by assertion, in which case, the simpler thing to do is not create entities that don’t explain anything and simply suggest that “phenomena are reliable” or “consistent” or whatever you would like to use to characterize “honesty”. This entire question is **all about** assertions, since it has been said several times that there is **no** way to “justify” or “prove” _anything_ without first _asserting_ an epistemology. Things with minds can deliberately deceive, things without minds cannot: this is my assertion. I cannot prove it. I am simply explaining why I, personally, dismiss such solipsistic nonsense as being as absurd as (A&-A). And I agree that old Immanuel was a complete Kant - strange that you should choose _his_ philosophy of transcendental idealism if you feel the same way. > [@](#): > > everything you know, you know. Actually, I contend that **there is no such thing as knowledge.** There is only stored information and permuted instances thereof, encoded via language. At best, there is such a thing as **belief** (_ie._ an output configuration accompanied by a “truth” decision, rather like in telecommunication decoding), but “_knowledge_”? When I say I “know” my own name, I access memory of a linguistic sound which my parents mouthed at me repeatedly from birth. This is not, I think, the “knowledge” you speak of and is, I suppose, where I stray from “supervenience” physicalism into outright [eliminativism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliminativism). _Of course_ “knowledge” requires a “mind”, just as a computer program requires a computer - that is simply _tautological_. My contention was that a mind-based reality is _explanatorily deficient_ since it does not explain mind’s _origin_. > [@](#): > > one needn’t go so far as to suggest that reality is constituted by the mind. That is a very extreme position. Well, **erl** , I think I must leave the floor to you to describe your position, for our audience and my recollection. If you could answer the following questions in the course of it I would be grateful:[ul][li]The universe existed for 13.7 billion years without any minds. Agreed?[/li][li]Dead brains don’t think. Agreed?[/li][li]Cognitive science and neuropsychology explain a great deal about the mind. Agreed?[/li]Fundamentally, where do we truly _disagree_? What do you consider that physicalism _cannot explain_? If I gave the physicalist answer to **all** of your questions, would proposing _further_ entities not violate the principle of Ockham’s razor? Indeed, does _any_ position proposing the existence of both the physical **and** the non-physical not invite a veritable slashing therewith?[/ul] ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [November 11, 2004, 11:54am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/10 "2004-11-11T11:54:48Z")
> [@Frylock](#): > > Just to add quandaries to quandaries, there’s the following problem. I forget the label for it, something like the Pyrrhonian Problematic or something like that. > > At least some our beliefs seem to be justified by reference to other beliefs. My belief that I can get a coke by going to the fridge is justified by my (presumably true) belief that I put some cokes in there earlier today. I’ve never really heard that called a “problem” before. It’s just the regression clause of the Principle of Inferential Justification: Justification in believing P on the basis of E requires both (1) justification in believing E, and (2) justification in believing that E makes probable P. The regression clause is clause (1). > [@](#): > > 1. Some beliefs are justified by reference to other beliefs, while some other beliefs are justified w/out reference to other beliefs. These other beliefs are to be accepted either on some other basis, or simply on no basis at all–they just have to be assumed. This is called Foundationalism. > > 2. All beliefs are justified by reference to other beliefs, and this network of beliefs loops back onto itself. Belief A justifies belief B, belief B justifies belief C, and so on to some belief Z which in turn justifies belief A. > > 3. All beliefs are justified by reference to other beliefs, and there is no loop of justification, and the chain of justification is infinitely long. I can ask “why should I beileve this” and get an answer, then ask “why should I believe _that_” and get an answer, and ask “why should I believe _that_”, and get an answer, and this can continue forever w/out my ever repeating a justification. All of those are foundationalist. A foundationalist can believe that justification (1) regresses to an axiomatic truth, (2) regresses infinitely, or (3) regresses circularly. > [@](#): > > All three of these options leave us feeling uncomfortably as though there is no firm foundation for belief. In the first case, are we just supposed to accept certain beliefs w/out what we usually think of as rational justification (i.e. inference from other beliefs which we are confident are true)? In the second case, wouldn’t this render all belief systems ultimately circular, which we usually take to be an epistemic vice? And in the third case, we just feel like our concern hasn’t been answered–our desire