# Medieval Tactics **URL:** \ **Category:** Factual Questions\ **Created:** [September 27, 2002, 12:44am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/medieval-tactics/129792 "2002-09-27T00:44:56Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 4
**Author:** ![drachillix](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/48db29/32.png) [@drachillix](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/drachillix)\ **Post date:** [October 16, 2002, 1:53pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/medieval-tactics/129792/61 "2002-10-16T13:53:54Z")
Well I don’t have the historical background that some of you do but I _have_ been in an SCA battle and the use of a wedge for breaking a line seems pretty obvious to me. Once formations make contact, line/formation discipline goes to hell. The point where they contact turns into a giant medieval mosh pit full of one on one fights. A straight line provides relatively even resistance where as the wedge, by sheer weight of charge, will tend to penetrate. The soldiers in ranks behind the front will not just stand and wait their turn to fight they will push forward and seek targets, slipping between existing fights or assisting their bretheren with their opponents. Since there are more people in the center section of a wedge formation, more assistance is available to carry the fight forward. ---
**Author:** ![Maeglin](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/8baadc/32.png) [@Maeglin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Maeglin)\ **Post date:** [October 16, 2002, 8:15pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/medieval-tactics/129792/62 "2002-10-16T20:15:43Z")
> [@](#): > > But winning Stamford Bridge lost Hastings for Harold. No, hastening to engage William before the arrival of his entire feudal levy _and_ not forcing him to winter for awhile amidst insignificant forage lost Hastings for Harold. 😉 Not to mention, as my pet theory goes, the loss of his brothers Leofwine and Gyrth. ---
**Author:** ![Tamerlane](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tamerlane/32/7602_2.png) [@Tamerlane](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Tamerlane)\ **Post date:** [October 16, 2002, 9:19pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/medieval-tactics/129792/63 "2002-10-16T21:19:59Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Go alien \* > The English put up a good enough fight so that the country was called England, not Daneland. Way off topic, but I would actually disagree with this. England in point of fact _was_ conquered by the Danes and only a dynastic accident kept them from remaining under a Scandinavian dynasty ( at least for a time ), i.e. Canute’s and Hathacanute’s young deaths. A significant portion of the English people, including sections of the nobility, many of whom had deep cultural and linguistic ties to the Danes et al after years of conquest and settlement ( not to mention the essentially Scano-Germanic character of Anglo-Saxon England period ), seem to have been content with Canute and his dynasty. Indeed Godwin, Harold Godwinson’s father, owed his prominent position to Canute and was married to a sister-in-law of his. Edward the Confessor succeeded to the throne because he was the ally, half-brother, junior co-King of sorts and designated heir of Hathacanute, who died childless. The fact that he was also the last direct descendant of the house of Wessex didn’t hurt his candidacy either, of course. But he didn’t take the throne by conquest. **jiHymas** : Thanks - I’ve appreciated the education, believe me :). - Tamerlane ---
**Author:** ![Kilt-wearin\_man](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/k/82dd89/32.png) [@Kilt-wearin\_man](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Kilt-wearin_man)\ **Post date:** [October 17, 2002, 5:22am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/medieval-tactics/129792/64 "2002-10-17T05:22:02Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by jiHymas \* > \*\* > Well, we’ll have to disagree. If you come across any references that would shed light on the subject, please post! \*\* You mean besides Nigel Tranter? Tranter was a respected historian and based every event in his novels on known history (especially in the case of battles and other major turning points) and confined conjecture to minor details such as private conversations that were lost to history as soon as the participants parted. As I said before, he also authored several straightforward history books that, unfortunately, I don’t own yet, but he used the same criteria in his research whether he was writing a novel about Robert the Bruce or a scholarly history of 14th century Scotland. ---
**Author:** ![Go\_alien](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9d8465/32.png) [@Go\_alien](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Go_alien)\ **Post date:** [October 17, 2002, 1:20pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/medieval-tactics/129792/65 "2002-10-17T13:20:51Z")
**Maeglin** , without Stamford Bridge, William would have faced a tougher, fresher and larger army. I’d have backed Harold. All your points are valid, but IMHO they