# Khalilzad Cable: Militias and "Neighborhood Governments" Run Baghdad **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [June 19, 2006, 11:23am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276 "2006-06-19T11:23:27Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 3\ **Page:** 5
**Author:** ![RTFirefly](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/c77e96/32.png) [@RTFirefly](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RTFirefly)\ **Post date:** [June 24, 2006, 2:33am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276/81 "2006-06-24T02:33:36Z")
[QUOTE=Ryan\_Liam] Ok, again I will ask the question, what’s your estimate of the Iraqi Governments influence of the population of the country, compared to insurgent and militia influence. [/quote] Who cares about _influence_? An insurgency doesn’t work like that. The government is a government to the extent that it can maintain a monopoly on major violence. An insurgency tries to demonstrate that the government isn’t actually governing anything. > [@](#): > > Given the fact no Iraqi army bases have been overrun by insurgents, or large amount of Police stations (you can never count on all Police Stations not being suspectible to being overrun) either, See above. You’re thinking of set-piece conflicts between rival nations, not official governments versus insurgencies. > [@](#): > > I can count on Iraq security forces being increasingly up to the challenge to counter the insurgency. Only a matter of time. I’m so glad for you. > [@](#): > > So you’re willing to believe what Madmonk has been talking about in Iraq, willing to believe what other people who aren’t in favour of this war are experiencing, yet you’re unwilling to take note of someone who’s travelled with US troops in one of the most dangerous parts of Iraq? I think you’re confusing my having expressed gratitude towards **madmonk** with _reliance_ on him. And no, I still don’t know who this guy is, except by your worthless say-so, and a map with arrows doesn’t mean shit anyway. > [@](#): > > No, that’s because they had taken over Fallujah, Mosul, Tall Afar, Samarra, and didn’t need to place emphasis on the capital when they were doing so well in destroying Government order in the Sunni regions of Iraq. OK, so the Sunni insurgents could have taken over Baghdad all along, but instead _chose_ to take over cities in the Sunni part of Iraq. (You realize that makes no sense, of course.) But now they’ve taken over Baghdad as an act of desperation. > [@](#): > > The map shows the US and Iraqi forces moving into Anbar to establish themselves, since Anbar is sparsely populated, it makes it more difficult for insurgents to move around freely, so the concerntration would be Baghdad, where there is a relatively large population, cover, available arms, and a population which is at best suspicious of Shias. So IOW, the US/Iraqi forces are giving up Baghdad, where you say an insurgency has lots of advantages, to control Anbar, where you say it doesn’t. Yeah, _that_’s gonna lead to victory. > [@](#): > > Their support network only has to be better than the insurgents. So if the Iraqi army’s logistics go from being the US Army to just being better than the insurgents’, that big step down will actually _improve_ the Iraqi army’s performance? > [@](#): > > Then that’s fine then, but don’t expect a well trained first class Iraqi military in only 3 years of us invading the country. And next year it’ll be ‘only 4 years’, and the year after that, if there’s still something that can be called Iraq, it’ll be ‘only 5 years’, and so forth. I don’t “expect a well trained first class Iraqi military in only 3 years”, but the point is, you’re making claims that they’re going to be good enough to defeat the insurgency one of these days. The problem is, the insurgency has improved significantly over time; nobody’s making excuses for them. They’re playing major-league terror _now_, and still getting better at it. They aren’t waiting around for the Iraqi security forces to be good next year or the year after. > [@](#): > > And 2003 to 2002, oh which brings us to the already sectarian deathhole that Iraq already was, but then that was State Terrorism comitting those acts, not insurgents. No doubt Saddam was brutal, but even under Saddam, kids could play outside, you could sip coffee at a sidewalk cafe without having to worry about being blown up, women could hold real jobs, drive cars, and didn’t have to cover themselves from head to toe, and in general you could live a normal life if you didn’t criticize the regime. Now the threats to one’s life are legion, because that’s what happens when a society breaks down. > [@](#): > > Then lets have a look > > Iraqi Elections 3 times > > Iraqi Constitution > > Iraqi Army and Police taking up more responsibilty All of these are ‘progress’ in a _pro forma_ sense. Until such events are demonstrated to improve the security situation, they’re not progress. It’s like my handing out pieces of paper and claiming they’re money; it won’t make anyone any richer. > [@](#): > > Iraqi Army and Police taking far more casualties than MNF forces. More