# Justification of Epistemology **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [November 10, 2004, 12:09am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934 "2004-11-10T00:09:48Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 5
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [November 15, 2004, 4:52pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/81 "2004-11-15T16:52:00Z")
I look forward to whatever you can squeeze in, **erl**. **other-wise** : I realise that you asked me some direct questions which I should have answered as best I could before posing mine. > [@](#): > > Why the abhorrence of ambiguity? I feel it useful to try to get us all to lay our cards on the table as honestly as possible. Since I contend that we can never really _know_ anything _for certain_, I am interested in getting people’s “best guess” with the rhetorical gun to their head. > [@](#): > > If ever, at some point, you were not aware, how would you know? Clocks will be out of kilter with my “awareness” clock - there will be “missing time”. > [@](#): > > For as long as you can remember, you’ve always been aware. This must be the case, for what would a memory of non-awareness be a memory of? I consider this to be a _tautology_: one cannot be _aware_ of being _non-aware_. This is logically inconsistent from the off. One must _infer_ that one was non-aware at a particular time. If inference is _forbidden_, well, whither science? And so I repeat my question: In your opinion, is the dosed twin **aware** at 1pm, or not? ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [November 15, 2004, 5:12pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/82 "2004-11-15T17:12:52Z")
In the meantime, **SentientMeat** , it might be worth our while for you to do the same i.e. present the escape from solipsism from your point of view in whatever manner suits you. Perhaps it will help me know how to respond, which points of my own to stress, etc. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [November 15, 2004, 5:37pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/83 "2004-11-15T17:37:17Z")
> [@](#): > > If you think that this kind of explanation in terms of senses, memory, language and cortices is inadequate, well, so be it: I am merely interested in your alternative if we are not to descend into nihilistic refusal to believe or countenance anything. I _do_ think this “explanation” is inadequate, for reasons I’ve already mentioned. What I _don’t_ see is how my unwillingness to favor any of the current speculations causes us to “descend into nihilistic refusal to believe or countenance anything”. If the various attempts to interpret quantum theory haven’t lead to nihilism, I don’t see why _this_ should. > [@](#): > > As for my evidence that the organism on the table is not aware when under deep anesthesia, it does not respond even to being sliced up like halal livestock, nor does it do anything which I or any other organism does when I am “aware”… Again, this is evidence that the organism on the table _is not responding_. That’s it. _Just_ not responding. How do you make the leap from lacking behaviors that you _associate_ with awareness to lacking awareness? Especially when there have been numerous reports of utterly unresponsive patients who were nonetheless fully aware during their operations? I don’t know how else to make this clear. I’m not saying that it’s _impossible_ that the poor schmoe on the table lacks awareness, I’m saying that it’s impossible for you to know one way or the other. A categorical statement that they lack awareness is faith-based, not evidence-based. You only have access to your own awareness and you never _don’t_ have access to your own awareness. > [@](#): > > …and having experienced it myself there was a period of an hour which my awareness cannot account for. How did you know there was a period of an hour? Did you experience the passing of an hour with no awareness, or did someone (who has no absolutely no access to your awareness) experience an hour passing and tell you what _they_ experienced? > [@](#): > > Do you say that the dosed twin is aware at 1pm, or not? What is the _difference_ between the two twins at 1pm? If the dosed twin is unwilling or unable to tell me whether or not they were aware at 1pm (or if she/he was unable to track time) then there is no way for me or anyone else to know if they were aware. The difference between the two twins is that they had different experiences; that’s all. The dosed twin never experienced a lack of awareness… how could he? ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [November 15, 2004, 6:01pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/84 "2004-11-15T18:01:09Z")
