# KURSK: Worst German Military Disaster? **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [August 30, 2007, 12:05am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/kursk-worst-german-military-disaster/417438 "2007-08-30T00:05:52Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 6
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [May 9, 2013, 2:05am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/kursk-worst-german-military-disaster/417438/101 "2013-05-09T02:05:35Z")
> [@madsircool](#): > > Its easy to encircle troops that arent allowed to retreat. Which, as noted, is something the Soviets learned from. Hitler never did. > [@](#): > > The brutality in the Ukraine started long before 1941. The Soviets murdered 8 million Ukrainians during the 1930’s and countless numbers of others. What this has to do with the war and German treatment of Slavic people they had decided were untermensch I don’t get. > [@](#): > > Their lack of inesse and any sort of military skill can perhaps be seen in the Battle of Berlin. They had the war won. They didnt need to massively assault the city..but thats what they did..I have read that they took one million casualties. Its an obscenity. Nonsense, of course they had to massively assault the city. The Battle for Berlin was the Götterdämmerung of Nazism. The cost of taking the city was the major reason Eisenhower wasn’t in favor of trying to take it. Regarding “lack of finesse” I’d point out that the Soviets took the time to encircle the city before reducing it, something that for example the Germans singularly failed to even try to do at Stalingrad. > [@](#): > > The survival rate if German POWs likely wasnt any higher. Actually, it was higher. Regardless, I don’t see how communist crimes excuse Nazi ones. > [@](#): > > The Germans could have easily won that war had they adopted the warplans from WWI. Granting sovereignty to Ukraine and the Baltic States and promisin g to overthrow the Bolshis and actually following through on it would have made things very hard on Uncle Joe. Yeah, the problem with that is its hard to grant sovereignty to people that you are planning to commit genocide on. ---
**Author:** ![Tamerlane](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tamerlane/32/7602_2.png) [@Tamerlane](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Tamerlane)\ **Post date:** [May 9, 2013, 2:11am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/kursk-worst-german-military-disaster/417438/102 "2013-05-09T02:11:36Z")
> [@madsircool](#): > > I disagree that there was much Soviet ‘skill’. Hmmm…Zhukov came in fourth in our 2010 [Greatest Military Leaders Elimination Game](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=574323) ;). Rather too high in my opinion, but still I wouldn’t dismiss him. However wasteful of lives he may have been, he showed a deft hand at times ( Khalkin-Gol )and his record certainly was impressive enough. ---
**Author:** ![Malthus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/85f322/32.png) [@Malthus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Malthus)\ **Post date:** [May 9, 2013, 2:17pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/kursk-worst-german-military-disaster/417438/103 "2013-05-09T14:17:27Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > Sortfa, but not completely correct. > > The Japanese government was outlined in the Meiji Constitution, which was based on the German model of government. The Ministry of War (Army) and Ministry of Navy were members of the cabinet, but did not report to the Prime Minister, but rather directly to the emperor, who was not actively overseeing the day-to-day matters, nor attempting to set or veto strategies. > > In addition, the chiefs-of-staff of the service branches also nominally reported directly to the emperor and were not under their respective ministers. > > Although the prime ministers were military leaders, they were outside of the chain of authority within the ranks. The foreign ministers and (I believe) most other cabinet members were civilians. > > You are correct that there was no political oversight of the military. Fair enough. By “take over the government” I meant not only the formal arrangements, but the fact that the military establishment was, pre-war, content to sit back and allow “double patriot” - type fanatics assasinate any political figures in the formal government who stood in the way of miliary expansion. The result being that, during the war, whatever the armed services wanted, they tended to get - the establishment being fully cowed. Of course that left all the more room for an absurd degree of inter-service rivalry … ---
**Author:** ![Malthus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/85f322/32.png) [@Malthus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Malthus)\ **Post date:** [May 9, 2013, 2:20pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/kursk-worst-german-military-disaster/417438/104 "2013-05-09T14:20:19Z")
> [@Tamerlane](#): > > Hmmm…Zhukov came in fourth in our 2010 [Greatest Military Leaders Elimination Game](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=574323) ;). Rather too high in my opinion, but still I wouldn’t dismiss him. However wasteful of lives he may have been, he showed a deft hand at times ( Khalkin-Gol )and his record certainly was impressive enough. That was such a fun thread - and the worst military commander thread was even more so. 😃 ---
