Yes, let’s look at how that “competitive market regulation” worked out in reality, shall we?
This instant message exchange between two unidentified Standard & Poor’s officials about a mortgage-backed security deal they were supposed to be rating on 4/5/2007:
Official #1: Btw (by the way) that deal is ridiculous.
Official #2: I know right…model def (definitely) does not capture half the risk.
Official #1: We should not be rating it.
Official #2: We rate every deal. It could be structured by cows and we would rate it.
Here’s the ratings agency bit in context in a bit of quote art I did about how dereguilation led to the financial meltdown :
*“Where once more-marginal applicants would simply have been denied credit, lenders are now able to quite efficiently judge the risk posed by individual applicants and to price that risk appropriately. These improvements have led to rapid growth in subprime mortgage lending.”
Alan Greenspan
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank,
April 2005
“Mr. Howard made it clear to the mortgage broker that he could not read or write, but his loan application erroneously claimed he had had 16 years of education.”
Center for Responsible Lending report
“IndyMac: What Went Wrong?”
June 30, 2008
“I would reject a loan and the insanity would begin,”
one former underwriter
told CRL. “It would go to upper management and the next
thing you know it’s going to closing… I’m like, ‘What the Sam Hill?
There’s nothing in there to
support this loan.’”
Center for Responsible Lending report
“IndyMac:
What Went Wrong?”
June 30, 2008
“That was your homework—to watch Boiler Room.”—Lisa Taylor, Ameriquest loan agent, quoted in the Los Angeles Times, February 4, 2005
What is that movie? Boiler Room? That’s what it’s like. I mean,
it’s the [coolest] thing ever. Cubicle, cubicle, cubicle for 150,000
square feet. The ceilings were probably 25 or 30 feet high. The
elevator had a big graffiti painting. Big open space. And it was
awesome. We lived mortgage. That’s all we did. This deal, that deal.
How we gonna get it funded? What’s the problem with this one? That’s all everyone’s talking about . . .
We looked at loans. These people didn’t have a pot to piss in. They can barely make car payments and we’re giving them a 300, 400 thousand dollar house…
Then the next one came along, and it was no income, verified assets. So you don’t have to tell the people what you do for a living. You don’t have to tell the people what you do for work. All you have to do is state you have a certain amount of money in your bank account. And then, the next one, is just no income, no asset. You don’t have to state anything. Just have to have a credit score and a pulse.
[reporter] Alex Blumberg: Actually, that pulse thing. Also optional. Like the case in Ohio where twenty-three dead people were approved for mortgages…
Match the allegation with the institution.
**Allegation **
-
Handed out copies of the movie Boiler Room as a training tape
-
Partnered to sell its “PayOption Arms†with a brokerage owned by a five-time felon, whose convictions included gun-related charges
-
Forbade loan officers to check borrower income on certain loans
-
Ran an "art department" in its Tampa office, where documents were altered
-
Settled allegations of institutionalized marketing deception that covered two million customers
-
Developed “FastQual,†a program designed to approve borrowers in twelve seconds
-
Incentivized brokers and loan officers through “yield spread premiums†and other compensation schemes to put borrowers into more expensive loans
-
Tapped two kegs of beer at weekly staff meetings
**Institution **
A. Citigroup
B. Countrywide
C. Ameriquest
D. IndyMac
E. Merit Financial
F. New Century
G. All of the above
Quiz Answers: 1C, 2B, 3D, 4C, 5A, 6F, 7G, 8E.
http://www.ocnus.net/artman2/publish…_printer.shtml
Case in point: this instant message exchange between two unidentified Standard & Poor’s officials about a mortgage-backed security deal on 4/5/2007:Official #1: Btw (by the way) that deal is ridiculous.
Official #2: I know right…model def (definitely) does not capture half the risk.
Official #1: We should not be rating it.
Official #2: We rate every deal. It could be structured by cows and we would rate it.
http://www.cnbc.com/id/27321998/S_P_…ctured_by_Cows
"The big saying was ‘A skinny file is a good file,’ " said Nancy Erken, a WaMu loan consultant in Seattle. She recalled helping credit-challenged borrowers collect canceled checks, explanatory letters and other documentation that they could afford their loans.
"I’d take the files over to the processing center in Bellevue and they’d tell me ‘Nancy, why do you have all this stuff in here? We’re just going to take this stuff and throw it out,’ " she said…
In an internal newsletter dated Oct. 31, 2005, and obtained by The Seattle Times, risk managers were told they needed to “shift (their) ways of thinking” away from acting as a “regulatory burden” on the company’s lending operations and toward being a “customer service” that supported WaMu’s five-year growth plan.
Risk managers were to rely less on examining borrowers’ documentation individually and more on automated processes, Melissa Martinez, WaMu’s chief compliance and risk oversight officer, wrote in the memo.
Soon after, WaMu’s risk managers were called to an “all-hands” meeting at the company’s posh new conference center near Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. Dale George, a former senior credit-risk officer in Irvine, Calif., recalled that Martinez emphasized “the softer side of risk management” at the meeting.
"The whole tone it set was that ‘Maybe the next file I review I should pull back, hold off on downgrading (a loan), not take a sharp pencil to what production was doing,’ " he said.
“They weren’t going to have risk management get in the way of what they wanted to do, which was basically lend the customers more money.”…
**
“Someone in Florida had made a second-mortgage loan to O.J. Simpson, and I just about blew my top, because there was this huge judgment against him from his wife’s parents,” she recalled. Simpson had been acquitted of killing his wife Nicole and her friend but was later found liable for their deaths in a civil lawsuit; that judgment took precedence over other debts, such as if Simpson defaulted on his WaMu loan.
"When I asked how we could possibly foreclose on it, they said there was a letter in the file from O.J. Simpson saying ‘the judgment is no good, because I didn’t do it.’ "**
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/htm…11_wamu25.html
Here’s the remainder of the cnbc structured by cows link :
A former executive of Moody’s says conflicts of interest got in the way of rating agencies properly valuing mortgage backed securities. Former Managing Director Jerome Fons, who worked at Moody’s until August of 2007, says Moody’s was focused on “maxmizing revenues,” leading it to make the firm more “issuer friendly.”
How about that? You remove regulations and corporations who have a fiduciary duty to their shareholders to maximise revenue set about maximising revenue by any means they can!
And they do this because the guys at the top could whore themselves out to the highest bidder and increase the ratings agencies’ profits by multiples of their regulated-era earnings, and consequently earn multiples of their regulated-era incomes.