legal issues in Anna Nicole Smith case

[Gfactor]

Here is the decision of the District Court:

http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/CACD/RecentPubOp.nsf/0/3e2b24e60e29602788256b75005ef293/$FILE/SACV01-97DOC.pdf

She also tried to get the judgment increased:

FindLaw Legal Blogs - FindLaw

And here is the District Court’s order on Subject Matter jurisdiction:

FindLaw Legal Blogs - FindLaw

[PBear42]

Great links!! The more I read, the less I like Dastardly Son. And the more I read, the more I wonder whether the bankruptcy/district court overreached.

[Gfactor]

@PBear42

Essentially, the issue is how to reconcile the prerogatives of two courts with expansive jurisdiction, in this case a Texas probate court and a California bankruptcy court. By law and tradition, a probate court has the power to adjudicate all disputes pertaining to a decedent’s estate. By law and tradition, a bankruptcy court has the power to adjudicate all disputes related to a debtor’s estate. What to do if those two broad jurisdictional grants conflict?

That’s the problem. Neither law nor tradition are as clear as you say. As the 9th Circuit pointed out, the probate exception has in fact been applied in bankruptcy cases. And those cases have been around for a while. *Harris v. Zion’s Sav. Bank & Trust Co. (1943)

The probate court, not the bankruptcy court, is the appropriate forum for weighing the respective benefits or detriments to those who share in the equity of the decedent’s estate.

When we reflect that the settlement and distribution of decedents’ estates and the right to succeed to the ownership of realty and personalty are peculiarly matters of state law; that the federal courts have no probate jurisdiction and have sedulously refrained, even in diversity cases, from interfering with the operations of state tribunals invested with that jurisdiction.

Id. *

So it seems that bankruptcy courts have a longstanding lack of authority to decide probate matters, at least as far as the Supreme Court is concerned.

Who gets to decide those questions is what the Ninth Circuit (and now Supreme Court) case is about.

Right.

IMHO, there’s both less and more here than meets the eye. On the one hand, it’s a screwy fact pattern and not a problem any of us is likely to see. In an important sense, is hardly matters who wins or loses. On the other hand, it’s an interesting legal question that doesn’t lend itself to easy resolution. As the saying goes, this scenario would make an excellent exam question.

Actually, the sister issue that I mentioned before arises frequently in divorce cases where one spouse files for bankruptcy. I’ve litigated it several times.

The Ninth Circuit decided that the bankruptcy court was required to defer to the probate court.

No. The court held that the District Court lacked the power to hear the case. It didn’t have jurisdiction. That’s not deference, that’s no power to hear the case.

As an aside, note that the Ninth Circuit acknowledged (as I asserted) that the bakruptcy court had related-to jurisdiction, but concluded that the probate exclusion removed the proceeding from federal jurisdiction. See footnote 14.

@Footnote 14

As a general proposition, Vickie Lynn Marshall is correct that she was
entitled to sue E. Pierce Marshall directly for a tort in her bankruptcy
action. It is the probate exception that removes the claim from federal
jurisdiction.

Kind of a weird thing to say. This is what makes the probate exception so “mysterious and esoteric.” http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/8th/012898p.pdf. It’s a judge- made exception. As I pointed out before, none of the jurisdictional statutes bear it out in their text. I think we can expect Scalia and Thomas to hate it. But see, *Ankenbrandt * (Scalia and Thomas join the majority adopting a statutory construction reading an exception into the diveristy jurisdiction statute). But essentially the court ruled that it would have jurisdiction were it not for the fact that it doesn’t. All it is saying is that the probate exception is an exception.

In Ankenbrandt, the court reviewed the much revisited sister exception to federal jurisdiction: the domestic relations exception.

The Court found that the exception was not required by Article III. Tracing the history of the doctrine, the Court found that Congress intended to include the exception in the term “all civil actions” because the exception existed when the statute was amended.

By the same logic, section 1134 was enacted five years after Harris, and has been amended several times since then. 28 U.S. Code § 1334 - Bankruptcy cases and proceedings | U.S. Code | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute . The Court could well conclude that Congress must have intended to include the exception in the term “all civil proceedings,” which is what section 1334 gives the district courts the power to hear. That’s not much of a stretch at all. “All civil actions” looks very similar t “all civil proceedings.”

