If meaning comes from God, then meaning is circular because God is absolute. I have no idea what meaning is in a materialistic context. As I recall, when I was a materialist, I was an existentialist (Camus style).
“T” and “validity” are not the same thing.
T is a property of propostions.
validity is a property of arguments (syntactic structures). An argument is valid if each statement can be derived from the definitions and assumptions using the axioms of the formal system.
the important relationship betweenthese two ideas is that valid structures preserve T. Thus, if our assumptions possess the property T, and our structure is valid, then our conclusions possess the property T.
I would find that point compelling, if I found that point to be true.
I said: {Logic} */* {English} != {Logic} / {English}
you said: {Logic} */* {English} = {}
Really? What prevents logic from addressing the property “truth”? Logic cannot test directly for “correspondence to reality”, but that is a different thing entirely.
This is a valid English sentence.
I get the feeling that we are not very close at all and that this analogy is vaguely insulting (though I assume it was not intended to be). You offered this in response to: [T] has been very explicitely defined to map the observed behavior of “truth”. Thus, there is an English implication. Perhaps you would be so kind as to point out what “middle ground” you feel that I am glossing over.
For the record: implicate: To involve or connect intimately or incriminatingly.
Which you conclude because you have already begged that question. I see nothing particularly “special” about your circle.
I’m glad you at least recognize that you are begging the question. Since the whole point of your assertion is that logic is meaningless, you are free to feel that arguing in a circle is not a flaw. I, of course, am free to disagree.
Well, in this thread we have used the word to identify both the language(s) and the discipline(s). A discipline of formal logic is a method of reasoning bounded by a set of symbols and a set of axioms defining operations and substitutions for those symbols. A language of formal logic is the set of symbols, axioms, and rules for substitution.
In the above, “reasoning” might be replaced by “calculation”, “demonstration”, “investigation”, or “symbol manipulation”.
No worries on that front, unless the reference was to your own patience. I apologize if my innate snarkiness has seemed more gruff than usual. I ain’t mad, really. 
Again, I could not care less. You asked for an English statement which was "true regardless of the circumstances of [its] use. You have been provided with one.
“Means the same thing in all contexts” is not a defining quality of a tautology. “True in all contexts” is.
Meaningful and understandable, but since I have no way of knowing whether a point has been set aside “for the moment”, lost in the forrest, or simply ignored – I sometimes resort to VBB emphatics.
If I may pick just a tiny nit, T is also a property of inferences.
True.
Eris wrote:
The main problem that I have with the Correspondence Theory of truth is its amphiboly — there is no way to know whether a truth bearer is invoking a fact or a non-obtaining entity.
The second problem I have with it is that it is ontologically neutral in every context; thus, I cannot speak of God to you, but I may speak of God to Poly. Ontological neutrality makes contradictions moot.
And finally, I think it obfuscates reality rather than doing what it intends to do, which is to clarify reality. Facts are disreputable, and non-obtaining entities are modally vacuous.
How, for example, can you model a truth bearer doxastically? If B believes X, then the non-obtaining entity is neither B nor X, but belief itself.
But for you, the problem is greater than any that I have with it. You cannot maintain a theory of difference because if A is a fact, then there is no difference between your A and my A; and if A is a non-obtaining entity, then A is not a fact at all, but a state of affairs.
Well well well,
I can see you lack logic. You just told off A LOT of people. You may think logic is meaningless, but why would it matter to you? You have none whatsoever. Yes, there is more to this world than just logic, but come on, it’s not meaningless! It’s great, it makes this poor race feel like we’ve accomplished something, at least give me that. ugh.
I know what you mean. It’s always heartbreaking when the little ones suffer.
Well, the parallel should really be “invoking a fact” or “not invoking a fact” (alternatively, “a state of affairs that obtains” or “a state of affairs that does not obtain”), but more importantly I would note that epistemological uncertainty is hardly restricted to correspondence theories of truth. Many theories of truth are subject to uncertainty in “testing”, including deflationary theories. The issue will always revolve around questions of “recognizing” and “deciding”, and those issues are hardly restricted to correspondence theories.
I don’t follow your reasoning, here. This would seem to be a charge to be leveled at relativistic theories of truth, not correspondence theories. Can you connect the dots for me?
Clarity? I thought the intention was to find the truth. 
Facts may be disreputable to some, but that does not mean they do not exist. I share your distaste for non-obtaining entities, but I do not reject them out-of-hand. I think that it might be possible for a careful ontology to mitigate my concerns.