casualties = progress. Uhhuh. > [@](#): > > You’ve said it in another thread. > > [http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=7478030&postcount=169](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=7478030&postcount=169) I sure did. Thanks for making my point for me. > [@](#): > > It does if it brings about any meaningful results. You had been citing the _operations_ as being evidence of progress in and of themselves. Thank you for concurring on reflection that that’s not so. And of course, we have no evidence of meaningful results; all we have is your hope. Hope is not a plan, and it damned sure ain’t a proof. > [@](#): > > No, I was pointing out the limitations of security forces being able to prevent every terrorist attack. Since Iraqi intelligence services are being rebuilt as we speak, it’s going to be difficult to limit terrorist attacks no? And it’s getting more difficult each year. Guess the insurgents are being rebuilt faster than Iraqi intel is. I’m gonna call this and its numerous variants the “Iraq is a work in progress, and things are bound to get better” argument. It really isn’t an argument so much as a repeated assertion that in one way or another, we can’t expect the Iraqi army/intel/whatever to be at full speed yet, but it’ll turn that corner soon and things will improve. Maybe they _are_ getting better in hidden ways that haven’t borne fruit yet, but soon will make a major difference. You can’t prove it’s so, though, any more than I can prove it’s not. What I (and anyone else) _can_ look at is the track record: go back and look at each June from 2003 to 2006. Each June, things are worse in Iraq than the previous June. The insurgency has extended its reach much more rapidly than the Iraqi security forces, who still can’t operate on their own, and I’m still having a hard time coming up with stuff other than military press releases that says they’re even taking the lead role and being effective at it. > [@](#): > > If there was evidence of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Kirkuk, it would of surfaced in the news plenty of times, my cite provided the facts of what the Kurdish leadership is doing in conjunction with the MNF to prevent this. To repeat: your cite is **two years old**. I’d certainly trust it as an account of where things stood in Kirkuk in the summer of 2004. Anyway, [it’s been in the news](http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy/dreams_3598.jsp): > [@](#): > > Ethnic cleansing is sweeping the country. From Kirkuk in the north to Baghdad in the middle to Basra in the south, Kurds are driving out Turkmen and Arabs, Shi’a are killing Sunni, and the insurgency enjoys near unanimous support among Sunni. ---
**Author:** ![Ryan\_Liam](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/ryan_liam/32/3965_2.png) [@Ryan\_Liam](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Ryan_Liam)\ **Post date:** [June 24, 2006, 3:23am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276/82 "2006-06-24T03:23:08Z")
> [@](#): > > **RTFirefly** > > Who cares about influence? An insurgency doesn’t work like that. The government is a government to the extent that it can maintain a monopoly on major violence. An insurgency tries to demonstrate that the government isn’t actually governing anything. Look, influence on the part of fighting within an insurgency undoubtebly relies on some amount of influence, whether influence through outright terror, or influence through genuine support, or both, no insurgency can survive long without some support from a population, which then can be added with showing the government not maintaining a monopoly on violence. > [@](#): > > See above. You’re thinking of set-piece conflicts between rival nations, not official governments versus insurgencies. I’m actually not, I’m showing an example of whether Iraqi forces are not a demoralised force, unwilling to fight the insurgents. What you had with the ‘Fallujah brigade’ in 2004 isn’t happening in 2006, regardless of how you see it, and shows that there has been some major progress of realigning the security forces which are supposed to be doing their job. > [@](#): > > I think you’re confusing my having expressed gratitude towards madmonk with reliance on him. And no, I still don’t know who this guy is, except by your worthless say-so, and a map with arrows doesn’t mean shit anyway. I’ve provided you with the links, it’s no trouble to go and find out who he is, he has a blog, has been to Iraq, has travelled in Anbar. Those ‘arrows’ are showing the US and Iraqi forces manuvering, and establishing themselves within the Anbar province, and taking the battlespace from the insurgents, thus making it harder for them to operate. > [@](#): > > OK, so the Sunni insurgents could have taken over Baghdad all along, but instead chose to take over cities in the Sunni part of Iraq. (You realize that makes no sense, of course.) But now they’ve taken over Baghdad as an act of desperation. Well, there have been Sunni insurgents in Baghdad all along, but the assertion you’re making is not what I am getting at. Sunni insurgents used to be able to bring in