# Justification of Epistemology **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [November 10, 2004, 12:09am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934 "2004-11-10T00:09:48Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 6
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [November 16, 2004, 3:42pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/101 "2004-11-16T15:42:47Z")
**SentientMeat** Look, I know all this minutiae is frustrating and if you want to bow out, I’ll just say thank you; you’ve given me much to think about. My whole point in engaging in this conversation was to try and demonstrate that when it comes to higher cognitive functions, _especially_ subjective awareness, we have a lot of interesting WAG’s but precious little evidence or even unambiguous, repeatable data. Certainly not enough to strongly support _any_ “ism”, even physicalism. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [November 16, 2004, 3:47pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/102 "2004-11-16T15:47:08Z")
> [@](#): > > **other-wise** :How is this a problem? He’s still aware of the memories, even if they’re someone else’s memories. You seem to still be implying that memories are identical to awareness. I’ve asked before, but I’ll try again: Why? My position is that sensory information sorted into memory as moderated by chemical emotion is [how the mind works](http://pinker.wjh.harvard.edu/books/htmw/index.html), that these elements [explain awareness](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness_Explained), or at least many aspects of it. I contend that in the video of me under general anaesthetic, I was **not aware**. My preferred _explanation_ for this, out of all of the alternatives, is that anaesthetic subdues brain function to the point where awareness disappears **for a time**. If your position is that these elements do _not_ explain the **origin** of awareness, so be it. I have agreed with you numerous times that one cannot be aware of non-awareness. I merely asked you wether you thought (not whether you **knew** ) that I was _not aware_ in that video of me. _I_ think so, in any case. This is my _position_, my _guess_, my _belief_, my _opinion_. I do not _know_ that I was not aware (or indeed, that the sun will appear to move relative to the horizon tomorrow or that I am not in the _Matrix_). If you could tell me what _your_ position actually _is_, we could have a useful conversation. > [@](#): > > **Lib** : What I seem to be getting from you is that all the sensory organs must be abuzz for there to be awareness. Well, there’s a difference between “abuzz”, “depressed” and _near zero_. When I casually remarked all those posts ago the “physical molecules can affect our minds or make it temporarily disappear entirely” I thought we might all reasonably agree that I was _not aware_ when under general anaesthetic, and that awareness might indeed be graded “foggily” as you put it from that non-existent state on up to this level I, and I believe _you_, experience. (I cannot **know** that you experience that level, or indeed _anything_, of course.) So I’ll try again: In your opinion, _was_ my awareness numbed in that hour? ---
**Author:** ![Frylock](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/f/ce7236/32.png) [@Frylock](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Frylock)\ **Post date:** [November 16, 2004, 4:17pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/103 "2004-11-16T16:17:45Z")
**Liberal** , I’ve forgotten some of my Modal Logic it seems. Could you remind me of something? What would the notation “\<\>[sup]-2[/sup]A” mean? “–\<\>A” or “-\<\>\<\>A”? In other words, if in the General Axiom I make h=1, i=0, j=-1, and k=-2, which of the following axioms do I thereby generate for my model: “\<\>A → -–\<\>A” or “\<\>A -\> --\<\>\<\>A” ? The more I think about it the more I think I remember it was the latter, and the more it seems that must be it in any case. But could you confirm this for me? Thanks… -FrL- > [@Liberal](#): > > But, as you know, induction can be misleading. Perhaps the state of awareness in each context is different in essence such that there is no accessibility relation between them. > > Consider the General Modal Axiom: \<\>[sup]h[/sup][sup]i[/sup]A -\> [sup]j[/sup]\<\>[sup]k[/sup]A. > > Let h=1, i=0, j=0, k=-1. > > We have \<\>[sup]1[/sup][sup]0[/sup]A -\> [sup]0[/sup]\<\>[sup]-1[/sup]A. > > Or, \<\>A -\> ~\<\>A. > > Or, \<\>A -\> ~~~A. > > Or, \<\>A -\> ~A. > > Given the definition of relation — wRoR’v if and only if for some u, wRu and uR’v — the General Axiom gives us: > > wR[sup]h[/sup]v & wR[sup]j[/sup]u -\> Ex(vR[sup]i[/sup]x & uR[sup]k[/sup]x). > > So, wR[sup]1[/sup]v & wR[sup]0[/sup]u -\> Ex(vR[sup]0[/sup]x & uR[sup]-1[/sup]x). > > Since R[sup]0[/sup] is the Identity relation, we get: > > wR[sup]1[/sup]v & u=w -\> Ex(v=x & uR[sup]-1[/sup]x) > > Resolving the identities: > > uR[sup]1[/sup]v -\> uR[sup]-1[/sup]v > > So, obviously: > > uRv -\> u(~R)v > > These two modalities cannot access one another. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [November 16, 2004, 4:49pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/104 "2004-11-16T16:49:55Z")
> [@](#): > > My position is that sensory information sorted into memory as moderated by chemical emotion is how the mind works, that these elements explain awareness, or at least many aspects of it. I contend that in the video of me under general anaesthetic, I was not aware. My preferred explanation for this, out of all of the alternatives, is that anaesthetic subdues brain function to the point where awareness disappears for a time. Your first link takes me to Steven Pinker’s “How the mind works”. Pinker has repeatedly stated, _just like I have been stating here_, that he thinks understanding subjective awareness, the subject under discussion here, is forever beyond our conceptual grasp (Actually, I’m less pessimistic; I just think it’s _currently_ beyond our conceptual grasp, and hence _there are no explanations for it_). Your second link takes me to Dennett’s “Consciousness Explained”. Since Pinker and Dennett **disagree** precisely on the irreducibility of subjective awareness, I’d be interesting in knowing how you manage to reconcile these opposing viewpoints, given that you’re presenting them in support of your position. > [@](#): > > If you could tell me what your position actually is, we could have a useful conversation. My position is that holding _any_ position that purports to explain awareness is unwarranted by the neurological “evidence”, and that it’s fruitful to examine why, when it comes to subjective awareness, conclusive evidence is so damn _elusive_. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [November 16, 2004, 5:18pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/105 "2004-11-16T17:18:50Z")
Well, my reading of the two (and others) is that they _all_ largely _agree_ on most aspects of cognitive science and what physical behaviour _correlates_ with what subjective experience. I would agree that Pinker is far more cautious regarding what he would consider a complete _explanation_ of subjective awareness than Dennett’s bold (and IMO overblown) claims. But I’d suggest that this is rather more the usual level of disagreement in _any_ scientific field: what satisfies Dennett does not quite count as an “explanation” to Pinker, in the same way that some archaeologists are satisfied by a single meteor impact at the Cretaceous-Tertiary boundary and others are not, or some geophysicists say that magnetic north is still not genuinely _explained_. Can we _reduce_ subjective awareness to physical cortices and memory? Not very well, no. **Yet**. And no better than we reduce the global _climate_ to energy and water vapour. But the physicalist does not quite go so far: his position is simply that nothing exists _but_ the physical, even if everything cannot yet be _fully_ explained therewith. Climatology and geophysics might be utterly baffling, but we would still not appeal to the **non-physical** when we hit a snag. In the same way, cognitive science and neuropsychology are only in their infancy, and explaining the origin of mind is the challenge of the millennium, but proposing such a _dualism_ as phsyical and non-physical is, to me, worth a slashing with Ockham’s Razor. As far as I could tell, neither Pinker nor Dennett suggested such a dualism. Do you? And I’m sorry to harp on about it, but again I ask: In your **opinion** , was I **aware** under general anaesthetic? ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [November 16, 2004, 8:00pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/106 "2004-11-16T20:00:23Z")
> [@](#): > > Well, my reading of the two (and others) is that they _all_ largely _agree_ on most aspects of cognitive science and what physical behaviour _correlates_ with what subjective experience. 1. They agree on many aspects of cognitive science (visual and aural processing, motor output, etc), but not subjective awareness (which is what we’ve been concerning ourselves with here). 2. There is tremendous disagreement among researchers over _which_ physical behaviors (By “physical behaviors” I’m assuming that you’re referring primarily to differences in brain-states) correlate with _which_ subjective experiences. Every attempted mapping I’ve seen has several (contradicting) competitors. (Admittedly, this is due at least in part to the immense complexity involved) 3. Physical behaviors still only _correlate_ with awareness; if you’re presenting them as evidence, you haven’t shown how they’re supposed to _explain_ or _account for_ awareness. > [@](#): > > As far as I could tell, neither Pinker nor Dennett suggested such a dualism. Do you? I’m suggesting there’s no current neurological “evidence” for or against dualism. (Also, correct me if I’m misreading you, but in your description of physicalism, dualism is impossible by definition, right?) > [@](#): > > And I’m sorry to harp on about it, but again I ask: In your **opinion** , was I **aware** under general anesthetic? I’ve answered this several times: In my opinion, I have no way of knowing whether or not you were aware under general anesthetic and neither does anyone else. It’s like you’re asking me: “In your **opinion** , is there a greenish rock buried somewhere on Saturn?” How the hell would _I_ know? ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [November 16, 2004, 8:20pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/107 "2004-11-16T20:20:00Z")
