# Khalilzad Cable: Militias and "Neighborhood Governments" Run Baghdad **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [June 19, 2006, 11:23am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276 "2006-06-19T11:23:27Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 4
**Author:** ![BrainGlutton](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/82dd89/32.png) [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)\ **Post date:** [June 21, 2006, 1:40am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276/61 "2006-06-21T01:40:45Z")
BTW, **Ryan,** why do you keep referring to Coalition troops as “MNF”? What’s that stand for? ---
**Author:** ![GIGObuster](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/gigobuster/32/421_2.png) [@GIGObuster](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/GIGObuster)\ **Post date:** [June 21, 2006, 1:42am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276/62 "2006-06-21T01:42:52Z")
[QUOTE=Ryan\_Liam] Thinking and _actually being_ are not one in the same thing. The Iraqi Government is the legitimate representative of the people of Iraq, it was duly elected by the people it governs. Neither the Afghan Parchams or the Vichy Government were elected, nor were they represenative. So using michael moore-esque comments of them being ‘minutemen’ is laughable. [/QUOTE] :dubious: Knowing how the “legitimate” government had to spike the original leader the Shiites wanted thanks to pressure from the US, and Bush ignoring on purpose requests by the new leaders to set a time line to leave. Then I have to say that a comment like in this quote is the one that deserves to be laughed at. [http://thinkprogress.org/2006/06/16/vp-requests-timetable](http://thinkprogress.org/2006/06/16/vp-requests-timetable) ---
**Author:** ![Ryan\_Liam](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/ryan_liam/32/3965_2.png) [@Ryan\_Liam](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Ryan_Liam)\ **Post date:** [June 21, 2006, 1:50am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276/63 "2006-06-21T01:50:08Z")
> [@](#): > > Could you walk me through that thought process please? You implied that the majority don’t have to be factor in the nature of a resistance organisation, only a section of the populace, which implies that that section of the populace is the only patriotic element of that country, and the rest are traitors to ‘the cause’ because they don’t want to participate in resisting the ‘occupier’ even though that occupier has enabled 2 thirds of the countrys population to elect people _they want_ into office. > [@](#): > > What about foreign targets? Of course they support attacks against foreign targets, but it’s surprising they don’t want attacks against Iraqi security forces, forces which those foreign occupiers have created. > [@](#): > > Again, could you explain this, please? Sorry, i’m just not understanding what you’re saying here. Sadr rebelled in 2004, launched numerous attacks against Iraqi security forces and MNF in general, however his party is now a part of the Iraqi government, a government in part created by those occupying powers which he was against. > [@](#): > > Knowing how the “legitimate” government had to spike the original leader the Shiites wanted thanks to pressure from the US, and Bush ignoring on purpose requests by the new leaders to set a time line to leave. Then I have to say that a comment like in this quote is the one that deserves to be laughed at. > > [http://thinkprogress.org/2006/06/16...uests-timetable](http://thinkprogress.org/2006/06/16...uests-timetable) Nice try, but that kind of political decision making has to be made within in the Iraqi Parliament, and voted on, it cannot be made arbitrality on the request of a vice President and President, both which have less powers than that of the PM. ---
**Author:** ![GIGObuster](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/gigobuster/32/421_2.png) [@GIGObuster](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/GIGObuster)\ **Post date:** [June 21, 2006, 2:03am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276/64 "2006-06-21T02:03:13Z")
[QUOTE=Ryan\_Liam] Nice try, but that kind of political decision making has to be made within in the Iraqi Parliament, and voted on, it cannot be made arbitrality on the request of a vice President and President, both which have less powers than that of the PM. [/QUOTE] Nice tap dancing there. Backing up a little: > [@](#): > > Sadr rebelled in 2004, launched numerous attacks against Iraqi security forces and MNF in general, however his party is now a part of the Iraqi government, a government in part created by those occupying powers which he was against. Last time I heard of them he (and almost all other Shiites) demanded the US and coalition forces to cede military control of operations (or leave). (at the same time that Iran was in the middle negotiating the impasse that Iraqis had when deciding the composition of the “legitimate” government.) Guess what the US did? ---
**Author:** ![RTFirefly](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/c77e96/32.png) [@RTFirefly](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RTFirefly)\ **Post date:** [June 21, 2006, 2:11am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276/65 "2006-06-21T02:11:53Z")
[QUOTE=Ryan\_Liam] Then it fucks up, then I’m wrong, and **you can be happy** [/quote] I think I’ve said all I need to say to you [in the Pit](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=376560). ---
**Author:** ![Revenant\_Threshold](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/f1d935/32.png) [@Revenant\_Threshold](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Revenant_Threshold)\ **Post date:** [June 21, 2006, 2:12am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276/66 "2006-06-21T02:12:24Z")
[QUOTE=Ryan\_Liam] You implied that the majority don’t have to be factor in the nature of a resistance organisation, only a section of the populace, which implies that that section of the populace is the only patriotic element of that country, and the rest are traitors to ‘the cause’ because they don’t want to participate in resisting the ‘occupier’ even though that occupier has enabled 2 thirds of the countrys population to elect people _they want_ into office. [/quote] No, i’m saying \*both \* those groups can be patriotic. They likely have the same end goals, but they see different means of getting to them. > [@](#): > > Of course they support attacks against foreign targets, but it’s surprising they don’t want attacks against Iraqi security forces, forces which those foreign occupiers have created. Not really. There’s a big difference between fighting occupiers and fighting collaborators. Sure, there may be dislike (even hate) for those who work with the coalition, but it’s a lot harder (especially when power is at a local level, as is the case here) to attack people you know rather than people you don’t. > [@](#): > > Sadr rebelled in 2004, launched numerous attacks against Iraqi security forces and MNF in general, however his party is now a part of the Iraqi government, a government in part created by those occupying powers which he was against. So? In both cases he was (presumably) acting in the way he thought best to get the end result he wanted. I notice also you mention that the government was in part created by the coalition troops; and as such not by Iraqi voters. ---
