Let's break gerrymandering

Great Debates
21

[QUOTE=Freddy the Pig]
None of the above. The criteria for districting should be (1) population equality (already required); (2) contiguity (already required); (3) compactness (which can be mathematically measured; (4) following county and city boundaries to the extent not inconsistent with the previous objectives; and (5) consistency with existing districts, especially on later iterations where you’re beginning with non-gerrymandered districts and want to minimize change.
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It’s not clear that this is going to get you results any different from a bunch of “safe” seats as is the case now. Especially point 4. Take for example, Illinois. This districting scheme would lead to a bunch of districts in Chicago (which will be safely Democratic), and a bunch of rural districts in downstate Illinois (which will be safely Republican). In fact, if you look at the Illinois map right now, that’s more or less what the districts look like. Despite that, there is clearly an issue with this district map, as most of the Democrats in Illinois won with over 70% of the vote in their districts…

22

I forgot to add, as a concise summary: the OP specifically mentioned “protecting incumbents” as a problem with the current system, and I don’t think your algorithm for apportioning districts necessarily solves that.

23

[QUOTE=MilTan]
I forgot to add, as a concise summary: the OP specifically mentioned “protecting incumbents” as a problem with the current system, and I don’t think your algorithm for apportioning districts necessarily solves that.
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The point is that the way districts are currently drawn has a huge potential for corruption and partisan outlining. The map may have no better arrangement than the elected officials’ version even if an objective algorithm draws it, but by and large I think having a program draw the districts will be much more fair. If that means that Democrats lose power, that’s the price of truly representative democracy. An electoral map should not look like a contorted plate of spaghetti and meatballs.

24

[QUOTE=Captain Carrot]
The point is that the way districts are currently drawn has a huge potential for corruption and partisan outlining. The map may have no better arrangement than the elected officials’ version even if an objective algorithm draws it, but by and large I think having a program draw the districts will be much more fair. If that means that Democrats lose power, that’s the price of truly representative democracy. An electoral map should not look like a contorted plate of spaghetti and meatballs.
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But you can have the algorithm maximize competitive districts, too – that doesn’t make it any less objective. Basically, I don’t think that the standards set forth by Freddy really do much other than make the districts “look pretty.”

What’s the problem with odd looking districts if they foster competitiveness, or better reflect the desires of the voters? The problem right now is that in many states, the districts don’t look pretty because they are drawn to achieve undesirable goals. The “prettiness,” or lack thereof, isn’t the goal in and of itself.

25

[QUOTE=MilTan]
What’s the problem with odd looking districts if they foster competitiveness, or better reflect the desires of the voters? The problem right now is that in many states, the districts don’t look pretty because they are drawn to achieve undesirable goals. The “prettiness,” or lack thereof, isn’t the goal in and of itself.
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The thing is that “odd-looking districts” are made to screw over the party that is not in power, or, failing that, to favor incumbents. They demonstrably do not foster competitiveness: in 2004 4 House incumbents were defeated, excluding the Texas redistricting to favor Republicans. 8 Senate incumbents lost, but Senators cannot use gerrymandering to help themselves get re-elected, thank Og. Districts do not need to, and in fact should not, look like octopuses on speed. If they do reflect the desires of the voters better, it’s by accident; districts should be based primarily on population, with secondary emphases on geography and transportation (i.e. rivers, cliffs, and highways are decent boundaries), and other districts (i.e. Congressional district lines should coincide with state Congressional lines as much as is optimal).

26

[QUOTE=Captain Carrot]
The thing is that “odd-looking districts” are made to screw over the party that is not in power, or, failing that, to favor incumbents. They demonstrably do not foster competitiveness: in 2004 4 House incumbents were defeated, excluding the Texas redistricting to favor Republicans. 8 Senate incumbents lost, but Senators cannot use gerrymandering to help themselves get re-elected, thank Og. Districts do not need to, and in fact should not, look like octopuses on speed. If they do reflect the desires of the voters better, it’s by accident; districts should be based primarily on population, with secondary emphases on geography and transportation (i.e. rivers, cliffs, and highways are decent boundaries), and other districts (i.e. Congressional district lines should coincide with state Congressional lines as much as is optimal).
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I agree that districts as they are now favor incumbents. But my point is that it has nothing to do with odd-shapedness, or anything like that. I hate to keep going back to Illinois as the example, but it makes the point cleanly, I think. I can draw well-formed districts in Illinois that favor incumbents (as the natural shape of compact districts in Illinois would), and I can draw oddly formed districts that are completely fair (as my “pie-piece” districts would be). There is nothing inherent in the shape of a district that makes it fair or unfair, and odd shapes can be used in the service of competitiveness or some other fairness metric just as easily as they’re used in the service of incumbency protection. I agree that compact districts are harder to twist to bad purposes, but they’re just as hard to use for good purposes. That’s why I think the criteria should be goal-based (e.g. we want competitive districts) rather than process-based (e.g. we want compact districts).

27

Have every state with more than two Representatives either elect all Representatives at-large or divide into several multi-member districts. Take California with it’s 53 Representatives. The state could be divided into 7 5-member districts and 3 6-member districts. Each party on the ballot could nominate as many candidates as seats. Voters could choose to vote for a straight party ticker and accept it’s order of candidates, rank candidates themselves, or mix and match cadidates from different parties.

28

I was under the impression that during the Civil Rights era, multi-member districts and at-large seats were banned as a common tactic of disenfranchising black voters.

