That’s not really true. In Shelley v. Kramer, the Supreme Court found that judicial enforcement of a racially-restrictive covenant violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Shelley v. Kramer was brought up in Shapria v. Union National Bank, the Ohio case noted above. The Shapira legatee argued that judicial enforcement of the Jewish marriage provision abridged his fundamental right to choose his spouse, a right long held to be constitutionally protected. The court held that the provision did not abridge his right to marry, only whether he would inherit or not. The court allowed in dicta that “if the facts and circumtances of this case were such that the aid of this court were sought to enjoin Daniel’s marrying a non-Jewish girl, then the doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer would be applicable, but not, it is believed, upon the facts as they are.”
I take this to mean that if the court were requested to actually forbid or compel a marriage (the word enjoin has two different senses, and I think the court intends them both), then Shelley v. Kramer would apply. In Shelley, an injunction against the actual sale of the property was sought. Here, however, Daniel (the legatee) can still marry whomever he wishes; the judicial enforcement creates an inducement rather than affecting Daniel’s ability to execute any particular marriage.
Public policy address wide issues not narrow ones. If the will had stipulated that the person never marry it would be against public policy. But this isn’t what it said, it said you must marry in the stated faith.
It’s highly unlikely that one couldn’t find a suitable marriage partner within one’s faith, unless you’re a Shaker or some other religion with a few members left.
No where in the US Constitution or any judical ruling do you find rights to be 100% absolute. It’s kind of like if someone kills my wife I have a right to see to it that that man is tried and convicted, but I don’t have a right to decide what his punishment will be.
If any of you estate lawyers happen to come across a female beneficiary who is about to be cut out of a gazillion dollar bequest for lack of a liberal atheist to marry . . .
Okay, my mind boggles easily. I agree with the quote above. Is the sense of the arguments presented that the Illinois Supremes were okay with religious restrictions but if it had been on race; they would have struck down? What about sex (must marry opposite)? Yea or nay.
In my simplified ideal existence; race, gender, religion, age, national origin … are not legitimate means to discriminate. All involve large classes of people. Shouldn’t there be equal treatment under state laws as well?
But let’s just be clear: if Granny is still alive, and patiently explains that you’re out of the will if you marry That Colored Fella – that’s fine, right? Until her dying day, Granny can discriminate by race, gender, religion, age, and national origin as she pleases: she can shower money each year on Grandson #2 and #3 (who married nice Jewish girls from the old country) while ignoring Grandson #1 (who didn’t) – and if Grandson #2 eventually gets divorced and takes up with a Baptist from Harlem or something, Granny can at that point decide she’ll leave everything to #3, yes?
That assumes that the grandchildren are and forever remain of that stated faith. A head count of people on these boards who have changed religions (or abandoned them) at some point in their lives would produce quite a high percentile.
I don’t see any conflict whatsoever between (1) and (2). My opinion of course, in answering the OP’s question about what ought to be law. One may marry whomever one pleases. That’s completely distinct from whether or not someone sets that decision up as a condition of giving one some coin. Unmanageable clutter in wills carries some weight, I suppose. For example, a complex arrangement that required generations of administrators not directly paid for by the estate–I can see that public policy might legitimately have an opinion on such a matter. Everything else? None of our business.
Marry who you want, leave your money in any way you want. The whole counter argument, ISTM, supposes some sort of entitlement to that money. There is none, IMO, except for certain exceptional situations (e.g., minors completely ignored in a parent’s will). And if there is none, than there can be no “unreasonable” restriction. There can be no undue restriction for access to money that in ANY event is yours only at the discretion of someone else (as a general rule).
Except this: Dead people can’t transfer their assets. They require the connivance of the living to do that. So when a testator puts an objectionable condition in his will, saying something like “my house to my son so long as he doesn’t marry out of the white race,” this is not a transfer of assets, this is a request made on us survivors that we effectuate this intent. And one which we, frankly, find deplorable. Now why should we cooperate with this scheme?
Suppose it were just an ordinary inter vivos gift. A father has a house in California that he wants to give to his son. He also wants to condition the gift on his son refraining from entering a mixed marriage. But here’s the rub: Dad is halfway around the world in Mongolia and can’t monitor his son’s romantic relations. So he asks you to monitor his son’s love life and report to Dad if the proscribed relationship is entered into. Do you feel at all obligated to honor Dad’s request? Of course not. Why should it matter if, instead of being in Mongolia, the reason for not be able to do it himself is that he’s dead? It’s not like there’s any element of unfair surprise. We all know we have a limited time here on Spaceship Earth. It is the fact that it is the living who must settle the affairs of the dead that allows the living to decide, to a certain extent, how that settlement will proceed.
Why do we cooperate with any intentions set in a will? And I think the operative point is that no one is compelled to effectuate his intent, if by that you mean making sure that only an “acceptable” marriage occurs. Everyone is still free to marry whomever they’d like. Why should we honor the dead guy’s intentions as specifically outlined in his will? For the same reason we honor much simpler bequests: that’s what he wanted done with his money and (for the most part) it’s nobody else’s business what his reasons were. We don’t decide who should get the dough, we don’t decide the conditions (with certain exceptions). Whether you or I would be offended by the condition is immaterial.
“To a certain extent” is the operative phrase. I’ve already acknowledged that there is a tipping point, a circumstance where the complications of carrying out the intention place an undue cost that is born by someone else. That’s not what’s happening here. Let me ask you this: suppose the will cared for any expense associated with ensuring the conditions were measured, even if the cost was trivial, even if it was an administrative cost similar to one carried out for most wills. Would that change your perspective? Or is it still to some material extent a “dead guys’ intentions don’t count” issue?
I am not a lawyer…so will not respond based on law but will respond based on how I feel about this.
When you are dead…you are dead. The dead shouldn’t have assets. The dead should not be interfering with the living.
It was your money…but it isn’t now. So, in order to have your money go to where you want it to go your will should dispense with the money/assets NOW. No holding on with strings or trying to manipulate people. Your estate needs to dispensed with because YOU are dead…you no longer can have assets.
JMHO.
{This also relates to how I feel about people complaining about the ‘death tax’. No…it is not a tax on the dead or death. You are dead…you no longer have assets. People inheriting your lear jet and billion dollar mansion may have to pay a tax on it…but it isn’t YOU paying the tax…because you are dead - you know DEAD…as in no longer a part of this world - gone - goodbye man. The dead don’t pay taxes…because they have no assets. :)}