**Author:** ![Little\_Nemo](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/little_nemo/32/3120_2.png) [@Little\_Nemo](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Little_Nemo)\ **Post date:** [May 9, 2013, 4:04pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/kursk-worst-german-military-disaster/417438/105 "2013-05-09T16:04:45Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > Yeah, the problem with that is its hard to grant sovereignty to people that you are planning to commit genocide on. It’s a matter of timing. The Nazis would have been smarter (albeit just as evil) if they had waited until the war was done before starting the genocide. They should have proclaimed their enemy was Stalin and the communist regime. Call for an uprising and create anti-Soviet military units to fight the Red Army. Save German troops while encouraging the people in the USSR to kill each other. Then when the war is won, the Nazis could have used their collaborators to kill off the remnants of the pro-Soviet side. And when that was done, the Nazis could have finally revealed their true colors and turned on their puppet regime and eliminated that. ---
**Author:** ![BlinkingDuck](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/eada6e/32.png) [@BlinkingDuck](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BlinkingDuck)\ **Post date:** [May 9, 2013, 4:40pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/kursk-worst-german-military-disaster/417438/106 "2013-05-09T16:40:40Z")
> [@Malthus](#): > > That was such a fun thread - and the worst military commander thread was even more so. 😃 [http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=585694&highlight=worst+military+commander](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=585694&highlight=worst+military+commander) ---
**Author:** ![colonial](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/34f0e0/32.png) [@colonial](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/colonial)\ **Post date:** [May 9, 2013, 5:04pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/kursk-worst-german-military-disaster/417438/107 "2013-05-09T17:04:29Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > And yet curiously not a single historian in the 24 years since he wrote it has chosen to either call him out on it or deride what he wrote as a blurb, only you. Rather odd considering his peers had no issue speaking critically of him when they disagreed with other things he wrote. If all you have to offer are lame attempts at character assassination of Keegan, absurdities that he should have footnoted that sentence with weather reports of May 1941 or it had no value and similar tripe, Keegan’s failure to fulfill an elementary citational obligation reflects to his own disadvantage, not mine. The book I am now reading, a bio of a WW2 US Admiral, is 606 pages long, including 81 pages of notes (but not including bibliography and index).Does Keegan even _have_ any notes? I am wondering if he and his editors decided that his reputation was so exalted that he need not bother with them at all. I have done lot of googling on this matter in the last few days, and Stalin was the only in-English, clear-cut primary source reference I could find for the flooding issue aside from the chat room contributor mentioned in my last post who cited Guderian. Here is what Stalin said on the radio, in person: [(Cite):](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portal%3AMilitary_of_Greece%2FSelected_quotes%2F5) Stalin :“The Russian people will always be grateful to the Greeks for delaying the German army long enough for winter to set in, thereby giving us the precious time we needed to prepare. (underline added) We will never forget” If anyone was in an authoritative position to assign credit it was Stalin, who furthermore would not have been inclined to credit anyone except Soviets for a Soviet victory on Soviet soil unless the credit was blindingly, obviously due. On the other hand, Stalin’s surprising generosity is undercut by information which I will relate a few paragraphs below. There is a primary source available, dated 1951 under Franz Halder’s written signature, but it is in German. It is available here: [The Relationship Between the German Campaign in the Balkans and the Invasion of Russia](http://www.fold3.com/document/158924688/) It is behind a paywall, but there is a free 7-day introductory period. Maybe a SDMB member who knows German will be interested enough to see what light is shed on the issue of river flood levels near the western USSR border in May and June 1941. > [@Dissonance](#): > > I have nothing further to say to you outside of the Pit. Ha ha- I was pitted once before. My feelings didn’t get too hurt, but by all means go for it. I will might have a looksie at OP, but I can’t promise to deign reply. > [@Dissonance](#): > > This is as absurd as your insistence that had the Japanese won at Midway that thousands of fighters would have had to be assigned to Hawaii