**Author:** ![scabpicker](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/scabpicker/32/8268_2.png) [@scabpicker](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/scabpicker)\ **Post date:** [June 21, 2006, 5:53am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276/67 "2006-06-21T05:53:06Z")
[QUOTE=Squink] Off topic I know, but what’s the theme music for that animation? It puts me in mind of [Kelly’s Heroes](http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0065938/), an excellent movie btw, but that can’t be right, can it? [/QUOTE] If I am not mistaken, it is [_Patton_](http://imdb.com/title/tt0066206/). Really, they used the music from _Patton._ It was on last week, so I am pretty certain. I’ll also have to point out, that it is simply a flash animation that shows where an operation _occurred_. It comes complete with troop movement arrows, as if they are manuvering against a formation. I think they are really thinking it is WWII they are depicting. Since there are no results of any of the actions, and Baghdad is considered a “Clear and Hold” operation, which remains on the map after its first action, it seems that they are listing any action, successful or not. Not much of a cite for anyone being driven from anywhere. [This site](http://icasualties.org/oif_a/CasualtyTrends.htm) has a breakdown of US casualties by period and location. The most recent period (Dec 15 - present ) shows that soldiers are still dying in those areas, and soldiers are dying overall at roughly the same rate. So, if they did drive them out of those areas, into Baghdad, it does not seem like it really did much good. Since, it seems clear that now, they really do not control Baghdad to a meaningful degree. As for an 80% voting rate meaning a 20% support rate for insurgents, or any variation on an 80% voting rate meaning anything: In Lebanon, the warring parties often formed “national unity” governments. They did not do much to stop its civil war, for the most part. In fact, their first civil war was started due to one of the parties having a hard time in the polls. Even if the support rate of the various insurgent groups did total just 20% (which I do not think is the case), that percentage of the population can tear the rest of the population a new one, if they are being armed from outside, which is likely the case, wouldn’t you say? ---
**Author:** ![RTFirefly](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/c77e96/32.png) [@RTFirefly](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RTFirefly)\ **Post date:** [June 21, 2006, 12:56pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276/68 "2006-06-21T12:56:53Z")
One frame for thinking of the separate Iraqi ethnic and religious groups would be Spain, with its Catalans, Basques, and so forth. [Here’s a piece from yesterday’s Sydney paper about the Catalan autonomy vote.](http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/catalan-autonomy/2006/06/19/1150701484520.html) It would be silly to say that one can’t be a Catalan patriot simply because Catalans are a minority within the larger nation of Spain, which has a legitimate democratic government. Stephen Maturin might be a fictional character, but his creator, the late Patrick O’Brian, clearly would have thought it silly too. 🙂 ---
**Author:** ![RTFirefly](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/c77e96/32.png) [@RTFirefly](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RTFirefly)\ **Post date:** [June 21, 2006, 1:50pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276/69 "2006-06-21T13:50:09Z")
One final rebuttal to **Ryan\_Liam** as he slides into _persona non grata_ status: [QUOTE=Ryan\_Liam] Given the population of Iraq, give me a percentage of how much the Iraqi government has influence over them as opposed to the militias and insurgents. [/quote] OK, it wasn’t the wording: the underlying question was stupid. > [@](#): > > A control of an area by a certain group gives you the example of what would follow if they controlled the country. Since the minstry of Defence controlled said areas, it gives you an example of how the Government would run Baghdad if properly secured. And the lessons of this example are? > [@](#): > > :rolleyes: > > Missing the point once again, the insurgency in Iraq lost much of the battlespace it owned in the Anbar province due to an increased Iraqi Army and MNF force projection into the area. This doesn’t change the fact that **Ryan** ’s ‘cite’ is a flash animation at somewhere called [billroggio.com](http://billroggio.com). IOW, he has no cite. > [@](#): > > Adding to the fact that the former head of Al Queda stated that most of his operations would be centred on Baghdad, it’s one of the reasons as to why the Capital is suffering extraordinary amounts of violence. And this is a good thing _how??