# Lets Do Another "What If the USA Stayed Neutral in WW2" **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [August 3, 2022, 4:21am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/lets-do-another-what-if-the-usa-stayed-neutral-in-ww2/969000 "2022-08-03T04:21:56Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 4
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [August 17, 2022, 3:14pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/lets-do-another-what-if-the-usa-stayed-neutral-in-ww2/969000/61 "2022-08-17T15:14:09Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > I’d like to reemphasize this point for the sake of those who might not be aware of how much this was the case. The [Mukden Incident](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mukden_Incident) in 1931 which started Japan’s adventures into China via a false-flag incident leading to the seizure of Manchuria was carried out by a cabal of junior officers against the express wishes of the Japanese government and Emperor: It’s an interesting aspect of their culture to where junior officers take actions and more senior officers stand by. Sometimes they allow more freedom to subordinates, such as permitting them to say things that some of the senior officers wish they could but because of their positions, they can’t speak such things out loud. These junior officers were often (usually? I’m not certain) members of the various “societies,” the ultranationalist groups which were hellbent on pushing Japan further and further into Asia and other countries. [Gen. Kanji Ishiwara](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kanji_Ishiwara), for example, one of the leaders of the Mukden Incident, was a founder of a semi-religious and Pan-Asianist organization, the East-Asia League Movement (_Tōarenmei undō_ ). Ishiwara was a follower of Nichiren: > [@](#): > > Both Nichiren and his followers have been associated with fervent [Japanese nationalism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_nationalism) specifically identified as [Nichirenism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nichirenism) between the [Meiji period](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meiji_period) and the conclusion of [World War II](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II).[[99]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nichiren_Buddhism#cite_note-99)[[100]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nichiren_Buddhism#cite_note-kodera-100) The nationalistic interpretation of Nichiren’s teachings were inspired by lay Buddhist movements like [Kokuchūkai](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kokuch%C5%ABkai) and resulted in violent historical events such as the [May 15 Incident](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/May_15_Incident) and the [League of Blood Incident](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/League_of_Blood_Incident).[[101]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nichiren_Buddhism#cite_note-101)[[102]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nichiren_Buddhism#cite_note-102)[[103]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nichiren_Buddhism#cite_note-103) Among the key proponents of this interpretation are [Chigaku Tanaka](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tanaka_Chigaku) who founded the [Kokuchūkai](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kokuch%C5%ABkai) (English: Nation’s Pillar Society). Tanaka was charismatic and through his writings and lecturers attracted many followers such as [Kanji Ishiwara](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kanji_Ishiwara).[[30]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nichiren_Buddhism#cite_note-Habito1999-30): 427–428 Nisshō Honda advocated the unification of Japanese Buddhists to support the imperial state.[[30]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nichiren_Buddhism#cite_note-Habito1999-30): 428 [[94]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nichiren_Buddhism#cite_note-Covell2006-94): 230 Other ultra-nationalist activists who based their ideas on Nichiren were [Ikki Kita](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ikki_Kita) and [Nisshō Inoue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nissh%C5%8D_Inoue).[[30]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nichiren_Buddhism#cite_note-Habito1999-30): The main co-conspirator, [Seishirō Itagaki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seishir%C5%8D_Itagaki) was also a Nichiren Buddhist, but I don’t know his level of involvement or if he was a member of Ishiwara’s movement. As they were the two lead members, it would make sense if they had that connection. Starting in the 1920s and 30s and until the war, there were numerous associations and societies which pushed Japanese ultranationalism. There were more such groups in the IJA than the IJN and it was easier for these groups to operate openly in Korea and Manchuria, which is one reason that the strike north idea was more widespread. The idea of senior officers not censuring their subordinates reminds me of the [Kujo Incident](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ky%C5%ABj%C5%8D_incident), the attempted coup after the announcement of the surrender. While the War (Army) Minister, General Amami, was aware of the officer agitating for the coup, and while he forcefully told them not to rebel, he also didn’t have them arrested. Continuing along these lines, the overall war “strategies” were being pushed by middle level officers in the planning sections (departments) of the services, and then mostly not being vetoed by their bosses. From _Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy by Eri Hotta_ > [@](#): > > The navy, too, had its middle-ranking hawks. The primary example was Ishikawa Shingo, a section chief in the Navy Ministry’s Military Affairs Bureau, also in his midforties. In 1931, around the time of the Manchurian Incident, he wrote a controversial book, Japan’s Crisis, under a pseudonym (and without permission from the navy, grounds enough for dismissal from the service). In it, he warned that the United States had entertained ambitions to control the East since the middle of the previous century, and he urged Japan to embark on a “great national march to ensure its right to survival” in the face of impending American threats. He thought the conferences on naval reduction that had been held in Washington and London were part of a Western conspiracy to obstruct Japan’s rise to prominence. > > Like the army’s Ishiwara Kanji, who had conceived of the Manchurian takeover, Ishikawa greatly influenced younger officers with his polemical book, turning many in what had traditionally been the pro-British navy into Nazi sympathizers. In his thinking, Japan’s military occupation of French Indochina was about preparing for an inevitable war rather than a possible one. Ishikawa, in fact, favored a forceful military advance beyond Indochinese borders and advocated the conquest of British Malaya within 1941. Ishikawa would later boast, “I am the one who brought Japan to the war course.” One could say that these bakuryo [literally “officers behind the curtains,” middle ranking military planners officers] were simply doing their soldierly job of preparing for war while keeping an eye on the opportunity for strategic and territorial aggrandizement. > > The problem for Japan in mid-1941, however, was that war preparation became the sole focus in the absence of an overarching national policy guiding it. Those at the top were often too willing to be led by the junior officers they should have been restraining, adopting their urgent rhetoric uncritically. The navy’s chief of staff, Nagano Osami, summarized that attitude unabashedly: “Because the section chiefs are the ones most in the know, I accept their views.” > > Five decades later, Ishii Akiho, a bakuryo officer in the Army Ministry who was responsible for drafting many of its successful proposals, reflected on the power he and his colleagues had once possessed in those crucial months leading up to Pearl Harbor: “Fools that we were, we could make an important policy decision as long as we took the initiative. Of course, our policy might have been modified along the way, but [our voice] was that important.… And so my sin is great.” > > In his mind, the most fundamental problem of the time was that no one in the chain of command ever doubted that the Japanese empire was destined to achieve regional—if not global—leadership and thus needed to expand no matter what. This meant that even if one expansionist program was rejected, the planners would come up with another just as expansionist. Well, they would ask, “if we can’t go there, where can we go instead?” (I’ve broken up a paragraph to make it easier to read on screen.) The problem is that middle level officers in the field and in the war planning departments were driving the military in the absence of strategic control by the country’s top leaders, either civilian or military. As such, chaos tends to follow and unwinnable wars “happen.” As I’ve posted before, war with the US seems unavoidable without clear leadership actively preventing the intermediate steps. ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [August 17, 2022, 6:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/lets-do-another-what-if-the-usa-stayed-neutral-in-ww2/969000/62 "2022-08-17T18:27:30Z")
