English speaking family since the very beginnings of Middle English, English university and college prof, senior technical writer, and yet I don’t find it a stretch at all. Nor did your Court of Appeal.
Of course you are fluent in English, but perhaps you have not been focused on English usage. Perhaps you are used to certain words being used a certain way, such that when they are used in a way that you are not used to, you do not accept them and assume that most folks share your discourse register, leaving you not grokking what others find normal. It’s no biggie as long as you don’t get fixed in your position to the point of hitting your head against the wall, and you make efforts to learn why others have different discourse registers.
In the matter at hand, if a finger were not to be considered to be an object, that would leave a hole in the law that seeks to penalize penetration, despite fingers being objects that are frequently used to penetrate.
As markn+ noted, both Merriam Webster’s and Oxford’s definitions would cover objects such as fingers. These are the two premier publishers of English dictionaries.
Since the legislature would not chose to leave a hole in the law, and since applying the primary definitions given by the two leading English dictionaries would not leave a hole in the law, IMHO the appeal court did not need to go any deeper into whether or not a finger is an object in the context of the legislation in the context of public policy.
It is fair game to argue against the obvious, for sometimes one hits paydirt, so by all means debate the issues of whether a thumb is a finger and whether a finger is a digit and whether a digit is an animate object and whether an animate object is an object and whether an object can predicate the statute’s clause or penetrate a person 'cause it’s a thumb. I would not expect the Court of Appeal to chase its own tail over this sort of thing, and I would not expect a lawyer to take a run at it, for it would be a waste the court’s time, the lawyer’s time, and the client’s money – at least up around here in Soviet Kanukistan, for I have no idea how statutes are interpreted in the USA.
When it comes to statutory interpretation, I start with three basics to see if my interpretation is likely to run into trouble. If my interpretation fits all three of these three basics, then I cautiously proceed. If it doesn’t then I have a lot of work to do before I run with it.
– Plain meaning. Does the statute work when applying the ordinary meaning of the words?
– Mischief. What mischief is the statute trying to remedy, and what interpretation of the words in the statute will lead to a remedy?
– Golden Rule. Don’t be a jerk. What interpretation of the words in the statute will not be contrary to public policy?
When applying these basics, it leaves me with a finger being an object in accordance with the primary definition in both of the two top English dictionaries, so it passes muster for being a plain meaning.
The statute is trying to prohibit penetration, and interpreting object in accordance with the primary definition in both of the two top English dictionaries supports the statutes goal of prohibiting penetration. The finger is object that is plugging the hole in the dyke (don’t go there you dirty minded people). Pulling the finger out of the law would leave a hole in law.
Interpreting object as per the primary definition in both of the two top English dictionaries is not contrary to the public policy of prohibiting the pervy penetration –
including forbidden fingering – of children’s privates.
Having met these three basics, I’d move on.
For a better explanation of these three basics, have a boo at Driedger and Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes.
On the teeter totter balancing literalists and contextualists, I’m not just a contextualist – I’m a pragmatist, so for me, sometimes plain meaning alone does not cut it, and sometimes the legislative intent is not up to speed. US Republicans would call me supporter of judicial activism.
Literalists who find this way too fuzzy-wuzzy-hippie-dippy and are curious about this approach, or who just can’t get the mindset of folks who figure that a finger is an object, might enjoy reading the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27, 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC) (yes, I realize that shoes are for toes rather than fingers, but just go along with me on this one), the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Rooney v. ArcelorMittal S.A., 2016 ONCA 630, and most significantly, Ruth Sullivan’s “Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada that makes the hop from contextualism to good ol’ boy git 'er done pragmatism.” It will take a while to read, but hopefully it will give you a better understanding of what goes into statutory interpretation (at least how we do it in the Great White), and leave you with some tools with which you can apply to your interpretation of your penetrating object statute.