I agree with Libertarian on one point…this has gotten crazy.
Muad’Dib, I have absolutely no idea how you got that out my earlier post.
Expose? What is hiding it? Where are you looking?
I do believe in a concept of truth. The "Real World"™ is where this truth is found. Here is where we look for it.
Vorlon, I sure hope you can parse your own replies to me in light of something like suicide or not eating and ‘simply dying’. You’re simply stating that the Tao is what is and not is; and that accountability is not a human phenomenon, because it is the Tao.
If someone chooses to be accountable, that is simply a delusion on their part; a part of the Tao as well. Ultimately, you should just be the Tao.
This whole Tao philosophy has a synonym in english: absurd.
-Justhink
Libertarian, is this a troll? Explain the Aristotlean model, how it is being used here and subsequent systems of thought which have long eclipsed it. What was the next model? The one after that? etc… Which one are we currently in? How is it so much more efficient that one should be veiwed with scorn and ridicule for not embracing it? Does the new system use logic at all, or is it just “might makes right”?
Please explain yourself here.
-Justhink
Well, it always seems absurd, mainly because trying to talk about something that can’t be described is extraordinarily difficult.
Suiciding or starving oneself to death is not implied by Taoism in any way I can determine.
We might consider the Tao to be the actual laws of physics (not necessarily the same laws we use to model the world, but the laws that actually define the world).
When you assign a property to something, you also exclude the opposite of that property from the thing. (The Invisible Pink Unicorn is a good example of the violation of this principle.) The Tao is what is there before a property is assigned.
We could say that the Tao has no properties (all properties are negated) or that it has all properties (all properties are affirmed). These two states are different in linguistic appearance, but are identical. (Would you like your ice cream on top of your pie, or your pie beneath your ice cream?)
What does accountability have to do with anything?
And the rest of your own argument seems to flow consistently from this, so fair enough. However, as you might guess from our previous discussions, I would hesitate to accept the foregoing assumption as a good starting point, and certainly not without more serious consideration (on my part) before proceeding further.
For instance, one question which comes to mind – and this is rhetorical, since I think a discussion on this point would take us too far off-topic: what (in Wittgenstein’s definition or yours), is a “fact”? Until such a term has been rigorously defined, and without relying on the argument it is later intended to support, it should not be used. It is even potentially misleading to use it because it plays upon the assumption that we all know, and agree, what a “fact” is.
Justhink
Just read.
erl
I might be wrong, but you appear to be trying to synthesize some of Wittgenstein’s early language arguments (specifically the language of logic) with the structure of language he develops later in PI. Unless I am misleading the analgous treatments of “logic” and “pain” in your posts. I think this approach is a mistake.
“Logic” is no less a natural language than “English”. To speak of either (or any language) as “meaning” something is to misapply the English word “meaning”. Languages do not have meaning, they are comprised of elements which have meanings. You might as well condemn the set of natural numbers for having no ordinal value.
If you insist upon Wittgenstein’s earlier approach to meaning, then I do not see how you declare either logical statements or the English word “pain” to be without referent. I can only make that position work for “pain” by accepting the Private Language Argument, which clearly depends upon meaning as a social construct. Even allowing PLA, I’m not sure I can follow you to declare that logical statements can have no referent. If “symmetrical” has a referent, then so does modus ponens. If neither has a referent, then I think your theory of meaning is too limited to be useful.
Spiritus!
(Is this a quicky, or are you back?)
Hi Lib. Thanks for the smile.
This is whatever time will permit me. Not a quickie, but perhaps a “nooner”. (Or perhaps I really don’t want to draw that metaphor in too much detail.)
I didn’t miss your separate argument for the meaninglessness of logic, BTW, it just seemed that the thread as a whole was more focused on erl’s presentation and I thought I would try arguing just one point at a time for a change.
Then again, my lack of restraint in such matters is legendary.
If you declare logic to be meaningless because it rests upon tautologies (as does all that contains definitions) then in what do you find both meaning and lack of definition?