to defend against hundreds of Japanese bombers that could be based there, ignoring both the facts that hundreds of bombers couldn’t fit on the Midway Atoll I stand by what I said. > [@Dissonance](#): > > and that nowhere, ever, has a 10-1 ratio of defending fighters to attacking bombers been considered anything but massive overkill. Bullshit. Try telling that to any Germans and Japanese who are old enough to remember their cities being blasted into rubble. Their _own homes_ being blasted into rubble. There were 10s of millions of such people during the war. Also, I doubt there has ever been a commander of any service who did not yearn for a 10-1 unitary (i.e. men, guns, tanks, planes, bows and arrows etc etc) advantage of any kind. > [@Dissonance](#): > > I’ll leave you two things to chew on: Operations in Greece concluded on April 30th. German forces were back in position for Barbarossa by mid to late May. How exactly was the Balkan operation continuing to delay them from launching Barbarossa from the end of May and most of June until June 22? It may be that the Balkan operation delayed Barbarossa until June 22 long before the 4/30 end of the campaign: [1953 US Department of the Army Study: The Effect of the Balkan Campaigns on Barbarossa](http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/ETO/East/Balkans/Campaigns/Campaigns-5.html) (from link, **bold emphasis** added): > [@](#): > > Because of the annual spring floods in eastern Poland and western European Russia, 15 May was the earliest possible date for the start of the invasion of Russia. No postponement was mentioned before the Yugoslav revolt, which had an immediate effect on the plans for Operation BARBAROSSA. \*\*As early as 27 March Hitler estimated that the campaign against Yugoslavia would delay the invasion by about four weeks. \*\*This estimate was based on the diversion of forces for the assembly against Yugoslavia. Headquarters staffs, divisions, and GHQ units that were on the way to the concentration areas for Operation BARBAROSSA or whose departure was imminent had to be diverted. Those units had to be replaced by others whose departure was delayed because they were not ready for commitment. However, of the two corps headquarters and nine divisions that were diverted to the Yugoslav campaign, all but three infantry divisions were replaced from the Army High Command reserves by the time Operation BARBAROSSA got under way. > > Another factor considered in calculating the delay was that all. units, in particular the armored and motorized infantry divisions, would have to be refitted after the Balkan campaigns. This rehabilitation, which was estimated to take a minimum of three weeks for the mobile Units, had to be performed within Germany in the vicinity of major repair shops and spare parts depots. > > The plans for the invasion of Russia were modified in accordance with this estimate. **On 7 April Field Marshal von Brauchitsch issued an order in which he explained that Operation 25 necessitated changes in the preparations for the Russian campaign postponing it between four and six weeks. The new target date was to be 22 June.** Subsequent conferences between Hitler and his military advisers confirmed this new date for D-day, and it was adhered to in the end. > > Actually, only part of the delay was caused by the campaigns in the Balkans. Operation BARBAROSSA could not possibly have started on 15 May because spring came late in 1941. As late as the beginning of June the Polish-Russian river valleys were still flooded and partly impassable as a result of exceptionally heavy rains. Hopefully the last paragraph is not an interpolation by the modern transcriber. If it is in the original it constitutes acceptable though rebuttable (by primary source evidence) that the weather did not cause Barbarossa to be delayed until 6/22 because 6/22 was selected long before the delaying weather transpired. > [@Dissonance](#): > > I’ll leave you two things to chew on: Operations in Greece concluded on April 30th. German forces were back in position for Barbarossa by mid to late May. How exactly was the Balkan operation continuing to delay them from launching Barbarossa from the end of May and most of June until June 22? Whoever your cite is, I don’t see how it can get around this from the 1953 US Army study cited above: “Another factor considered in calculating the delay was that all. units, in particular the armored and motorized infantry divisions, would have to be refitted after the Balkan campaigns. This rehabilitation, which was estimated to take a minimum of three weeks for the mobile Units, had to be performed within Germany in the vicinity of major repair shops and spare parts depots”. It is too optimistic to accept that those vital armored and motorized units are all going to refit in the minimum three weeks and then get soundly positioned in only one week with Army Group South, at 500 miles the furthest distant of the three AG from Germany. > [@Wiki](#): > > And this, from wiki, Battle of Greece, Impact on Barbarossa: In 1942, members of the British Parliament characterised the campaign in Greece as a “political and sentimental decision”. Eden rejected the criticism and argued that the UK’s