supplies from ‘ratlines’ from the Al Qaim (near the Syrian border) all the way to Fallujah and Baghdad, and was the primary route for people who committed suicide attacks and multiple car bombings, not to mention money, supplies etc. Now with those supply lines disrupted, insurgent forces have consolidated their positions within and around Baghdad, and have entrenched themselves within that population. Which is why tit for tat sectarian killings have increased, and the number of insurgent attacks in the Capital have skyrocketed. > [@](#): > > So IOW, the US/Iraqi forces are giving up Baghdad, where you say an insurgency has lots of advantages, to control Anbar, where you say it doesn’t. > > Yeah, that’s gonna lead to victory. Erm again that’s not what I’m getting at, what I was saying was the MNF went on the offensive in Anbar to relieve the pressure on Baghdad, which you know was suffering unbelievable amounts of suicide attacks and car bombings, and since the main insurgent supply lines were coming from Anbar, it’s only logical to try and shut them down. Besides, the US and Iraqi forces didn’t ‘give up’ Baghdad, like I said they were trying to relieve the pressure off it. > [@](#): > > So if the Iraqi army’s logistics go from being the US Army to just being better than the insurgents’, that big step down will actually improve the Iraqi army’s performance? Apologies if this is what I’m implying, it’s a hypothetical, if the US somehow couldn’t/or thought that it didn’t have to help Iraqi forces in logistics, Iraqi logistics only have to be better than the insurgents in order to defeat them, the Iraqi armys performance relies on morale as well as weapons, so if they saw their own soldiers being able to take on terrorists independently, it increases confidence and support in their ability. > [@](#): > > And next year it’ll be ‘only 4 years’, and the year after that, if there’s still something that can be called Iraq, it’ll be ‘only 5 years’, and so forth. Well this all depends on the Iraqi leadership to get off their collective asses and do something about it, something which [I’m more optimistic about.](http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,19570875-31477,00.html) > [@](#): > > I don’t “expect a well trained first class Iraqi military in only 3 years”, but the point is, you’re making claims that they’re going to be good enough to defeat the insurgency one of these days. The problem is, the insurgency has improved significantly over time; nobody’s making excuses for them. They’re playing major-league terror now, and still getting better at it. They aren’t waiting around for the Iraqi security forces to be good next year or the year after. I’m not denying the insurgency has become more violent and organised than the previous years, but you’re missing the point, the IA has also improved it’s ability to take the lead against them, so what we’re seeing now is a stalemate situation, with neither side with the ability to take the strategic initiative. > [@](#): > > No doubt Saddam was brutal, but even under Saddam, kids could play outside, you could sip coffee at a sidewalk cafe without having to worry about being blown up, women could hold real jobs, drive cars, and didn’t have to cover themselves from head to toe, and in general you could live a normal life if you didn’t criticize the regime. > > Now the threats to one’s life are legion, because that’s what happens when a society breaks down. Society already had broken down when Saddam was in power, it was only his abhorrent brutality which kept everyone from fighting each other (which is a stretch considering the amount of rebellions) I don’t doubt that things are bad in Iraq, however let’s hope that in the future it’s the exception and not the norm. > [@](#): > > All of these are ‘progress’ in a pro forma sense. Until such events are demonstrated to improve the security situation, they’re not progress. It’s like my handing out pieces of paper and claiming they’re money; it won’t make anyone any richer. I’ll go back to the security forces again, before the elections, we had security forces which were notoriously unreliable for loyalty or effectiveness, the elections and constitution help the political situation by saying to the insurgents that we’re providing all communities with the opportunities for their voice to be heard. As for security forces, it gives them more of an impetus to fight for that Government. > [@](#): > > More casualties = progress. Uhhuh. Erm no, all I’m saying is that Iraqi forces are being fielded more, which means they’ll incur more casualties than we do, as MNF forces are relegated more and more to the background. > [@](#): > > I sure did. Thanks for making my point for me. And I’m saying it’s not the ARVN of the 21st century. > [@](#): > > You had been citing the operations as being evidence of progress in and of themselves. Thank you for concurring on reflection that that’s not so. And of course, we have no evidence of meaningful results; all we have is your hope. Hope is not a plan, and it damned sure ain’t a proof. [Carbombings drop by 20% this year Military