> [@](#): > > In the meantime, \*\*SentientMeat[b/], it might be worth our while for you to do the same i.e. present the escape from solipsism from your point of view in whatever manner suits you. Fair do’s. We wake in this prison and, if we are not to be simple _animals_, seek to make _sense_ of our predicament, to _explain_ how it came to be so. Our pursuit is balanced by two counterweights: _explaining power_ and _economy_, both of which have featured strongly in this thread. Solipsism is **the most parsimonious** proposal. All I need to postulate is _me_. Other people, rocks, plants, even far away stars: these are **unnecessary**. Since everything I know is, by definition, correlated with _me_ and I can remember a universe _lacking_ me, then I require nothing _but_ me to account for _everything_. But where it scores highly on the parsimony stakes, it is utterly deficient in terms of explaining power. I simply cannot _explain_ how I came to be, nor can I explain the vast array of phenomena which assail my consciousness. My mind seemingly has no effect whatsoever on this “reality” thing, except insofar as I affect it via these crude mechanisms such as speech and bodily force. The only explanation for the fact that I cannot manipulate the vast majority of my personal reality with my mind, it seems to me, is that the vast majority of stuff is **not me**. The less parsimonious, but more explanatorily powerful hypothesis is that I exist **in addition to** things which are not me. I have not violated Ockham’s principle because it is _necessary_ to propose that plurality. Now, going further than your direct question, we _could_ propose mind **s** , plural, as our base position. Again, it is parsimonious. But again, I feel it has woefully inadequate _explaining power_. There are clearly things in the universe which are _not minds themselves_ - other _people_ might be, sure, and even other animals. But plants, and rocks, and stars? They surely exist _whether minds do or not_. And it is these things-which-are-not-minds which **explain the origin of minds** just as those things-which-are-not- **me** explain the origin of **me**. Everthing _seems_ mind-correlative, just as everything _seems_ me-correlative, or life- or carbon-correlative. But these are _truisms_ based on the fact that the only things which can _perceive_, or _know_, or _to which things can seem_ are **minds** (or life, or carbon structures, or me.) And so I appeal to the physical. I say that the universe _exists_, is _real_, regardless of the existence of myself, or minds in general, since it has greater _explaining power_ even though it is not so economic with entities. And then I **stop** , since I believe that no _more_ entities need be proposed: the universe and everything in it, including me and my mind, will be explained by the physical (_ie. space_, ultimately), with no dualism required. Hope this helps. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [November 15, 2004, 6:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/85 "2004-11-15T18:03:58Z")
> [@](#): > > I feel it useful to try to get us all to lay our cards on the table as honestly as possible. Since I contend that we can never really know anything for certain, I am interested in getting people’s “best guess” with the rhetorical gun to their head. I understand your viewpoint, but you’re just gonna have to pull the trigger on me. I honestly couldn’t pick an “explanation” that wouldn’t just be a blindfolded, over-the-shoulder dart throw. > [@](#): > > - “If ever, at some point, you were not aware, how would you know?”\* > > Clocks will be out of kilter with my “awareness” clock - there will be “missing time”. Well, I don’t know about you, but even when I’m fully aware my “awareness” clock is _frequently_ out of kilter with GMT (“Oh, crap. It’s 5:00 _already_?). I don’t see how “missing time” can be a criteria for lack of awareness. (And I still have a problem with calling it “missing time”… YOU didn’t experience any time missing at all.) ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [November 15, 2004, 6:14pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/86 "2004-11-15T18:14:29Z")
> [@](#): > > **otherwise:** If the various attempts to interpret quantum theory haven’t lead to nihilism, I don’t see why this should. Well, I favour Many World myself. Howboutyou? > [@](#): > > How do you make the leap from lacking behaviors that you associate with awareness to lacking awareness? By induction, the entire basis of science. > [@](#): > > Especially when there have been numerous reports of utterly unresponsive patients who were nonetheless fully aware during their operations? These reports have never been reliable: they strongly appear to be simple _dreams_ from when they were coming around, or when the anaesthesia was not dosed properly so they came round prematurely. > [@](#): > > I’m saying that it’s impossible for you to know one way or the other. A categorical statement that they lack awareness is faith-based, not evidence-based. As is everything, ultimately. [quote] How did you know there was a period of an hour? Did you experience the passing of an hour with no awareness, or did someone (who has no absolutely no access to your awareness) experience an hour passing and tell you what they experienced? [quote] I inferred it from the clock. > [@](#): > > The dosed twin never experienced a lack of awareness… how could he? I didn’t ask whether he experienced non-experience. I asked you a direct yes or no question: In your opinion, is the dosed twin **aware** at 1pm? ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [November 15, 2004, 7:00pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/87 "2004-11-15T19:00:17Z")