What will happen in the Supreme Court? Hard to predict. As you say, much depends on what the Court sees as the central issue. There are two grounds on which it could reverse the Ninth Circuit. First, it could hold that the probate exclusion doesn’t apply to bankruptcy jurisdiction.

Yes. That’s definitely a possibility.

Second, it could hold that the exclusion doesn’t apply to a claim pertaining to an estate dispute but doesn’t affect distribution of the estate itself.

Possible, but it would be very unlikely in this case. The probate court held that the case was required to be brought in probate court.

A state court’s holding regarding its jurisdiction over probate matters is binding on federal courts and is immune from collateral attack under the doctrine of res judicata. Underwriters Nat’l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 455 U.S. 691, 706-07 (1982); Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111, 115-16 (1963).

This is an unassailable legal claim. In other words, the Court would have to contradict the state court’s jurisdictional determination and find that a federal court gets to decide whether a case is really a probate matter even when the state has already decided it is. Cases cited in the opinion really say that the court can’t do that.

It seems to me significant that, originally at least, the probate exclusion wasn’t an exclusion. It was merely a statement by the Supreme Court (in 1912) that federal courts sitting in equity lack jurisdiction to adjudicate in rem probate disputes.

I agree. It is one of the many legal doctrines that has become ingrained in the law despite a very situational origin.

That’s a much narrower doctrine than the one adopted by the Ninth Circuit.

I agree, the interfering bit in *Harris *is dicta, and it has taken on a life of its own. And see, Ankenbrandt, (permitting a domestic relations-related tort action because,“the domestic relations exception encompasses only cases involving the isuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree.”) The cases are similar because they both arise out of a party seeking a friendlier forum in a federal court while state court proceedings are ongoing. *Ankenbrandt *demonstrates that the court, at least back in 1992, was restricting implied exceptions to federal jurisdiction.

What’s at issue, then, is whether it empowers a bankruptcy court to adjudicate an ancillary claim between claimants to the estate, which claim could and traditionally would be resolved in a probate court. To this, I think the answer could be “yes.”

You might be right.

Thus, here, the Texas probate court could administer the estate, resulting in Dastardly Son’s getting most of the money. Then, the bankruptcy court (exercising related-to jurisdiction) could give Trophy Wife a monetary award directly against Dastardly Son, which might be collected from the estate distribution or from other assets.

Problem is, the first court to reach judgment gets to decide what its judgment includes. It gets to decide what it decided, what it should have decided, and whom is bound by the judgment. I cited case for most of this stuff before. They call it the first-in-time rule, and it gets pretty complicated. If you want some citations, I’ll be happy to provide them.

In other words, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, I don’t see a conflict between the two exercises of jurisdiction.

The conflict is that it the second court can’t rewrite the first judgment. If the first judgment, in its home state, precludes the litigation of the tort claim (as is undisputed in this case) the second court must follow that law. That’s what happened here.

But it gets even more complicated. The rule about the preclusive effect given foreign judgments only applies to the judgment. It doesn’t wrest a court of jurisdiction. Therefore, if the district court had reached the issue first, its decision would win the day.

And the second court usually gets to decide how the first court would interpret its judgment. Cf. Sun Oil v. Wortman (1988) (to be unconstitutional misconstruction of state law must contradict law of the other State that is clearly established and that has been brought to the court’s attention). So there is some play in the joints there.

Now, as in any situation where two different courts are addressing factually related disputes, there are other issues. The most important of these, as you note, are those of issue and claim preclusion. Here, the question is whether the California district court should have deferred to the factual findings of the Texas probate court, which found after a five month trial that Dastardly Son had done no wrong. As you also note, this was not decided by the Ninth Circuit. There’s an important wrinkle here, though, which you don’t mention. The bankruptcy court had already ruled for Trophy Wife before the probate case went to trial. It was the district court’s review of that ruling which happened after trial.