29

I absolutely concur with the OP.

All governments somewhere inside them have some form of institutional corruption. Some, like the US, fewer than others. However, gerrymandering at all levels is particularly shameful.

It exists because there is no part of the government that is not ‘democratically liable’ - ie. dependent on an electorate and, by cirollary, the partisans of one or other of the political parties. Even the Supreme Court Judges are appointed as part of the political process.

This means - unless you tell me otherwise - that there is no part of American governance that can truly be called objective or impartial. As such, gerrymandering will never be eradicated.

Strangely enough, it is one of the strongest argument that the UK has in favour of its continuing monarchical system. The Queen might be archaic but she does provide a fixed point of impartial authority above parties within the government.

30

[QUOTE=acsenray]
I was under the impression that during the Civil Rights era, multi-member districts and at-large seats were banned as a common tactic of disenfranchising black voters.
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Federal law (enacted under the “times, places, and manner” clause) does indeed require single-member districts for the House of Representatives, but the requirement long predates the Civil Rights Movement. It was first enacted in 1842, lapsed in 1852, and was reinstated and has been in force continually since 1872. A Congressman accustomed to defending a district doesn’t like to be at the mercy of a state legislature which might suddenly make him run statewide.

(The Voting Rights Act extended the restriction to state and local elections; conversion to at-large elections at the state and local level can be challenged if there are grounds to believe the purpose was to reduce minority representation.)

Obviously, this does add a serious hurdle for those who advocate multi-member districts with PR. Congress would have to agree to allow this first; whereas the reform of drawing single-member districts on a less partisan basis can be enacted on a state-by-state basis.

Compact districts which respect pre-existing political boundaries have virtues independent of whether they maximize competitiveness.

Even in this age of world-wide media, there are still local newspapers and local TV and radio stations. Drawing districts in a compact manner allows these media to cover the races in a more coherent manner, and reduces the necessity of advertising across multiple jurisdictions, which holds down the cost of campaigning.

Congressmen have offices in their districts, and they hold debates when they’re campaigning. People don’t like to drive long distances to visit these offices or watch these debates. Compact districts mean that they don’t have to.

People like to discuss campaigns with their neighbors, and it’s easier to know your Congressman and follow the campaign when an entire metropolitan area (or in a large city, a coherent segment of a metropolitan area) is represented by a single person, as opposed to the situation in Illinois where a single Congressman represents a fragment of Springfield, and of Peoria, and of Decatur.

It’s true that compact districts don’t maximize partisan competition. But by removing partisan considerations from the process, they don’t minimize it, and they offer other virtues which make up for their competitive sub-optimality.

31

[QUOTE=Freddy the Pig]
It’s true that compact districts don’t maximize partisan competition. But by removing partisan considerations from the process, they don’t minimize it, and they offer other virtues which make up for their competitive sub-optimality.
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All right. I think I’m with you on there being other virtues of compact districts. But I don’t think this last statement is quite correct. You’re right that compact districts don’t necessarily minimize competitiveness, but, inasmuch as partisan divides are largely urban/rural divides these days, they get much closer to minimum competitiveness than districts drawn in some other way. Note the “compact” districts in and around NYC which are the least competitive House districts in the country. Likewise Chicago, SF, etc.

I’m all in favor of a non-partisan process, but I think we simply disagree as to what the first goal of that process should be.

32

[url=http://nationalatlas.gov/printable/images/preview/congdist/NY08_109.gif]This district is near NYC, not compact and not close. The twelfth district is less compact, and even more one-sided. The thirteenth is almost totally restricted to the island of Richmond, and elected a Republican 57-43. The fourteenth is not really compact at all, being split by an inlet of the Atlantic Ocean, and missing a chunk from its coast. The fifteenth is much the same as the fourteenth, but much more one-sided. The sixteenth I will give you, as it is somewhat near NYC, fairly compact, and not remotely close. The seventeenth is edging away from NYC, not really compact, and not too close.

Look, many of NY’s districts are not horrible examples of gerrymandering, and most of them aren’t close, but your point really isn’t that accurate. NY’s average spread was 36%, with four candidates unopposed; five Republicans out of 29 seats, and five close races. Texas had an average spread of 32%, with two candidates unopposed and three Democrats (no Republican) with no major party challenger; twelve total Democrats out of 32 seats, and one close race. California had an average spread of 34%, with four unopposed and four Democrats running without Republicans; sixteen Republicans out of 53 seats and two close races. Virginia had an average spread of 30% with one Democrat unopposed and two Republicans without Democrats; three Democrats out of 11 seats and one close race. North Carolina had an average spread of 25% with one Democrat unopposed; six Democrats (with one more up in the air) out of 13 and one close race.

New York’s races are not great on average, but they’re not substantially worse than the rest of the country. NY actually had a higher percentage of close races than the five states I examined (three partisan, my own, and one random decent-sized state).

(All data from CNN and nationalatlas.gov)

33

NY as a whole will have some close races, thanks to upstate NY. I was specifically talking about the urban districts.

Anyway, do you really think that compactness would do anything to the competitiveness of the 8th or the 12th? It would be just as bad, with no way of making things better (as opposed to making more of the NYC districts reach out into Westchester or something – I haven’t done a careful study of NY voting patterns or anything). I don’t know why those NYC districts are drawn precisely in that manner, but there seems to be a pretty uniform partisan makeup across all of them. So I think my general point still stands – even if the NYC districts were made more compact, they would still be ridiculously non-competitive.