> [@](#): > > Well, I favour Many World myself. Howboutyou? I like Many Worlds, too. It makes my head hurt. (Actually, Bohm’s stuff is pretty painful as well, in a completely different way.) > [@](#): > > - “How do you make the leap from lacking behaviors that you associate with awareness to lacking awareness?”\* > > By induction, the entire basis of science. Since a behavior that’s associated with awareness is not itself an example of awareness, how do you justify the induction? > [@](#): > > These reports have never been reliable: they strongly appear to be simple dreams from when they were coming around, or when the anaesthesia was not dosed properly so they came round prematurely. Cite, please. ([Here’s mine](http://www.straightdope.com/classics/a990226.html) , for starters) > [@](#): > > I didn’t ask whether he experienced non-experience. I asked you a direct yes or no question: In your opinion, is the dosed twin **aware** at 1pm? In my opinion, it’s not a yes or not question. Only the twin has knowledge of her/his awareness, and he/she has only ever experienced being aware. Do **you** agree? If so, your question is malformed. If not, why not? ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [November 15, 2004, 10:22pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/88 "2004-11-15T22:22:12Z")
[Borrows heavily from Wittgenstein, if anyone cares] [In philosophical posts, I often use double quotes to emphasize a word _or_ concept, and single quotes to emphasize the symbol we use for such a concept.] First, let’s outline what “solipsism” means to me. Roughly, it is the idea that only the self is able to be appealed to for knowledge: “I am the only one who can know if I am right.” If you consider most applications of solipsism, you can see that this is indeed a generalization of it proper for the context at hand. Problems I have with this stem from its non-trivial application. Its trivial application (i.e. its general assertion) is indisputable just like any other “foundation” which stands without judgment. Initial remark: the expression of solipsism causes problems for any solipsist. That is, its formulation, discussed by multiple people, collapses quickly. _If only I could know, how could I assert solipsism in meaninful terms?_ The problem being, of course: how could anyone understand? – What is there to discuss? The solipsist here must retreat to the trivial application, in this case, that “Only I can know what I _really_ mean.” But if mere assertion is the grounds we deal with, than an assertion of any alternative in return is the only satisfactory way of dealing with it and we may consider the matter closed. It is in this where I find the biggest divide with solipsism: _meaning is not a private phenomenon_. I find the PLA referenced earlier to be the essential motivation for this based on what is initially an empirical approach. “What does it take for a word, phrase, action, etc. to have meaning?” Not in a philosophical sense, but in a “time before I took my first philosophy course” sense… before someone found out what solipsism was all about and why it was such a trump card (and why it didn’t amount to much as a trump card). A time before philosophical investigations when we learned to speak the language we will eventually use to discuss philosophy. That is, for example, how did I learn what “solipsism” is? --It is in such an investigation that we can find the escape, generally speaking. Practically speaking, the only escape from assertion is another assertion, so one could suggest simply that the only way to avoid solipsism is to assert otherwise. I have no real problem with that. But it is not very motivating. However, it is _not just_ that meaning is a social phenomenon, for not everyone will grant that right off. What else we may consider is knowledge, mistake, certainty, and doubt. One thing people often take for granted, especially those very keen in the natural sciences, is that skepticism should be the initial approach (e.g., “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence”). However, further reflection reveals that this is not the whole story (rhetorical point: consider, for example, a definition of an “extraordinary” claim). So to, does _doubt_ require a framework, a sense, such that when someone doubts