Well, if it is a non-obtaining entity then B does not, in truth, believe X. So your objection reduces to, “correspondence theory makes it hard to doxastically model beliefs which nobody believes.” Of course, if one chooses to accept facts, then the question of modeling non-obtaining entities disappears entirely. Really, though, I am not sure that ease of doxastic modelling should be a requirement for a theory of truth, especially considering that methods for doxastic modelling are hardly static.
I don’t think I follow this one either. It would seem to apply only if one both applied a theory of difference to the the same objects as a theory of truth (not unreasonable, but necessary?) and required objects of identical correspondence (i.e. to the same fact/state of affairs) to be different (doesn’t seen necessary or reasonable).
I think I need the dots connected on this one, too.
BTW A big for the little ones.
Spiritus wrote:
Having never said that they are restricted to correspondence theories, I don’t disagree. But I think that the amphiboly of correspondence theories is quite famous. Even the differentiation between “fact” and “state of affairs” is itself suspect, since the assertion of a state of affairs implies the assertion of a fact about the state.
Deflationarily, either the assertion and the truth are the same or else the assertion contains the truth and is reducible to an assertion that is the truth.
It is indeed true of relativistic theories, but with respect to correspondence, if you and I discuss God, we are in fact discussing God[sub]1[/sub] and God[sub]2[/sub]. Inasmuch as you lack aything in your frame of reference that is the same as God when I speak of God, you cannot connect what I say with any fact or state of affairs. But Tris and I may discuss God such that his God and mine are the same.
Answer this question by a fact alone: what is the exact time? You cannot tell me the truth. Now, answer this question by a state of affairs alone: is it cold outside? Again, you cannot tell me the truth.
I meant the entire assertion: B(X).
I have to disagree respectfully. Well, maybe not “ease”, but at least possibility. After all, holding to a theory of truth is itself a doxastic state.
Given that a present state of affairs has obtained from personal experience, how can you and I ever share a common frame of reference, including one about exactly what constitutes difference?
Yes, because teh epistemological argument has been leveled most often against correspondence theories, but it applies with no less force to deflationay theories of truth.
I disagree. The differentiation is ontological and quite unambiguous: do false statements refer to uninstantiated objects (non-obtaining states of affairs). While the difference is subtle (perhaps trivial) for truth, it is significant for falsehood.
Now I am confused again. That sounds more like an identity theory of truth. My understanding of a deflationary theory is that the assertion of the truth of a statement is the same as the assertion of the statement, not that the assertion is the truth. 
I disagree. If the barrier lies in phenomenology it applies no less to Tris-Lib than to Spiritus-Lib. If the barrier does not lie in phenomenology, then you need to both develop the non-phenomenological frame to which you refer and demonstrate why that frame imposes a limitation upon a correspondence theory of truth. Even then, you are left with the need to account for how, if said frame can shift w/regards to the question of God (as in your own case) it can represent an impermeable barrier to “truth” under a correspondence theory. I frankly doubt that you can make that case stick, but it might be fun to see you make the atempt.
This is a bit disingenuous of you, since you just recently offered “The lake is beautiful” as a statement without truth value. Perhaps, as an illlustration, you would like to demonstrate how a deflationary theory of truth will tell me “what is the exact time” and “is it cold outside”?
A more general response, of course, is that no theory of truth is likely to transcend the limitations of human knowlege. The fact that I cannot know, unabiguously, the answer to “what is the exact time” is a lmitation of epistemology, not an attack on any particular theory of truth. Please do supply your own answers to the two questions, though. I am interested in learning the exact time.
I have only minimal exposure to doxastic models. Are you saying that a correspondence theory of truth would have particular trouble with regards to the doxastic question: Is it true that B believes X? How so?
- Can you point me to a proof that it is impossible to model doxastically a correspondence theory of truth?
- Assuming 1, can you tell me why this should be viewed as a flaw in the theory rather than a limitation in the modeling? Why wouldn’t be more akin to the observation that certain modalities cannot be addressed in K?
Once again, I find it strange to use an epistemological argument based in phenomenology to damn a particular theory of truth (or of difference, in this case). More to the point, though, is this your answer to my questions? Are you saying that any possible theory of difference must allow you and I to recognize with perfect correspondence when and hoe entities differ?
If so, I must strongly disagree. If the razor for acceptance is that any theory must be able to pierce all epistemological and phenomenological barriers then we might as well simply embrace nihilism and get on with imagining our lives.
Perhaps another way for me to understand your objection on this grounds would be for you to show me how a deflationary theory of truth is modeled doxastically and then explain how a correspondence theory would not be addressable using the same techniques.