A good point. I hadn’t noticed. But this was a non-core proceeding, according to all of the courts, in a non-core proceeding,

(c)(1) A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but that is otherwise related to a case under title 11. In such proceeding, the bankruptcy judge shall submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court, and any final order or judgment shall be entered by the district judge after considering the bankruptcy judge’s proposed findings and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters to which any party has timely and specifically objected.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection, the district court, with the consent of all the parties to the proceeding, may refer a proceeding related to a case under title 11 to a bankruptcy judge to hear and determine and to enter appropriate orders and judgments, subject to review under section 158 of this title.
(d) The district court may withdraw, in whole or in part, any case or proceeding referred under this section, on its own motion or on timely motion of any party, for cause shown. The district court shall, on timely motion of a party, so withdraw a proceeding if the court determines that resolution of the proceeding requires consideration of both title 11 and other laws of the United States regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce.

28 U.S. Code § 157 - Procedures

What is the effect of a bankruptcy courts decision in a non-core matter?

The Court’s decision means only that final judgment in this non-core proceeding must be entered by this Court rather than the bankruptcy court. By this order, the Court rules that the bankruptcy court’s judgment is proposed rather than final, and therefore neither party has prevailed at the present time. Thus, Vickie’s claim against Pierce for tortious interference has not yet been resolved by any court.

(Emphasis added).

and this from the 9th Circuit:

**The district court then vacated the bankruptcy court’s final judgment **because it concluded that Vickie Lynn Marshall’s claim was not a “core” bankruptcy claim, and that the bankruptcy court’s judgment merely constituted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

In other words, the bankruptcy court only had authority to propose findings of fact and conclusions of law; it’s judgment wasn’t final. This may be a technicality, but it is one that is well-established. A judgment must be final to have preclusive effect. E.g., http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=wa&vol=188230maj&searchval&invol=1 (res judicata requires a final judgment on the merits). Therefore, the state court wins.

In any event, that’s a different set of issues and doesn’t go to jurisdiction. If the Supreme Court reverses, it presumably will be with an instruction to take up the preclusion issues.

Finally, as regards abstention, I’m familiar with the doctrine. Doesn’t apply here for two reasons. First, abstention applies to all related-to proceedings, not just probate proceedings.
Right. My point was that the specific abstention provisions show that Congress did not intend the district court to entertain every case over which the statute might grant it jurisdiction.

Doesn’t raise the peculiar issues driving this case.

Actually it does, at least at one level. One of the mysterious issues here is federalism. Should a federal court decide state law issues? Section 1334 (c) answers that question, “no.” It provides for two kinds of abstention:

Discretionary: Section (c)(1) says that a court can abstain in the interest of comity with state courts or respect for state law even* if the claim arises under the bankruptcy code.* This means the court gets to decide, and as we have discussed, this decision is unreviewable. That means you ask the court, and it’s decision is final. All of the policies that support a probate exception support abstention under (c)(1).

Mandatory: A court that decides that it will not abstain under section (c)(1) must make sure that it is not required to abstain under section (c)(2). Decisions under section (c)(2) are in fact reviewable. Section (c)(2) requires a district court to abstain

in a proceeding based upon a State law claim or State law cause of action

sounds good so far . . .

related to a case under title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a case under title 11,

. . .

again, that’s us. . .

with respect to which an action could not have been commenced in a court of the United States absent jurisdiction under this section,

Oooh, that give me a headache. . . wait . . . Ok. So the Court does not have to abstain if there is an independent ground for the court’s jurisdiction, right?

Well, they are apparently citizens of different states and the amount in controversy is sufficient so, I’ll go with diversity jurisdiction.

But wait another second . . . this whole case is about whether an exception that everyone agrees applies in diversity cases, also applies in bankruptcy cases. So if the exception applies, then there is no independent ground for jurisdiction. In this case, that means that the district court would lack diversity jurisdiction. Because the district court would lack diversity jurisdiction, the district court is required to abstain. :eek: What a long strange trip . . .

Of course you are right that this case is not about abstention right now . . . but if the Court was required to abstain, the Court got the right result for the wrong reason.

Second, as you note, the decision whether to abstain is not reviewable on appeal, which (I assume) is why the Ninth Circuit doesn’t discuss it.