something, it is clear what exactly they are doubting, and what the remedy is for that doubt. Doubt, like knowledge, requires a framework for sensibility. A test for some kinds of knowledge, for example, might require a demonstration (say, understanding the rules of addition). Doubting, in such cases, indicates not just a lack of certainty but includes with it “a means of satisfying”; that is, where I cannot be[come] certain, I cannot doubt. Where there is no hope for certainty, it makes no sense to doubt; and where there is no doubt, certainty also loses its sense. I wish to draw attention, specifically, to the phenomena that only have meaning in relation to others. That is, in this thread, knowledge and mistake, and certainty and doubt. Knowledge is generally recognized by means of some demonstration, given some criteria, that tries to exclude the possibility of mistake (and this is “accidentally getting it right” a la Gettier as well as “getting it wrong” i.e. “being mistaken”). This is not generally possible, however (a separate discussion), and so **we feel certainty with regards to knowledge, such that we no longer doubt the existence of a mistake.** I emphasize that to indicate the role these four terms play with respect to each other most plainly. Stated in analytic-speak for those so minded: one can be certain if and only if one can doubt; one can have knowledge if and only if it is possible or “makes sense” to make a mistake. The _means of satisfying_ one’s doubts entail the means of being or becoming certain (or, if you are keen on overqualifying such things, “more” certain [than one already is]). Doubt, as such, requires a ground, and that ground contains the means of assuading it (though it doesn’t promise anyone can meet the standard, that is another argument). Where one cannot be mistaken, one can neither be in the know; where one cannot find any way to doubt, one cannot be certain. Certainty assures the absence of doubt (not its meaninglessness), and knowledge assures the absence of mistake (but not its impossibility). Certainty is not, in practice, the _impossibility_ of doubt, it is its satisfaction (i.e. doubt is alleviated). Consider, for things you say you know: what would it be like to be mistaken? Have you a clear idea of how someone could point out to you that you were mistaken? _Are you aware of how to make a mistake in such things?_ Why is this important? To repeat: without doubt, there is no certainty; without the possibility of mistake, there cannot be knowledge. These things stand in contrast to the others. Where I cannot be mistaken, I cannot be said to know, for how would I demonstrate it? --knowing, as opposed to what? Being wrong? Being mistaken? But the solipsist admits he can make no mistake and admits no other standard. And this just means there is no standard, that everything is ‘right’. But then the solipsist does not have knowledge. Now I do not present this as an escape from solipsism; as stated previously, if it is asserted, it can only be met with assertion. If it is approached non-trivially (if it is explored but not asserted) then it collapses in these kinds of distinctions. Epistemologically, it permits everything because it can forbid nothing. But, as indicated, where one cannot be making a mistake, one cannot be said to know anything. That is just what “to know” means: the possibility of demonstration, and the conditions under which one would be mistaken. **Why does this matter in the current discussion?** Because it is just that ontological matters fall into these “assertions”. I can assert that there is only matter (or physical things), or I can assert that there is only mind, or I can assert that there is both matter and mind, but none of these will in fact represent knowledge because we cannot suggest 1) a means of demonstration that satisfies our curiosity and 2) the conditions that would show us we were mistaken in our belief. It is precisely for these reasons that I feel that such concerns should be 1) selected against, epistemically, and 2) not included in our epistemological investigations. **What impact does this have on epistemology in general?** Firstly, no particular epistemological limits are universal in themselves; they are definitional and procedural, but not immune to revision. This, of course, represents a kind of epistemological relativism, though it needn’t be thought of so drastically as to be _subjectivism_ which, for reasons outlined here and previously, I find impossible to hold up in a non-trivial sense. Secondly, that we cannot consider any correspondence to “how things really are” as a judge of truth because it is precisely “how things really are” that is outside epistemology. We seek knowledge, yes, and something we might seek is how things are, yes, but this is a definitional and procedural process which must admit the possibility of mistake, and so must admit the ability of revision, and so cannot be asserted as universally valid. This is not, of course, a weakening of the verb “to know” which, much to everyone’s discontent, has never allowed P to be inferred from “I know P” in the first place, so we are not leaving out anything we had, only acknowledging what we do not have in the first place. Epistemology, being in part a recognition of the limits of human knowledge, should generally point such things out. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, it allows for the possibility of disagreement about what limits are precisely and what procedural method best matches the possibilities of knowledge in the first place without the arrogance, IMO, that traditional _a priori_ accounts yield. Epistemology is the study of the nature and limits of human knowledge. Those who fail to recognize those limits do not have what I consider knowledge. Thankfully, I do not feel that I am alone in that, so there is no need for what I am calling trivial solipsism. … …But I am still, like, _totally_ right about all this. 😉 ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [November 15, 2004, 10:39pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/89 "2004-11-15T22:39:20Z")
Everyone knows, of course, that I make typos just to see if you were paying attention. _cough_ assuage _cough_ (among others I’m sure) I think in concepts often and not specific words, so something like “assuage” is “dissuade” often get mixed up to create new meaningless words. I don’t do this on purpose. Sorry. :o ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [November 16, 2004, 10:16am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/90 "2004-11-16T10:16:21Z")
**erl** : Thanks for that. I feel I’ve been rather the Inquisitor here: is there anything you’d like to ask about my rejection of solipsism (or anything else)? > [@](#): > > **erl** :without the possibility of mistake, there cannot be knowledge…Where I cannot be mistaken, I cannot be said to know, for how would I demonstrate it? Agreed (indeed, this is almost _another_ truism.) And we might _always_ be mistaken: If you _might_ be wrong, you cannot be _certain_. If you _can’t_ be wrong, you have merely _asserted_. (1+1=2 is not _knowledge_ since it _cannot_ be wrong.) There is thus **no such thing as knowledge** , only _belief, guess_ and _opinion_. So when you say that reality is mind-correlative, could you be wrong? Be careful: postulating a mind-independent reality _which you can know_ is a **contradiction** : it cannot be **right** , since the only things which could possibly do this thing called “knowing” are _minds_. We cannot, by definition, _know_ a mind-independent entity. We can only _believe it exists_. We might further believe that it somehow _produces mind from non-mind_. If you **do** believe so, why then, we are… _…like minded_. 🙂 **other-wise** : We are going around in circles, so I’ll politely decline another go on the carousel. Your citation clearly supported _my_ contention that the dose of anaesthetic is sometimes not _strong enough_, leaving motor function depressed but brain function elevated. In any case, I’d disagree with your final direct question: not even the twin _knows for certain_ that it is _his_ awareness, since someone else’s memories could be fed into his apparatus. Beliefs and opinions are ultimately _all we have_, unless we are following a _tautology_ (which one cannot logically _disagree_ with except to remark that they are rhetorically _useless_.) As for “it’s not a yes or no question”, my motivation for coaxing a guess one way or the other out of you regarding whether someone with little to no brain function is _aware_ or not is unfortunately somewhat lacking. I believe the inductive step is clear: the clock shows that hours have passed since I was last aware, and so I conclude that I was **not aware for those hours**. I believe all the evidence points to a resounding “_NO_” as clearly as the evidence points (_inductively_) to the sun rising tomorrow. But as ever, in order to avoid debates of attrition, I leave you the last word. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [November 16, 2004, 11:48am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/91 "2004-11-16T11:48:16Z")
> [@Sentient](#): > > I believe the inductive step is clear: the clock shows that hours have passed since I was last aware, and so I conclude that I was not aware for those hours. But, as you know, induction can be misleading. Perhaps the state of awareness in each context is different in essence such that there is no accessibility relation between them. Consider the General Modal Axiom: \<\>[sup]h[/sup][sup]i[/sup]A -\> [sup]j[/sup]\<\>[sup]k[/sup]A. Let h=1, i=0, j=0, k=-1. We have \<\>[sup]1[/sup][sup]0[/sup]A -\> [sup]0[/sup]\<\>[sup]-1[/sup]A. Or, \<\>A -\> ~\<\>A. Or, \<\>A -\> ~~~A. Or, \<\>A -\> ~A. Given the definition of relation — wRoR’v if and only if for some u, wRu and uR’v — the General Axiom gives us: wR[sup]h[/sup]v & wR[sup]j[/sup]u -\> Ex(vR[sup]i[/sup]x & uR[sup]k[/sup]x). So, wR[sup]1[/sup]v & wR[sup]0[/sup]u -\> Ex(vR[sup]0[/sup]x & uR[sup]-1[/sup]x). Since R[sup]0[/sup] is the Identity relation, we get: wR[sup]1[/sup]v & u=w -\> Ex(v=x & uR[sup]-1[/sup]x) Resolving the identities: uR[sup]1[/sup]v -\> uR[sup]-1[/sup]v So, obviously: uRv -\> u(~R)v These two modalities cannot access one another. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [November 16, 2004, 11:55am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/92 "2004-11-16T11:55:11Z")