> [@DrDeth](#): > > “The Russians wouldn’t have that “overwhelming superiority in tanks, artillery, …” without Zhukov, who could call in favors from his _Mentor_.” That Mentor as I said before was an incompetent Marshal, who was a Stalin favorite. So, your dissembling aside, that’s a big no for you having any actual evidence or a cite that Stalin based his decisions on whether or not to send troops to a war was based on ‘favors’ beings called in. As to your again bizarre and uncited claims that Soviet superiority in armor, artillery, logistics and mobile operations didn’t exist, let’s take a look at a few actual cites on what happened. From [wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Khalkhin_Gol), bolding mine: > The two armies continued to spar with each other over the next two weeks along a four-kilometre (2.5 mi) front running along the east bank of the Khalkhin Gol to its junction with the Holsten River.[[33]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Khalkhin_Gol#cite_note-FOOTNOTEDrea1981p._1_(Japanese_Initiatives)-35) **Zhukov, whose army was 748 km (465 mi) away from its base of supply, assembled a fleet of 2,600 trucks to supply his troops, while the Japanese suffered severe supply problems due to a lack of similar motor transport.**[[27]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Khalkhin_Gol#cite_note-FOOTNOTENeeno2005-29) > **Japanese artillery supported the attack with a massive barrage that consumed more than half of their ammunition stores over a period of two days.** [[34]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Khalkhin_Gol#cite_note-FOOTNOTEDrea1981p._53_(Hills_742_and_754)-36) The attack made some progress but failed to break through Soviet lines and reach the bridge. **The Japanese disengaged from the attack on 25 July due to mounting casualties and depleted artillery stores.** By this point they had suffered over 5,000 casualties between late May and 25 July, with Soviet losses being much higher but more easily replaced.[[27]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Khalkhin_Gol#cite_note-FOOTNOTENeeno2005-29)[[35]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Khalkhin_Gol#cite_note-FOOTNOTEDrea19817-37) From the study I cited [earlier](https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA378202.pdf), again bolding mine: > On 23 July, the 64th and 72nd Infantry regiments launched a frontal assault following an intense > artillery preparation against the 11th Tank Brigade, 149th Motorized Rifle Regiments and 5th Machine Gun Brigade. **The battle quickly became an artillery dual [sic] with the Soviets producing a greater volume of fire.** Although the Japanese did succeed in pushing the Soviets off Hill 733, over 5,000 Japanese troops were killed, and the Soviets were still on the east side of the Halha River, the Japanese claimed border. and > **Japanese ground forces, without tanks or artillery, crossed over on a single bridge into Mongolia on** **2 July. The crossing force was quickly met, as described earlier, with swarms of Soviet tanks and** **armored cars.** The Japanese suffered very heavy casualties and withdrew on 4 July. The left wing of the operations did not even reach the river and also sustained heavy losses. And finally, you missed my point about the Soviet Army having ~20,000 tanks at the outbreak of WW2. Of course most of them were elsewhere during the Soviet-Japanese border conflicts, the point is that sending 1,000 tanks to Mongolia wasn’t a very big deal for the USSR, being only about 5% of its total tank pool. For Japan, that figure was a lot closer to being the entirety of their operational tank pool, not something that they could idly deploy to Mongolia. In point of fact, given their precarious logistical situation in Mongolia (see, that logistical advantage the Soviets had popping up again) such a deployment couldn’t actually be supported. ---
**Author:** ![DrDeth](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/b487fb/32.png) [@DrDeth](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DrDeth)\ **Post date:** [August 17, 2022, 8:13pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/lets-do-another-what-if-the-usa-stayed-neutral-in-ww2/969000/63 "2022-08-17T20:13:05Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > So, your dissembling aside, that’s a big no for you having any actual evidence or a cite that Stalin based his decisions on whether or not to send troops to a war was based on ‘favors’ beings called in. It is right there on the wiki page. Look, it is fine for you to disagree on a matter of opinion. But you keep getting the details wrong. You thought Russian tanks were much better than the Imperial Japanese “paper mache” tanks. You were wrong, and I showed it with cites. You got the numbers of artillery wrong. You clearly had no idea of the aircraft used. You did not know of Zhukovs past. You post indicated that Russia had 20000 tanks available, even though it is known they did not, as you admit here. Then you try to prove your point of "massive superiority in amount of artillery " by showing that Zhukov used his artillery better- which is exactly my point. Zhukov also used hi crappy tanks better, and even his infantry better. It is a well known FACT of military science and history that a Great General will make a huge difference in a battle. Zhukov was indeed a great general, and is generally agreed the best General Russia had. Your argument seems to be that having a Great general makes no difference, that the Soviets would have won a very close battle even with a mediocre inexperienced officer. In my opinion- that is wrong. Zhukov made the difference- not having a few more crappy tanks. It was knowing how to use those crappy tanks that won the battle, as my cites have shown. Your opinion seems to be otherwise. It is fine to have an opinion, and your opinion is of course valid. But you have gotten increasing angry and argumentative when my cites have shown over and over you missed or got wrong many details. And your opinion goes against the military experts I have cited. If you want to think an advantage in numbers of crappy tanks is all that is needed- instead of superior tactics and leadership- fine. But at least get the details of those crappy tanks right. ---
**Author:** ![RickJay](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/bb73d2/32.png) [@RickJay](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RickJay)\ **Post date:** [August 18, 2022, 5:12pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/lets-do-another-what-if-the-usa-stayed-neutral-in-ww2/969000/64 "2022-08-18T17:12:43Z")
> [@Horatius](#): > > A lot of people don’t realize how much Canada contributed to keeping the convoys alive. By the end of the war, we were the 3rd (maybe 4th, reports differ) largest navy in the war, after the US, UK, and maybe USSR. And it would appear that most of those ships were built in Canada. The majority of ships were Canadian built, but the majority of sheer power was not. Canada had no capital ships. Its two largest surface combat ships were two light cruisers of British construction; and most of the destroyers were British or American-built. When you get down to frigates (almost all River class ships, a British design but mostly built in Canada) and corvettes (mostly Flower-class) then Canadian yards were building them. ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [August 18, 2022, 10:24pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/lets-do-another-what-if-the-usa-stayed-neutral-in-ww2/969000/65 "2022-08-18T22:24:00Z")
The irony and the display of lack or reading comprehension in this post is really just astounding. The strangest part is that only thing you quote is my stating “that’s a big no for you having any actual evidence or a cite that Stalin based his decisions on whether or not to send troops to a war was based on ‘favors’ beings called in.” and then proceed to talk about everything but that all the while misstating or misconstruing everything I’ve written, arguing with strawmen of your own invention. ---
**Author:** ![DrDeth](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/b487fb/32.png) [@DrDeth](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DrDeth)\ **Post date:** [August 18, 2022, 11:12pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/lets-do-another-what-if-the-usa-stayed-neutral-in-ww2/969000/66 "2022-08-18T23:12:30Z")
Well, lets see- you have been wrong about nearly every tactical issue. And my central thesis does not depend on Stalin giving anyone favors. It depends on Zhukov being the general. You refuse to reply to this, as pretty much every historian or military expert would agree with me, not you. Every time I give a cite, you are proven wrong, then you drop that issue, pretending it never happened, then demanding more and more cites- moving the goalpost even more and more. Which will- prove you wrong, and then you ignore it. Now you are asking for a cite on my opinion I am done with you. Nor is your continued anger and animosity wanted here. ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [August 19, 2022, 12:30am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/lets-do-another-what-if-the-usa-stayed-neutral-in-ww2/969000/67 "2022-08-19T00:30:52Z")