for an epistemic basis or foundation is answered “there is none! You can never find an ultimate epistemic foundation!” Yet we feel if there can be no ultimate justification for beliefs, there’s really no justification at all for them. > > One way to try to get out of this problem might be to deny what it assumes–that inference is central to justification. We should evaluate systems of belief-formation not by reference to their inferential structure, but instead by reference to something else. Virtue Epistemology evaluates belief-forming structures in terms of whether they have certain things we might call “virtues.” Different virtue epistemology theorists have different lists of virtues, and I’m not clear at the moment what “epistemic virtues” might be, but I think they would include things such as having sense organs in proper working order, having the habit of seeking coherence in thought, being the sort of person who desires to believe truths, and so on. I don’t think virtue epistemology is really relevant here. For me, it is helpful to analyze justification by beginning with the argument of justification skeptics. It goes something like this: (A) A belief is justified if and only if its inferential chain is (1) infinite, (2) ends with an axiom, or (3) circulates to the original belief. (B) But infinite chains are “vicious” (meaning unaccessible) and therefore cannot justify any belief. (C) Axioms are arbitrary and are not the successors of any belief; therefore, they are unjustified (implying that beliefs drawn from them are unjustified as well). (D) And circular arguments, while valid, are not sound, and therefore do not justify any belief. The two primary justification theories, foundationalism and coherentism, can be formed by denying one or more premises of the skeptic. (Incidentally, note how untenable the skeptical position is, since it dismisses axioms as arbitrary and yet states them.) One version of coherentism rejects (D), while another, more popular version rejects (A). (A) is rejected because it presupposes that justification is linear, while coherentism holds that justification is nonlinear — a web of relations rather than a chain of inferences. Foundationalism, obviously, rejects clause (1) of (A). All justification theories (including skepticism) are either foundationalist or coherentist, and may be stated either postively by a set of premises or rules or negatively by the rejection of premises or rules. Infinitism, which you indicate is your theory of choice (you and Peter Klein might be the only two) is nothing more than foundationalism that rejects the skeptic’s (B); that is, you believe that infinite regression is not vicious. And reliablism is merely foundationalism that rejects (C) — axioms may be externally justified by non-epistemic means (such as acquaintance). ---
**Author:** ![JMS\_CCT](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/bbe5ce/32.png) [@JMS\_CCT](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/JMS_CCT)\ **Post date:** [November 11, 2004, 2:09pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/11 "2004-11-11T14:09:41Z")
> [@Meatros](#): > > I’ve been thinking a lot about epistemology and ontology lately and I’m just not knowledgeable enough to come up with anything concrete (is that ironic?). > > So the question for the Great Debates is, is there a justifiable epistemology out there? If so, what is it and what are the difficulties with it (if there are any)? > > My current stance is that I’m favoring materialism, but recently I’ve discovered some holes in it-at least some gaps in _my_ knowledge, which stem from (again, ironically enough) knowledge/thought. > > I don’t perceive these to be huge problems, but I don’t think I fully understand the criticisms of materialism. So I come here and ask all of this to my fellow dopers. > > I have a suspicion that there is no clear answer, hence the great debate. > However the optomist in me wanted to put this in general questions… 😃 For a long study on this read Francis Schaeffer’s, “How Should We Then Live; The Rise And Decline Of Western Thought And Culture.” ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [November 11, 2004, 4:01pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/12 "2004-11-11T16:01:19Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > This entire question is **all about** assertions, since it has been said several times that there is **no** way to “justify” or “prove” _anything_ without first _asserting_ an epistemology. No problem. I’m just saying, why assert entities and then assert their “honesty” to explain the reliability of phenomena when you can simply assert the reliability of phenomena. To me it is simply a question of parsimony. I am not banishing the electron. I am suggesting that operations with electrons involve our conception of them, and we shape our explanation in like with our conception, and adjust when new phenomena reliably appear. > [@](#): > > I cannot prove it. I am simply explaining why I, personally, dismiss such solipsistic nonsense as being as absurd as (A&-A). Solipsism is simply the position that only I exist, everything is a product of my mind. I am not arguing for solipsism as it isn’t very fun or elucidating. > [@](#): > > And I agree that old Immanuel was a complete Kant - strange that you should choose _his_ philosophy of transcendental idealism if you feel the same way. I choose to call it transcendental idealism because it most closely maps how I go about arguing things and how I account for conceptual objects. Kant’s “transcendental idealism” is another matter. Not every philosopher agrees about every thing. I’m a much bigger fan of Hume than Kant, a much bigger fan of Husserl than Hume, and Wittgenstein trumps them all for me. > [@](#): > > Actually, I contend that **there is no such thing as knowledge.