says](http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-05-08-car-bombs_x.htm) \*BAGHDAD — The number of deadly car bomb attacks in Iraq has dropped by nearly 20% this year, despite a recent wave of bombings, according to the U.S. military. \*\*The decline is largely the result of U.S. and Iraqi offensives that have disrupted routes used to smuggle foreign suicide bombers into Iraq and raids on car bomb factories, said Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, the chief U.S. military spokesman. The offensives in western Iraq, starting last summer, were designed to disrupt a smuggling route established by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian commander of foreign fighters in Iraq. “It’s a continual operation to make sure he can’t re-establish himself there,” Lynch said.\*\* In the first four months of this year, insurgents detonated 284 car bombs against civilian, police or military targets, according to U.S. military statistics. During the same period last year, insurgents used 349 car bombs.\* > [@](#): > > And it’s getting more difficult each year. Guess the insurgents are being rebuilt faster than Iraqi intel is. > > I’m gonna call this and its numerous variants the “Iraq is a work in progress, and things are bound to get better” argument. It really isn’t an argument so much as a repeated assertion that in one way or another, we can’t expect the Iraqi army/intel/whatever to be at full speed yet, but it’ll turn that corner soon and things will improve. Well I’ll go out on a limb and say that if Iraqi, Jordanian and US intelligence can kill Zarqawi and disrupt his network, there is a huge potential that this insurgency will be either forced to the table, or defeated. This isn’t Vietnam, there aren’t a number of state actors supporting the insurgents, most Arab states next to Iraq have increased border security and the ability of funds for the insurgents to use is limited. Even in the Soviet-Afghan war, which has a slight comparison to this war, the players aren’t their to turn the tide completely to the insurgency. > [@](#): > > Maybe they are getting better in hidden ways that haven’t borne fruit yet, but soon will make a major difference. You can’t prove it’s so, though, any more than I can prove it’s not. What I (and anyone else) can look at is the track record: go back and look at each June from 2003 to 2006. Each June, things are worse in Iraq than the previous June. The insurgency has extended its reach much more rapidly than the Iraqi security forces, who still can’t operate on their own, and I’m still having a hard time coming up with stuff other than military press releases that says they’re even taking the lead role and being effective at it. Both sides seem to be divided, the insurgents are loosely affiliated and the Iraqi forces are somewhat divided by sectarianism, so again this year is the defining year of whether it can go either way. But I remain optimistic because the Iraqi Gov has more international and public support than the insurgency, so sure, they can harm the Government, but that’s the best they can do. They can’t overthrow it. And numerous attempts to plunge it into civil war have failed. > [@](#): > > To repeat: your cite is two years old. I’d certainly trust it as an account of where things stood in Kirkuk in the summer of 2004. > > Anyway, it’s been in the news: Well the Kurdish leadership isn’t condoning the violence, isn’t condoning the attempts by some Kurds to drive out Arabs and has made it official policy for matters to be settled within the court of law. If it was the PUK or KDP allowing this, then it would be more concerning. ---
**Author:** ![RTFirefly](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/c77e96/32.png) [@RTFirefly](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RTFirefly)\ **Post date:** [June 24, 2006, 11:31am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276/83 "2006-06-24T11:31:26Z")
[QUOTE=Ryan\_Liam] Look, influence on the part of fighting within an insurgency undoubtebly relies on some amount of influence, whether influence through outright terror, or influence through genuine support, or both, no insurgency can survive long without some support from a population, which then can be added with showing the government not maintaining a monopoly on violence. [/quote] Well, I guess that settles it: since the insurgency is thriving, it must have lots of support. You’ve answered your own question. > [@](#): > > I’m showing an example of whether Iraqi forces are not a demoralised force, unwilling to fight the insurgents. Well, some Iraqi forces are perfectly willing to fight the insurgents, because they’re the Shi’ite militia. But that’s less about law and order than civil war under the cloak of law and order. > [@](#): > > What you had with the ‘Fallujah brigade’ in 2004 isn’t happening in 2006, regardless of how you see it, and shows that there has been some major progress of realigning the security forces which are supposed to be doing their job. A lot’s happened in this war already, so I’m afraid I don’t catch your reference, in addition to your logic. > [@](#): > > I’ve provided you with the links, it’s