> [@DrDeth](#): > > Well, lets see- you have been wrong about nearly every tactical issue. Name one. An actual one, not a strawman that you’ve invented. > [@DrDeth](#): > > And my central thesis does not depend on Stalin giving anyone favors. It depends on Zhukov being the general. You refuse to reply to this, as pretty much every historian or military expert would agree with me, not you. Yes it does. You’ve stated that the only reason the Soviets had the forces they did was because Zhukov had the favors to call in to get them, which is utter nonsense. I have replied to it, and sorry but no, you haven’t presented a single military expert or historian who agrees with you that the outcome of the Soviet-Japanese border conflict depended upon Zhukov being the general at the scene, much less ‘pretty much all of them.’ > [@DrDeth](#): > > Every time I give a cite, you are proven wrong, then you drop that issue, pretending it never happened, then demanding more and more cites- moving the goalpost even more and more. Which will- prove you wrong, and then you ignore it. Now you are asking for a cite on my opinion I am done with you. Your cites either 1) don’t say what you think they do, 2) don’t address anything I’ve actually argued and 3) haven’t proven me wrong on anything I’ve stated. I haven’t moved a single goalpost. In fact, you’ve continuously made claims that you are unable to provide any evidence for while claiming you have as here: > [@Dissonance](#): > > > [@DrDeth](#): > > > > In fact a few have- in various “What-If” books about WW2. But historians tend to stay away from “what-if” hypothesizes. Nor do I claim that grabbing the DEI without a Pearl Harbor was a "obvious, simple solution - but the USA would _not_ have declared war over it. Period. Sooner or later American assistance “short of war” would have caused war to break out- which was Roosevelt’s plan against the Nazis. IMHO, Roosevelt would have hit Germany first- just like he really did. > > Name one. I’ll take that as a no. > . and here: > [@DrDeth](#): > > > [@Dissonance](#): > > > > Your hero-worship of Zhukov aside, you _seriously_ think the USSR was only able to have overwhelming superiority in tanks, artillery, mobile operations and logistics because Zhukov was on the scene and able to call in favors from Stalin? > > “The Russians wouldn’t have that “overwhelming superiority in tanks, artillery, …” without Zhukov, who could call in favors from his _Mentor_.” That Mentor as I said before was an incompetent Marshal, who was a Stalin favorite. which you now claim was never your argument at all, which would be serious goalpost shifting if it weren’t for the fact that it clearly is what your initial argument was without any wiggle room to allow goalpost shifting. > [@DrDeth](#): > > Nor is your continued anger and animosity wanted here. I’ll take that under advisement once you speak for the entire board or are appointed a mod, but again you’re fighting strawmen in your head, or perhaps doing some serious projecting. I’m not the slightest bit angry. ---
**Author:** ![RickJay](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/bb73d2/32.png) [@RickJay](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RickJay)\ **Post date:** [August 22, 2022, 3:47pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/lets-do-another-what-if-the-usa-stayed-neutral-in-ww2/969000/68 "2022-08-22T15:47:24Z")
Great Debates is not an appropriate forum for a personal argument, which this is becoming. Dial it back at once. RickJay Moderator ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [September 2, 2022, 4:41am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/lets-do-another-what-if-the-usa-stayed-neutral-in-ww2/969000/69 "2022-09-02T04:41:21Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > This leads me to [Colonel Tsuji](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masanobu_Tsuji), who dovetails into this conversation in quite a few ways. Briefly, > > > [@](#): > > > > Tsuji was among the most aggressive and influential [Japanese militarists](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_militarism). He was a leading proponent of the concept of _[gekokujō](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gekokuj%C5%8D)_ , (literally “the bottom overthrowing the top”) by acting without or contrary to authorization.[[3]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masanobu_Tsuji#cite_note-KGB-3) He incited the [1939 border clash with the Soviet Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nomonhan_Incident) and was a vehement advocate of war against the [United States](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States).[[4]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masanobu_Tsuji#cite_note-thediplomat.com-4) > > (quote shortened) I recommend people read the wiki article on Col. Tsuji, specifically > [@](#): > > By 1934, he was active in the Army’s political intrigues as a member of the _Tōseiha_ (“[Control Faction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control_Faction)”) and helped block the attempted coup d’état of the rival _Kōdōha_ (“[Imperial Way Faction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial_Way_Faction)”). That brought him the patronage of General and future Prime Minister [Hideki Tojo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hideki_Tojo) and General and future War Minister [Seishirō Itagaki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seishir%C5%8D_Itagaki). One of @DrDeth’s many mistakes in this thread relates to the supposition that if the Japanese had not gotten beaten so badly by the Soviets in 1939 that the Strike North faction would have prevailed. Hence, the Strike South faction would not have convinced Japan to move against the DEI and Malaya, and that a way with the US would have been averted. The problem with this is that the relationship between the various factions and their aims were not as clear cut as this fallacious argument implies. Col. Tsuji is the perfect example. People here may be aware that the Kodoha (Imperial Way) Faction are characterized as pro Strike North and that their opposition, the Toseiha (Control) Faction was pro Strike South, but here is Tsuji who was Toseiha but one of the chief instigators of the mini war with the Soviets, and thus Strike North. OK, so there is that contradiction. However, it gets even messier. After the Japanese defeat by the Soviets, his defiance got him into hot water with the Emperor, who wanted him sacked. He did have friends in high places who got him transferred first to a safer post and then: > [@](#): > > Eventually other friends in the Army were able to get Tsuji transferred to the operations section of the General Staff, where, in the words of Military Service Bureau chief Tanaka Ryukichi, he became “the most determined single protagonist of war with the United States” (Goldman 2012). During the final weeks of peace, he is alleged to have plotted the assassination of Prime Minister Konoye if the latter succeeded in arranging a last-minute peace summit with [Roosevelt](http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/R/o/Roosevelt_Franklin_D.htm). So we see someone who was both Strike North and Strike South. While it would seem to make more sense if there were one strong cohesive Strike North faction and another cohesive Strike South faction, but in reality it was much messier. It’s not clear that had the Strike North gone more successfully, that the Strike South would have never happened. There were many military leaders who were arguing for both. Another mistake is another assumption is that had the war gone better against the Soviets that the Strike South faction would have been stopped, and then the US would have stayed out. The reasoning is the Japanese wouldn’t have invaded French held Indochina, which was the action which lead to the US enacting oil embargo, which started the countdown to war. This is a fallacy, because no one knows what the US reaction to that situation would have been. Arguably, it could have made the oil embargo that much easier for FDR because the Japanese would have been in a worse position to challenge the Western allies. There were people in his administration who wanted to support China more, but were afraid of antagonizing Japan. The Japanese would haven been hopelessly over extended by fighting not only the Chinese but also the Soviets, so the administration may have decided they could afford to take the chance, especially in spring of '42 or later as their preparations for war against the Japanese would have been more completely. Had the Japanese gotten tied up with with the Soviets, it may not have gone well for them in 1939 and 1940. The accepted wisdom by many top IJA leaders was that they weren’t strong enough to fight the Red Army alone, although some leaders were pushing them into wars anyway. The IJA already couldn’t defeat the Chinese, and the economy was suffering. Adding the Soviets would have really over extended them. ---