** Strange thing to say after having just talked about all these epistemological issues like math and science. > [@](#): > > When I say I “know” my own name, I access memory of a linguistic sound which my parents mouthed at me repeatedly from birth. Quite so. I guess the more interesting question, which you do not answer, is how you knew that was the right sound, and how you knew it was meant to refer to you. There is more to human behavior than tape recorders and playback devices. > [@](#): > > My contention was that a mind-based reality is _explanatorily deficient_ since it does not explain mind’s _origin_. Well that’s a strange problem. Mathematics doesn’t explain the origin of math, science doesn’t explain the origin of science, epistemology does not, without circularity, justify itself. But it is not to say that such explanations are impossible, only that they fall outside of the domain in consideration. [ul][li]The universe existed for 13.7 billion years without any minds. Agreed?_That is the current explanation. We have no reason to doubt it that wouldn’t also cast everything else into doubt. Yes._[/li][li]Dead brains don’t think. Agreed? _They exhibit no behavior that I would call “thinking”, correct._[/li][li]Cognitive science and neuropsychology explain a great deal about the mind. Agreed? _They can explain a lot about the brain and its affect on human behavior. I don’t know why you would think I’d disagree with this. Of course we can investigate each other._[/li][li]Fundamentally, where do we truly _disagree_? What do you consider that physicalism _cannot explain_? If I gave the physicalist answer to **all** of your questions, would proposing _further_ entities not violate the principle of Ockham’s razor? Indeed, does _any_ position proposing the existence of both the physical **and** the non-physical not invite a veritable slashing therewith? _Quite so, which is why I do not posit the additional entity “matter” when I already know intuitively that there is “mind”._[/li] _We disagree that reality is mind-independent. It is just that simple. There is nothing in reality that we know of that we have not grasped mentally. You might say that’s just tautological. I would probably agree on most occassions. I am not suggesting that there isn’t an “otherness” about phenomenal objects. There is as I think we all know by inspection. I am suggesting that we get no closer to understanding “otherness” by positing a mind-independent realm that just happens to be reliable._[/ul] ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [November 11, 2004, 4:37pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/13 "2004-11-11T16:37:28Z")
I think the argument between Sentient and Eris is rooted in the fairly modern notion that there is no worldview that isn’t existential. At the risk of uniting you both to turn against me (in a gentlemanly way), I submit that neither of you is considering that essence might precede existence. It needn’t be that things exist either independent of or dependent on human minds. It may well be that that which exists cannot not exist because its existence is essential. Temporality is a non-issue since the human mind can conceive of that which did exist, does exist, and even will exist. And I don’t mean in a prognosticating sense of knowing what will exist, but of knowing that something can exist in the future that does not exist now. Existence is merely one manifestation of essence. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [November 11, 2004, 4:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/14 "2004-11-11T16:38:49Z")
> [@](#): > > why assert entities and then assert their “honesty” to explain the reliability of phenomena when you can simply assert the reliability of phenomena. Because those reliable phenomena might be _lies_. > [@](#): > > Strange thing to say [that there’s no such thing as “knowledge”] after having just talked about all these epistemological issues like math and science. Strange for a physicalist? Surely not. Epistemologies like maths and science are ultimately physical things _themselves_. > [@](#): > > I guess the more interesting question, which you do not answer, is how you knew that was the right sound, and how you knew it was meant to refer to you. There is more to human behavior than tape recorders and playback devices. Of course, I have said the same repeatedly in this very thread. We could speak of pointing fingers, eye contact, reward for repetition or any number of _animal_ studies but I hope