decision was unanimous and asserted that the Battle of Greece delayed the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union. UK politics and sentiment have no bearing on how Marita affected Barbarossa. > [@Wiki](#): > > This is an argument that historians such as Keegan used to assert that Greek resistance was a turning point in World War II. _Keegan_ asserted this? Someone missed an opportunity to correct what must be a mistake by some Wiki contributor. > [@Wiki](#): > > According to film-maker and friend of Adolf Hitler Leni Riefenstahl, Hitler said that “if the Italians hadn’t attacked Greece and needed our help, the war would have taken a different course. We could have anticipated the Russian cold by weeks and conquered Leningrad and Moscow. There would have been no Stalingrad”. This does nothing to support a revisionist position. Rather, When two people who are out to kill each other (Hitler and Stalin) agree on something (Marita delayed Barbarossa by weeks) then there is as much reason as not to believe there might be something to it. > [@Wiki](#): > > Despite his reservations, Brooke seems also to have conceded that the Balkan Campaign delayed the offensive against the Soviet Union. Bradley and Buell conclude that "although no single segment of the Balkan campaign forced the Germans to delay Barbarossa, obviously the entire campaign did prompt them to wait. This does nothing to support a revisionist position. In the interests of transparency, I was able to locate an e-book by Bradley and Buell and it reveals that Wiki is misleading because B&B in fact straddle the fence: [The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean](http://books.google.com/books?id=HP3-9NNz71sC&printsec=frontcover&dq=John+N+Bradley+%26+Thomas+B+Buell.&hl=en&sa=X&ei=fpOJUYCtLePG0gHPr4CIDw&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=John%20N%20Bradley%20%26%20Thomas%20B%20Buell.&f=false) (from link, emphasis added): Page 96 “…Hitler might have used his influence to reach a peaceful solution (in Greece) and bring about the departure of the British. Had he done so **the German army would have been spared a diversion from preparing for the attack on Russia**. Page 101 “… **a late thaw caused flooding and wet conditions well into June**. **(FOOTNOTE#)116".** “ **Although no single segment of the Balkan campaign caused the Germans to delay Barbarossa, obviously the enitire campaign did force them to wait.** On the other hand the Germans could have begun earlier had they thought it important. In the last analysis anticipation of blittzkreig sucess in Russia influenced German thinking more than the Balkan campaign.” [/quote] Does anyone notice what is footnoted? Unfortunately I was unable to locate the footnote section on the e-book. > [@Wiki](#): > > On the other hand, Richter calls Eden’s arguments a “falsification of history”. I could not find anything on this via Google. > [@Wiki](#): > > Basil Liddell Hart and de Guingand point out that the delay of the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union was not among Britain’s strategic goals and as a result the possibility of such a delay could not have affected its decisions about Operation Marita. UK motives have no bearing on how Marita affected Barbarossa. > [@Wiki](#): > > In 1952, the Historical Branch of the UK Cabinet Office concluded that the Balkan Campaign had no influence on the launching of Operation Barbarossa. I could not find anything on this via Google. > [@Wiki](#): > > According to Robert Kirchubel, “the main causes for deferring Barbarossa’s start from May 15-June 22 were incomplete logistical arrangements and an unusually wet winter that kept rivers at full flood until late spring.” The e-book for this Wiki cite does not include discussion of pre-attack weather. > [@Wiki](#): > > This however does not answer whether in the absence of these problems the campaign could have begun according to the original plan. Keegan writes: > In the aftermath, historians would measure its significance in terms of the delay Marita had or had not imposed on the unleashing of Barbarossa, an exercise ultimately to be judged profitless, since it was the Russian weather, not the contingencies of subsidiary campaigns, which determined Barbarossa’s launch date. It is reasonable to assume that Keegan is specifically referring to late flooding which occurred possibly as late as early June 1941. If so then he is mistaken to say that the weather determined the launch date because in reality the launch date was set long before late flood weather had actually transpired. Secondary source information leads me to believe the weather would probably have postponed Barbarossa until after 5/15. How much after 5/15 is still unclear, and it is frustrating to be unable to locate primary source details in English. ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [May 9, 2013, 6:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/kursk-worst-german-military-disaster/417438/108 "2013-05-09T18:03:35Z")
> [@Little\_Nemo](#): > > It’s a matter of timing. The Nazis would have been smarter (albeit just as evil) if they had waited until the war was done before starting the genocide. I can’t see this realistically being possible; it was a core belief of Nazism going back to its roots. Hitler had been talking about lebensraum from the moment he emerged as the head of the Nazi party. It feels like the “had the Nazis not been Nazis” argument with the twist at the end of them having secretly been Nazis all along and just postponed acting that way until they won. Hitler spelled out very clearly the kind of war he intended on fighting in the East to his generals and issued the Commissar Order before Barbarossa began. The Einsatzgruppen followed right on the heels of the troops on June 22. And as I’ve always said of alternate histories where the Nazis aren’t the Nazis, if you remove the Nazis there is suddenly no reason for Germany to be invading the USSR. > [@](#): > > They should have proclaimed their enemy was Stalin and the communist regime. Call for an uprising and create anti-Soviet military units to fight the Red Army. Save German troops while encouraging the people in the USSR to kill each other. They did these things as best they could, the “crusade against bolshevism” angle was used to good effect in recruiting foreign forces to sign up for the SS in places like the low countries and France, and the Spanish Blue Division was established with the understanding that it would only be employed on the Eastern front against the USSR. It should be noted though that Jewish Bolshevism was one of the Nazis favorite things to rant on about, from Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag on the invasion of the USSR: > [@Adolf Hitler](#): > > For more than two decades the Jewish Bolshevik regime in Moscow had tried to set fire not merely to Germany but to all of Europe…The Jewish Bolshevik rulers in Moscow have unswervingly undertaken to force their domination upon us and the other European nations and that is not merely spiritually, but also in terms of military power…Now the time has come to confront the plot of the Anglo-Saxon Jewish war-mongers and the equally Jewish rulers of the Bolshevik centre in Moscow! Approximately 1 million Soviet POWs served in the German Army as Hiwis or in Osttruppen formations, albeit motivated more by the desire not to be starved to death than by anti-communist zeal. And if it’s blasphemy, I’ll be joining you in the afterlife. I agree turning south to Kiev was the wisest course of action in 1941. ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [May 9, 2013, 6:07pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/kursk-worst-german-military-disaster/417438/109 "2013-05-09T18:07:29Z")
@ **colonial** : I mean exactly what I said. I have nothing further to say to you outside of the pit, and will neither read nor respond to any of your tripe outside of it. Or possibly even in it if it remains of the same caliber. ---
**Author:** ![colonial](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/34f0e0/32.png) [@colonial](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/colonial)\ **Post date:** [May 9, 2013, 6:25pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/kursk-worst-german-military-disaster/417438/110 "2013-05-09T18:25:12Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > @ **colonial** : I mean exactly what I said. I have nothing further to say to you outside of the pit, and will neither read nor respond to any of your tripe outside of it. Or possibly even in it if it remains of the same caliber. Do what you gotta do, but don’t expect me to respond with silence to any of your future debateable opinions or substandard arguments. ---
**Author:** ![Little\_Nemo](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/little_nemo/32/3120_2.png) [@Little\_Nemo](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Little_Nemo)\ **Post date:** [May 9, 2013, 7:02pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/kursk-worst-german-military-disaster/417438/111 "2013-05-09T19:02:34Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > I can’t see this realistically being possible; it was a core belief of Nazism going back to its roots. Hitler had been talking about lebensraum from the moment he emerged as the head of the Nazi party. It feels like the “had the Nazis not been Nazis” argument with the twist at the end of them having secretly been Nazis all along and just postponed acting that way until they won. Hitler spelled out very clearly the kind of war he intended on fighting in the East to his generals and issued the Commissar Order before Barbarossa began. The Einsatzgruppen followed right on the heels of the troops on June 22. And as I’ve always said of alternate histories where the Nazis aren’t the Nazis, if you remove the Nazis there is suddenly no reason for Germany to be invading the USSR. I agree that the Nazi regime was going to kill the Slavs at some point. But Hitler was capable of taking short-term detours en route to his long-term goals. He did after all make a temporary alliance with Stalin in 1939 when it suited his current plans. If he had been convinced of the necessity, he could have decided on a program of pretending to be a liberator in 1941 and waiting until 1943 or so before showing his true colors. ---
**Author:** ![mlees](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/ba8739/32.png) [@mlees](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/mlees)\ **Post date:** [May 9, 2013, 7:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/kursk-worst-german-military-disaster/417438/112 "2013-05-09T19:38:48Z")
> [@Little\_Nemo](#): > > I agree that the Nazi regime was going to kill the Slavs at some point. But Hitler was capable of taking short-term detours en route to his long-term goals. He did after all make a temporary alliance with Stalin in 1939 when it suited his current plans. If he had been convinced of the necessity, he could have decided on a program of pretending to be a liberator in 1941 and waiting until 1943 or so before showing his true colors. I’m not sure Hitler had such complete and total control over all Nazis in Germany as this implies. In 1934-1936, there were many domestic crimes commited by Nazis against Jews in Germany. These were spur of the moment acts of thuggery, or some minor official abusing his governmental powers. These folks felt they were caring out Hitlers desires, even though they did not have explicit permission from the party leadership to do a specific deed. (I think it was Ian Kershaw who termed this mindset and method as “working towards Hitler”.) The party leadership didn’t care much about protecting the Jews, so they didn’t put a stop to it. The Army didn’t like this lawlessness, and managed to convince Hitler to purge Rohm and the SA (Hitler had other reasons to do this, as well.) But anywho, I believe that the Nazi Party “tent” had a crap ton of radicals pulling this way and that, with the party leadership having to react to events, just as often as it directed it’s members. By '41, Hitler had a lot more political power (and the Army had less). Even so, the major players (Goering, Himmler, Goebbels, for example) had authority to do plenty of things on their own, without asking permission first. Georing had quite the portfolio, for example (thanks, wiki!): Minister-President of Prussia, President of the Reichstag, Reichsstatthalter of Prussia, Reichsminister of Aviation, and Reichminister of Forestry. ---
**Author:** ![Malthus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/85f322/32.png) [@Malthus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Malthus)\ **Post date:** [May 9, 2013, 10:15pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/kursk-worst-german-military-disaster/417438/113 "2013-05-09T22:15:39Z")
The plain fact is that the Nazis had no overall coherent or sensible plan for dealing with Eastern Europe. As with many other areas of Nazi-dom, they tended to react with ad-hockery and at cross-purposes, with various Nazi sub-groups working on different (and, sometimes, mutually contradictory) goals. At its most simple, the Nazis had no less than three possible futures in mind for their Eastern conquests: (1) Create a bunch of client states as ethnic enclaves under German imperial domination of course, but enjoying some degree of autonomy - or at least offer to create such states - and then, organize the ethnic nationalists as allies against the remaining communists. So, for example, the Nazis would arm the Ukranians (who had plenty of reasons to hate the communists), with the promise of a Nazi-ruled “free Ukraine”. (2) Create what would amount to a “Greater Prussia”, only nore Nazi-like - a military aristocracy of Nazis ruling over vast estates worked by Slavic serfs. Cull the serfs to eliminate the unruly, the disobedient, and the intelligent. (3) Cleanse the place of Slavs (either through outright murder or “ethnic cleansing” by forced resettlement) and move in free German settlers, making of the place a new, greater Germany. The problem, of course, is that plan (1) isn’t really practical if your victims get wind of plans (2) or (3); plan (2) requires retaining Slavs while plan (3) requires eliminating Slavs; and plan (3) assumes that the Nazis would be able to produce from somewhere vast numbers of Germans. A more centralized evil Nazi-type schemer would insitute plan (1) until they won the war, then introduce plan (2), and finally replace the victims altogether gradually with plan (3) as Germans became available. But the Nazis were organizationally incapable of such long-term planning. ---
**Author:** ![Little\_Nemo](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/little_nemo/32/3120_2.png) [@Little\_Nemo](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Little_Nemo)\ **Post date:** [May 10, 2013, 12:43am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/kursk-worst-german-military-disaster/417438/114 "2013-05-10T00:43:00Z")
> [@Malthus](#): > > But the Nazis were organizationally incapable of such long-term planning. Hitler could make plans for ninety days in the future or ninety years in the future. His problem was he couldn’t make plans for anything in between. ---
**Author:** ![njtt](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/n/ecd19e/32.png) [@njtt](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/njtt)\ **Post date:** [May 10, 2013, 1:28am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/kursk-worst-german-military-disaster/417438/115 "2013-05-10T01:28:00Z")
> [@detop](#): > > So true, and the Soviets learned it in 1941. During Operation Barbarossa, it was not uncommon to find T-34s going into combat with a spare tranny on their rear deck. Well _that_ evokes some interesting imagery! 🙂 ---
