I again disagree.
Chronos, that’s an interesting question, but I was only commenting on what appeared to be your suggestion that the mere fact that you might end up with more than one guardian was of itself a hurdle.
Would you mind providing a link that explains the common law definition of “engaging in conduct”?
I’d still like that link, but a refined google found this:
Emphasis added.
I would certainly offer that “an ordinarily prudent or careful man” would feed a three year old child, particularly since resources are not an issue.
And you’re again wrong. Unless specifically defined in a statute otherwise, “reckless” means:
“A person’s conduct is reckless if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary, under the circumstances.” (emphasis added)
(RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965), quoted in Galloway v. Walker, a 2004 Idaho case found here:
Clarification: My cited definition and the point I’m making relate to the central question of this thread: Whether it is illegal to refrain from acting, when that action would prevent injury to another, and inaction will make that harm reasonably certain.
When did Idaho court decisions become the national standard for all states?
They didn’t. The Restatement, however, is just that. A restatement and distillation of the laws of all 50 states. A real cite. Something you haven’t offered yet.
Also, outside of a Monty Python sketch, repeated contradictions do not make an argument.
Is he? Even in Idaho it may not be so clear:
Both 18-401(1) and 18-403 make no reference to biological children. I think it could certainly be arguable as to whether our skier is subject to criminal prosecution.
Forgive this non-lawyer his ignorance, but aren’t the Restatements generally about civil cases? I thought we were discussing a potential criminal case.
No, I think the Idaho statutory language “having a child … dependant on him” for care refers to a prior relationship, with existing duties. (I agree with you that it need no be a biological child, though.)
The Restatement does deal with torts, and not criminal law directly, but (i) many of the criminal statutues that people have cited here only apply if there’s a prior relationship or duty, and we can look to general (including tort) law for discussions of that; (ii) recklessness is primarily a tort concept; and there is often a parallel tort remedy for crimes. I’m also not aware of a Criminal Law Restatement.
For these reason, a court considering a criminal charge will often look to tort definitions of words/phrases such as “negligent”, “willful and wanton”, “duty of care” and, yes, “reckless”, if there is no definition of the word in the criminal statute at issue.
For example, here’s an Illinois Supreme Court reckless homicide case, where the court looks to general common law (and the Tort Restatement section I cited earlier) to determine whether the defendant’s behavior falls within the definition of “reckless”: People v. Potter, 5 Ill.2d 365, 125 N.E.2d 510 (1955).
There is no Restatement of criminal law, but there is the Model Penal Code; I’m not at home with my law books, or I’d provide some quotes. Unlike the restatements, of course, the MPC does not state common law – it provides recommendations, some that conflict with common law – especially in the area of mens rea.
I guess what I see is that 18-401(1) in conjunction with a reasonable, prudent test (see the reference in post #84) establishes the dependancy, ie, in a case where two people are left alive (one a very small child) and resources are available, would a reasonable, prudent person take the step of feeding and caring for the child? Since the rather obvious answer is yes, the child is dependent and the statute applies. To borrow from Bricker, “I think if I were a[n Iowa] DA, I’d roll the dice.”
Then again, not much skiing going on in the lonestar state. 
It would be wrong, I agree. Would it be criminal?
Lacking a good-faith belief that the person I was prosecuting was factually guilty?
Yes.
A similar question could be asked about medical personnel. An M.D. is required by law to help a heart attack victim on the street. What if the same M.D. walks through the N.Y.C. subway system everyday and never bothers to offer help to any of the many mentally disturbed individuals who could at any moment throw themselves on the tracks? Would he be liable if one did?
I don’t believe this is correct. It’s a common misconception, debunked already in this thread, that the so-called Good Samaritan laws require this. They don’t.
What they may do is immunize medical personnel who choose to help an injured stranger on the street (injured as a result of a car accident, heart attack, drowning, or whatever) from malpractice claims brought by the victim, even if the treatment somehow worsens the injury.
(Note: Good Samaritan laws are enacted at the state level. They vary, and your state may not have one. Don’t rely on this post as legal advice that applies in your situation.)