> [@Frylock](#): > > **Liberal** , > > I’ve forgotten some of my Modal Logic it seems. Could you remind me of something? > > What would the notation “\<\>[sup]-2[/sup]A” mean? “–\<\>A” or “-\<\>\<\>A”? In other words, if in the General Axiom I make h=1, i=0, j=-1, and k=-2, which of the following axioms do I thereby generate for my model: > > “\<\>A → -–\<\>A” > > or > > “\<\>A -\> --\<\>\<\>A” > > ? > > The more I think about it the more I think I remember it was the latter, and the more it seems that must be it in any case. But could you confirm this for me? > > Thanks… > > -FrL- I’ve actually never seen it. But given the S4 Axiom (A -\> A), I would read \<\>[sup]-2[/sup]A as ~(\<\>\<\>)A, or simply ~\<\>A (which = ~A). ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [November 16, 2004, 8:36pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/108 "2004-11-16T20:36:01Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > So I’ll try again: In your opinion, _was_ my awareness numbed in that hour? No doubt unintentionally, you seem to be implying that I have evaded your question. I might ask you five times whether, in your opinion, I was mugwax when I passed out. If your responses are an attempt to get me to get me to clarify what I mean by mugwax, then I cannot call you evasive. I’ll say again, if you’ve tied awareness to the brain, then definitively, you cannot be aware when your brain is anesthetized. There is no need to draw any conclusion, because the premise states the condition. But under that condition, you were not aware yesterday, because yesterday-brain does not exist. I’m beginning to wonder whether you aren’t really asking about memory rather than awareness. Since you were on the table breathing, and the anesthetist was monitoring the EEG of your frontal lobe activity, it is entirely possible that you were aware but the anesthetized hippocampus simply doesn’t remember any of it. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [November 16, 2004, 9:52pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/109 "2004-11-16T21:52:08Z")
Very well, **Lib** an d **other-wise** , according to _your_ definition of “awareness”, whatever that might be, is there any _difference_ in it when under general anaesthetic? **other-wise** : I’ve been happy for you to declare your position as the _fence_ and to endure the pot-shots therefrom, but I think you overestimate the strength with which I am putting forward my position here. If I could ask you to read the entire thread again, you’ll find I’ve stated the same reservations over and over. I am simply telling you where my Belief-O-Meter needle points. I am hypothesising a computer which sorts sensory input into memory, moderated by chemical emotion and which labels memories using language. I am saying that I believe that this hypothetical computer would have **a** subjective experience (which we _couldn’t know_). Not the subjective experience anything like mine - maybe more like that of an insect or a lizard, but **a** subjective experience. Sensory input, memory and chemical emotion are all demonstrably physical, insofar as cognitive science studies the physical. So when I say that I guess the mind is essentially physical, I am simply extending what I say about gravity, or magnetic north, or the weather, to the mind, **even though NONE of those things are yet explained properly**. That physical molecules have such a profound effect on the mind is merely another datum in that overall view. Just as one does not conclude that Darwinism is justified by a single fact, so it is with my view of physicalism: it is the position I have come to accept after surveying all of the available facts. So, in the interests of a genuine debate, I politely request: Please provide a word, or phrase, or paragraph, or whatever, which best describes your philosophical position, and we can compare yours to mine. I admit that mine is highly imperfect, as I have said many times in this very thread, but we might find that yours is in a different league altogether. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [November 16, 2004, 11:35pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/110 "2004-11-16T23:35:21Z")
