Nos anciens ont su mourir,
Pour la gloire de la Légion.
Nous saurons bien tous périr
Suivant la tradition.
In my earlier cite on the surrender in the Philippines it said the biggest surrender of US forces prior to that was at Harper’s Ferry during the Civil War.
The Code of Conduct does not itself have the force of law, and even if it did there is plenty of wiggle room when it comes to what might constitute “means to resist.”
More importantly, the UCMJ, which does actually have the force of law, is far from silent on the matter. Specifically, Article 99, misbehavior before the enemy, may be applicable to:
Any member of the armed forces who before or in the presence of the enemy… shamefully abandons, surrenders, or delivers up any command, unit, place, or military property which it is his duty to defend…
With “[s]hamefully abandoning, surrendering, or delivering up command” requiring:
(a) That the accused was charged by orders or circumstances with the duty to defend a certain command, unit, place, ship, or military property; (b) That, without justification, the accused shamefully abandoned, surrendered, or delivered up that command, unit, place, ship, or military property; and (c) That this act occurred while the accused was before or in the presence of the enemy.
And, again, there’s plenty of room in that “without justification” element to make out a defense, even if some nominal resistance may yet have been offered. What constitutes “justification”? Well, I guess you’ve got to surrender, survive captivity, and maybe go to court-martial to find out. But I have to believe it would encompass something along the lines of the forlorn defense of the Philippines during WWII, MacArthur’s own ego not withstanding. Nobody should have to die for their commanding officer’s ego. Even if they do all the time.
The Code of the United States Fighting Force quoted upthread seems to indicate that there is such a thing as being allowed to surrender.
It does, actually. It was issued pursuant to Executive Order 10631. It effectively constitutes a lawful order issued to all members of the U.S. Armed Forces. As such, violating the Code of Conduct would be a violation of Article 92 of the UCMJ.
Sort of?
That does seem to imply that a member of the Armed Forces in command could lawfully surrender if the members of their command don’t still have the means to resist. But I’m not aware of any elaboration of what would constitute not “still hav[ing] the means to resist.” I wasn’t an officer, so maybe they get more specific training on that, but as an NCO, the military culture that I experienced had an implicit and explicit expectation that U.S. Soldiers don’t surrender. That “I will never surrender of my own free will” bit was the part that was emphasized.
I probably should have quoted more extensively from the History of the United States Army in World War 2, The Fall of the Philippines than I did earlier, which was only the first couple of paragraphs of the final chapter. The surrender of the remaining forces in the Philippines gets complicated, but yes, US commanders can issue orders for surrender to their forces. I’d suggest reading the full chapter as well as the chapter preceding, but to cite it a bit further:
On the morning of 6 May General Sharp received two messages. The first was the one in which Wainwright relinquished command of the Visayan-Mindanao Force and directed Sharp to report to MacArthur for orders. The second was from General MacArthur who, on learning of the surrender of Corregidor and without knowledge of Wainwright’s instructions to Sharp, immediately ordered the commander of the Visayan-Mindanao Force to “communicate all matters direct to me.”[46] With this dispatch MacArthur assumed command of the Visayan-Mindanao Force.
The first intimation Sharp had of Wainwright’s intention to reassume command came from the latter’s radio broadcast on midnight of the 7th. He immediately repeated the gist of the broadcast, which directed him in unmistakable terms to surrender, to MacArthur and asked for further instructions. The reply from Melbourne came promptly: “Orders emanating from General Wainwright have no validity. If possible separate your forces into small elements and initiate guerrilla operations. you, of course, have full authority to make any decision that immediate emergency may demand.”[47] At the same time, MacArthur informed the Chief of Staff of Wainwright’s broadcast and of his own orders to Sharp. “I believe Wainwright has temporarily become unbalanced,” he concluded, “and his condition renders him susceptible of enemy use.”[48]
When General MacArthur made this judgment he was probably unaware of the circumstances which had dictated Wainwright’s course of action during and after the surrender of Corregidor. He could not have realized that it was the fear of what would happen to the 11,000 men on Corregidor which had forced Wainwright to accept Homma’s terms. Wainwright believed, as did many of the American officers on his staff, that the Japanese would kill their prisoners in cold blood if the commanders in the south did not surrender.[49]
There is no direct evidence that the Japanese actually made such a threat. In 1946, during the course of the Homma trial, Colonel Pugh stated that he had no personal knowledge that a threat had been made. But he added that General Wainwright certainly believed his men would be killed
–575–
if Sharp did not surrender.[50] One the same occasion Wainwright testified that the Japanese told him they did not regard the Americans as prisoners of war but as hostages, “held to insure the success of the negotiations with forces in the south. . . .” “My principal concern,” he said then, “was for fear that they would do what they said they would do; that is, slaughter all those people in the fortified islands unless the troops all over the Archipelago surrendered.”[51]
…
General Sharp’s position on 8 May was not an enviable one. First Wainwright had released him and now sought to reassert his control. He had reported to MacArthur and from him had received complete authority to act on his own judgment. His legal right to ignore Wainwright’s reassumption of command and order to surrender was undeniable. But from the Manila broadcast he had received some intimation of the possible consequences of such a course. He decided, therefore, to await the promised arrival of Wainwright’s emissary, Colonel Traywick, before making his decision. In the meantime, in accordance with MacArthur’s instructions, he released from his control the island commanders in his force and directed them to prepare for guerrilla operations.