Well, I am attempting to synthesize both works, yes, but not try to apply them simultaneously, if that makes any sense. Some key statements made in the Tractutus lead me to find their application outside of the framework of the Tractutus itself.
Of course a language doesn’t have meaning. I’m sorry if—through context or sloppiness of phrasing—I’ve implied that. I did try to note on page two that “the symbols of logic do not represent” (as a direct quote from the man himself). This was meant to relate them to “pain” and such (though such a relation was incidental, honestly; I just mentioned it for completeness).
The second thing to note is the scope of logic: it has no bounds whatsoever. If I misapply a logical sentence to an English one (as I did purposely in the OP) the fault is not with logic, but with the notion of implication in the English sentence; that is, the reason it is wrong is because of the meanings of the English words, not because of some flaw with the logical sentence. We find the error through an analysis of meaning, not syntax. An error in a logical proof, however, is not found by an analysis of what the terms mean (indeed, if my claim is correct, it never could be) but rather the syntax of the statement and/or any statements that proceeded it.
Imagine reading a logical proof and declaring it false because of what the terms meant rather than an appeal to the axioms dictating manipulation of the symbols. Under what conditions would this be acceptable?
A complete treatment of logic is finished before we ever declare what the terms mean. A complete treatment of [English] can’t be done without dealing with what the terms mean.
If logic is a natural language, then at best it is an abstraction of the syntax of meaning (something I was also trying to touch on on page two); that is, given the truth of the meaning of the terms of the sentence all that is left to evaluate is the structure, and this is where logic comes in. This does not give it meaning (logic’s constituent symbols); indeed, it necessarily takes the meaning away.
Spiritus wrote:
Why, Spiritus, I would have thought that to be obvious. God, of course.
This is where you lose me; as I see it, you didn’t misapply a logical sentence to an English one, you compared two completely different sentences.
The logical sentence was (P & (P => Q)) => Q. This is a tautology, there are no meanings for P and Q which make this false; if you were actually able to find such meanings, then you would really have some kind of point. But, if I’m understanding you, it seems to me you keep claiming that you have found such meanings for P and Q, and this is where you lose me.
So we let P = “I wake up early enough”, Q = “I will have eggs for breakfast”. The only english sentence ever mentioned was, “If I wake up early enough, I will have eggs for breakfast”. This is vastly different from our above sentence structure; this sentence is P => Q. This logic sentence is clearly not a tautology, it can be true or false, depending on the truth values of P and Q. If it’s the case that I wake up early enough, but do not have eggs for breakfast, then both:
-
If I wake up early enough, I will have eggs for breakfast.
-
P => Q.
are false statements, the first one “as English”, the second one “as logic”.
The sentence we should be looking at (to compare it to (P & (P => Q)) => Q) is “If I wake up early enough (and if I wake up early enough, then I will have eggs for breakfast), then I will have eggs for breakfast”. There’s nothing you can do that will make this sentence false, it follows a tautological pattern, and is therefore true. If it turns out that you wake up early enough, and you don’t have eggs for breakfast, then your parenthetical comment was false, making the entire statement true. So in this case we have both:
-
If I wake up early enough (and if I wake up early enough, then I will have eggs for breakfast), then I will have eggs for breakfast
-
(P & (P => Q)) => Q
true; the first “as English”, the second “as logic”.
I keep getting the impression that you think you’ve found an instance of an English sentence with a truth value different from what it’s logical structure would indicate, which you haven’t. Or maybe I’m misunderstanding you entirely?
I get that you are trying for synthesis, but I maintain that this particular attack on logic is so firmly rooted in Wittgenstein’s early understanding of “meaning” that it cannot effectively combined with his later approach to grammar.
And this distinguishes logic from English in what way?
I disagree. The fault is with your mapping, it lies in neither the logical nor the English construct. The English statement is not “wrong” under the rules of English. The logical statement is not invalid under the rules of logic. The truth value which we assign to the meaning of the English sentence is “False”.
I would say, rather, that we find a grammatical error. Meaning cannot be divorced entirely from syntax in either English or logic. The very purpose of syntax is to create structures to assist in interpretation.
Put another way: if the meaning of a sentence and the syntax of a sentence do not yield identical valuations for validity (under disparate structures for evaluation, no less), then what perspective must we have to declare that the error lies in one and not the other?
Maybe I am missing something, but I cannot make the bridge you seem to be building stretch across the abyss. Perhaps if you tell me explicitely what abstract structure(s) you are using to determine the truth value of a meaning it would help me see your point. Generally I use one or another form of logical reasoning to determine the truth value of an intellectual proposition, but “Here there be worm Ourouboruses” (something like that).
I am torn. I want to answer: neither is improper subject verb agreement. Which is true and reflects the idea that errors in structure can often be identified without appeal to meaning.
I also want to answer: I disagree. It is not necessary to assign explicit substitutions for each term (P,Q,. . .), but the meaning of those terms is not any particular substitution, but rather the combination of: rules for legal substitution, sytactical restrictions on symbol placement, axiomatic relationships between symbols, etc. In short – the meaning is how we use the symbols (where have I heard that before?). Logic is not the only language with very specific rules for how symbols might be “legally” used in relation to each other. Formal logic, however, attempts to make explicit all criterion for usage without appeal to external elements. No pointing at the thunder.
First make it clear to me how the two choices are distinct. (Well, apart from the seemingly artificial specification of appealing to only axioms rather than other basic elements of logical structure. I’m pretty sure that isn’t what you are looking for.)
Again, I think you need to make it very explicit how you are defining “mean”. You certainly do not seem to be following Wittgenstein’s logic of grammar. Not that you have to, of course, but I thought that was an integral element of your attempted synthesis.
At best? How are we evaluating the possible mappings for a language?
Well, logic can also be pretty useful in deciding the truth of the terms of a sentence.
I see no reason to reach that conclusion. How do the constituent symbols of logic lose meaning when the structure of a logical statement is analyzed?
Lib
I figured as much, but I have also seen you quite frequently apply definitions to God (God==Love, for instance).
Spiritus
Actually, God is Love doesn’t define very much, if anything, because I’m not sure what love is either, except that it is the goal of my moral journey.
I am able to prove, with almost a trivial modal tableau, that God exists if I define Him as “necessary existence”. But then interestingly, when I do that, the nonbelievers — even they who understand that the argument is sound — protest that I’ve defined Him into meaninglessness.
Still, I think that’s unfair. “Necessary existence” is a fine paraphrase of “supreme being”, I think. But then I’m back to the same God-is-Love-but-what-is-love? quandry. What is supreme? And what, really, is a being?
It is an honor to discuss these matters once again with you, Spiritus. You cannot know the profound effects that you’ve had on me. I consider you my superior (though that does not mean that I believe you to be right about everything). I promise not to corner you with these asides. And I will enjoy reading with great interest your remarks to Eris et al. God go with you, my friend.
Spiritus! I was wondering if you were still around. Glad to see that you are.
jm
(formerly nothamlet, Con Template)
Exactly! You want to know how I’m bridging the gap… I’m saying: there is no bridge! The meaning in logic comes from its application to English-like sentences and situations. Logic is intended to stand alone from this. A loss of contingency (to use the analytic/synthetic distinction) is a loss of meaning.
Isn’t it? In what way are you understanding English in this statement? Can we understand English sentences without appealing to reality? Can I deliberately engage in an English conversation without referencing reality (however reality “is”) and not speak nonsense? But suppose a geometer were to wonder what extra variables would be like where we use [two or three] variables to represent dimensions. Like, say, Riemann. To what is he appealing when he constructs such beasts? This particular tail wags the dog, now, with space-time interpretations of experiments. But then?
And what is the oft-used logical tautology in this thread interpreting? Yet I offer you this English tautology: “It’s always someone else’s baby until its yours.”
Is it my familiarity with English over logic that is the problem here? Is that why I find no meaning in the terms? Honest question.
But given proper subject-verb agreement the truth of an English sentence is not guaranteed.
Nice parenthetical comment 
Don’t think it hasn’t been dancing through my head this entire thread, because it is that comment which I’m combatting, at least as it applies to logic.
Yes, logic is used. I haven’t denied that. But what I’m saying is it is meaningful only when it is used to analyze something that already has meaning. I am fairly certain you weren’t unclear on this being my point, I just want to be sure.
You are familiar with the proof that 2=1[sup]†[/sup]? Is this proof false because two can’t equal one, or is it false because step such-and-such involved division by zero, which is forbidden? (This is like the mention of partially miscible fluids, or the union of clouds.)
Is the answer here: “logic can also be pretty useful in deciding the truth of the terms of a sentence”? But my point is that it isn’t useful for this. My determination of the truth of statements is not found by wondering what their logical structure is. If it were, someone would need to learn logic before they learned English (or whatever). My determination of the truth of a logical statement or proof is not found by wondering what the symbols represent (because they don’t represent!).
Meaning as use… symbols that represent. The key to my understanding of what I’m saying is what these two say together. In order for a symbol to have meaning, to have a use, it must represent. Here Wittgenstein was careful, in Philosophical Investigations, to mention things like “particular instances of being guided” or “particular acts of counting” rather than appealing to a very real and abstract definition of “guide” or “count” in which some might take a word to have sense (that is, the answer to “what does such-and-such mean?” is not “it means [such-and-such], period”). Quite literally, by taking context in consideration, “When I say [this] in [this] case, you are to [do, think, say, respond, etc] [in such-and-such a manner].” That’s what it means with meaning-as-use.
Given a logical sentence, the truth of it can be determined without appeal to the content of the free variables or any context. Given a picture or short movie of a person crying, the truth of it remains ambiguous. Is this an actor? Is it a cry of joy? “Is this person crying?” I wouldn’t know how to answer that question. Crying is just as much a symbol as the word “cry”. But the truth of propositions-about-crying are underdetermined without a way to analyze meaning; that is, the truth of whether a person is crying depends on understanding why this person appears to be crying, for if they were acting (and something had merely been sprayed in their eyes to simulate tears as is done sometimes) then it isn’t true they are crying.
That is, given an English sentence, an appeal to the content of the free(ish) variables is required to determine its truth.
And let’s leave it here for right now. I’ll say that the rest of the symbols of logic actually have meaning, somehow just the free variables don’t. Now: can we construct an English sentence analogous to this, where only (say) relational words are used and what they relate are empty and still have the sentence have meaning? What does it mean? How do I use that sentence?
†[sub] For those among us that have not seen this “proof”, I present it here in the form with which I am familiar:
a=b
a^2=ab
a^2-b^2=ab-b^2
(a+b)(a-b)=b(a-b)
a+b=b
b+b=b
2b=b
2=1
[/sub]
Sidetrack for Cabbage:
P = I wake up on time
Q = I eat eggs for breakfast
Please translate:
P->Q
I would say, “If I wake up on time, then I eat eggs for breakfast.”
“A is A”?
[slight hijack]
erislover, have you ever used a graphical programming language like ProGraph? I haven’t myself, but I’ve seen examples of code from those languages, and they definitely encourage the view that free variables are…well, if not meaningless then at least transparent and unnecessary. I suspect that it might be possible to translate logic into a notation that didn’t even use free variables as such, so long as you don’t mind writing propositions in a sprawling, two-dimensional format.
Some pictures of what I mean by “graphical programming language”: here, and here
[/slight hijack]
Added on preview: I believe Cabbage’s concerns are with the difference between “If I get up on time, I eat eggs for breakfast” and (P & (P->Q))->Q, not just plain old P->Q. That is, if I’m interpreting his concerns correctly…
If P and Q are true, then P->Q falls out by modus ponens.