> [@Sentient](#): > > Very well, Lib an dother-wise, according to your definition of “awareness”, whatever that might be, is there any difference in it when under general anaesthetic? I like the “state of elementary or undifferentiated consciousness” definition. That allows drugged people, autistic people, and newborns to be “aware”. So far as I can tell, there is no difference in it when under general anesthetic. (It is, after all, undifferentiated.) But that is not to say that you will remember what you were conscious of when the hippocampus recovers. An eternal awareness (if you will allow me a slight digression) can be imagined to be like that. There are no memories because there is no past. ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [November 17, 2004, 12:58am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/111 "2004-11-17T00:58:16Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > **erl** : is there anything you’d like to ask about my rejection of solipsism (or anything else)? Perhaps later, yes. > [@](#): > > And we might _always_ be mistaken… But the point we can take from my exposition is that this _is_ just a truism. You seem to take it in some Cartesian Medidator sense. It is simply the character of empirical investigations. > [@](#): > > If you _can’t_ be wrong, you have merely _asserted_. (1+1=2 is not _knowledge_ since it _cannot_ be wrong.) Funny you should mention arithmetic. Do you remember, at all, learning it? Did you make mistakes…? > [@](#): > > So when you say that reality is mind-correlative, could you be wrong? I have two responses open to me. One is a favorite of mine: “I can’t possibly be making a mistake. --But some day, rightly or wrongly, I may think I realize that I was not competent to judge.” 🙂 The other is: the only way I can imagine that I would be wrong is if someone could demonstrate mind-independent categories _or_ could demonstrate that what we know, or say we know, we know without appeal to such categorization. I am not clear how this could possibly be done, and so that means, no, I cannot be wrong (but some day…). I tend to look at it as a definitional framework for explanations rather than something “I know”, and earlier I even mentioned that I try to shift the burden of proof onto my detractors. A low tactic, to be sure, but some say turnabout is fair play. 😉 > [@](#): > > Be careful: postulating a mind-independent reality _which you can know_ is a **contradiction** : it cannot be **right** , since the only things which could possibly do this thing called “knowing” are _minds_. But that is quite the point, epistemologically speaking. **What is the nature and limit of human knowledge?** > [@](#): > > We cannot, by definition, _know_ a mind-independent entity. We can only _believe it exists_. I would find such a belief useful if I could see benefit I might have from it. I am not looking for the ultimate science experiment or a mystical path to enlightenmight, just a little hint that it serves some purpose to posit mind-independence. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [November 17, 2004, 1:56am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/112 "2004-11-17T01:56:29Z")
> [@erislover](#): > > I would find such a belief useful if I could see benefit I might have from it. I am not looking for the ultimate science experiment or a mystical path to enlightenmight, just a little hint that it serves some purpose to posit mind-independence. One purpose (and it might take a bit of thought to discern how spectacular it really is) would be awareness from an objective reference frame. Mind-dependency necessitates subjectivity. ---
**Author:** ![DSeid](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/dseid/32/20194_2.png) [@DSeid](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DSeid)\ **Post date:** [November 17, 2004, 3:17am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/113 "2004-11-17T03:17:07Z")
A little drive by … Much of this current conversation seems a bit moot to me. Being someone interested in how things really do work I wonder if many of the classic epistemolgic questions are really moot at this point. Or if they are, even worse, trite. For practical purpose a brain independent reality exists and it is made of something. Our quest for knowledge is to form systems that increasingly better model that reality as we are capable of percieving it using our cognitive systems and their extensions. Our awareness, our consciousness, is an emergent property (not an epiphenomenom) needed to tell self from nonself and to achieve goals. It emerges from a self referential patterns that includes itself as an object set. And the aside, some serious physicists wonder if the physical is an illusion and all reality is information at its core. It can all come round after all. ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [November 17, 2004, 3:17am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/114 "2004-11-17T03:17:26Z")