**Author:** ![DrDeth](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/b487fb/32.png) [@DrDeth](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DrDeth)\ **Post date:** [September 2, 2022, 6:37pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/lets-do-another-what-if-the-usa-stayed-neutral-in-ww2/969000/70 "2022-09-02T18:37:46Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > One of @DrDeth’s many mistakes in this thread relates to the supposition that if the Japanese had not gotten beaten so badly by the Soviets in 1939 that the Strike North faction would have prevailed. Hence, the Strike South faction would not have convinced Japan to move against the DEI and Malaya, and that a way with the US would have been averted. It is not a mistake. It is my opinion. > [@TokyoBayer](#): > > It’s not clear that had the Strike North gone more successfully, that the Strike South would have never happened. There were many military leaders who were arguing for both. Sure. But the Strike North plan would have put great pressure on the USSR. Maybe it still would have failed, sure. No one knows. At least you are not trying to claim that Zhukov was a not critical factor in that battle. > [@TokyoBayer](#): > > This is a fallacy, because no one knows what the US reaction to that situation would have been. Exactly. No one knows. Neither do you. So not a “fallacy”. And it would have changed WW2 greatly. So, basically all you are saying here is that my opinions on a Alt-hist are wrong, and yours are right. Well, “_Yeah, well, you know, that’s just, like, your opinion, man.”_ And posting your opinion like it is a fact is not very nice. Dissonance got actual _facts_ wrong. No ones opinion- based upon solid facts- is wrong. Not yours, not mine, not even Dissonances. As long as you know the facts. I admit you generally know the facts, but I have proven here I do also. The whole idea behind alt-hits is to give OPINIONS based upon facts. I know many people don’t like Alt-hist for that very reasons. But as long as the opinion is based upon facts, it is not 'wrong". ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [September 3, 2022, 4:35am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/lets-do-another-what-if-the-usa-stayed-neutral-in-ww2/969000/71 "2022-09-03T04:35:32Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > > [@Dissonance](#): > > > > This leads me to [Colonel Tsuji](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masanobu_Tsuji), who dovetails into this conversation in quite a few ways. Briefly, > > > > > [@](#): > > > > > > Tsuji was among the most aggressive and influential [Japanese militarists](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_militarism). He was a leading proponent of the concept of _[gekokujō](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gekokuj%C5%8D)_ , (literally “the bottom overthrowing the top”) by acting without or contrary to authorization.[[3]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masanobu_Tsuji#cite_note-KGB-3) He incited the [1939 border clash with the Soviet Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nomonhan_Incident) and was a vehement advocate of war against the [United States](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States).[[4]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masanobu_Tsuji#cite_note-thediplomat.com-4) > > > > (quote shortened) > > I recommend people read the wiki article on Col. Tsuji Something else that looking at the military career of Col. Tsuji really underscores that isn’t immediately evident just from wiki is the abysmal logistical situations that Japan continuously founds itself in. Partly this was due to the tiny size of its industrial economy in comparison to the nations it was facing apart from China, part of it was the enormous drain that the war in China was exerting continuously on Japan, and part of it was its military culture, which didn’t place much emphasis on logistics and considered it to some extent a dishonorable assignment to be given. Convoy escort assignment wasn’t something destroyer captains in the IJN particularly looked forward to being assigned to, for example. Back to Tsuji though, his three most notable military assignments were in the Soviet-Japanese Border conflict, the Malaya campaign, and Guadalcanal. Tsuji was a gifted staff officer, but all three of these campaigns show failings in Japanese logistics. As already noted and cited above, Japan faced severe logistical problems in Mongolia, and were vastly outmatched by the Soviets in this area. They had severe difficulties trying to keep the forces actually involved supplied and had to break off engagements due to their inability to supply the much smaller number of guns they had compared to the Soviets. Even in the successful Malaya campaign, Japanese logistics really weren’t up to snuff. They profited greatly from captured Commonwealth stores alleviating their logistical issues as they advanced south, in what came to be known as the ‘Churchill ration’. Tsuji was later sent to Guadalcanal in September 1942 to become a staff officer of 17th Army, where in the words of [Richard B. Frank](https://www.amazon.com/Guadalcanal-Definitive-Account-Landmark-Battle/dp/0140165614) “Tsuji’s undoubted intelligence played a key role in Japan’s triumph in Malaya, and he was expected to put fire into the 17th Army, which so far had not displayed much flair in the view of Imperial Headquarters.” One of the major issues the Japanese faced was the inability to supply the troops they sent to Guadalcanal even with sufficient foodstuffs, leading to malnutrition, starvation, and greater vulnerability to the numerous diseases faced on the island. When one offensive failed, additional troops would later be sent with the hope that they would be sufficient to overwhelm US forces on the island, solving the supply issue the way it had worked in Malaya. When the offensive inevitably failed in the face of superior firepower the Americans possessed, the Japanese troops were left to live off of the meagre amounts of supplies able to be delivered until the next big offensive when more fresh troops were sent down. Japanese deaths from starvation and disease outnumber combat deaths, and the [~10,000 troops Japan was able to evacuate at the end of the campaign](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guadalcanal_campaign#Ke_evacuation) were in no condition for further combat use. Something I came across while trying to find a pdf of Tsuji’s book online (I read it in college a loong time ago) that’s directly relevant to this discussion is in [The Fall of Fortress Singapore: Churchill’s Role and the Conflicting Interpretations by Rab Paterson](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309269145_The_Fall_of_Fortress_Singapore_Churchill%27s_Role_and_the_Conflicting_Interpretations), bolding mine > To exert some pressure on Japan, the US, in retaliation for Japan’s > actions in Asia, started economic sanctions. **These sanctions increased and the US** > **eventually revoked the commercial treaty that allowed the Japanese to import oil** > **from the Dutch East Indies and the US in July 1941.** Cutting off Japan’s oil supplies > was a serious matter for the Japanese military. **They had anticipated this action and** > **in early 1941, the Japanese Army’s General Staff Headquarters had asked for a** > **report from the War Office concerning the reserves of natural resources that Japan** > **possessed.** > > **The report stated that Japan had insufficient oil to bring the war in China to a** > **successful (for the Japanese) conclusion. Attacking the Russians would lead to a similar outcome. In both instances their oil reserves would run out before they could** > **secure victory on the battlefield.** However, if the Japanese forces were used against > the European colonies in South East Asia, specifically the Dutch East Indies, then the > Japanese forces could use the oil and natural resources there if they captured those > vital areas. This left the Japanese with four choices: (1) they could pull out of > Manchuria, which would have been politically unacceptable to the Japanese ultranationalists, who were a major power in Japan at this time. (2) They could maintain > their forces in China and run out of oil in a few months due to the embargo. They > would then have to give up their gains in Manchuria and also have used up their > precious oil reserves for nothing. **(3) Another option was to attack Russia in addition** > **to keeping their forces in Manchuria. This would have led to a worse situation for** > **the Japanese than if they maintained their position in China. They would most likely** > **have to pay reparations to the Russians afterwards, in addition to losing their gains** > **in Manchuria and using up their oil supplies. (4) Their only other option was to** > **seize the oil-rich Dutch East Indies. This would inevitably bring Japan into conflict** > **with the US and the British.** Note in particular the last sentence: in a report the Japanese Army’s General Staff Headquarters had asked for from the War Office, they concluded that in the only other (and only remotely feasible) option to seize the oil in the DEI would inevitably bring Japan into conflict with the US and the British. Note also that the Japanese ability to import oil from the DEI wasn’t revoked by the Dutch, it was revoked by the US. > [@DrDeth](#): > > Dissonance got actual _facts_ wrong. Name one. Something I actually stated or argued, not a strawman you invented. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [September 3, 2022, 1:19pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/lets-do-another-what-if-the-usa-stayed-neutral-in-ww2/969000/72 "2022-09-03T13:19:14Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > Something else that looking at the military career of Col. Tsuji really underscores that isn’t immediately evident just from wiki is the abysmal logistical situations that Japan continuously founds itself in. Partly this was due to the tiny size of its industrial economy in comparison to the nations it was facing apart from China, part of it was the enormous drain that the war in China was exerting continuously on Japan, and part of it was its military culture, which didn’t place much emphasis on logistics and considered it to some extent a dishonorable assignment to be given. Convoy escort assignment wasn’t something destroyer captains in the IJN particularly looked forward to being assigned to, for example. Here, of course, we need to skip over to [http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm](http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm) to see the grim economic realities. > [@](#): > > It’s no secret that Japan was, shall we say, ‘economically disadvantaged’ in her ability to wage war against the Allies. However, the sheer, stunning _magnitude_ of this economic disparity has never ceased to amaze me. So, just go give you an idea of the magnitude of the mismatch here, I decided to compile a few statistics. Most of them are taken from Paul Kennedy’s “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers” (which, among other things, contains an excellent analysis of the economic forces at work in World War II, and is an all-around great book) and John Ellis’ “World War II: A Statistical Survey.” In this comparison I will focus primarily on the two chief antagonists in the Pacific War: Japan and the United States. They say that economics is the ‘Dismal Science’; you’re about to see why… > > Overview > > By the time World War II began to rear its ugly head (formally in 1939 in Poland, informally in China in 1937), America had been in the grips of the Great Depression for a decade, give or take. The net effect of the Depression was to introduce a lot of ‘slack’ into the U.S. economy. Many U.S. workers were either unemployed (10 million in 1939) or underemployed, and our industrial base as a whole had far more capacity than was needed at the time. In economic terms, our ‘Capacity Utilization’ (CapU), was pretty darn low. To an outside culture, particularly a militaristic one such as Japan’s, America certainly might have appeared to be ‘soft’ and unprepared for a major war. Further, Japan’s successes in fighting far larger opponents (Russia in the early 1900’s, and China in the 1930’s) and the fact that Japan’s own economy was practically ‘superheating’ (mostly as the result of unhealthy levels of military spending – 28% of national income in 1937) probably filled the Japanese with a misplaced sense of economic and military superiority over their large overseas foe. However, a dispassionate observer would also note a few important facts. America, even in the midst of seemingly interminable economic doldrums, still had: > > Nearly twice the population of Japan. > _Seventeen_ time’s Japan’s national income. > Five times more steel production. > Seven times more coal production. > _Eighty_ (80) times the automobile production. and > [@](#): > > | Country | % of Total Warmaking Potential | > | --- | --- | > | United States | 41.7% | > | Germany | 14.4% | > | USSR | 14.0% | > | UK | 10.2% | > | France | 4.2% | > | Japan | 3.5% | > | Italy | 2.5% | > | Seven Powers (total) | (90.5%) | Japan was maxed out in the war with China by 1941. Among other serious problems they had was that Tokyo did not have an extensive sewer system, and by summer of '41, they were facing a serious issue of removing night soil. Previously, it had been transported by truck, but with gas extremely limited for civilian use, they had problems removing it from the capital. Note that this was even before the US oil embargo and without a war against the USSR. I’ve noted in other threads about Pearl Harbor and the _what if_ Japanese had attacked the oil farm there, but in addition to them not having sufficient resources, it was acknowledged by one IJN officer later that had they taken into consideration the effects of oil on US logistics, they would have been much more likely to really consider their own and realized they were SOL before they started. Note that the USSR had four times the war making capacity of Japan and had the IJA attempted to take on the Red Army before the Wehrmacht tied them down, the Japanese industry could not match the Soviets. Also, another serious problem was that the IJA simply lacked a doctrine for tank battles. They had copied the French model of dispersing their tanks to support infantry while I’ve read that the Red Army actually had a good model for tank warfare in 1939, although that’s something @Dissonance would know much more about. Japan doesn’t seem to have the manpower numbers to beat the Soviets. In 1940, they had 27 divisions in China, 12 in Manchuria and only two in Japan and Korea for a total of 41 and by outbreak of war with the West, it had only increased to 51 divisions. Their logistics were maxed out in China without the ability to rapidly increase production of trucks and other support, even if they had thought about it. > [@Dissonance](#): > > Something I came across while trying to find a pdf of Tsuji’s book online (I read it in college a loong time ago) that’s directly relevant to this discussion is in [The Fall of Fortress Singapore: Churchill’s Role and the Conflicting Interpretations by Rab Paterson](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309269145_The_Fall_of_Fortress_Singapore_Churchill%27s_Role_and_the_Conflicting_Interpretations), bolding mine Thanks for that link. I’ve read similar things from other sources, but I don’t know if we can place as much blame on Churchill as Paterson wants. It seems that almost everyone under estimated Japan’s abilities prior to the war. Yes, London needed to have built up Singapore better, but the US should have fortified the Philippines earlier as well. As per that article, most of the planning for a possible war against Japan assumed that Europe wasn’t getting destroyed by Germany, and in fact, the Japanese got really ambitious only after the fall of France and the Netherlands, and with Britain on the ropes. (As an aside, the article accurately depicts Churchill’s mistaken assumption that the US would rescue Singapore, which wasn’t really dispelled until Arcadia when the US leaders told the British to fuck off, although not in those terms. One of the books on my list to read is _Code Name Arcadia_ and [the presentation](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bbtRX5ppAqY) by the author General John Shortal to WWII History Round Table is interesting.) The sad truth is that it would not have taken that much for the Western powers to have made prospects for the war much more difficult. One claim written after the war by the USAF (as part of the battle for relevance post war) was that if the US had had (IIRC) 2,000 modern fighters in something like 10 mutually supporting bases in the Philippines, that alone could have prevented the Pacific War. Given the number of Japanese aircraft at the outbreak of the war, and the relative industrial capacities, that seems quite likely. Of course, that would not have happened in a vacuum. Had the US stationed 2,000 fighters, they would have also upgraded the Army and Navy facilities as well and increased overall readiness. ---
**Author:** ![DrDeth](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/b487fb/32.png) [@DrDeth](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DrDeth)\ **Post date:** [September 3, 2022, 8:22pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/lets-do-another-what-if-the-usa-stayed-neutral-in-ww2/969000/73 "2022-09-03T20:22:35Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > Name one. Something I actually stated or argued, not a strawman you invented. Russian tanks vs Japanese ones. Numbers of artillery. Numbers of tanks (confusing total tanks over all USSR with tanks on the Siberian front). > [@TokyoBayer](#): > > Japan doesn’t seem to have the manpower numbers to beat the Soviets. Not by themselves, no. But USSR without allies, beset by the Nazis in the West? ---
**Author:** ![DrDeth](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/b487fb/32.png) [@DrDeth](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DrDeth)\ **Post date:** [September 3, 2022, 8:41pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/lets-do-another-what-if-the-usa-stayed-neutral-in-ww2/969000/74 "2022-09-03T20:41:25Z")
Remember, this thread is “what if the USA stayed neutral in WW2”. ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [September 3, 2022, 9:25pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/lets-do-another-what-if-the-usa-stayed-neutral-in-ww2/969000/75 "2022-09-03T21:25:11Z")
> [@DrDeth](#): > > > [@Dissonance](#): > > > > Name one. Something I actually stated or argued, not a strawman you invented. > > Russian tanks vs Japanese ones. Numbers of artillery. Numbers of tanks (confusing total tanks over all USSR with tanks on the Siberian front). And those would all be either strawmen of your own invention, or you not understanding what I actually wrote. You are the one who erroneously brought T-34s into the discussion, I am not wrong on the superiority in weight and numbers of Soviet artillery as can clearly be seen on the cites I’ve provided, and you are the one who is confused on the total number of Soviet tanks vs the numbers committed in Mongolia. I very clearly stated both 1) that the Soviet pre-war tank inventory was ~20,000 vehicles and 2) that the Soviets committed over 1,000 tanks, again as noted in the cite I provided. I frankly have no idea how you could conclude from this that I confused the total number of tanks with the numbers committed against Japan during the border conflicts, considering my pointing out that committing 1,000 tanks to Mongolia wasn’t a very big deal for the USSR as it only represented 5% of their total tank pool, while 1,000 tanks for Japan would both be closer to the entirety of their operational tank pool, and couldn’t actually be committed to Mongolia in any event as they were logistically hard pressed enough supplying the 73 tanks they did commit. > [@TokyoBayer](#): > > Also, another serious problem was that the IJA simply lacked a doctrine for tank battles. They had copied the French model of dispersing their tanks to support infantry while I’ve read that the Red Army actually had a good model for tank warfare in 1939, although that’s something @Dissonance would know much more about. Indeed, of the Japanese divisions in existence prior to Dec 7th 1941 a grand total of zero were tank divisions; tanks were in independent brigades and regiments which weren’t organized for combined arms operations, lacking any organic infantry or artillery and thus incapable of independent operations, only operations with other infantry formations they were supporting. The 73 Japanese tanks employed at Khalkhin Gal consisted of the 3rd and 4th Tank Regiments nominally organized as the [“1st Tank Corps”](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Khalkhin_Gol#July:_Japanese_assault), which when committed needed infantry, engineer and artillery battalions detached from Japanese infantry divisions as it lacked any of these assets on its own. Notably, the infantry and engineers attached were regular ‘leg’ infantry lacking any motorization. Japan didn’t form any tank divisions until [September 1942](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_Tank_Division_(Imperial_Japanese_Army)) when two were formed in Manchuria to keep an eye on the Soviets. Soviet theory and doctrine for armored warfare was well developed, going back to the late 1920s and early 1930s with [deep battle theory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_operation), > In 1929, [Vladimir Triandafillov](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladimir_Triandafillov) and Tukhachevsky formed a partnership to create a coherent system of principles from the concept formed by Svechin. Tukhachevsky was to elaborate the principles of the tactical and operational phases of deep battle.[[9]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_operation#cite_note-9) In response to his efforts and in acceptance of the methodology, the Red Army produced the _Provisional Instructions for Organizing the Deep Battle_ manual in 1933. This was the first time that “deep battle” was mentioned in official Red Army literature.[[10]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_operation#cite_note-10) It’s thus no surprise that the Soviets were able to end Khalkhin Gal with a double envelopment using over 1,000 tanks in combined-arms operations, nor was it something that required Zhukov to have been in command in order for it to have happened. By November 1940, Soviet tank forces were organized into 29 [Mechanized Corps](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mechanised_corps_(Soviet_Union)#Composition_of_a_mechanised_corps_(1941)) (not to be confused with the division sized Mechanized Corps formed by the Soviets in 1942) each comprising two tank and one motorized infantry division, with a strength on paper of 1,031 tanks, 36,000 personnel and having a total of 20 tank, 12 motorized rifle and 6 artillery battalions each. There a paper here titled [APPLICATION OF THE SOVIET THEORY OF “DEEP OPERATION” DURING THE 1939 SOVIET-JAPANESE MILITARY CONFLICT IN MONGOLIA](https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA524118.pdf) which deals directly with Soviet deep operations and the Soviet-Japanese border war. The abstract: > During the Interwar period, the Soviet theory of “deep operations,” like Soviet military science as a > whole developed in parallel with Soviet armed forces organizational reform, including rearmament and > preparation for current threats. The determining factors which created favorable conditions for the > emergence of the theory were rearmament and reorganization of the Red Army and the combat > experience of previous wars of 20th century. However, Stalin’s 1937-1940 repression impeded the > development and application of the theory. At the same time in the Far East, a full-scale undeclared war developed between Japan and the Soviet Union. The 1939 war became the real battlefield for examining the Red Army, its capability to deploy combined joint forces, to organize comprehensive combat and logistic support of its troops, and to coordinate the efforts with the Mongolian People’s Army. The 1939 military conflict in the Far East demonstrated the growth of the Soviet theory of the “deep operation,” as well as the leadership talents of General Georgi Konstantinovich Zhukov. This thesis explores aspects of the “deep operation” development and its application during the1939 Soviet-Japanese military conflict in Mongolia. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [September 12, 2022, 11:59am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/lets-do-another-what-if-the-usa-stayed-neutral-in-ww2/969000/76 "2022-09-12T11:59:45Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > I very clearly stated both 1) that the Soviet pre-war tank inventory was ~20,000 vehicles and 2) that the Soviets committed over 1,000 tanks, again as noted in the cite I provided. I frankly have no idea how you could conclude from this that I confused the total number of tanks with the numbers committed against Japan during the border conflicts, considering my pointing out that committing 1,000 tanks to Mongolia wasn’t a very big deal for the USSR as it only represented 5% of their total tank pool, while 1,000 tanks for Japan would both be closer to the entirety of their operational tank pool, and couldn’t actually be committed to Mongolia in any event as they were logistically hard pressed enough supplying the 73 tanks they did commit. This was clear by my reading of your posts as well. IIRC the Soviets had more tanks than the Western armies put together at this point, although I’m not sure of the exact numbers. Quick googling suggests that France had about 4,400 modern tanks; Germany had 3,500, mostly Panzer I and II; the US only had a few hundred, and I didn’t quickly see the British numbers, but it would be around French numbers?. Equally clear is the idea that the Soviets could lose hundreds or even thousands of their tanks, but the Japanese could not. The two kings of tank production in real WWII history were the Soviets and the Americans, while the British and Germans were far behind and the Japanese never made many. I don’t see any basis for the assertion that it was a personal favor to a particular commander that resources were allocated to the Far Eastern Front. The Soviets and the Russians before them were well aware of dangers from the Japanese and considered Eastern Siberia as an area of strategic importance. The USSR and Japan had been having low level border skirmishes for several years and Stalin himself was on record (in either 1936 or '38, IIRC) stating that any attack by the Japanese would be met by twice the force in return. Hardly seems like just a chance meeting somewhere changed the outcome of the war. I have never read anything about the Japanese having a chance against the Soviets in 1939. The weird argument that “counterfactual” is supposing that the US isn’t involves ignores the fact that in 1939, the US wasn’t involved yet and the Japanese still got their collective asses kicked. I think a lot of WWII counterfactuals are attempts to bring [Axis & Allies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis_%26_Allies) to life, despite the absurdities of the scenarios. Something you (@Dissonance ) once posted years ago is still spot on. In response to someone saying what if the Nazis did this or that, how it would have affected the war, and you wrote that if Hitler had done that, he wouldn’t have been Hitler. If the Japanese didn’t have a fantastical belief in an almost divine right to greatness far beyond their industrial and economic realities, they wouldn’t have picked fights with powers that could crush them. > [@Dissonance](#): > > Something I came across while trying to find a pdf of Tsuji’s book online (I read it in college a loong time ago) . . . . . It’s a great book. If you need a link to the free online version, let me know. ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [September 13, 2022, 3:42am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/lets-do-another-what-if-the-usa-stayed-neutral-in-ww2/969000/77 "2022-09-13T03:42:33Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > This was clear by my reading of your posts as well. IIRC the Soviets had more tanks than the Western armies put together at this point, although I’m not sure of the exact numbers. Quick googling suggests that France had about 4,400 modern tanks; Germany had 3,500, mostly Panzer I and II; the US only had a few hundred, and I didn’t quickly see the British numbers, but it would be around French numbers?. The British had much less than the French, the BEF had most of Britain’s tanks with it in France in 1940 and all 700 of those were lost or abandoned when the BEF was evacuated from Dunkirk. Pre-war and up to Barbarossa in June 1941 the Soviets not only had more tanks than any other nation; they had more tanks than every other nation in the world combined. At about the time the Soviet tank forces were re-organized into those 29 mechanized corps in November 1940, the Soviets had produced roughly - 8,000 BT-5/7 series fast tanks (BT standing for _Bystrokhodnyy tank_, lit. “fast moving tank” or “high-speed tank”) - 11,000 T-26 tanks - 2,500 T-27 tankettes - 2,500 T-37/38 amphibious scout tanks - 500 T-28 medium tanks - 61 T-35 heavy tank 5 turreted monstrosities sometimes referred to as land battleships Production runs of the T-34 and KV series tanks started in 1940 and the production lines on all of these earlier models that hadn’t already been shut down were in the process of doing so. To give a comparison in terms of divisions and organization, those 29 mechanized corps had between them 58 tank divisions and 29 motorized divisions, each motorized division incorporating a light tank regiment. When Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, it had 6 panzer divisions, 4 light (leichte) divisions which were motorized infantry with a single panzer battalion, and 4 motorized division which had no tanks at all. By the time Germany invaded France in May 1940, the 4 light divisions had been upgraded to full panzer divisions, giving Germany a total of 10 panzer divisions and the number of motorized divisions raised to 8, including 3 of the Waffen SS. To prepare for Barbarossa and the need for a larger number of formations to cover such a huge front, Hitler had the number of panzer divisions double to 20 by the expedient of halving the number of tanks in each division. This wasn’t entirely a bad thing, as the earlier panzer divisions were rather tank heavy, as were the 58 Soviet tank divisions they faced at the start of Barbarossa. Pretty much everyone’s tank formations proved to be top heavy with tanks early in their war experiance and the pattern over time tended to settle at about a 1:1:1 ratio of tank, motorized infantry and artillery battalions as being the most effective for combined arms operations. And Japan, in June 1941, still had zero tank divisions, with their tanks organized into independent regiments and brigades consisting solely of tanks without any combined arms organization intended to be parceled out to operate with leg infantry formations, or integrated with independent mixed brigades, again with leg infantry. On a bit of a side note on how well Japanese and Soviet tanks directly traded losses and how thier failure in the Border War began to (_very_) slowly turn the wheels on Japanese thinking about tank doctrine, I came across [this](https://tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww2/jap/ww2_ijn_tanks.php): > **War with the Soviets** > > In 1938-39, several frontier incidents had degenerated into a full scale battle. The biggest clash occurred at Kalkhin Gol. IJA forces were defeated by the better tanks and more aggressive Russian tactics. The generals, whom had always seen tanks primarily as a mean to offer support to the infantry, began to see them as a fighting force in themselves. The 3rd and 4th Tank Regiments in Manchuria were equipped with all the range of IJA models in service that year. They were committed during those days, were they lost 42 tanks out of 73, while the Russians had lost 32 [BT tanks](https://www.tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww2/soviet/soviet_BT-7.php). After some initial successes, the Japanese tanks were surrounded and decimated. This failure triggered many changes in the IJA tactical thinking and, in response to the Russian tanks, several new antitank guns and new tank models were devised. General Tomoyuki Yamashita was sent to Germany to study Wehrmacht tactics and armored warfare doctrine. He made a report, full of recommendations for new medium tanks and better infantry equipment against tanks. In April 1941, the armored branch became independent, with General Shin Yoshida as first commander in chief. > [@TokyoBayer](#): > > I think a lot of WWII counterfactuals are attempts to bring [Axis & Allies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis_%26_Allies) to life, despite the absurdities of the scenarios. Indeed. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [September 14, 2022, 11:02am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/lets-do-another-what-if-the-usa-stayed-neutral-in-ww2/969000/78 "2022-09-14T11:02:05Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > The British had much less than the French, the BEF had most of Britain’s tanks with it in France in 1940 and all 700 of those were lost or abandoned when the BEF was evacuated from Dunkirk. OK, thanks. I appreciate your expertise on all things WWII. I’ve read much less about ETO than the Pacific War, but I suppose that’s because I’ve lived in Asia, especially Japan for so long. Something that gets overlooked a lot by casual students of the war is the effect on IJA leadership and doctrines from Japan’s experiences in China. I think that more people are aware of how Japan’s defeat of the Tsar’s fleet at Tsushima shaped the IJN doctrine and leaders, and the **[Decisive Battle Doctrine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kantai_Kessen#:~:text=The%20theory%20was%20derived%20from,a%20single%2C%20decisive%20naval%20action.)** (艦隊決戦, **Kantai Kessen** , “naval fleet decisive battle”). Wiki explains it well. > [@](#): > > The **Decisive Battle Doctrine** (艦隊決戦, **Kantai Kessen** , “naval fleet decisive battle”) was a [naval strategy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_strategy) adopted by the [Imperial Japanese Navy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial_Japanese_Navy) prior to the [Second World War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II). The theory was derived from the writings of American naval historian [Alfred Thayer Mahan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Thayer_Mahan). In the Decisive Battle Doctrine the Japanese navy would win a war by fighting and winning a single, decisive naval action. The idea gained broad acceptance following the [Russo-Japanese War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Japanese_War), where a well-trained, smaller Japanese naval force gained a decisive victory in the [Sea of Japan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_of_Japan) at the [Battle of Tsushima](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Tsushima), defeating the [Imperial Russian Navy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial_Russian_Navy) of their rival the [Russian Empire](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Empire), a western naval power. Operational plans thereafter were influenced by the effective naval gunnery Japan demonstrated at Tsushima. However, the influence on IJA leadership by their more recent experiences in China is often overlooked. The Chinese armies sucked, to use a military term, and the IJA was able to overwhelm them often by sheer willpower. The infamous banzai charges were developed in China, and were highly successful there against poorly train, armed and led troops which were more likely to flee in panic than hold their ground and fire effectively. Likewise, they never had to develop any doctrine for their amour, as we’ve discussed. The IJA placed a lot of emphasis on individual unit (from squads up to companies-ish) tactics such as night fighting, although their strategic leadership was often less effective, with the Malay campaign a notable exception. The Soviets were not impressed in 1939. Again, this is another reason why there really can’t be a reasonable reason for a Japanese victory in the Soviet Far East. Their problem was that the IJA leadership loved these tactics because it feed into their self-created myth of the superior Yamato warrior spirit, so success against the disorganized and poorly equipped and trained Chinese helped create a mindset which led them to more reckless actions against the better disciplined and equipped Allies. Trying to understand the Japanese military in WWII is difficult for most Western people, because Japanese culture is difficult to understand for outsiders. Even scholars can have difficulty with it as they can slip into a trap of thinking that Japanese would think the same way as others in similar circumstances. There is a fascinating book about Japanese baseball, [You Gotta Have Wa](https://www.amazon.com/You-Gotta-Have-Robert-Whiting/dp/0307455971) which writes how Japanese players would often try harder in practice than they would in real games. That makes little sense to Western people, but perfect sense to Japanese people. The Pacific War history is similar. The decision process needs to be evaluated through the lens of Japanese culture rather than through classical military history. Of course, trying to learn from Hasbro games hasn’t proven to be very effective. ---
**Author:** ![Jasmine](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/jasmine/32/2964_2.png) [@Jasmine](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Jasmine)\ **Post date:** [September 14, 2022, 11:36am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/lets-do-another-what-if-the-usa-stayed-neutral-in-ww2/969000/79 "2022-09-14T11:36:08Z")
I think the European Theater would have hinged on Germany’s invasion of Russia. I’m not convinced that Hitler could have succeeded there even if there was no D-Day. If he did, he would have won the war if he simply negotiated a peace settlement with Great Britain. No more bombs and no invasion if you make no attempts to regain western Europe. ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [September 15, 2022, 4:08am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/lets-do-another-what-if-the-usa-stayed-neutral-in-ww2/969000/80 "2022-09-15T04:08:57Z")
> [@Jasmine](#): > > I think the European Theater would have hinged on Germany’s invasion of Russia. I’m not convinced that Hitler could have succeeded there even if there was no D-Day I absolutely agree. For all of its tactical and operational successes, Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, was a strategic failure. Its goals of destroying the Soviet armed forces before they could retreat into the interior and to bring about the collapse of the USSR were both unsuccessful and with the advantage of hindsight unobtainable. Germany had grossly underestimated the size of the Soviet armed forces and their mobilization potential, meaning the object of destroying the Red Army before it could retreat to the interior was an impossible task as massive forces were being raised in the interior even as those close to the border were destroyed. These victories didn’t come cheap for the Germans either, unlike the case in the defeat of France. David Stahel wrote a series of books dissecting the fighting from Barbarossa ([Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East](https://www.amazon.com/Operation-Barbarossa-Germanys-Cambridge-Histories/dp/052117015X)) to the Soviet counteroffensive at Moscow ([Retreat from Moscow: A New History of Germany’s Winter Campaign, 1941-1942](https://www.amazon.com/Retreat-Moscow-Germanys-Campaign-1941-1942/dp/0374249520)). From [Operation Typhoon: Hitler’s March on Moscow, October 1941](https://www.amazon.com/Operation-Typhoon-Hitlers-Moscow-October/dp/1107501954/ref=pd_lpo_3?pd_rd_i=1107501954&psc=1): > On 22 June 1941 the Red Army numbered 5,373,000 > men; by 31 August, in spite of its losses, it had grown to 6,889,000; > and by 31 December 1941 the army had reached an estimated eight > million men. > While the Red Army was growing in size the Ostheer was > shrinking. Although there was access to reinforcements from the > German Replacement Army, these reserves were very limited and their > transportation to the front could not keep pace with the rate of loss. By > the start of August Army Group Centre had lost some 74,500 men, but > had received only 23,000 replacements. With 85 per cent of German > men aged between 20 and 30 already in the Wehrmacht by the summer > of 1941, and those remaining outside either ineligible for health reasons > or judged too important to the war economy, the reserve manpower > pool was indeed small. The commander of the German Replacement > Army, Colonel-General Fritz Fromm, outlined the limitations to Halder > in a discussion on 20 May 1941. After deducting a share of men to act > as a reserve for the Luftwaffe (90,000 men), Fromm determined that the > Ostheer would have access to 385,000 replacements. With surprising > candour Halder noted that 275,000 casualties were expected in the > initial border battles, with a further 200,000 expected in September. > Thus, by Halder’s own figures the Replacement Army would not suffice > for the demands of the campaign through to the end of September and > nothing at all would remain if the war dragged on longer. In the event, > by the end of September, the Ostheer had lost even more than Halder > estimated. Between 22 June and 30 September some 551,039 men were > recorded as casualties, a figure far exceeding the Replacement Army’s > capacity, plunging the Ostheer into a rapid and irreversible decline. Logistically the infeasibility of Barbarossa is evident by the situation at the launch of Operation Typhoon, the German push to take Moscow after a two month pause by Army Group Center which had outstripped its supply lines and during which its forces were turned south to aid in bringing about the encirclement of Kiev. Amazingly, even with two months to improve their supply situation and build up stockpiles, there was not enough fuel on hand in October when it was launched to actually reach Moscow. From the same source: > If Typhoon was following an altogether classic course, so too > were the operational problems now emerging. Before Guderian could > even think about driving on to Tula he first needed to address his near absent fuel reserves. Langermann-Erlancamp’s 4th Panzer Division was > momentarily unopposed on the road to Tula, but unable to exploit its > advantage for lack of fuel. On 5 October Guderian requested 500 cubic > metres of fuel be flown to an airfield near Orel, but at best Kesselring > could only manage about 70 to 100 cubic metres on 6 October. > Likewise, Schweppenberg’s XXIV Panzer Corps was also pleading > for more fuel, which led to another demand on Kesselring’s already > overextended transport capacity. As Guderian acknowledged, the > availability of fuel for Operation Typhoon was essential; ‘the future > extent of our movements was ultimately dependent on this’. > Nor was Panzer Group 2 the exception. Hoepner’s advance on Viaz’ma was > already causing problems for Vietinghoff’s XXXXVI Panzer Corps > because fuel shortages combined with bad roads were slowing all > movement. Even worse, after being halted by Soviet counterattacks > on 4 October, Hoth’s Panzer Group 3 could still not advance on > 5 October because fuel stocks had been totally exhausted. Kesselring > was again requested to fly in urgent deliveries in order to restart the > attack. Astonishingly, in the midst of such basic shortages and with > the offensive only days old, Wagner, the army quartermaster-general, > wrote in a letter on 5 October: > “Operational goals are being set that earlier would have made our > hair stand on end. Eastward of Moscow! Then I estimate that the > war will be mostly over, and perhaps there really will be a collapse > of the [Soviet] system … I am constantly astounded at the Führer’s > military judgement. He intervenes in the course of operations, > one could say decisively, and up until now he has always acted > correctly.” > Such blind devotion and professional incompetence was by no means > limited to Wagner within the OKH. Indeed, given Wagner’s many > shortcomings and failed promises, his survival in the post of > quartermaster-general only confirmed the support he, and his judgements, often enjoyed. Importantly Wagner was an enthusiast for all > manner of Nazi ideals, including the power of individual ‘will’, which > asserted the power of the spiritual over the tangible. Following this line > of Nazi mythology, German troops, regardless of the supply situation, > could conquer Moscow so long as they remained determined to do so. > The folly of such belief should have been apparent during Operation > Barbarossa, but the absence of a learning curve within the German > high command doomed Operation Typhoon to repeat many of the > previous mistakes. The parallels between the Nazi belief that ‘will’ could overcome any material problems and the Imperial Japanese belief that ‘spirit’ could do the same are obvious. Importantly for the sake of the premise of the OP, all of this was accomplished before lend-lease from the US had anything but the tiniest effect, the [first lend-lease protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend-Lease#US_deliveries_to_the_Soviet_Union) from the US to the USSR wasn’t signed until October 7, 1941. During the Cold War the USSR downplayed lend-lease as if it was entirely unimportant, which clearly wasn’t the case. It certainly was of great help in allowing the ultimate speed of Soviet advances against Germany later in the war. Without lend-lease the war would certainly have dragged on longer and may have led to something of an incredibly bloody protracted stalemate in the East, but Germany was very unlikely to actually defeat the USSR even without lend-lease being a factor. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/lets-do-another-what-if-the-usa-stayed-neutral-in-ww2/969000.md?page=3) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/lets-do-another-what-if-the-usa-stayed-neutral-in-ww2/969000.md?page=5)