(c)(2) abstention is specifically carved out of the unreviewablity provision of section 1334(d).

Reading between the lines, one gets the impression that’s what they thought should have happened here (I think so too) and were frustrated at not being able to reverse on that ground.

I’m sure you are right.

For good or bad, though, that’s how the statute works and the Ninth Circuit doesn’t become right by using the probate exclusion to back-door a reversal of the failure to abstain.

Actually, it is a common precept of appellate law that a court will affirm a lower court that gets the right result for the wrong reason. http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=va&vol=1615012&invol=1; http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=mt&vol=98&invol=257; http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=ar&vol=1998a/980709/98-670&invol=2; http://www.michbar.org/opinions/appeals/2005/090205/28604.pdf; http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=6th&navby=case&no=99a0314p

[Bryan_Ekers]

Gotta wonder how much this has cost the heirs in legal fees. They could’ve paid Smith off long ago.

[Gfactor]

@Gfactor

The court awarded her $474K

Should be $474M. $474,754,134, to be precise.

[Gfactor]

@Bryan Ekers

Gotta wonder how much this has cost the heirs in legal fees. They could’ve paid Smith off long ago.

The Texas probate court awarded Pierce Marshall $541,000 in attorneys’ fees, according to the 9th Circuit opinion. In sure he paid substantially more than that, and the estate’s fees would probably not be included.

OTOH, Smith got close to half a billion dollars from him in the bankruptcy case.

[PBear42]

Hey, Gfactor. Many thanks for an interesting discussion.

Let’s start with whether a bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to hear a probate-related dispute. For the view that it doesn’t, you cite Harris. I don’t read the case the same way. Rather, by my reading, all Harris says is that the powers of a decedent’s representative under state law are derived from and limited by state law. In that case, the representative sought bankruptcy protection on behalf of the decedent, notwithstanding having been denied power to seek such relief by the probate court. It was in this context, then, that the Supreme Court ruled that the probate court was the appropriate forum to resolve the issue. That’s a far cry from ruling that bankruptcy courts are inherently disqualified from hearing probate-related disputes.

As for the “sister” problem of divorce property settlements, my observation is similar to yours but slightly different. In particular, I’m aware of no body of case law which disables a bankruptcy court from addressing such issues on jurisdictional grounds. Rather, the cases of which I’m aware, e.g., Robbins v. Robbins, 964 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1992) speak of this as a practical resolution of the conflicting-jurisdictions problem. Thus, and I assume your personal litigation experience is consistent, this is a prudential not a jurisdictional issue.

Conversely, the Sianis case, which you cite for the proposition that the probate exception is “mysterious and esoteric,” actually held that the federal district court could and should have heard the petitioner’s challenge to a disputed trust (as distinguished from a disputed will). If Sianis is good law, how wrong can the bankruptcy/district courts in Marshall have been?

Then we have the problem of whether the Texas probate court’s assertion that it had exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute between Trophy Wife and Dastardly Son had to be respected by the bankruptcy court as a matter of “full faith and credit.” To me, the simple answer to this is that the Supremacy Clause trumps the state court claim, unless some principle of federal law compels a different result. Stated a little differently, federal law may choose to respect the exclusive prerogatives of a state probate court, but it isn’t required to do so.

Finally, we have the issue of appealability of a failure to abstain. I stand corrected. As you say, pursuant to 28 U.S.C 1334(d), mandatory abstention (or failure to abstain pursuant to 1334©(2) is appealable. In my defense, I note that (i) your original float of the issue, based presumably on ©(1),spoke of it as nonappealable; (ii) I’ve never seen such an appeal taken, perhaps because of the final judgment rule; and (iii) the Ninth Circuit did not rest its decision on this ground. That said, you’re on solid ground when you assert that if the Ninth Circuit reached the right result, albeit on the wrong grounds, that’s okay. It’ll be interesting to see whether the Supremes duck this one on that basis.

[Paul_in_Qatar]

I am certainly no legal expert but is it legal to cut your wife out of a will without a ‘spite clause?’ Just not mentioning her is enough? I did not know that.