Or, as I have been arguing, intersubjectivity, there being no basis for knowledge subjectively. 🙂 ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [November 17, 2004, 3:25am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/115 "2004-11-17T03:25:42Z")
That was @ **Lib**. **DSeid** , “for all practical purposes…” For _practical_ purposes we simply assume the world is how it appears. That position, termed ‘naive realism’, is idealism at heart. Idealism in its many appearances is not a popular position, philosophically, but I find some of them quite workable, and strongly feel that those represent the “best” positions to work from, given the many reasons I’ve outlined. As ever, I shy away from mind-dependence and strike the empirical chord with “mere” correspondence–that is, our categorization is the beginning of the analysis, and because of that, we cannot reach outside of it. I do not feel this constitutes denying reality any special stature. Recognizing what we have to work with is not a matter of denial. > [@](#): > > Our quest for knowledge is to form systems that increasingly better model that reality as we are capable of percieving it using our cognitive systems and their extensions. But the very interesting part is not that they are oracles, but that they are _extensions_. They do not probe in any special way, they become another sensory apparatus. Much like when I prod something with a stick, I deduce its hardness not because I have sensed it, and not because “hardness” is a “real” property (whatever that means, which is usually “mind-independence”), but because the stick is an extension of my own senses. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [November 17, 2004, 3:27am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/116 "2004-11-17T03:27:33Z")
> [@](#): > > Very well, Lib an dother-wise, according to your definition of “awareness”, whatever that might be, is there any difference in it when under general anaesthetic? Yes, there was a difference in my awareness when I was under general anesthetic (see post #52). But then, what-I’m-aware-of and _how_ I’m aware (sober? drunk? sleepy? engrossed?) is _always_ changing. It’s just being aware that doesn’t change. > [@](#): > > So, in the interests of a genuine debate, I politely request: Please provide a word, or phrase, or paragraph, or whatever, which best describes your philosophical position, and we can compare yours to mine. I think I can take a crack at this, but could you narrow it down a little? You’d like me to describe my philosophical position on…? ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [November 17, 2004, 3:28am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/117 "2004-11-17T03:28:03Z")
> [@erislover](#): > > Much like when I prod something with a stick, I deduce its hardness not because I have sensed it… That is, not because I have sensed it with the “normal” senses. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [November 17, 2004, 9:54am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/118 "2004-11-17T09:54:34Z")
> [@](#): > > **Lib** : I like the “state of elementary or undifferentiated consciousness” definition. That allows drugged people, autistic people, and newborns to be “aware”. So far as I can tell, there is no difference in it when under general anesthetic. And so you would not say that general anaesthetic makes you _un_conscious? (Indeed, that there is _any such thing_ as unconsciousness or _lack_ of awareness, nor that physical molecules such as alcohol or LSD _affect_ consciousness, mind or awareness?) If this is indeed your position, I feel we have found our point of irreducible divergence and must leave it to our audience to decide which is the most reasonable option. > [@](#): > > **erl** :Funny you should mention arithmetic. Do you remember, at all, learning it? Did you make mistakes…? **If** 1+1=2 is right, **then** I was sometimes mistaken. _Can_ 1+1=2 be **wrong** , and if not, can it really be considered “knowledge”? And, conversely, how can something _uncertain_ be called “knowledge”? Surely a more accurate word would be _belief, guess_ or _opinion_ (regardless of one’s _confidence_ therein)? > [@](#): > > What is the **nature** and limit of human knowledge?..