_ If AQ in Iraq (not AQ itself) can cause “the Capital [to] suffer extraordinary amounts of violence”, _that’s unequivocally bad news_. Even if it means they’re not fucking up lightly-populated Anbar while they’re doing it. > [@](#): > > Then it fucks up, then I’m wrong, and you can be happy, but I don’t see that situation coming. Aside from the Pitted statement, the fact that **Ryan** “do[es]n’t see that situation coming” doesn’t make it any less likely. The track record is, security’s been going downhill in Iraq, _despite the presence of 138,000 US troops and 227,000 quality Iraqi security forces._ He has no evidence for why this trend should reverse itself. > [@](#): > > No I don’t, putting words into my mouth won’t help. Sounds like **Ryan** is just unwilling to acknowledge an unsupported assertion as an unsupported assertion. > [@](#): > > We all know Iraqis joining the armed forces need large amounts of training, which takes time and energy to accomplish, there’s also the need to follow up on this with adequate weapons and supplies readily available for them to fight to the best of their abilities. All in which after 3 years, will take some time before it becomes a viable independent force which doesn’t need MNF help. If it’s not happening in 3 years, that leaves unanswered the question of exactly how long it will take. > [@](#): > > That’s because of the issues of leadership and weapons, a soldier is only as good as the commanding officer leading them, not to mention good supply and ability to project force into troubled areas. Yet the Iraqi Army is able to field upto 111 divisions into counter terrorism operations, of which 63 are able to take the lead. And the results are what we see. Oops. > [@](#): > > Other than the fact 70,000 Iraqi troops, police forces backed up by MNF forces set up in the Capital? How long will they be there? Will they be doing anything useful, or just terrorizing the citizenry? Are they _still_ there? (I haven’t heard anything about them in several days.) > [@](#): > > Because the people in those neighbourhoods are the ones who’ll eventually decide whether or not to rally around the government they elected. I don’t think the Government is ‘seemingly unable’ to stop them since they’re carrying out countless counter terrorism operations throughout the country every day. And the German Army in 1944-45 was undoubtedly “carrying out countless counter” US-UK-USSR “operations throughout the country every day” as they were losing the war. > [@](#): > > In counter insurgency, the decision comes to whether to focus intelligence on serious challenges to the government, and ignore localised terrorism in neighbourhoods for the time being whilst this is being dealt with, or to concerntrate force projection into those neighbourhoods, knowing full well that without accurate intelligence, you can anger the population further with random arrests and attacks. If the government is losing Baghdad as the result of a rational decision about resource allocation, what lesson does a rational person draw from that? > [@](#): > > Now that you mention it. > > [Read](http://hrw.org/reports/2004/iraq0804/7.htm) > > Serious abuses of this type committed by Kurdish forces and armed Kurdish civilians diminished significantly as U.S. forces consolidated control over Kirkuk and began acting against Kurdish abuses. It is also likely that the Kurdish leadership itself acted against the abuses, fearing an international outcry.123 \*\*When Human Rights Watch revisited Arab neighborhoods in Kirkuk in mid-June 2003, the Arab residents claimed that the situation had stabilized and that they were no longer receiving threats to abandon their homes. \*\* Many were, however, considering selling their homes, as explained by one resident: “Now, the situation is good but we are cautious. So many families are selling their homes and moving to their original areas. For the past months, our situation has been very unstable—there is no transitional government formed, there is no law, and we don’t know what will happen to us.”124 > > The abuses committed by armed Kurdish elements, while inexcusable, were of a limited nature and it is unclear whether they were formally sanctioned by Kurdish leaders. The fact that only a limited number of killings and other abuses were reported strongly suggests that the Kurdish leadership—probably under pressure from their American allies—took strong steps to prevent wider abuses by their forces. However, it is clear that Kurdish leaders are under tremendous pressure to rectify the historic injustices faced by their supporters, and may not be able to control indefinitely the demands for redress by their supporters. Bolding mine. The situation in Kirkuk has been stabilized since mid-2003?? I don’t think there’s a cite for that. ( **Ryan** ’s cite doesn’t support that. He can go back there and figure out why, if he wants. :rolleyes:\*\*) ---
**Author:** ![Ryan\_Liam](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/ryan_liam/32/3965_2.png) [@Ryan\_Liam](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Ryan_Liam)\ **Post date:** [June 21, 2006, 10:32pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276/70 "2006-06-21T22:32:15Z")
> [@](#): > > OK, it wasn’t the wording: the underlying question was stupid. It’s a simple enough question, I’ll dumb it down further if you like Given the population of Iraq now, what percentage do you think it has influence over compared to militias and insurgents, it’s a simple enough question, estimates welcome. > [@](#): > > And the lessons of this example are? Iraqi Government control will be beneficial to the population once it’s ability to permamently control the country is established. > [@](#): > > This doesn’t change the fact that Ryan’s ‘cite’ is a flash animation at somewhere called [billroggio.com](http://billroggio.com). IOW, he has no cite. Bill roggio has been to Iraq, he’s been to [the Anbar province](http://billroggio.com/archives/2005/10/a_journey_to_an.php) > [@](#): > > \*A Journey to Anbar Province > (This post will remain at the top of the page for several days) > > In the coming weeks I will be taking part in an opportunity that, while not risk free, is more than I can pass up. To make it happen, I will need assistance and good fortune. I’d like your assistance in sending me to Iraq. > > A couple of weeks ago I received an invitation to visit and tour the operations environment I’ve been covering here for the last year. That invitation, from senior Marine officers with the Regimental Combat Team - 2, 2nd Marine Division, presents an opportunity for me to provide first hand reporting from Iraq, as well as to continue to provide context to the reports coming from other sources as I’ve done here at the Fourth Rail. > > Current planning centers on leaving in mid-November, and I plan to be out of country for a month and in theater as long as possible. I will be taking an unpaid leave of absence from my current employment, and hopefully returning to find that I’m still employed. And I’ll need lots of assistance to make this a reality. Foremost is a means to defer the significant cost of going. Additionally I am seeking the media credentials necessary for entry into Iraq. > > My daily reporting on the war will continue, although not here at the Fourth Rail. Along with Steve Schippert and Marvin Hutchens, I will continue to provide high value media content, along with other extensions to the coverage I have offered here. We will soon be announcing the launch