(How like the case of that poor lady in Florida. She was married, the husband made a decision about her care. The Mother and Father objected, not realizing that marriage trumps being a parent. Excitement ensued.)

[Gfactor]

@Paul in Saudi

I am certainly no legal expert but is it legal to cut your wife out of a will without a ‘spite clause?’ Just not mentioning her is enough? I did not know that.

Simple answer. In this case, yes. See, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20001121.html for a discussion of the probate issues. It has to do with community property law and marrying a really old guy for a short period of time.

(How like the case of that poor lady in Florida. She was married, the husband made a decision about her care. The Mother and Father objected, not realizing that marriage trumps being a parent. Excitement ensued.)

There are definitely some similarities. And I don’t hear any Senators crying out that the 9th Circuit is activist in this case.

[Gfactor]

@PBear42

Hey, Gfactor. Many thanks for an interesting discussion.

Thank you. It has been very challenging. I’ve had to think about, and find citations for, all sorts of esoterica that a litigator gets to blow the dust off of once every decade or so.

Let’s start with whether a bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to hear a probate-related dispute. For the view that it doesn’t, you cite Harris. I don’t read the case the same way. Rather, by my reading, all Harris says is that the powers of a decedent’s representative under state law are derived from and limited by state law. In that case, the representative sought bankruptcy protection on behalf of the decedent, notwithstanding having been denied power to seek such relief by the probate court. It was in this context, then, that the Supreme Court ruled that the probate court was the appropriate forum to resolve the issue. That’s a far cry from ruling that bankruptcy courts are inherently disqualified from hearing probate-related disputes.

Right, the rest is dicta. But they seemed so sure.

As for the “sister” problem of divorce property settlements, my observation is similar to yours but slightly different. In particular, I’m aware of no body of case law which disables a bankruptcy court from addressing such issues on jurisdictional grounds. Rather, the cases of which I’m aware, e.g., Robbins v. Robbins, 964 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1992) speak of this as a practical resolution of the conflicting-jurisdictions problem. Thus, and I assume your personal litigation experience is consistent, this is a prudential not a jurisdictional issue.

Right. And after Ankenbrandt, there is little left of the doctrine in bankruptcy court. I’ve even seen an unpublished case where a bankruptcy court did divide marital property. The problem in either case is that specialized state law governs the property rights, and the assets of the estate can’t be known for sure until the state law issues are decided by some court.

In this (6th) Circuit, In re White controls the issue. That case deals with modifying the stay and abstention. It also rejects the all-too-common claim that “bankruptcy law” should govern the distribution of marital assets because of the Supremacy Clause. As I pointed out a a while back, bankruptcy law does not establish property rights. Those are governed by state law. Anyway, I’m pretty sure White does not directly address the domestic relations exception head on, but it does say that a district court sitting in bankruptcy has concurrent jurisdiction over the property distribution aspects of a divorce case.

Conversely, the Sianis case, which you cite for the proposition that the probate exception is “mysterious and esoteric,” actually held that the federal district court could and should have heard the petitioner’s challenge to a disputed trust (as distinguished from a disputed will). If Sianis is good law, how wrong can the bankruptcy/district courts in Marshall have been?

Sianis* correctly considered state law dispositive. It looked to state law to determine whether each claim could be heard in a court of general jurisdiction or was required to be heard in probate court. The challenge to the will was properly dismissed because under Nebraska law, it had to be brought in probate court. Regarding the challenge to the trust:

The Trust was established and, as best as we can discern from the record before us, funded before Mrs. Sianis’s death. The probate court entertained no jurisdiction over its res or its administration during the pendency of the probate proceeding. Additionally, the Jensens have not directed us to any Nebraska authority suggesting that Mr. Sianis could have challenged the validity of the Trust in the probate proceeding; nor has our research turned up any such authority.

Caselaw: Cases and Codes - FindLaw Caselaw

Because the challenge was not permissible in a probate court, this claim was not covered by the probate exception. The 9th would have agreed with this analysis.

The Court also considered the res judicata effect of the probate proceedings. It applied Nebraska law when it did so.

I see the results as consistent. Nebraska has the right to determine the jurisdiction of its probate court, just as Texas does.