…
General Sharp’s decision to surrender placed him in exactly the same position
–576–
Wainwright had been in on 7 May. He now had to reassume command of the officers he had released for guerrilla operations the day before. This he did on 10 May in a clear text message–he had destroyed his codes–rescinding his earlier instructions and directing his subordinate commanders to cease all operations at once, stack arms, and raise the white flag. One of his staff officers, he told them, would soon arrive with written orders and with detailed instructions. These orders, he concluded, were “imperative and must be carried out in order to save further bloodshed.”[55] Later that night, at 1915, he announced his decision to General MacArthur. “I have seen Wainwright’s staff officer,” he explained, “and have withdrawn my order releasing commanders on other islands and directed complete surrender. Dire necessity alone has prompted this action.”[56]It was with great relief that General Wainwright heard from Colonel Traywick when that officer returned to Manila on 11 May that General Sharp had decided to place his forces again under Wainwright’s command and to accept the order to surrender. This decision, he believed, averted a massacre and saved the Corregidor garrison.[57]
Wainwright’s relief was premature. General Sharp’s surrender orders proved far more difficult to enforce than had been anticipated. His troops were scattered among many islands; most of them were untrained Filipinos; and those who were safe in their mountain hide-outs showed no disposition to give up their freedom. Communication between the islands was poor and it would be some time before the last troops laid down their arms. Until then the fate of the Corregidor garrison hung in the balance.
The detailed instructions to each commander were sent by courier on the 11th. In each case the commander was directed to assemble his men at a designated point and at a certain time. General Chynoweth, for example, was to bring his men to the northern outskirts of Cebu City; Christie to Iloilo City, and Colonel Cornell, commander of the Leyte-Samar Force, to Tacloban and Catbalogan. Land mines and other explosives that might cause injury or damage to the Japanese were to be removed within twenty-four hours, and those that could not be removed were to be plainly marked. All commanders were warned against the destruction of military of civilian property and urged to accord the Japanese “courteous and prompt obedience.”[58]
The surrender on Mindanao was generally without incident, although here, as elsewhere, a large number of troops preferred to leave their units rather than become prisoners. Colonel Chastaine, unable to get his regiment to the appointed place in time, requested, and presumably secured, permission to arrive at a later date. Others may have had similar difficulties.[59] The most striking commentary of the enforced surrender came from General Fort, commander of the 81st Division ¶, who wrote to General Sharp: “Many of my officers encouraged me to disobey orders and continue–and strange to relate, Filipino and
–577–
Moro officers–which I’ll admit was a temptation as my own small force was undefeated and was growing stronger with the reorganization which I had undertaken. . . . I had difficulty in holding some of them true to discipline.”[60]
The law kinda seems like it is telling troops it is death or prison for them.
I’d guess most would choose prison.
Seems a silly law.
Troops often fight losing battles (remember the Alamo) but they don’t do it for fear of going to prison if they don’t.
I don’t think it’s that silly. Sometimes it may be necessary for a force to fight a last stand. When the need is dire, and the value of the last stand is high. In those situations you need your men willing to fight to the bitter end. The sort of ethos you instill to promote that sort of thing is one in which surrender is not seen as acceptable behavior.
The flipside is people are going to get captured, and even surrender. One way to address that reality is if you (you being upper brass etc) determine it was mostly unavoidable and they had accounted for themselves at the level duty required, you just opt to not pursue punishment for the infraction. No harm no foul.
There was a time in the old Royal Navy where any loss of a ship for any reason, the Captain was put on trial before the Admiralty. The default presumption was a Captain losing his ship has performed in a manner unacceptable to the Navy. Now, not infrequently the Captain would have a good reason and be acquitted, but there is a reason the charges being brought were automatic. Even losing your ship to mutiny would result in those charges being brought–the Captain of the HMS Bounty stood trial for having lost the ship, for example (he was acquitted.)
I think it is silly to make surrendering illegal.
I do not think the threat of prison is what will keep them going in such a situation.
I don’t think having a code of ethics is about prison as a consequence. I don’t think laws against rape are why all men aren’t rapists. But having a law against rape helps reinforce to society that rape is not moral behavior.
That really is not the same thing at all.
If you are a soldier presumably you have an ethic and code to fight for your country and fellow soldiers.
If you are a rapist are you raping for a reason beyond your own satisfaction?
It’s the broad point that the reason people obey laws is not out of fear of prison, mostly. So assuming it is a bad idea to have a law because you don’t think people are doing the thing to avoid being punished for the law, is not logical. Laws codify our societal values, it is a value within the society of the military to not surrender.
It IS the broad point. But not the point you mean.
Equating a soldier to a rapist is just…weird. That they are motivated by the same things is just wrong.
I suspect that the word shamefully is key here. Clearly this is open to societal norms and a bit rubbery, but it is very hard to imagine that in most western societies it would be regraded as shameful to surrender in the face of certain death or similar. As we saw, in WW2, the Japanese combatants saw things differently, and that was even then a significant issue. It was hard to comprehend a societal norm where anything other than death was a dishonourable and shameful alternative to victory.
For a commanding officer in the modern world, pursuing action in the face of near certain defeat and the loss of further lives under their command - well that is action worthy of court martial. Societal expectations are that a CO will not pursue such actions. We would regard sending a military unit on a known suicide mission as abrogating pretty much the core of our ethical beliefs. Requiring a military unit to behave as if every action they are on as an implicit suicide mission if things turn against them is no different.
In summary: there is no shame in preserving life when there is no viable alternative.
It looks like you’re more interesting in weighing in with opinions than discussing the factual existence of U.S. policy towards surrender.
This is not my opinion. I asked you a question based on your post.
Is US policy towards surrender equivalent to rape?
That’s not a genuine question since I already explained the reason for my post.
Is surrendering immoral behavior?
My opinion on its morality isn’t relevant. It would be accurate to say the military’s regulations and laws are intended to represent the value system that generations of military and civilian leaders have wanted. That value system treats surrender as improper as evidenced by the Code of Conduct and UCMJ.
You started with bringing rape into this thread so where is the connection?