And the sun might not rise tomorrow. My guess is that it will. My guess is that I was not “differently aware” when my brain function tended to zero for that hour, but not aware _at all_. Out of interest, what’s yours? ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [November 16, 2004, 12:18pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/93 "2004-11-16T12:18:26Z")
> [@Sentient](#): > > And the sun might not rise tomorrow. Indeed, it might not. > [@](#): > > My guess is that it will. Hopefully, you base that guess on what you deduce (rather than induce) from the earth’s rotation. > [@](#): > > My guess is that I was not “differently aware” when my brain function tended to zero for that hour, but not aware at all. > > Out of interest, what’s yours? My guess is that our reference frames are subjective, and that I can therefore know nothing about your awareness. But I know that if you have tied awareness to your brain function as an initial premise, then your conclusion is pretty much just a restatement of it. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [November 16, 2004, 1:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/94 "2004-11-16T13:03:07Z")
Not an intial premise, no: the explanation I choose from all the alternatives. “The sun will rise tomorrow” is an induction based on a deduction regarding Earth’s rotation, yes. “I was not aware for an hour” is _also_ an induction based on a deduction regarding Earth’s rotation. I deduced that the Earth’s rotation and my awareness became out of sync. I was _not aware of_ that fraction of a revolution. I assume _you’ve_ had general anaesthesia, **Lib**. What is your _guess_ regarding that period of its action? Do you agree with the statement “Under general anaesthetic, I was not aware”? ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [November 16, 2004, 1:55pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/95 "2004-11-16T13:55:05Z")
Well, I don’t really see it that way, regarding the sunrise. “The sun will rise tomorrow” is not an induction from the earth’s rotation; rather, it’s just a metaphor describing a point of view — much like you would describe someone walking away from you as “receding into the distance”. From their viewpoint, they are not receding at all. You are. Likewise, the sun isn’t rising. The earth is simply rotating around where you can see the sun. With respect to general anesthesia, I haven’t ever experienced it, so I’m realy not qualified to comment on it subjectively. But objectively, it could well be the sort of relation that I illustrated above: a reflective relation much like our present experience, or what the Bible calls “the blink of an eye”. Temporality is a funny thing. By reckoning, I’ve been here a long time. However, all of that is nothing but memory. It does not exist. Neither does any future exist. And the closer it gets to the end, the more the perspective is skewed. I feel like I am essentially the same person I always was. I’m often caught by surprise when I realize how old I am. A temporal reference frame cannot be objective simply because no two entities can have the same experience, owing to the nature of electromagnetism. (You and I are prevented from occupying the same space at the same time, and thus experiencing the same thing the same way.) Only an objective frame (wRv&wRu -\> v=u ) contextualizes the earth experience properly: that is to say, it has not yet happened, is ocurring, and has finshed — all at once. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [November 16, 2004, 1:58pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/96 "2004-11-16T13:58:43Z")
