how many times must I point out to you that it is your process that I reject? It is this sort of stunning stupidity/ability to blatently ignore what is specifically being stated vs. whatever tortured imagining your warped mind conjures up to be my statement that makes me speculate about the lack of oxygenated brain cells in your control.
IOW evidence supports my conclusion about you.
(Emphasis added by me).
I call bullshit on your revisionism here. Earlier you repeatedly and emphatically stated many times that evaluating the credibility of her accusation based on it’s being a “statistically rare crime pattern” would only be used by you in the absence of any other evidence with which to make a determination.
You specifically denied that the statistical frequency of the crime type should be used in all cases, and you even said that in the presence of actual evidence in a specific case, the statistical data should not be part of evaluating the truthfulness of the accusation.
Now you’re saying it should be used in combination with the other evidence? 
Emphasis in the following quotes is all added by myself:
And, my personal favorite:
They affect the likelihood (or our handicapping of the likelihood) that it took place as reported by the accuser, which is what we have to go on because she and the players are the ONLY ones who know what happened in that bathroom. Her allegations are the triggering event for the indictment of two guys who have a lot to lose. Her allegations are what the DA is going on (PROOF: If she had not made the allegations, there would be no case).
If her allegations are true, the event took place.
If her allegations are not true, it did not (unless some imagines some weird bizarro subset of cases where she’s totally lying about what happened, but was in fact raped anyhow).
Thus, the truth of her allegations is highly relevant to (determinative of) the occurrence vel non of the event.
Thus, we may for first order purposes (and in absence of other determinative evidence) treat “truthfulness of allegations” as identical to “occurrence of event.”
Thus, I posit, one may in evaluating “likelihood of truthfulness of allegations” take into account all factors suggestive thereof.
If one has reason to doubt the past truthfulness of the allegate-or, one may take that into account in ballparking the likelihood of “truthfulness of current allegations.”
If one finds the concatenation of alleged circumstances that would have to come into play unlikely (i.e., there are five red balls in a bag of twenty balls and the picker self-reports that she blindly picked them out five in a row), one may also consider that in setting a percentage for “likely truthfulness of allegation” and thus (in the absence of direct proof of “occurrence”), by proxy, “likely occurrence of given event.”
You may not like it but since we’re all speculating, I prefer my method to the head-in-sand one.
And, I’d make a heck of a lot more money by the end of the season in a sportsbook with this approach than you would by a blind insistence that there’s no reason the Houston Texans (2-14) should be expected to do worse than the Indianapolis Colts (14-2), just because of past records, and the rarity of personnel-challenged, undersized teams suddenly reversing their fortunes. My predictions of what would in fact happen in 2006 would be (in fact) right in more (not all) instances than would a random-walk.
Wow you showed me (or, demonstrated my original contention that you’re just calling me a big dummy-head because you wanted Tawana to be telling the truth (seriously, tell me you didn’t initially give sympathetic consideration to the notion that there was a plague of massa-on-black-girl gang rape that the racists were covering up) and that may not be looking so good now).
I don’t know what you think you’re arguing.
If I had DNA evidence galore, I’d pay no mind to the likelihood of a particular crime pattern in denying the boys’ claim that no sex took place.
If I had no evidence at all, but knew something about crime patterns that pointed toward skepticism regarding a particular, and not-so-common, one, I’d take that into account, maybe, and be skeptical.
If I found out the accuser was a convict, I’d be that much more skeptical.
If I found out the timelines were screwy, I’d be, I don’t know, 4.326% more skeptical.
It’s accretive, the circumstantially-induced skepticism. My reference to “in combination” was simply a shorthand for the fact that in this case, several odd circumstances have in fact accreted. Does this somehow belie my discussion of any one of them as having possibly-predictive usefulness? I honestly don’t understand your point.
It’s not determinative, the skepticism, and it could readily be overcome by other “determinative” evidence.
Remember how many times I had to state that I don’t dispute the DoJ stats, just the interpretation of them? Maybe if you italicize “process” and put it in bold, he’ll get it. Then, if that doesn’t work, you could put it in all caps, in bold, and italicized. After that, I don’t know.
Remember how you lied that you hadn’t bothered to look at them, because they shook your worldview too badly?
Good fucking lord.
show me exactly ONE post of mine that remotely suggests that position.
you have to admit - his ability to spit in the wind of reason is award winning.
Unless those convictions have anything to do with the tendency to make false reports, then they have as much weight as the criminal record of the defendants. I haven’t heard you talk much about the players prior run ins with the law. Why not, if this is so important?
Which goes back to credibility of the accuser, not the likelihood of an alleged incident (white-on-black rape). You’ve suggested all along in this thread that the accuser’s claim, on its face, is unlikely because of DoJ stats. But if we bring the accuser’s credibility into the equation, based on your repeated disclaimers, the DoJ stats are not important anymore. Do you even know what you’re saying any more?
The one kid’s battery charge makes me x% more likely to think he’d do something violent. Does the other one have a record?
The law distinguishes between “crimen falsi” (crimes involving falsity or deceit), or “crimes of moral turpitude,” and other crimes. Larceny (of which the accuser here was accused) is generally (if not universally) considered one of the crimen falsi/crimes of moral turpitude, on the view that there is something inherently deceitful in driving around in someone else’s car as though you owned it. Battery is not, as far as I know, classified with the crimen falsi/moral turpitude offenses. This distinction (don’t blame me, blame the Romans) provides at least one possibility for why a larceny convinction could be more of an “impeaching” factor as to current truthfulness than would battery, in the mind of a reasonable handicapper.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=224142
http://www.gapsc.com/ProfessionalPractices/moral_turpitude.pdf
They are facing jail time, she is not, so if they’re equally “not that credible,” our system breaks the tie in their favor. Put differently, our system presumes we hate false convictions or false indictments more than we hate false exonerations or false non prosecutions. (This isn’t a fun fact to face because it makes us realize that our system is set up with the implicit assumption that we will not prosecute or convict some non-zero number of defendants, not through “error” but through simply putting a judicial thumb down on the scale so as to credit a defendant’s denials more than a just-about-equally-credible accuser’s/prosecution’s inculpatory statements).
I know precisely what I am saying. And it is not consistent with your belief that “data point no. 2 automatically renders data point no.1 ‘not important anymore.’” If the prosecutors came in with data point no. n, a video of the guys screwing her just as she reported, together with their confession that there had been no consent, that would become, in effect, the only relevant data point. But how do you get from there to inferring that “the credibility issue,” once it’s in play, renders the “rarity issue” “not important?” Other than by personal handicapping, I mean? Do you not agree with, or have you not been reading, my description of “accretive handicapping,” in which it’s implicit that there may be multiple data points, some or all of which may be considered in combination in placing our bets at the betting window, when there is no definitely definitive point or set of points?
Example: We find out the only lie she ever told was when she said her friend’s ass didn’t look too big in those pants. And, the event she’s alleging happens every day (her wallet got stolen by a young guy out of her open purse). Data points no. 1 and 2 both have relevance in reaching our conclusion that her story might be highly credible indeed.
Example: We find out she lied in about 50% of the instances of which we have evidence. But the event she’s reporting (someone sent a phishing e-mail to her today from Romania) is incredibly common. Hmm, say I as DA, she’s not the ideal witness, but I don’t have much trouble believing someone spammed her because it happens all the time. He is still using both data points, even though on your theory, our knowledge of her (low-ish) credibility should trump our knowledge of what are common and uncommong patterns.
Example: Sixteen bishops have stated that they’ve never known her to deviate from the strictest punctilio of truthfulness. She claims that a giraffe bit her in Nob Hill (but there is no giraffe to be seen on the street nor giraffe teeth imprints or saliva). Her credibility is not irrelevant, and it would make me look that much harder for some rogue runaway circus menagerie or some alternative hypothesis to her being a stone cold liar (maybe she’s on medication). But again, both factors (how truthful is she known to be?, and how often do things like what she’s reported happen?) are, legitimately, given play.
Edit for clarity.
Because the “rarity issue” was what you were using to justify outright skepticism of her claim, regardless of her credibility, and in the oft-repeated disclaimer absence of evidence. In other words, you maintained that it is reasonable to make a prima facie judgement of skepticism based on a couple of statistics about white-on-black rape and false rape charges on college campuses. Now you are trying to make it seem like you factored in her credibility all along. But if that was the case, why would right stuff like this:
So throughout this thread you’ve repeated, as you even admit, qualifiers about absent evidence. Over and over again. As if that somehow makes it okay to extrapolate DoJ stats to a individual incident, but whatever. You’ve apparently taken all these pains to show why it’s okay to be skeptical of this case based solely on numbers.
That’s why the “rarity issue” shouldn’t be important to you anymore when facts related to credibility come into the picture. Because in the presence of (potential) evidence that casts doubt on the accuser’s honesty, you are now no longer dealing with primae facie determinations, a priori assumptions, and whatnot. You are dealing with possible evidence. The question of credibility extends not just to the accuser but to the accused as well. So it’s not just a one-sided issue.
Furthermore, the plausibility of any given incident is not affected by the trustworthiness of the accuser. As I pointed out earlier, that’s a whole separate issue. On its face there’s nothing outlandish about a stripper being gang-raped. But if its proven that the stripper has a history of lying about similar incidents, it is not unreasonable to think she may lying about this one. This however has nothing whatsoever to do with whether it is unlikely that white guys would rape a black girl, which is what me and you kept going back and forth about.
The only thing you’ve omitted here (but it’s very important) is that my qualifiers have always been (or been intended to be – God knows I’ve been forced to type 963 times that my “predictors” are of no use if the entire nation saw the rape take place on the 50 yard line at the Super Bowl halftime show) phrased in terms of “absent other determinative evidence.”
That’s a hugely important word.
If their DNA had been found on/in/all-over her (as one would prima facie expect in a three-man 30 minute spontaneous gang-bang), that would be to me pretty “determinative” other proof that their claim of “no sex took place” was bullshit.
It wasn’t. That is not, in itself, “determinative” (I could also use the legal term dispositive) evidence of no-sex.
But . . . what’s left (both pro and anti her story) is “not determinative” although it may still be “evidence.” Her testimony (however reliable/unreliable) is still “evidence.” The DNA test is “evidence.” Their alibis are “evidence.” Some of those may be crap evidence in which we should place no confidence. Some may be good evidence.
My position has never been based upon (and I’m sorry if you read it as being) “if there is a single piece of other indicative material or hint [i.e., “evidence”], my partial reliance on [circumstantial factor[s] X [Y, Z]] must fall.” Nope. Some of the circumstantial facts reinforce each other. Some tend to cancel out. All could be obliterated in the face of direct, “determinative” evidence (one piece or several). But that has not (qualitatively) arrived yet. If something less than determinative evidence emerges . . . then the circumstantial circumstances are still informative (or may be judged as such by some reasonable people).
Yes, the Newsweek article I quoted on a previous page mentioned it, though without many details. Basically, her initial report to the police was that she didn’t think the accuser was raped. (This may have been before there was even an accusation to support/refute.)
If anyone is interested, I’ll quote the article directly.
It says here that she declined to press charges, fearing for her safety. We are left to wonder exactly why someone would make a police report 4 years after an event if she had no intention of pursuing the matter.
Nifong is officially a licensed moron (based on his further statetments in the article you cite):
[quote]
Durham County District Attorney Mike Nifong said Friday that the state’s rape shield law likely would prevent the earlier case from ever coming into play in the prosecution of the Duke lacrosse players.
“That law makes the prior sexual behavior of the victim in a rape prosecution irrelevant unless it falls into one of four narrowly defined categories,” Nifong said.
Those categories are any relationship between the victim and the defendant, if the incidents are so similar as to resemble a pattern of behavior, if the prior incidents show the defendant couldn’t have committed a crime or as part of a psychological opinion that the victim made up or fantasized the incident.
[quote]
(emphasis supplied by Huerta
No. 1, and most importantly, does this fuckwit not understand that we are not talking about “prior sexual behavior” at all, but rather “prior allegation behavior?”
No. 2, and even assuming that this sort of evidence was deemed to be “prior sexual history” (I would be interested to see any cites to when prior involuntary, as opposed to voluntary, sexual activity was deemed to be within the ambit of the rape shield at all, given that the whole point of the rape shield is keeping out evidence of a “victim’s” prior promiscuity – I wouldn’t call being an (ostensible) gang rape victim “promiscuous”) – is he sufficiently retarded to think people won’t think “Say, thanks for pointing out those four narrow categories, the second and fourth of which seem potentially mighty relevant here!”
No. 3, when a prosecutor’s strongest argument is, “Don’t worry, I think I can dodge the admission of this probative evidence” – you might just be a dumbfuck redneck political hack shyster, Nifong.
Here is a post (on a Duke BB message board) from a law professor concerning the NC rape shield law.
Several interesting motions have been filed by the defense, including asking for the removal of Nifong from the case. Cite.
The New Black Panthers have joined the fray. Link.