no trouble to go and find out who he is, he has a blog, has been to Iraq, has travelled in Anbar. > > Those ‘arrows’ are showing the US and Iraqi forces manuvering, and establishing themselves within the Anbar province, and taking the battlespace from the insurgents, thus making it harder for them to operate. The arrows don’t prove a goddamn thing. They’re still no more than a nice picture saying that US and Iraqi troops passed through some places. The arrows don’t mean shit as far as results. And that’s why I haven’t bothered to look up billroggio anyway - what does it matter to know who it is that backs up a non-cite? (And lots of people have blogs, and hell, Judith Miller’s probably been to Anbar.) > [@](#): > > Well, there have been Sunni insurgents in Baghdad all along, but the assertion you’re making is not what I am getting at. Sunni insurgents used to be able to bring in supplies from ‘ratlines’ from the Al Qaim (near the Syrian border) all the way to Fallujah and Baghdad, and was the primary route for people who committed suicide attacks and multiple car bombings, not to mention money, supplies etc. Now with those supply lines disrupted, insurgent forces have consolidated their positions within and around Baghdad, and have entrenched themselves within that population. Which is why tit for tat sectarian killings have increased, and the number of insurgent attacks in the Capital have skyrocketed. You got a cite for any of this? Just wondering. Not to mention, if this is what the insurgency can do when their supply lines are messed up… > [@](#): > > Erm again that’s not what I’m getting at, what I was saying was the MNF went on the offensive in Anbar to relieve the pressure on Baghdad, which you know was suffering unbelievable amounts of suicide attacks and car bombings, and since the main insurgent supply lines were coming from Anbar, it’s only logical to try and shut them down. Besides, the US and Iraqi forces didn’t ‘give up’ Baghdad, like I said they were trying to relieve the pressure off it. It wasn’t what you were saying, but never mind that: the new story doesn’t hang together any better than the old one. Baghdad’s in a lot worse shape now than it was when billroggio’s arrows started moving around. If that was the intent of Operation Billroggio, it failed miserably. > [@](#): > > Apologies if this is what I’m implying, it’s a hypothetical, if the US somehow couldn’t/or thought that it didn’t have to help Iraqi forces in logistics, Iraqi logistics only have to be better than the insurgents in order to defeat them, That’s absurd. A conventional army’s logistics and an insurgency’s logistics are going to be such different things that any comparison is going to be apples-and-oranges. And a conventional army’s logistics are inevitably going to have to be more complex and sophisticated than those of the insurgency. Particularly in a country such as Iraq, which is simply [awash in leftover munitions](http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/10/25/iraq.explosives/). > [@](#): > > the Iraqi armys performance relies on morale as well as weapons, so if they saw their own soldiers being able to take on terrorists independently, it increases confidence and support in their ability. I think I see the word ‘if’ in there again. > [@](#): > > Well this all depends on the Iraqi leadership to get off their collective asses and do something about it, something which [I’m more optimistic about.](http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,19570875-31477,00.html) > [@](#): > > THE Iraqi Government will announce a sweeping peace plan as early as tomorrow in a last-ditch effort to end the Sunni insurgency that has taken the country to the brink of civil war. Let’s hope that this actually works out. It would be a real blessing for a war-torn country. But note the words, “last-ditch.” > [@](#): > > I’m not denying the insurgency has become more violent and organised than the previous years, but you’re missing the point, the IA has also improved it’s ability to take the lead against them, so what we’re seeing now is a stalemate situation, with neither side with the ability to take the strategic initiative. No, what **you** are seeing is a stalemate. > [@](#): > > Society already had broken down when Saddam was in power, it was only his abhorrent brutality which kept everyone from fighting each other (which is a stretch considering the amount of rebellions) So people could walk the streets unharmed despite the ethnic animosities, but that was only because of Saddam. You’re making him sound like, if not the good guy, then a necessary evil. > [@](#): > > I don’t doubt that things are bad in Iraq, however let’s hope that in the future it’s the exception and not the norm. We all share this hope. > [@](#): > > I’ll go back to the security forces again, before the elections, we had security forces which were notoriously unreliable for loyalty or effectiveness, the elections and constitution help the political situation by saying to the insurgents that we’re providing all communities with the opportunities for their voice to be heard. As for security forces, it gives