of a new site focused on national and international security threats and the U.S. led war on terror. Some time before my departure I will move my coverage to that site – [ThreatsWatch.Org](http://ThreatsWatch.Org). \* If that isn’t enough, the Times (a UK paper) has an article on him going to Iraq. > **[Latest news & breaking headlines](https://www.thetimes.com/)** > > The latest breaking UK, US, world, business and sport news from The Times and The Sunday Times. Go beyond today's headlines with in-depth analysis and comment. > [@](#): > > And this is a good thing how?? If AQ in Iraq (not AQ itself) can cause “the Capital [to] suffer extraordinary amounts of violence”, that’s unequivocally bad news. Of course it is, but it’s also indicating of how much time and energy Al Queda in Iraq and numerous other insurgent groups are spending to disrupt life in Baghdad, but it’s large scale violence is not representative of the entire state of Iraq. \*Al-Qaida in Iraq has been increasingly focusing its attacks on Baghdad rather than on U.S. targets in western Iraq. “Baghdad is divided according to geographical area, and we know the al-Qaida leaders in each area,” al-Gharrawi said. \* [http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060614/ap\_on\_re\_mi\_ea/iraq\_060613183208](http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060614/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_060613183208) > [@](#): > > Even if it means they’re not fucking up lightly-populated Anbar while they’re doing it. Of course :rolleyes: > [@](#): > > Aside from the Pitted statement, the fact that Ryan “do[es]n’t see that situation coming” doesn’t make it any less likely. The track record is, security’s been going downhill in Iraq, despite the presence of 138,000 US troops and 227,000 quality Iraqi security forces. He has no evidence for why this trend should reverse itself. Because Iraqi Army Police and Troops need more time to establish proper logistics and capable offensive ability independent of MNF support? Not to mention waiting until the fruits of NATO officer training south of Baghdad and support from British and US military institutions to build up a capable Iraqi military leadership comes about. These things take time, and in an insurgency, you know for a fact they’ll throw everything they can at these nacisent security forces to make sure they fail. > [@](#): > > Sounds like Ryan is just unwilling to acknowledge an unsupported assertion as an unsupported assertion. You made the assertion that I implied more people joining security forces = less insurgency, when you know that training and ability to be effectively put out into the field are other points to the question. > [@](#): > > If it’s not happening in 3 years, that leaves unanswered the question of exactly how long it will take. Yes it does, but since a country like Iraq has an ethnic, sectarian and religious dimension to it, most of which are violent, then one can assume it’s going to take more than three years to ‘get the job done’ > [@](#): > > And the results are what we see. Oops. Oops, I’m glad you see the incompetence of the Iraqi Army amusing or cause for sarcasm, but they’re doing an excellent job in the field even though they’re plagued by inefficiencies and bad equipment. ARVN they’re not. Basic officer training [takes nine months at most](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/08/01/wirq01.xml) (for Iraq) and we’ve been in the country for 3 years, you do the math. > [@](#): > > How long will they be there? Will they be doing anything useful, or just terrorizing the citizenry? Are they still there? (I haven’t heard anything about them in several days.) [Iraqi troops arrest leader of insurgent murder squad](http://breakingnews.iol.ie/news/story.asp?j=186636042&p=y86636748) > [@](#): > > And the German Army in 1944-45 was undoubtedly “carrying out countless counter” US-UK-USSR “operations throughout the country every day” as they were losing the war. Yes, the Iraqi Government is comparable to the Nazi Government in Berlin fighting 3 superpowers in 1944-45 in which millions were killed for the ideology of one dictator.:rolleyes: > [@](#): > > If the government is losing Baghdad as the result of a rational decision about resource allocation, what lesson does a rational person draw from that? In every war, insurgent or otherwise, there are limits concerning what a government can do with the resources it’s got, if however, the resources it has increases and they have the ability to increase the success of pacification, then of course the favour will turn to that of the Iraqi Government. Intelligence gathering takes time. > [@](#): > > Bolding mine. > > The situation in Kirkuk has been stabilized since mid-2003?? I don’t think there’s a cite for that. (Ryan’s cite doesn’t support that. He can go back there and figure out why, if he wants. ) We’re talking about the ethnic tensions right? Well, what it’s describing is the stabilisation of Kurds (most of whom are still camped outside the city) being unable to forceably take over homes, and the PUK and KDP have taken action to prevent foreable relocation by Kurdish returnees. Bombings and attacks are by insurgents who want to increase the ethnic tension within Kirkuk to make it perpetually unstable. I don’t see large scale insurgent activity being committed by angry Arab residents or rogue Peshmerga units wanting to kick the other side out. ---
**Author:** ![Voyager](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/voyager/32/133_2.png) [@Voyager](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Voyager)\ **Post date:** [June 21, 2006, 11:12pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276/71 "2006-06-21T23:12:38Z")
I’m getting this flashback to 1969 here. (I think my hair is about to grow down to my shoulders again. 🙂 ) Vietnam had a democratically elected government, and the Vietnamese forces kept taking on a bigger and bigger role. One difference - if I recall, Saigon was fairly safe to move around in. Insurgencies on the run tend not to flee to the very center of power of their opposition and then function effectively there. As for the security forces, I wonder what percentage of these new recruits are insurgents who have infiltrated. It appears that if you are living in a Sunni area, a Shiite government policeman is not a welcome sight. ---