Well, deflationary truth can be modelled by any arbitrary modality that can accomodate a Tarskian biconditional. In fact, T("[symbol]f[/symbol]"[symbol])Ûf[/symbol] is, to my mind, a pretty good definition of deflation.
As you know, it is easy enough to slide from Identity to pretty much any truth theory, including Deflation. In fact, I would say that that is exactly the hand that history has dealt Identity. Even as recently as Dodd, whenever sufficient pressure has been applied, Identity has always morphed into something else.
I can’t model correspondence theory, though, since I have to presume the antecedant. Leaving aside doxastics for simplicity and clarity, even with common S4, how am I going to model an infinitely recursive entity? Or, to put it another way, how am I going to bridge from possibility to necessity for a fact or state of affairs? Even if I postulate it as necessary, I can’t conclude that it is possible since there is no axiom (that I’m aware of) that infers possibility from necessity.
Even if I were to model it without modality, I would end up with something like T([symbol]f[/symbol])[symbol]Ûf[/symbol], which is just silly. To borrow from Al Gore, there is no controlling phenomenological authority over facts. Today’s fact might be yesterday’s fantasy and tomorrow’s heresy. And a state of affairs is nothing but a photograph of reality when reality is a motion picture. If it weren’t for its non-obtaining entities, you might be able to map correspondence deonticallly.
With regards to the Tris-Lib discussion of God, there is no phenomenological barrier since the frame of reference for that discussion is metaphysically absolute.
For us “little ones” trying to follow along at home, definitions of terms such as doxastic can be found at these sorts of sites.
The definition of amphiboly, for instance, is hilarious.
Oops, I forgot, Spiritus. The time is now, and it is definitely cold outside my door.
We are at risk of hijacking erl’s attack on logic deep into truth theories. Erl, if you want us to take it elsewhere, just say so.
Sure, that’s a pretty standard formulation of the equvalence schema. Now, given the doxastic question you posed before, how does the equivalence schema add to the doxastic model?
yes, but you seem to be taking it in the other direction. You claim the deflationary position yet assert the identity? Are you really willing to replace [symbol]Û[/symbol] with ==?
Another thing I wanted to clarify. What do you think is the proper object of deflationary theory, propositions? I make that guess only because it seems most in agreement with this slide towards identity.
I don’t see that. Can you demonstrate the necessity?
What infinite recursion? T("[symbol]f[/symbol]"[symbol])Û[/symbol]Factsymbol[/symbol]
I can’t say that it adds much to our understanding, but neither does a deflationary theory.
Well, M + B will get you there, or you can just accept D directly.
[sub]reference for the "little ones"[/sub]
(M) **[]A -> A**
(B) **A -> []<>A **
(D) **[]A -> ~[]~A**
[] means "it is necessary"
<> means "it is possible"; ~[]~A (by definition)
~ signifies negation
Maybe, but that’s the identity theory for you. It isn’t the correspondence theory, though. In modelling correspondence theories, we have no necessity for ("[symbol]f[/symbol]") to map to ([symbol]f[/symbol]). Isomorphism to any fact/obtaining state of affairs is sufficient.
Nice metaphor, but I don’t think it’s accurate. In fact, since corrsspondence theories explicitely map to reality, the truth value of a truthbearer is directly ties to the “moving picture” rather than teh snapshoot.
F(A) -> ~[symbol]A[/symbol]
Or one might rely upon the facts: ~T(A) -> [symbol]"a[/symbol]
Oh please, are you seriously arguing that a shared metaphysic allows absolute epistemological certainty? And how do you know that you have a shared metaphysic?
If you’re going to use the epistemological argument against alternative theories of truth you coulsd at least apply it with equal rigor to all questions of verification.
Exactly. Deflationary theory offers no answers and then condemns other theories for failing to provide absolute certainty for all answers.
Spiritus
You’re probably right about several of your points. I should step back and review my considerations about the matter.
Fair enough.
For the record, I’m not anti-deflationary theory. I find some arguments for deflation quite compelling, I’m just not ready to entirely surrender the attempt to expicate truth. Actually, when musing about such things I often make use of a deflationary model as a “placeholder” for truth, since it simplifies things by doing away with correlation criteria, etc.
I’m not arguing for a corresponsence model, either. I probably fall most closely into the “different truths for different objects” school, but my thoughts on this are very much “in progress”.
It’s always the “simple” things that give me the most trouble.