them more of an impetus to fight for that Government. IIRC, one of the messages of the Constitutional ratification vote was that anytime the Shi’ites and Kurds mostly agreed on something, the Sunnis were screwed. > [@](#): > > Erm no, all I’m saying is that Iraqi forces are being fielded more, which means they’ll incur more casualties than we do, as MNF forces are relegated more and more to the background. That says they’re _out there_ more, but it’s no gauge of _effectiveness_. > [@](#): > > And I’m saying it’s not the ARVN of the 21st century. You can say whatever you like, until they prove they can stand on their own. [Carbombings drop by 20% this year Military says](http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-05-08-car-bombs_x.htm) > [@](#): > > \*BAGHDAD — The number of deadly car bomb attacks in Iraq has dropped by nearly 20% this year, despite a recent wave of bombings, according to the U.S. military. > \*\*The decline is largely the result of U.S. and Iraqi offensives that have disrupted routes used to smuggle foreign suicide bombers into Iraq and raids on car bomb factories, said Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, the chief U.S. military spokesman. > > The offensives in western Iraq, starting last summer, were designed to disrupt a smuggling route established by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian commander of foreign fighters in Iraq. “It’s a continual operation to make sure he can’t re-establish himself there,” Lynch said.\*\* > > In the first four months of this year, insurgents detonated 284 car bombs against civilian, police or military targets, according to U.S. military statistics. During the same period last year, insurgents used 349 car bombs.\* Nice, but the number of bodies showing up in the morgues keeps increasing. > [@](#): > > Well I’ll go out on a limb and say that if Iraqi, Jordanian and US intelligence can kill Zarqawi and disrupt his network, there is a huge potential that this insurgency will be either forced to the table, or defeated. [Seems our own military had a different view of things, before he was killed](http://www.nysun.com/article/34443): > [@](#): > > WASHINGTON - Even as American and Iraqi soldiers were closing in on Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the commander of the American forces in Iraq was trying to get Washington to lower the terrorist leader’s importance and profile. > > In May, the Multinational Forces in Iraq sent a cable marked “secret” to the Pentagon requesting that the reward of $25 million for Zarqawi’s capture be reduced, according to military and administration officials. > > The request was part of a recalculation by American war planners who had noticed that the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq’s role in the insurgency was gradually diminishing after Iraq’s foreign fighters, Islamists, and irredentist Baathists in January formed a new umbrella terror organization known as the Mujahadin Shura Council, or consultative council of holy warriors. > > The new constellation of car bombers and kidnappers significantly reduced the role of Al Qaeda in Iraq, relegating it to just one of a number of groups under the leadership not of the Jordanian-born Zarqawi, but an Iraqi, Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi. > > This development, according to two military sources, persuaded America’s top generals that the enemy’s organization had become less reliant on a top-down hierarchy. The strategy to reduce the monetary reward for Zarqawi in part reflected a recognition that the man himself had been demoted. > [@](#): > > Both sides seem to be divided, the insurgents are loosely affiliated and the Iraqi forces are somewhat divided by sectarianism, so again this year is the defining year of whether it can go either way. And we get “next six months”-ism too! (There’s been a widespread tendency of pro-war pundits to say “[the next few/three/six months](http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=2884)” will determine Iraq’s fate. Then when Iraq gets worse again, they say the same thing again, a few months later.) > [@](#): > > But I remain optimistic because the Iraqi Gov has more international and public support than the insurgency, so sure, they can harm the Government, but that’s the best they can do. They can’t overthrow it. And numerous attempts to plunge it into civil war have failed. Well, pretty much everyone else not afffiliated with the government or the GOP is saying Iraq’s in a civil war. And the goal of an insurgency is less to overthrow the government as to make it irrelevant. > [@](#): > > Well the Kurdish leadership isn’t condoning the violence, isn’t condoning the attempts by some Kurds to drive out Arabs and has made it official policy for matters to be settled within the court of law. If it was the PUK or KDP allowing this, then it would be more concerning. Well sure, it _could_ be worse. But the point is, this is happening whether or not it’s offficially authorized. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/khalilzad-cable-militias-and-neighborhood-governments-run-baghdad/361276.md?page=4)