**Author:** ![Ryan\_Liam](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/ryan_liam/32/3965_2.png) [@Ryan\_Liam](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Ryan_Liam)\ **Post date:** [June 21, 2006, 11:26pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276/72 "2006-06-21T23:26:00Z")
> [@](#): > > I’m getting this flashback to 1969 here. (I think my hair is about to grow down to my shoulders again. ) Vietnam had a democratically elected government, and the Vietnamese forces kept taking on a bigger and bigger role. One difference - if I recall, Saigon was fairly safe to move around in. That’s because Saigon had an army with the ability to secure the capital through ruthless military suppression, Diem anyone? One difference though, there is no Iraqi equivalent of a North Vietnam for it to be invaded by. > [@](#): > > **South Vietnamese Politics** > > In 1967 South Vietnam held its first elections under the new system. Following the elections, however, it switched back to a presidential system. The military nominated Nguyen Van Thieu as their candidate, and he was elected with a plurality of the popular vote. Thieu quickly consolidated power much to the dismay of those who hoped for an era of more political openess. **He was re-elected unopposed in 1971, receiving a suspiciously high 94% of the vote on an 87% turn-out. Thieu ruled until the final days of the war, resigning in 1975. Duong Van Minh was the nation’s last president and unconditionally surrendered to the Communist forces a few days after assuming office** > **[South Vietnam](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Vietnam#Politics)** > > The Republic of Vietnam (RVN; Vietnamese: Việt Nam Cộng hòa, VNCH), commonly known as South Vietnam, was a country in Southeast Asia that existed from 1955 to 1975. It first garnered recognition in 1949 as the associated State of Vietnam within the French Union, with its capital at Saigon. Since 1950, it was a member of the Western Bloc during the Cold War. Following the 1954 partition of Vietnam, it became known as South Vietnam and was established as a republic in 1955. Although South Vietna... > [@](#): > > Insurgencies on the run tend not to flee to the very center of power of their opposition and then function effectively there. Not unless the population is large enough for them to hide within. > [@](#): > > As for the security forces, I wonder what percentage of these new recruits are insurgents who have infiltrated. It appears that if you are living in a Sunni area, a Shiite government policeman is not a welcome sight. Well considering the majority of Iraq’s insurgents were within Sunni Areas, it obviously made the recruitment of local Sunnis into Government forces more difficult, which therefore forced the Governments hand into relying on Shia and Kurdish security forces until this could be compensated. [http://www.mnf-iraq.com/Daily/May/060501.htm](http://www.mnf-iraq.com/Daily/May/060501.htm) Taken from Wikipedia _April 30, 2006 The first entirely Sunni class of Iraqis graduates from army basic training at Habbaniyah, Iraq[16]. It is the first visible sign of a new coalition strategy aimed at recruiting Sunnis in particular, hoping that a greater inclusion of Sunnis into the army will help quell the insurgency as well as sectarian violence. These group of graduates from Al-Anbar province are scheduled to serve in the 1st and 7th Iraqi Army Divisions._ ---
**Author:** ![RTFirefly](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/c77e96/32.png) [@RTFirefly](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RTFirefly)\ **Post date:** [June 22, 2006, 1:48am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276/73 "2006-06-22T01:48:06Z")
[QUOTE=Ryan\_Liam] It’s a simple enough question, I’ll dumb it down further if you like Given the population of Iraq now, what percentage do you think it has influence over compared to militias and insurgents, it’s a simple enough question, estimates welcome. [/quote] It was already too dumb to make sense. > [@](#): > > Iraqi Government control will be beneficial to the population once it’s ability to permamently control the country is established. And RTFirefly control will be beneficial to the population once it’s ability to permamently control the country is established. And I’ve provided as much evidence for my assertion as you have for yours. But seriously, once I’m in full control of Iraq, it’ll be in great shape. > [@](#): > > Bill roggio has been to Iraq, he’s been to [the Anbar province](http://billroggio.com/archives/2005/10/a_journey_to_an.php) > > If that isn’t enough, the Times (a UK paper) has an article on him going to Iraq. > > [Latest news & breaking headlines | The Times and The Sunday Times](http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,20411-1847715,00.html) Afer reading about this damned war for three years, I’ve never heard of this guy. So Anbar trip or no, I’m not buying into his authority. But even if he speaks _ex cathedra_, that map doesn’t prove anything. > [@](#): > > Of course it is, but it’s also indicating of how much time and energy Al Queda in Iraq and numerous other insurgent groups are spending to disrupt life in Baghdad, but it’s large scale violence is not representative of the entire state of Iraq. Sure, it’s taking a lot of time and energy. But if we were making progress, _they wouldn’t be able to do this at all_, no matter how much time and energy they were investing. Because they weren’t able to do this last year, or in 2004 or 2003. > [@](#): > > \*Al-Qaida in Iraq has been increasingly focusing its attacks on Baghdad rather than on U.S. targets in western Iraq. “Baghdad is divided according to geographical area, and we know the al-Qaida leaders in each area,” al-Gharrawi said. \* Well, yeah. I’ve agreed for the sake of argument that the insurgency is all too successfully concentrating on Baghdad at the expense of Anbar. We just draw different conclusions as to what that means. > [@](#): > > Because Iraqi Army Police and Troops need more time to establish proper logistics and capable offensive ability independent of MNF support? We’re their logistical support now. Will they provide better logistics than we do? I kinda doubt it. And their offensive capability with our logistic support should similarly be at least as good as that without it. > [@](#): > > Not to mention waiting until the fruits of NATO officer training south of Baghdad and support from British and US military institutions to build up a capable Iraqi military leadership comes about. These things take time, and in an insurgency, you know for a fact they’ll throw everything they can at these nacisent security forces to make sure they fail. And again, you just assume that things will get better as a result of some future event. I’m getting kinda