that my point is clear: that “knowledge of my name” can ultimately be explained by reference to _memory_. > [@](#): > > Quite so, which is why I do not posit the additional entity “matter” when I already know intuitively that there is “mind”. To clarify: what do you mean when you say that you **do not posit “matter”**? _What are you saying_ about the unheard tree and its pressure wave? > [@](#): > > We disagree that reality is mind-independent. It is just that simple. This word “reality” is crucial. What is the _difference_ between the **real** and the **physical** , in your opinion? > [@](#): > > There is nothing in reality that we know of that we have not grasped mentally. You might say that’s just tautological. I would probably agree on most occassions. Which occasions would you _disagree_ on? I’m afraid you have me at a disadvantage, **erl**. You seem to understand my position quite well, to the extent that you can clearly see where we disagree. I cannot say the same of yours, and am trying every which way to ask the right question. I’ll try again: _Can a transcendental idealist **be a physicalist**? If not, why not?_ ---
**Author:** ![Frylock](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/f/ce7236/32.png) [@Frylock](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Frylock)\ **Post date:** [November 11, 2004, 4:57pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/15 "2004-11-11T16:57:57Z")
Liberal, the trilemna I mentioned called the Pyrrhonian Problematic. It is dealt with by lots of epistemologists including Ernest Sosa among many others. The three options do _not_ all represent foundationalism. Only the first represents foundationalism. The second represents coherentism. The third represents the very unpopular position called Infinitism. You can find this information in the introduction to part III of the Blackwell Philosophy Anthology “Epistemology”. I’m puzzled because your subsequent comments seemed somewhat sophisticated, but frankly you got this part just plain wrong. I’m also puzzled because the somewhat sophisticated remarks you _did_ offer said very much the same thing I said in my own post, just without using the phrase “Pyrrhonian Problematic.” So I’m not sure what to make of your post. -FrL- > [@Liberal](#): > > I’ve never really heard that called a “problem” before. It’s just the regression clause of the Principle of Inferential Justification: Justification in believing P on the basis of E requires both (1) justification in believing E, and (2) justification in believing that E makes probable P. The regression clause is clause (1). > All of those are foundationalist. A foundationalist can believe that justification (1) regresses to an axiomatic truth, (2) regresses infinitely, or (3) regresses circularly. > I don’t think virtue epistemology is really relevant here. For me, it is helpful to analyze justification by beginning with the argument of justification skeptics. It goes something like this: > > (A) A belief is justified if and only if its inferential chain is (1) infinite, (2) ends with an axiom, or (3) circulates to the original belief. (B) But infinite chains are “vicious” (meaning unaccessible) and therefore cannot justify any belief. (C) Axioms are arbitrary and are not the successors of any belief; therefore, they are unjustified (implying that beliefs drawn from them are unjustified as well). (D) And circular arguments, while valid, are not sound, and therefore do not justify any belief. > > The two primary justification theories, foundationalism and coherentism, can be formed by denying one or more premises of the skeptic. (Incidentally, note how untenable the skeptical position is, since it dismisses axioms as arbitrary and yet states them.) One version of coherentism rejects (D), while another, more popular version rejects (A). (A) is rejected because it presupposes that justification is linear, while coherentism holds that justification is nonlinear — a web of relations rather than a chain of inferences. Foundationalism, obviously, rejects clause (1) of (A). > > All justification theories (including skepticism) are either foundationalist or coherentist, and may be stated either postively by a set of premises or rules or negatively by the rejection of premises or rules. Infinitism, which you indicate is your theory of choice (you and Peter Klein might be the only two) is nothing more than foundationalism that rejects the skeptic’s (B); that is, you believe that infinite regression is not vicious. And reliablism is merely foundationalism that rejects (C) — axioms may be externally justified by non-epistemic means (such as acquaintance). ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [November 11, 2004, 6:58pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/16 "2004-11-11T18:58:05Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > Because those reliable phenomena might be _lies_. Bah. Don’t get hung up on Cartesian skepticism like that. (Besides which, if you’re using phenomena to investigate this “matter” you’re still running into the problem.) If you want skepticism, tackle Hume. As a personal matter, I feel Hume presented the logical end of empirical investigation, crushing the existence of Self, the idea of infinity, and so much more. And that’s just in the first part of his Treatise. Anyone keen on examining reality from the perspective of empirical investigations should pay strict attention to his arguments. I don’t like Kant for reasons which aren’t worth mentioning, but it takes a pretty different mindset to address Hume. Popper went with his critique of induction and turned verificationism of the positivists into falsification that we all know and love. But Popper was so focused on the methodological investigations and classifications of science as such that he missed the bigger picture, IMO. What I mean is, it is hard to take Hume piecemeal, in my estimation, he was very thorough and if you agree with his basic assumptions then it is pretty much guaranteed you’ll be forced to accept his conclusions. Now, I’m not saying this is necessarily so, certainly people interested in philosophy do nothing if not disagree, but I remember being pretty much swept away by his presentation. He singlehandedly destroyed the metaphysical positions I held prior to reading him. While I no longer feel he is “right”, I do credit him with breaking down my preconceived notions and leaving me empty. It took Wittgenstein and Husserl to build me back up, even though Wittgenstein would take no position on realism/idealism, and Husserl presented a transcendental phenomenology. I simply go one step further and adopt the metaphysical perspective that phenomena is all that is necessary for explanation, and phenomena are mind-correlative “events”, so I consider “idealism” to be the best description of my perspective. > [@](#): > > Strange for a physicalist? Surely not. Epistemologies like maths and science are ultimately physical things _themselves_. Strange to suggest there is no knowledge in a discussion about how things are and what good epistemological methods are. > [@](#): > > that “knowledge of my name” can ultimately be explained by reference to _memory_. Man, it is like you are _right there with me_. And then I lose you… > [@](#): > > To clarify: what do you mean when you say that you **do not posit “matter”**? _What are you saying_ about the unheard tree and its pressure wave?This word “reality” is crucial. What is the _difference_ between the **real** and the **physical** , in your opinion?Which occasions would you _disagree_ on? Allow me to first explain my use of the word “physical”. It is a categorical word that describes a transcendental object’s _role in language_ and in the broader Wittgensteinian sense of _language games_ (which includes non-verbal yet meaningful behavior). It is not a categorical word that _distinguishes an ontological mode_. Like Hume, I suggest that maybe there is a mind-independent reality; I do not deny its possibility or existence. Its existence is unknowable and hence philosophically uninteresting. It is certainly not necessary to account for empirical investigations IMO, so it is superfluous and adds nothing to the discussion. (Again: MHO.) > [@](#): > > _Can a transcendental idealist **be a physicalist**? If not, why not?_ I would suggest a resounding “no”. The reality we interact with is one of transcendental objects which are understood by a transcendental consciousness. What, exactly, is being transcended? The level of bare phenomena, i.e. pure sense input. From this manifold of sensation our consciousness, which transcends the manifold itself, grasps transcendental objects. Husserl considers such things with the phrase ‘intentional objects’, which is roughly “those things that I’m directed towards.” This is not a solipsistic direction; he is not suggesting some kind of internalism where we are only directed “inwards”, as it were. I am focused on an object that is not me, and this is still true even when I am remembering an object. (He distinguishes modes of satisfying intentions in such a case.) Husserl was big into objective reality. Some consider that all he ever accomplished was the ontology of subjectivity. I don’t know about that, he was a philosopher who constantly reworked and revised his opinions over time and made great effort to operate within an intersubjective reality. (These opinions of mine are formed by reading his works directly as well as others’ accounts of him.) We might distinguish three perspectives; one is the objective perspective, which is what we investigate, i.e. “underlying” reality, but which we can only investigate in a phenomenal sense through intersubjective behavior and justification. (Actually, having already accepted a level of objectivity, there was an objectively best way to pursue knowledge and there was objective knowledge and a wider range of _a priori_ knowledge than mathematics and etc; I don’t go that far, but I won’t argue against it, either.) Finally there would be a subjective perspective, but my own readings of Wittgenstein have led me to discount subjectivity as such for not being meaningful. (I must stess “my readings” there, though I have not read any account of W that strictly disagreed with me.) As you can see, the mind is the point from which we _begin_. It cannot be discounted without