BTW, I only cited *Sianis * because it was the first case I found with the “mysterious and esoteric” stuff from Posner’s 7th Circuit opinion. I didn’t actually read it until just now.

Then we have the problem of whether the Texas probate court’s assertion that it had exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute between Trophy Wife and Dastardly Son had to be respected by the bankruptcy court as a matter of “full faith and credit.” To me, the simple answer to this is that the Supremacy Clause trumps the state court claim, unless some principle of federal law compels a different result.

The Full Faith and Credit Act requires that federal courts give the state-court judgment, and particularly the state court’s resolution of the res judicata issue, the same preclusive effect it would have had in another court of the same State. Challenges to the correctness of a state court’s determination as to the conclusive effect of a federal judgment must be pursued by way of appeal through the state-court system and certiorari from this Court. See Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947).

Parson’s Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank* (1986). So the Supreme Court has already ruled the Supremacy-Clause-as-trump theory invalid.

Finally, we have the issue of appealability of a failure to abstain. I stand corrected. As you say, pursuant to 28 U.S.C 1334(d), mandatory abstention (or failure to abstain pursuant to 1334(c)(2) is appealable. In my defense, I note that (i) your original float of the issue, based presumably on (c)(1),spoke of it as nonappealable; (ii) I’ve never seen such an appeal taken, perhaps because of the final judgment rule; and (iii) the Ninth Circuit did not rest its decision on this ground.

Guilty on all counts.

That said, you’re on solid ground when you assert that if the Ninth Circuit reached the right result, albeit on the wrong grounds, that’s okay. It’ll be interesting to see whether the Supremes duck this one on that basis.

I agree.

[Bryan_Ekers]

@Gfactor

Should be $474M. $474,754,134, to be precise.

Well, that clears things up. When I thought it was a mere $474,000 in dispute, I wondered why the heirs didn’t just pay her off with the loose change in their couch cushions.

[Gfactor]

@Bryan Ekers

Well, that clears things up. When I thought it was a mere $474,000 in dispute, I wondered why the heirs didn’t just pay her off with the loose change in their couch cushions.

I’m bad with numbers. Sorry. And I was probably in shock. I mean come on, four hundred million dollars . . . :eek: Your comment inspired me to take a second look.

[PBear42]

By and large, I think we’ve answered the OP’s question. One clarification. I didn’t mean to suggest that the Supremacy Clause means a federal court may ignore a decision by a state court. Clearly it may not. That’s the issue and claim preclusion issue we were discussing earlier. What I meant is merely that a state cannot, by fiat, declare that disputes of a certain kind may be heard only in its courts. Under the Supremacy Clause, assuming there’s statutory jurisdiction, federal courts may hear such cases, unless they choose not to.

[PBear42]

And the winner is … federal jurisdiction.

[Paul_in_Qatar]

Anna Nicole has just become even more attractive in my eyes.

[Gfactor]

@PBear42

And the winner is … federal jurisdiction.

Interesting. Thanks for following up.

Here is the decision, for those playing at home:

04-1544.pdf

[Sampiro]

This whole thing is too damned complicated. It could really benefit from a song by this guy to explain just what’s happening.

“…she met a 90 year old man who bought her two great big titties
it’s clear he knew what he was doing it don’t take a committee
to know he didn’t think she wed for looooove
but the issue is not what he saw in her
it’s inheritance law and 'yers
Yes it is.”

Kid: So the Supreme Court ruled in her favor! Yeaaa! That means she gets $550 million and it’s gonna be fun watching somebody spend that much and wind up broke in three months, right!

Animated Educational Character: If only it were that simple…

You see now she’s back to the state courts where she’ll wait in the docket
with a lot of other cases while her lawyer exposes his c_ck at
cameras on her next reality show
and that is where she’ll stay yes she will
but today she is still
just a plaintiff."

[Gfactor]

Here, Dahlia Lithwick answers the *real *questions in the case:

The court finds Anna Nicole hot.

[Airman_Doors_USAF]

All I want to know is whether or not Clarence Thomas got the chance to offer her a Coke.

[PBear42]

Gfactor: Here, Dahlia Lithwick answers the real questions in the case: