[QUOTE=Dissonance]
The posited time frame is the late 1970s though; so there are none of those neat toys introduced into service in the 1980s when there was a resurgence in defense spending and technology development. So no cruise missiles, no F-117s, no M-1s, no Bradley AFVs or Apache gunships or MLRS or F-15E Strike Eagles. The US Army is going to be using M60A1s (or god forbid M60A2s), M113s and AH-1 Cobras.
[/QUOTE]
Fighting from defensive terrain that gave a huge advantage to the defender, and with training far better than the Soviets had…and pretty motivated allies, as opposed to the unmotivated allies AND their own conscripted soldiers. Yeah, I know we won’t get all of the ‘neat toys’, but we still had the ability for deep strikes against their infrastructure and logistics, logistics that had serious bottle necks for something like this. It would have been far more difficult for the Soviets to roll through western Europe (or even Germany) than people in this thread seem to think because they are simply looking at the raw numbers of troops, tanks and such and not seeing the logistics picture of HOW the Soviets would move all of that crap through a hotly contested and motivated country such as West Germany, or the state of their actual military was at that point in time (pretty bad except in raw numbers).
As far as Clancy goes, he invented magic stealth fighters that decisively curbed the Soviet ground attack so that his war was fought ‘on nearly equal terms.’ I wouldn’t have expected that IRL.
Is there much in the way of leaked Soviet first strike plans in the late '70s/early '80s? All I know about is Seven Days to the Rhine. In the event of a NATO first strike and invasion it calls for a counter-strike through West Germany and the Low Countries, but not into France, and not an attack against the UK. Whether that’s realistic or not, I dunno. It seems to generally be assumed that the fog of war, positive feedback, and MAD would quickly lead to an out of control death spiral. That’s probably likely, but I could imagine scenarios where both sides pull back after a limited tactical exchange. I know some of their older plans from the '60s called for nuking everything vaguely European and then racing to secure the major ports.
The way some arm chair generals over the years have gone on and on about the Soviets pouring through the Fulda Gap, all the wonderful cataclysmic armor battles we missed out on, the obsession over this or that weapons system, etc. I think some of them are actually disappointed that WWIII never happened and they never got to break into their lifetime supply of MREs and iodide tablets. The '80s was just one big case of atomic blue balls. Hey, there still might be time.
Late seventies, early eighties satelite surveilance and other sundry methods were top notch at the time, it was said that we would have ten days notice, if the sovs ever decided to go on their world tour. Really the only question is what would Carter have done, Reagan and Ford, I would have no doubt that a warning would be issued followed by a pre-emptive strike on Russian targets.
On the counter side, I don’t doubt that if the Sovs did decide that it was time for the world tour, at the very least it would have started with a limited nuke strike, followed by the guards divisions. Personally , I think that was why the English sub commanders, got a pre delivered letter, in the event of.
I don’t think it’s that they like carnage, but rather, that people naturally wonder “what if?” Like how some alternate-history writers write about what if the Axis had won WWII. It’s not that they *want *the Axis to win, but rather, that the fact that it didn’t happen, leads to curiosity.
I disagree, a whole lot of people don’t see any other way out of their mundane existence. They imagine some form of apocalypse will allow them to rise to their true position, not realizing that most people, by definition, are average. Sure there are some that are what you’re talking about, but there’s others that Marshmallow’s talking about.
I haven’t had a chance to read this entire thread yet (but I definitely will as its one of my favourite subjects).
I do think the late 1970’s were a period of particular weakness for the West as a whole. There was a fairly recent article in several British newspapers that stated it is now known that during that time-period the UK had a stockpile of conventional weapons sufficient to last for a maximum of two weeks at the expected tempo of combat, and when those weapons were gone there was no capacity to replace them.
An interesting trilogy by John Wingate (Frigate/Carrier/Submarine) written in the early 1980’s depicted a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict which was restricted mostly at sea. A rather striking scene depicted the use of nuclear weapons on the NATO reinforcement convoys and the convoy escorts defending with them against the attacking Soviet submarines, the losses on both side are so unsustainable that an agreement to restrict future engagements to conventional weapons is quickly agreed.
The point of nuclear weapons is deterrence. So, obviously, you have to state that you’re going to use them. However, if deterrence didn’t work, deciding to actually use them is a non obvious choice.
Let’s take France : the Warsaw pact is victorious, about to overrun the country. You use nukes. What’s next? Best case scenario, there’s no nuclear counter-strike and the country is still overrun. Much more likely scenario (because the Soviet Union still has an use for deterrence wrt the UK and the USA), the country becomes a radioactive waste and is still overrun. Does it make sense to actually use nuclear weapons in this situation?
Let’s take the USA : western Europe is overrun. Even ignoring principles or treaty obligations, it’s a massive strategic loss for the USA. However, using nukes doesn’t solve this problem, but is likely to result in the USA being essentially destroyed. Hardly a better outcome.
Threatening to use nukes makes complete sense. Actually using them makes only sense if you’re probably going to survive it and still need the deterrence factor (and even then, president X not using nukes in situation A doesn’t mean that president Y won’t use them in situation B, so not using them in the former case doesn’t make deterrence disapear.)
That’s the reason why I’m not certain that an east/west conflict would necessary have resulted in an all-out nuclear exchange, even if one side was badly beaten.
If several Russian cities were vaporised, the capacity to carry on with an effective assault would be effectively nil.
Firstly, maintaining the supply lines needed to fight a war as far away as France would be severely compromised.
Secondly, all resources would be needed rebuilding.
Thirdly and any troops would be needed to and defend the now-weakened country against the anyone who may want to take advantage of the situation, from seceeding client states to outright invasion from China, NATO or the US.
And finally, with nukes now on the board massed troops will become a target.
An effective nuclear strike would pretty much guarantee that France couldn’t be overrun. That is a large part of the effectiveness of nuclear weapons as a deterrent. It isn’t just MAD, it’s that the damage done by even a limited strike changes the balance so quickly and dramatically that the ability to wage conventional war becomes almost impossible.
You are getting into mnetal knots with that logic. For deterrence to work, the potential agressors must believe that you WILL use nuclear weapons. If they suspect you will not, you are walking around with a “shoot me” sign. It invites adventurism.
Indeed that is the very reason for your own country’s weapons. French leaders cannot be certain the Russians believe that the US would risk Philadelphia for Paris. Which is why they have their arsenal as the Russians know the French will use nukes if need be.
I have no doubt that any leader of any nuclear power will use weapons if it comes to that.
“Nukes” doesn’t necessarily mean a direct escalation into strategic countervalue war. First there would be “tactical” nukes: low-yield devices intended for use on the battlefield against enemy formations, tank columns and so forth. Then there would be “theater” nukes: short and intermediate range strikes against military targets such as staging areas, rail and water transportation junctions, supply depots, etc. This might include targets within the Warsaw Pact countries but by intent NOT directly on Russian soil. Only after that would targeting Soviet cities be an option.
Nuclear weapons make a classic WW2 style conflict impossible because adding nukes into the equation means that the capacity to continue the war, either tactically or strategically, would quickly become impossible. Vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the only question was whether they could win a conventional blitzkrieg war quickly and decisively enough to present a fait accompli that NATO couldn’t or wouldn’t dare escalate from. The controversy in the 1980s over introducing an expanded theater-level nuclear capacity such as the Pershing II missile was precisely about whether introducing another graded step in escalation decreased or increased the chances of escalating to a full-scale nuclear war.
That is not the only point. The other one is economical – it’s cheaper to have some nukes rather than equip and maintain division after division of fighting troops. That is one reason why the US reduced its ground forces in Europe.
It’s also cheaper in terms of your own casualties to eliminate a Soviet army with nukes rather than by a pitched battle. Of course that assumes there’s not a retaliatory strike or even a wind shift that blows fallout back on your own troops.
While this is all very true, the problem with it lies at its very core: the distinction we’ve drawn between tactical and strategic use of nuclear weapons is an entirely artificial one, as indeed is the distinction we’ve drawn between conventional and nuclear war. Once one has let the jinn out of the bottle and broken the artificial boundary between conventional and nuclear, its a very small step from battlefield use to city-killers. Those professionally executed war games RickJay mentioned all either ended in a strategic exchange or the game was concluded with nukes either having been used or their release having been requested and all indications being that further escalation was inevitable. While a NATO/Warsaw Pact war would probably have started conventionally, it was almost certain to have gone nuclear very quickly and attempting to restrict their use to tactical “battlefield” targets wouldn’t last very long.
I don’t think the second part follows logically from the first part. When deterrence failed, for whatever reason, it doesn’t matter anymore to be convincing. You have to actually choose between, in this case, losing western Europe (assuming you’re the USA) and presumably mutual destruction. I don’t find obvious that US presidents would have necessarily chosen the latter if push had come to shove. In fact, rationally, they shouldn’t have, since it’s by far the worst option.Better to see western Europe becoming a Soviet satellite than being anihilated (along with everybody else).
(someone mentioned tactical use : that’s a different issue. It might be perfectly rational to use them for self-preservation. Especially since it might be part of the deterrence)
Ok. Maybe. But that assumes that the Soviet Union wouldn’t retaliate after having had its main cities vaporized. Which seems unlikely, since it’s not like it has much to lose by doing so at this point (France having already used its own weapons), and besides it logically still must convince the UK/USA that it will retaliate if they in turn use nukes.
To note again: the distinction between tactical and strategic use of nuclear weapons is an entirely artificial one; and one not likely to last very long if at all. The “intermediate” steps of theater nuclear weapons as an escalatory step between the two is even more artificial with the idea that the use of nuclear weapons could escalate to obliterating infrastructure targets (read: cities) in Europe but somehow remain restrained from obliterating cities in the US and the USSR. As soon as tactical nuclear weapons are used on the battlefield, the old war is over. Their use won’t be restricted to using one or two on an advancing Warsaw Pact tank column to try to deter them from advancing further. Every time this has been war gamed the other side refuses to be blackmailed and responds in kind with its own tactical nuclear weapons, which quickly spirals to hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons being used, the conventional situation being rendered moot and a strategic exchange occurring. Once the nukes have started flying there is little reason not to let the city-killers fly and a great incentive to use them out of fear that the other side will use them first.
One of the paradoxes of nuclear weapons is that if there was such a thing as perfect deterrence- that you could be certain that neither side would ever, for any reason no matter how desperate, be the first to use nukes- then it would be equivalent to a world where nuclear weapons didn’t exist. But if that were the case then we’d be back to total strategic industrial war like World War Two; which was exactly what atomic bombs were developed for in the first place. Nuclear weapons may be “unusable” but it proved indispensable that they might be used. Which pretty much is why deterrence apparently worked. Even in the case of false alarms the prospect of launching nukes was so terrible that people on both sides chose to risk an unanswered first strike rather than launch on warning.
I don’t think the assumption that this would exhaust Frances nuclear arsenals is correct. From memory, at the time France had something like 500 nukes.
The UK may be able to brook a separate peace from nukes and geographic barriers. France would not. France would be faced with the choice between being erased as a nation and using nukes. I really have no doubt as to what they’d chose.
France would fire off whichever fraction of their arsenals it would take to annihilate the Warsaw pact forces, and threaten to use the rest to end the Soviet Union as a functional nation.
This is not an area I am very knowledgeable about, but friends of mine who are deeply into this does say that Warzaw pact conventional capabilities were significantly overestimated by the west in the 70s and 80s. And scenarios from that time is built on that overestimation.