discounting everything we’ve investigated. I don’t know if that clears anything up, but it might let you have a better idea of what questions to ask to clear things up. **Lib** > [@](#): > > It needn’t be that things exist either independent of or dependent on human minds. This is precisely where I stand, which is a very wishy-washy uncommitted position, I know, but I’ve seen no way out of it. I have, however, chosen a side from which to phrase my terms which is, in my estimation, most parsimonous and that is to go on as if no mind-independent reality existed. I do not, however, wish to assert that it does not; I simply do not feel the answer one way or another impacts “what we can know and how we know it.” Much like the Michaelson Morley experiment didn’t disprove the existence of aether, it only showed that light is not a vibration of it: aether did not account for light’s behavior, so we stopped considering it. We adopted a position that aether is a mistake, but truly we haven’t ruled it out completely, we just no longer feel it has an explanatory role. > [@](#): > > Existence is merely one manifestation of essence. I go back and forth on the essence/existence question because I (already) only consider transcendental objects as “existing”, and they have no essence which is not simply an intersubjective construct (i.e. essence and existence are the same thing; describing one entails the other). However, in the past few months I have been considering a kind of platonic “realism” wherein the platonic “realm” is simply the realm of possibility, in which case essence (which is in this case possibility) does indeed precede existence (except that this is still a mind-correlative realm which is why I put realism in quotes). Like I said, it is something I’m thinking through now and have been for a while, but I am finding a great deal of comfort in using “pure” possibility as the foundation for actuality and investigation (e.g. when we investigate and find we were wrong yet fail to find out what is right, what were we “really” investigating?). One problem I have with it is based on Hume’s presentation of “ideas”. If you know what I’m referring to here then you could see instantly why I might have problems with essence preceding existence. But in any discussion of epistemology, I stick to explanatory angles rather than ontological commitments, so perhaps it is a sidetrack. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [November 11, 2004, 8:47pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/17 "2004-11-11T20:47:48Z")
**erl** , I’ll leave discussion of Hume for another time, if you’ll permit me - I’d like for now to explore your description of the physical more closely. > [@](#): > > I suggest that maybe there is a mind-independent reality; I do not deny its possibility or existence. Its existence is unknowable and hence philosophically uninteresting. It is certainly not necessary to account for empirical investigations IMO, so it is superfluous and adds nothing to the discussion. Have you not already admitted 13.7 billion years of mind-independent reality? How can such an admission be “philosophically uninteresting”? And _of course_ we can _start from_ a position of mind’s existence in order to investigate empirically, just as a biology class can begin with lions, rather than abiogenesis. But when it comes down to it, the question “what is the origin of lions” is every bit as necessary a question as “what is the origin of _mind_”? > [@](#): > > As you can see, the mind is the point from which we begin. It cannot be discounted without discounting everything we’ve investigated. Again, forgive me for leaving Edmund and Ludwig for another time, but why **cannot** all of those “mind” entities - language, behaviour, intention and the like - be explained by the cognitive science and neuropsychology you have also accepted? If you accept the possibility that they _can_, is this not to accept that an idealist can **be a physicalist**? ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [November 11, 2004, 9:21pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/18 "2004-11-11T21:21:38Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > Have you not already admitted 13.7 billion years of mind-independent reality? Not at all. I have admitted a common explanation for finding reality how it is… that is, for finding reality _how we find it_. We have not elimintated our minds from the equation. Clearly minds come in and out of existence. But there is no reality that is not mind-correlative. When I picture Earth as it existed two billion years ago, I still picture it from a perspective _as if I was there_. I cannot picture reality from a perspective the mind is incapable of taken. As I said above, even god must “see” objects perspectively, or he is not seeing what we call objects. Trivial semantic point or the very thing on which my presentation hinges? 🙂 > [@](#): > > But when it comes down to it, the question “what is the origin of lions” is every bit as necessary a question as “what is the origin of _mind_”? A fascinating question it will take minds to answer in a way that makes sense to minds. Do keep me posted. 