tired of **Ryan\_Liam** ’s Church of the Presumptuous Assumption. > [@](#): > > You made the assertion that I implied more people joining security forces = less insurgency, when you know that training and ability to be effectively put out into the field are other points to the question. OK, let’s roll tape: > [@Ryan\_Liam](#): > > Or that combine that with the fact that many in Iraq see that joining the security forces will eventually help stabilise the country, but let’s ignore that, no one in Iraq has a sense of patriotism or a willingness to defend their country right? Admittedly, that isn’t extremely intelligible, but that’s what it _appears_ to mean. > [@](#): > > Yes it does, but since a country like Iraq has an ethnic, sectarian and religious dimension to it, most of which are violent, then one can assume it’s going to take more than three years to ‘get the job done’ A shame we didn’t know this before invading. Oh, wait: lots of people discussed that problem at considerable length. But the Administration didn’t pay much mind. At any rate, the sectarian and ethnic violence has been _increasing_ over time. We were closer to having dealt with it last year than this year. And closer in 2004 than in 2005. And so forth. You see, there are these things called ‘metrics’. The idea is, you measure how much time, money, etc. it might take to achieve a goal by measuring how much progress you’ve made and at what cost, and how much progress you still need to make. Then you can estimate how far you’ve come, and how far you still have to go. But given that we’re getting _further_ from our goal, depite our time, money, effort, and lives spent, the presumption is that it will take us an infinite amount of all of the above to get to where we want to be. > [@](#): > > Oops, I’m glad you see the incompetence of the Iraqi Army amusing or cause for sarcasm, but they’re doing an excellent job in the field even though they’re plagued by inefficiencies and bad equipment. ARVN they’re not. Yet another unsupported assertion. > [@](#): > > Yes, the Iraqi Government is comparable to the Nazi Government in Berlin fighting 3 superpowers in 1944-45 in which millions were killed for the ideology of one dictator.:rolleyes: Are you really that obtuse? I guess so. The point was that the number of operations run doesn’t mean jack shit as far as progress towards a stable security situation goes. > [@](#): > > In every war, insurgent or otherwise, there are limits concerning what a government can do with the resources it’s got, if however, the resources it has increases and they have the ability to increase the success of pacification, then of course the favour will turn to that of the Iraqi Government. Another of your patented “If things get better, then they’ll get better” arguments. [/quote] We’re talking about the ethnic tensions right? Well, what it’s describing is the stabilisation of Kurds (most of whom are still camped outside the city) being unable to forceably take over homes, and the PUK and KDP have taken action to prevent foreable relocation by Kurdish returnees. [/QUOTE] What it’s describing happened _years ago_. **It’s not current.** Your cite is dated **August 2004.** You’re using it to describe what’s happening there _now_. I really can’t see any point in continuing this discussion. Presumptuous assumptions, two-year-old cites to describe the current state of ethnic cleansing in Kirkuk, repeated “if things improve, they’ll improve” arguments, unintelligible comments…enough. ---
**Author:** ![MrDibble](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mrdibble/32/114_2.png) [@MrDibble](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/MrDibble)\ **Post date:** [June 22, 2006, 10:31am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276/74 "2006-06-22T10:31:51Z")
[All quiet on the Western (Anbar) front, yep-yep-yep.](http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/06/22/iraq.main/index.html) ---
**Author:** ![Cervaise](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/cervaise/32/16693_2.png) [@Cervaise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Cervaise)\ **Post date:** [June 22, 2006, 2:35pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276/75 "2006-06-22T14:35:42Z")
[QUOTE=Ryan\_Liam] Given the population of Iraq now, what percentage do you think it has influence over compared to militias and insurgents, it’s a simple enough question, estimates welcome. [/QUOTE] I don’t have a specific figure, but I am fairly certain that they can be recognized on sight; [here’s a Flash animation that proves my point](http://yoga.at.infoseek.co.jp/flash/kikkomaso.swf). ---
**Author:** ![Ryan\_Liam](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/ryan_liam/32/3965_2.png) [@Ryan\_Liam](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Ryan_Liam)\ **Post date:** [June 22, 2006, 10:36pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276/76 "2006-06-22T22:36:48Z")
> [@](#): > > It was already too dumb to make sense. Ok, again I will ask the question, what’s your estimate of the Iraqi Governments influence of the population of the country, compared to insurgent and militia influence. > [@](#): > > And RTFirefly control will be beneficial to the population once it’s ability to permamently control the country is established. And I’ve provided as much evidence for my assertion as you have for yours. But seriously, once I’m in full control of Iraq, it’ll be in great shape. Given the fact no Iraqi army bases have been overrun by insurgents, or large amount of Police stations (you can never count on all Police Stations not being suspectible to being overrun) either, I can count on Iraq security forces being increasingly up to the challenge to counter the insurgency. Only a matter of time. > [@](#): > > Afer reading about this damned war for three years, I’ve never heard of this guy. So Anbar trip or no, I’m not buying into his authority. But even if he speaks ex cathedra, that map doesn’t prove anything. So you’re willing to believe what Madmonk has been talking about in Iraq, willing to believe what other people who aren’t in favour of this war are experiencing, yet you’re unwilling to take note of someone who’s travelled with US troops in one of the most dangerous parts of Iraq? > [@](#): > > Sure, it’s taking a lot of time and energy. But if we were making progress, they wouldn’t be able to do this at all, no matter how much time and energy they were investing. Because they weren’t able to do this last year, or in 2004 or 2003. No, that’s because they had taken over Fallujah, Mosul, Tall