Well, I don’t feel I can be any more convincing. I _understand_ that awareness _seems_ continual and eternal, like a tape loop after splicing (indeed, I have repeatedly _agreed_ that awareness is ultimately _defined_ as that tape loop). But if we were to sit down together and watch the video of you lying there like a butchered pig while I dance around your dilated pupils bellowing “Hands up all those who are aware. Anyone? No?”, and you were to _still_ refuse to admit that you were _not aware_ in that video, well, I guess I might as well give up and go to the cinema to try and solipsistically imagine a good film. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [November 16, 2004, 2:16pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/97 "2004-11-16T14:16:07Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > Well, I don’t feel I can be any more convincing. I _understand_ that awareness _seems_ continual and eternal, like a tape loop after splicing (indeed, I have repeatedly _agreed_ that awareness is ultimately _defined_ as that tape loop). But if we were to sit down together and watch the video of you lying there like a butchered pig while I dance around your dilated pupils bellowing “Hands up all those who are aware. Anyone? No?”, and you were to _still_ refuse to admit that you were _not aware_ in that video, well, I guess I might as well give up and go to the cinema to try and solipsistically imagine a good film. Oh, well, you don’t need general anesthesia for that. You can do the same thing with [Marshall Stewart Ball](http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/1558747435/ref=sib_dp_pt/102-1605236-4417756#reader-link). He won’t even know you’re there. He’ll be composing poetry. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [November 16, 2004, 2:41pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/98 "2004-11-16T14:41:54Z")
In you **opinion** , given that we can’t **know** , could he compose poetry under general anaesthetic? ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [November 16, 2004, 2:52pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/99 "2004-11-16T14:52:31Z")
> [@](#): > > other-wise: We are going around in circles, so I’ll politely decline another go on the carousel. Your citation clearly supported my contention that the dose of anaesthetic is sometimes not strong enough, leaving motor function depressed but brain function elevated. Dude, remember this?: > [@](#): > > **SentientMeat** :As for my evidence that the organism on the table is not aware when under deep anesthesia, it does not respond even to being sliced up like halal livestock, nor does it do anything which I or any other organism does when I am “aware”… > > _Response by **other-wise** _: Again, this is evidence that the organism on the table is not responding. That’s it. Just not responding. How do you make the leap from lacking behaviors that you associate with awareness to lacking awareness? Especially when there have been numerous reports of utterly unresponsive patients who were nonetheless fully aware during their operations? You claimed the evidence for lack of awareness was that the organism does not respond. I (and Uncle Cecil) pointed out that the organism can be aware and still not respond. You got any evidence that _hasn’t_ been shot down? (If you want to stick with reduced levels of brain activity, you’ll have to show how you know where the cutoff point is between awareness and lack of awareness. Good luck.) > [@](#): > > In any case, I’d disagree with your final direct question: not even the twin knows for certain that it is his awareness, since someone else’s memories could be fed into his apparatus. How is this a problem? _He’s_ still _aware_ of the memories, even if they’re _someone else’s_ memories. You seem to still be implying that memories are identical to awareness. I’ve asked before, but I’ll try again: Why? > [@](#): > > I believe the inductive step is clear: the clock shows that hours have passed since I was last aware, and so I conclude that I was not aware for those hours. I’m happy to pass this baton to **Lib**. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [November 16, 2004, 3:12pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/100 "2004-11-16T15:12:53Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > In you **opinion** , given that we can’t **know** , could he compose poetry under general anaesthetic? I doubt it, but then I’m not sure that composing poetry is a criterion for awareness. A general anesthetic numbs the lizard part of the brain. Even the lungs, heart, and other vital organs are anesthetized. If you have tied awareness to the brain (especially the limbic system), then the awareness is numbed as well. Your kicking-and-screaming test really tells you nothing. A person in deep meditation or an autistic child may react to you the same way the anesthetized person reacts. So might Hellen Keller. Awareness can mean simply “a state of elementary or undifferentiated consciousness” (_World Collegiate_). What I seem to be getting from you is that all the sensory organs must be abuzz for there to be awareness, thus disqualifying quite much of the population, including all the above mentioned as well as newborn infants, comatose people, people on drugs, and so on. I tend to think of awareness as something more foggy than that. It is, metaphorically speaking, the place where a priori knowledge dwells. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934.md?page=4) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934.md?page=6)