I have come down with a terrible case of work. I do not intend to drop this discussion, though thinking about it this weekend has led me to note that I think I allowed the discussion to be quite sidetracked in terminology I wasn’t used to and wasn’t prepared for. I will admit these errors quite openly now and return to restate my argument. I’ve spent time rereading my Wittgenstein, a logic text I have, and going through my copy of the Encyclopedic Dictionary of Mathematics from MIT Press and I will take pains to use terminology appropriately. I cannot promise a time, maybe a week. I will also be getting internet at home this Saturday (its been over three months without it!) and that should facilitate the discussion, too. So, I hope no one is going anywhere.
…
I don’t see any hijacking going on, and it ain’t my thread Indeed, since there is a not-so-subtle connection between truth and meaning, I think this is as appropriate a thread as any.
…
One quickie:
If A is a fact, if any difference exists between your A and my A it is not able to be formed into conversational speech about facts, and any hypothetical differences account for theories (say, theories of mind, qualia, and so on) (in other words, the way we talk about the subjective differences mirrors facts only in that they are stated as propositions). Because facts are absorbed into our speech and concepts, inter-subjectively formed, the nature of “subjective difference of facts” is unable to be spoken (as Spiritus might say, “This is how we use the word ‘fact’”). You take a rather strong view of correspondence, not one I want to imply. Reality—whatever it is—limits us in many ways. In seeking to understand reality’s truth we also create our own. But the two are so intertwined as to be indistinguishable. Hence I shy away from the use of the word “objective” and focus instead on “inter-subjective”. And this is really where the correspondence deflates to… well, deflationary theory. Because of the intersubjectivity being all we have to frame existence on, truths are asserted rather than actually discovered (as they would be in an objective reality). But I don’t feel that we can say that all truth is only asserted (else, really, we could “make” reality however we chose) even though we can’t get everyone to agree on some things. We assert what we can get away with, and both reality and inter-subjective opinion have a part in influencing this. Think of Rand’s saying that one can avoid reality, but one cannot avoid the consequences of avoiding reality.
Again, I take a rather dim view of ontology. In a work of mine Spiritus has I noted that the only real differences between an idealist and a realist are the things they are inclined to say (and these differences seem limited even here to metaphysical assertions). They both put their pants on one leg at a time. That’s a fact.
Spiritus, a quicky for you, as well.
This is, of course, the very question with which we are concerned. On one hand, nothing prevents it. On the other, nothing prevents it from addressing anything and everything else in the exact same way. In fact, we may use the exact same formal propositions and derivations for any number of arguments. As I think I’ve said, “Logic applies to everything it applies to.” Well, sure.
But the meaning of the symbols are determined by the context (the use we are putting them to). The context is, “We are talking about truth.” Note that this context itself is not able to be formed in the symbols of logic (Ramanujan: note also with my use of ‘context’—and in fact my understanding of it—‘P’ as an assertion in formal logic is not a context, rather it is the context which asserts ‘P’). It resides in us, in the conversation leading up to the point of the symbols. And when we reach our conclusion and the inference is over we pop out of the symbology and say [whatever is to be said from the inference].
Some things to note at this point.
Indeed. This is the structure of formal logic. However, and this is the point I need to stress the most, given true inputs, is the inference true?
Point the first: if it has to be, then there is nothing we’ve actually gained from the manipulations that wasn’t already there. That is, we have not created new information. It was an analytical act. Since we’ve gained nothing, logic contributed nothing to the discussion.
Point the second: if it is true, we do not say it is true by pointing at the symbols. Indeed, we instead point to the manifestation of the inference as proof of the symbols (which, you might note, is what many people tried to do the first two pages of the debate, thus missing my point entirely). Logic, then, doesn’t prove things, and doesn’t preserve truth. Logic preserves T, an analogous construction to truth, and after our logical actions are done on the symbols our formal logic allows and we return to the conversational-speech context (as noted above) we recast the inference in light of this. And then investigate whether this preservation was accurate. Our confidence in logic comes from our assessment of truth in the first place. But the development I’ve given here is only a more general form of my first point; indeed, after the mapping is complete, this more general phenomenon reduces to the first point of analytical manipulation.
Final point, then, is a sort of summary. Meaning is use. How do we use logic? That is, what do we say with it? We in fact don’t say anything with it that wasn’t already said without it. Hence, it is meaningless.
I’m still with you, Eris.
But what I’m really mulling over in my mind right now, after some the excellent points made by Spiritus, is whether or not the various truth theories are in fact different ways of describing the same thing. Whether A is true as a deflation, a correspondence, or an identity is beginning to seem almost irrelevant. And I am beginning to wonder whether truth is even phenomenologically relevant.
Spiritus
How is your (D) derived, going from <> to <> (or ~~)?