😉 > [@](#): > > …but why **cannot** all of those “mind” entities - language, behaviour, intention and the like - be explained by the cognitive science and neuropsychology you have also accepted? I didn’t say they couldn’t be explained. I said the mind couldn’t be discarded. The very thing we are calling “the brain” is quite clearly a transcendental object we have shown to be strongly if not completely tied to intersubjective (and possibly subjective) behavior. This fact in no way suggests that “the brain” is not a transcendental object grasped by the mind. The destruction of a brain and the corresponding absence of behavior by the being whose brain it was neither suggests nor demands that _his reality, like ours, is one consisting of transcendental objects grasped by the mind_. Whether there is some underlying cause or not is _not necessary for explaning phenomena_. So I discard it. Matter is the aether of ontology for me. Epistemologically, it serves no explanatory role. I have no problem suggesting that “the earth was around before I was.” But I do have a problem suggesting that the transendental object “the Earth” is not a mind-correlative object. Again, minds don’t “make” reality; reality is not constituted of mind. I fully believe that there is a reality common to us all; in fact, I assert it as such in order to leave solipsism which has no explanatory power, or at least is only a degenerate solution. I see no way to escape that all explanatory power of this reality is correlated strictly to mental activity, specifically the mental activity of grasping transcendental objects from a manifold of sensation. I feel that is as far as we are justified in taking metaphysical analysis, and thankfully, I feel its explanatory power is sufficient to account for the natural sciences and other such investigations. > [@](#): > > If you accept the possibility that they _can_, is this not to accept that an idealist can **be a physicalist**? They are opposite ends of the spectrum from the get go. One posits that all reality is mind-correlative, and one posits that all reality is mind-independent. If ever there were a larger divide, I’m not sure what it would be. If you are wondering why we can accept the same science when our metaphysics is so different, you will see why I stress the _explanatory power_ given by knowledge and epistemology and distinguish that from _ontological modes of existence_ which have no explanatory power. Now, were I a positivist, I might brush aside the ontological questions entirely; but I am not. I think metaphysical questions must be answered in some way if for no other reason than how they frame the way we approach descriptions of events. Some might say that if we know the same things then the metaphysics is unimportant. Some say. ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [November 11, 2004, 9:34pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/19 "2004-11-11T21:34:44Z")
**Sentient** , let’s take a nice example from science: the quark. You or I shall never, given the abilities of quarks under the current theory, see, touch, taste, hear, or smell a quark, nor shall we ever know someone who has, nor etc. Now, there are two ways we can approach quarks: 1. They are primarily an explanatory device: hypothetical objects meant to explain observed phenomena. It is not necessary to assert their existence to use their idea to explain observed phenomena. 2. They are real things that exist independent of our conception of them, of which our conceptions only hope to approximate, and which are what they are regardless of what we think about them. If we don’t think they’re real, we can’t “really” explain what is going on. Either perspective allows science to be performed, since science is primarily a methodology of prediction and testing coupled with selection criteria. It requires no prior commitment to the independence of objects from the investigation, as far as I can see. So I choose option (1) which I find easier to accept for reasons I’ve outlined already. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [November 11, 2004, 10:01pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/20 "2004-11-11T22:01:46Z")
Hi **Eris,** Since I’ve seen the word “mind” used to denote “thinking”, “awareness”, “consciousness”, “information processing”, and 50,000 other similar-but-not-necessarily-the-same concepts, I was wondering if you would give us a definition (or description) of what you’re referring to when you refer to “mind”. Also, instead of saying > [@](#): > > Clearly minds come in and out of existence. wouldn’t it be more a more accurate reflection of your philosophy to say “Clearly, observable mind-correlated behaviors come in and out of existence”? Or have I been misreading you? **Lib** , You said: > [@](#): > > Temporality is a non-issue since the human mind can conceive of that which did exist, does exist, and even will exist. You left out “… the human mind can conceive of **that which does not exist** ”. This was deliberate, right? (Hey, I’ve been away from the boards for a looooong time. May I ask why/when you changed your username?) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934.md?page=2)