Afar, Samarra, and didn’t need to place emphasis on the capital when they were doing so well in destroying Government order in the Sunni regions of Iraq. > [@](#): > > Well, yeah. I’ve agreed for the sake of argument that the insurgency is all too successfully concentrating on Baghdad at the expense of Anbar. We just draw different conclusions as to what that means. The map shows the US and Iraqi forces moving into Anbar to establish themselves, since Anbar is sparsely populated, it makes it more difficult for insurgents to move around freely, so the concerntration would be Baghdad, where there is a relatively large population, cover, available arms, and a population which is at best suspicious of Shias. > [@](#): > > We’re their logistical support now. Will they provide better logistics than we do? I kinda doubt it. And their offensive capability with our logistic support should similarly be at least as good as that without it. Their support network only has to be better than the insurgents. > [@](#): > > And again, you just assume that things will get better as a result of some future event. I’m getting kinda tired of Ryan\_Liam’s Church of the Presumptuous Assumption. Then that’s fine then, but don’t expect a well trained first class Iraqi military in only 3 years of us invading the country. > [@](#): > > Admittedly, that isn’t extremely intelligible, but that’s what it appears to mean. All I was saying that those thousands of people who apply to the Iraqi Army are doing it more than for just money or food, patriotism can come into play. > [@](#): > > A shame we didn’t know this before invading. Yeah, that’s why those Kurdish, Shia safe havens were set up. Oh, wait: lots of people discussed that problem at considerable length. But the Administration didn’t pay much mind. > [@](#): > > At any rate, the sectarian and ethnic violence has been increasing over time. We were closer to having dealt with it last year than this year. And closer in 2004 than in 2005. And so forth. And 2003 to 2002, oh which brings us to the already sectarian deathhole that Iraq already was, but then that was State Terrorism comitting those acts, not insurgents. > [@](#): > > You see, there are these things called ‘metrics’. The idea is, you measure how much time, money, etc. it might take to achieve a goal by measuring how much progress you’ve made and at what cost, and how much progress you still need to make. Then you can estimate how far you’ve come, and how far you still have to go. Then lets have a look Iraqi Elections 3 times Iraqi Constitution Iraqi Army and Police taking up more responsibilty Iraqi Army and Police taking far more casualties than MNF forces. > [@](#): > > But given that we’re getting further from our goal, depite our time, money, effort, and lives spent, the presumption is that it will take us an infinite amount of all of the above to get to where we want to be. Quote: Oops, I’m glad you see the incompetence of the Iraqi Army amusing or cause for sarcasm, but they’re doing an excellent job in the field even though they’re plagued by inefficiencies and bad equipment. ARVN they’re not. > [@](#): > > Yet another unsupported assertion. You’ve said it in another thread. > [@](#): > > **RTFirefly** > > Corrrelation? > > Vietnam: repeated claims that the ARVN was making progress towards being able to fight the war without our assistance. Claims all proved to be wrong. > > Iraq: repeated claims that the Iraqi security forces were making progress towards being able to fight the surgency on their own. Claims so far all proved to be wrong. [http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=7478030&postcount=169](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=7478030&postcount=169) Quote: Yes, the Iraqi Government is comparable to the Nazi Government in Berlin fighting 3 superpowers in 1944-45 in which millions were killed for the ideology of one dictator. > [@](#): > > Are you really that obtuse? I guess so. You’re claiming that 1944-1945, Nazi Germany is comparable to Iraq being able to fight off insurgents, in my view I don’t see the correlation. > [@](#): > > The point was that the number of operations run doesn’t mean jack shit as far as progress towards a stable security situation goes. It does if it brings about any meaningful results. Quote: In every war, insurgent or otherwise, there are limits concerning what a government can do with the resources it’s got, if however, the resources it has increases and they have the ability to increase the success of pacification, then of course the favour will turn to that of the Iraqi Government. > [@](#): > > Another of your patented “If things get better, then they’ll get better” arguments. No, I was pointing out the limitations of security forces being able to prevent every terrorist attack. Since Iraqi intelligence services are being rebuilt as we speak, it’s going to be difficult to limit terrorist attacks no? > [@](#): > > I really can’t see any point in continuing this discussion. Presumptuous assumptions, two-year-old cites to describe the current state of ethnic cleansing in Kirkuk, repeated “if things improve, they’ll improve” arguments, unintelligible comments…enough. If there was evidence of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Kirkuk, it would of surfaced in the news plenty of times, my cite provided the facts of what the Kurdish leadership is doing in conjunction with the MNF to prevent this. ---
**Author:** ![Voyager](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/voyager/32/133_2.png) [@Voyager](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Voyager)\ **Post date:** [June 22, 2006, 11:06pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276/77 "2006-06-22T23:06:51Z")
[QUOTE=Ryan\_Liam] That’s because Saigon had an army with the ability to secure the capital through ruthless military suppression, Diem anyone? One difference though, there is no Iraqi equivalent of a North Vietnam for it to be invaded by. [/quote] Too bad that ruthless army wasn’t so good fighting outside the city. Are you saying the South Vietnamese army was more effectve than the Iraqi one? Probably true, but it doesn’t bode well for the future. The old Iraqi army was, but a lot of them were Sunnis and on the other side. As for the election, I’m sure you are too young to remember the optimism about them - the light at the end of the tunnel. As for the power grab, do you really think an awful lot happened without the tacit approval of the US? Guys who didn’t play ball got themselves deposed or worse. > [@](#): > > Not unless the population is large enough for them to hide within. Large and supportive enough, you mean. There were a few people in Saigon also. > [@](#): > > Well considering the majority of Iraq’s insurgents were within Sunni Areas, it obviously made the recruitment of local Sunnis into Government forces more difficult, which therefore forced the Governments hand into relying on Shia and Kurdish security forces until this could be compensated. Not quite what I meant. More like they’re going to disappear you - even if you’re a big name attorney. Some may be insurgents in stolen uniforms, true. Of course disbanding the army, another clever BushCo move, didn’t help. ---
**Author:** ![Ryan\_Liam](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/ryan_liam/32/3965_2.png) [@Ryan\_Liam](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Ryan_Liam)\ **Post date:** [June 22, 2006, 11:47pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276/78 "2006-06-22T23:47:22Z")
> [@](#): > > Too bad that ruthless army wasn’t so good fighting outside the city. Are you saying the South Vietnamese army was more effectve than the Iraqi one? Probably true, but it doesn’t bode well for the future. The old Iraqi army was, but a lot of them were Sunnis and on the other side. The reasons as to why Saigon was reasonably safe for US personnel was because by the time US forces landed in SV, there was already a sizeable security infrastructure in place. Not to mention, the most loyal and effective ARVN forces were stationed in the Capital. As for the Iraqi Army, since it’s predecessor was disbanded, we’re building it from the ground up, one which doesn’t rely on loyalty of a particular ethnic group to get the job done. > [@](#): > > As for the election, I’m sure you are too young to remember the optimism about them - the light at the end of the tunnel. As for the power grab, do you really think an awful lot happened without the tacit approval of the US? Guys who didn’t play ball got themselves deposed or worse. An election that Iraqis can participate in and elect who they want undoubtebly eases the tension of maintaining an Iraqi Governing Council no? If we’re winning ‘hearts and minds’ we have to make sure we at least let Iraqis vote for who they want? > [@](#): > > Large and supportive enough, you mean. There were a few people in Saigon also. Yeah, I know about Tet and ‘mini Tet’ but you’re forgetting, in Vietnam there were different rules applied, such as disregarding civilian protection for one, and the ability of the SV to suppress the population. > [@](#): > > Not quite what I meant. More like they’re going to disappear you - even if you’re a big name attorney. Some may be insurgents in stolen uniforms, true. > > Of course disbanding the army, another clever BushCo move, didn’t help. Disbanding the army was a mistake yes, but what was a bigger mistake was not intiating a full demobilisation and disarmament of Iraqi Troops, not paying them, or providing pensions to retired military officers. ---
**Author:** ![Dumbguy](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/2bfe46/32.png) [@Dumbguy](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dumbguy)\ **Post date:** [June 23, 2006, 6:02pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276/79 "2006-06-23T18:02:40Z")
[QUOTE=Ryan\_Liam] Ok, again I will ask the question, what’s your estimate of the Iraqi Governments influence of the population of the country, compared to insurgent and militia influence. [/QUOTE] Based on the Altice-Breven Order Metric (developed in the late 40’s and used throughout the Cold War to measure political/military/social stability of nations/regions/cultural blocks), Coalition Forces currently control about 47% of Iraq (down from 52% in April). The number is lower if you weight for spatial diffusion as opposed to population density, but in Iraq the former metric seems largely irrelevant. It should be noted there’s a 3-5% degree of error due to (known and unknown) timing latencies in gathering data. P values within groups are constant, but values across groups must be measured in the same time slice (generally less than three days is considered optimal), but hat hasn’t always been possible in some regions of Iraq. This means it’s possible (although unlikely) the visible decrease in Order over the last few months is capricious (The August numbers should resolve the issue). In any event it’s safe to assume the number is in the upper 40s or low 50s. Over 65% is considered the threshold for a region to be considered a ‘State’ by the scale. Most of Europe (for reference) is in the 85%-95% range. Under 30% is considered anarchy. Somalia is around 27% by the last measure (further testing will probably be impossible there). ---
**Author:** ![Ryan\_Liam](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/ryan_liam/32/3965_2.png) [@Ryan\_Liam](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Ryan_Liam)\ **Post date:** [June 23, 2006, 7:29pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276/80 "2006-06-23T19:29:17Z")
[QUOTE=Dumbguy] Based on the Altice-Breven Order Metric (developed in the late 40’s and used throughout the Cold War to measure political/military/social stability of nations/regions/cultural blocks), Coalition Forces currently control about 47% of Iraq (down from 52% in April). The number is lower if you weight for spatial diffusion as opposed to population density, but in Iraq the former metric seems largely irrelevant. It should be noted there’s a 3-5% degree of error due to (known and unknown) timing latencies in gathering data. P values within groups are constant, but values across groups must be measured in the same time slice (generally less than three days is considered optimal), but hat hasn’t always been possible in some regions of Iraq. This means it’s possible (although unlikely) the visible decrease in Order over the last few months is capricious (The August numbers should resolve the issue). In any event it’s safe to assume the number is in the upper 40s or low 50s. Over 65% is considered the threshold for a region to be considered a ‘State’ by the scale. Most of Europe (for reference) is in the 85%-95% range. Under 30% is considered anarchy. Somalia is around 27% by the last measure (further testing will probably be impossible there). [/QUOTE] Thank you, would it be safe to assume that this point seems to be a point of transistion? Where the options of total state collapse and state being strengthened could be chosen? [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276.md?page=3) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276.md?page=5)