**Author:** ![RickJay](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/bb73d2/32.png) [@RickJay](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RickJay)\ **Post date:** [May 10, 2013, 1:39am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/kursk-worst-german-military-disaster/417438/116 "2013-05-10T01:39:00Z")
Hypotheticals where the Nazis are nice and accomodating to the Ukranians, or other Slav minorities, are pointless. That isn’t what Nazis do. The entire point of invading the USSR was the Hunger Plan and the murder of the Slavic peoples. ---
**Author:** ![Little\_Nemo](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/little_nemo/32/3120_2.png) [@Little\_Nemo](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Little_Nemo)\ **Post date:** [May 10, 2013, 2:05am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/kursk-worst-german-military-disaster/417438/117 "2013-05-10T02:05:50Z")
> [@RickJay](#): > > Hypotheticals where the Nazis are nice and accomodating to the Ukranians, or other Slav minorities, are pointless. That isn’t what Nazis do. The entire point of invading the USSR was the Hunger Plan and the murder of the Slavic peoples. Except for all the times the Nazis did do it. They made an alliance with Poland in 1938 in order to threaten Czechoslovakia. They made an alliance with the Soviet Union in 1939 to threaten Poland. They made an alliance with Bulgaria in 1941 to threaten Greece. When they invaded Czechoslovakia, they supported the Slovaks against the Czechs. When they invaded Yugoslavia, they supported the Croats against the Serbs. ---
**Author:** ![AK84](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/85e7bf/32.png) [@AK84](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/AK84)\ **Post date:** [May 10, 2013, 7:52am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/kursk-worst-german-military-disaster/417438/118 "2013-05-10T07:52:10Z")
> [@Little\_Nemo](#): > > I hold an even more blasphemous opinion. I think Hitler made the right decision to take Kiev in 1941. It stopped the drive to Moscow. It cooked the German goose. The only chance they had to win was lost. ---
**Author:** ![the\_diego](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/7bcc69/32.png) [@the\_diego](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/the_diego)\ **Post date:** [May 10, 2013, 8:05am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/kursk-worst-german-military-disaster/417438/119 "2013-05-10T08:05:46Z")
It was Guderian who proposed to swing his southern flank due south to link up with Von Runstedt. ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [May 10, 2013, 1:08pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/kursk-worst-german-military-disaster/417438/120 "2013-05-10T13:08:27Z")
> [@AK84](#): > > It stopped the drive to Moscow. It cooked the German goose. The only chance they had to win was lost. Reaching the end of their logistical tether stopped the drive on Moscow; Army Group Center was going to have to take a breather regardless of whether its next mission was to turn south or continue forward. AG Center was already further advanced than AG South due to the tougher opposition facing AG South, and the result was that AG Center was leaving a longer and longer exposed left flank. Had they continued forward towards Moscow after the needed pause, the logistical problem would continue to grow, the length of the exposed left flank would continue to grow and with it the thinning of troop density protecting it, and it’s doubtful that losing Moscow would have dealt a fatal blow to the USSR if it could even be reached. The sheer size of the force encircled and destroyed speaks to the danger it would have posed to AG Center’s flank had it been ignored, from [wiki](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kiev_(1941)): > [@](#): > > The encirclement trapped 452,700 soldiers, 2,642 guns & mortars and 64 tanks, of which scarcely 15,000 escaped from the encirclement by 2 October. Overall, the Southwestern Front suffered 700,544 casualties, including 616,304 killed, captured, or missing during the month-long Battle for Kiev. As a result, four Soviet field armies (5th, 37th, 26th, and 21st) consisting of 43 divisions virtually ceased to exist. The 40th Army was badly affected as well. Like the Western Front before it, the Southwestern Front had to be recreated almost from scratch. Not even the Germans could afford to leave a force that large behind threatening their flank, not even in 1941. Turning south and advancing at an oblique angle also was easier on the logistical situation than continuing directly east. A good read on the opposite interpretation though, that Moscow could have been taken and the war won is [_Hitler’s Panzer’s East_](http://www.amazon.com/Hitlers-Panzers-East-World-Reinterpreted/dp/0806125810) by R.H.S. Stolfi. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/kursk-worst-german-military-disaster/417438.md?page=5) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/kursk-worst-german-military-disaster/417438.md?page=7)