[I’d like] just a little hint that it serves some purpose to posit mind-independence. bolding mine. I feel we have explored the **limit** of knowledge _ad nauseam_. I’d now like to turn to its **nature** , and specifically its **origin**. Could you please provide a brief description of **how** you think entities which could know things (_ie._ minds) came to exist where none did before? > [@](#): > > **other-wise** : It’s just being aware that doesn’t change. Well, as I said to **Lib** , if your position is that I **was** _aware_ when under anaesthetic, I must simply disagree and leave our respective positions to the judgement of the audience. That you nevertheless consider that physical molecules _affect_ awareness is an important datum in itself, since it implies that awareness must at least have some physical _element_. > [@](#): > > I think I can take a crack at this, but could you narrow it down a little? You’’d like me to describe my philosophical position on……? Metaphysics. My position is that gravity, magnetism and the weather are all physical things, even if they have not yet been fully _explained_ physically: I do not propose a dualism of physical things and Higgs bosons, nor physical things and ice ages, nor physical things and Earth’s poles. I extend this to the mind and awareness (while recognising than we can no more grasp what it’s _like_ to be another mind any more than what it’s like to be a boson, or a magnet, or a cloud): I contend that non-physical things are an _unnecessary_ dualism if the existence of the physical is postulated. So, are you a _realist_ or an _idealist_, a _dualist_ or a _monist_, a _theist_ or _atheist_? Do you consider that awareness is a **fundamentally different thing** from physical things like gravity, life and weather? ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [November 17, 2004, 11:12am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/119 "2004-11-17T11:12:37Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > And so you would not say that general anaesthetic makes you _un_conscious? (Indeed, that there is _any such thing_ as unconsciousness or _lack_ of awareness, nor that physical molecules such as alcohol or LSD _affect_ consciousness, mind or awareness?) If this is indeed your position, I feel we have found our point of irreducible divergence and must leave it to our audience to decide which is the most reasonable option. Who knows? Biology hasn’t defined life. Physics hasn’t defined gravity. Medicine hasn’t defined consciousness. Philosophy hasn’t even defined existence. I imagine that it is possible for one part of the brain to be conscious (keeping in mind the term is vague) and another part to be unconscious. I mean hell, you could blow the whole thing up and surely it will have no physical mechanism for consciousness. But for me, the question is whether the brain is the person. I think our irreducible divergence has been covered long ago. Man is a dual creature, having a mind and a spirit. It is the latter that is his essence, and the latter that preceded his existence as an animal. He is both physical and metaphysical. It seems to me that the physicalist must accept the axiom \<\>A -\> A. If something can be true, then it must be true. If in some world among the many worlds it is possible that God exists, then God must exist. And because He must exist, He actually exists in every world: \<\>A \<-\> A. Yes, I realize that it is an unfortunate contradiction that the physicalist must accept the possiblity of the metaphysical, but such is the nature of untenable positions. It is no different from the skeptical epistemologist who declares axiomatically that all axioms are invalid. The physicalist must introduce entities in an attempt to eliminate the metaphysical. These entities are unnecessary, and as such, violate Ockham’s Razor. It all comes back to my original comment on the matter of awareness: it stands to reason that there are two different awarenesses, one temporal and one eternal, and neither accessible to the other. The temporal awareness is indistinguishable from memory; the eternal awareness is, obviously, without memory. What is there to remember when there is no past? Someone asked about the practicality of this discussion. As in all things, what is practical depends on what you are practicing. If your concern is with temporal awareness, then it is practical that you compare anesthetized brains with awake brains (and, of course, deal with the subnormative brains of infants and opium addicts). But if your concern is with eternal awareness, then it is practical to go about the business of studying eternity. In the end, for me, epistemology is justified by its objectivity. God knows. And that is the source of all justifed knowledge. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [November 17, 2004, 11:31am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934/120 "2004-11-17T11:31:39Z")
> [@](#): > > It seems to me that the physicalist must accept the axiom \<\>A -\> A. Pretty symbols on a page. The physicalist denies the metaphysical, and considers ontology a bunch of vanilla-flavoured hooey. The metaphysical is itself an unnecessary entity which receives a deserved Chelsea grin from good old Ockham, and an eternal awareness utter a philosophical chocolate teapot of wishful thinking. It stands to reason that just as there were no minds or awareness for 13 billion years, so there will be none after death. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934.md?page=5) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/justification-of-epistemology/273934.md?page=7)