were force weakening factors only because the army was already weak. Without Stamford Bridge, their impact would have much less. Harold pretty much had to fight quickly for political reasons. His throne wasn’t secure enough to risk leaving an invading army in Sussex for too long and he had to fight before the fyrd went home. **Tamerlane** , fair comment, but… An accident of history kept the ruling dynasty English and not Danish, true, but Alfred the Great stopped the country becoming Danish in the 9th century. He created a kingdom strong enough to eventually conquer the Danelaw and an English (as opposed to Wessex, Mercian or Danish) culture. If the dynasty had become Danish in the 9th century, my WAG is that culturally, the Scandinavian empire of Canute and his heirs would have centred on England - the strongest component both militarily and culturally - and become English in the same sense that Scotland “became” English after Kames VI became James I. ---
**Author:** ![Go\_alien](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9d8465/32.png) [@Go\_alien](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Go_alien)\ **Post date:** [October 17, 2002, 1:37pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/medieval-tactics/129792/66 "2002-10-17T13:37:58Z")
**Maeglin** , without Stamford Bridge, William would have faced a tougher, fresher and larger army. I’d have backed Harold. All your points are valid, but IMHO they were major factors only because the army was already weak. Without Stamford Bridge, their impact would have much less. Harold pretty much had to fight quickly for political reasons. His throne wasn’t secure enough to risk leaving an invading army in Sussex for too long and he had to fight before the fyrd went home. **Tamerlane** , fair comment, but… An accident of history kept the ruling dynasty English and not Danish, true, but Alfred the Great stopped the country becoming Danish in the 9th century. He created a kingdom strong enough to eventually conquer the Danelaw and an English (as opposed to Wessex, Mercian or Danish) culture. If the dynasty had become Danish in the 11th century, I reckon that culturally, the Scandinavian empire of Canute and his heirs would have centred on England - the strongest component both militarily and culturally - and become English in the same sense that Scotland “became” English after James VI became James I. The cultural impact of the Normans was much greater because the ruling class had been replaced wholesale by the death of William, unlike the situation under Canute & Harthacanute. (Apologies to all Scottish dopers for calling them English but you know what I mean.) ---
**Author:** ![Go\_alien](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9d8465/32.png) [@Go\_alien](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Go_alien)\ **Post date:** [October 17, 2002, 1:39pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/medieval-tactics/129792/67 "2002-10-17T13:39:16Z")
Neat, a double post of the draft and final versions of the reply. ---
**Author:** ![Tamerlane](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tamerlane/32/7602_2.png) [@Tamerlane](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Tamerlane)\ **Post date:** [October 17, 2002, 1:39pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/medieval-tactics/129792/68 "2002-10-17T13:39:46Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Go alien \* > If the dynasty had become Danish in the 9th century, my WAG is that culturally, the Scandinavian empire of Canute and his heirs would have centred on England - the strongest component both militarily and culturally - and become English in the same sense that Scotland “became” English after Kames VI became James I. A fair comment in return and I agree :). However my own additonal tack-on to that WAG is that if that situation had occurred, the Norman conquest would likely never have happened ( a lot less likely to have been tried and just as less likely to succeed if it had, even though an ambitious prince like William with his ties to Emma of Normandy might still have been tempted to make the gamble ) and in its absense England would have retained a very strong Germanic character that would have shared far more cultural connections to the Scandinavian north than the Latin west. We would have quite the alternate history in Europe. But this really is getting pretty far afield from the topic ;). - Tamerlane ---
**Author:** ![Go\_alien](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9d8465/32.png) [@Go\_alien](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Go_alien)\ **Post date:** [October 17, 2002, 1:47pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/medieval-tactics/129792/69 "2002-10-17T13:47:09Z")
**Tamerlane** , true. William’s chances against a dynastically Danish England (say that quickly three times!) would have been limited to say the least. And had Denmark remained under that same dynasty… It might be off topic but it is interesting. ---
**Author:** ![jiHymas](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/439d5e/32.png) [@jiHymas](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/jiHymas)\ **Post date:** [October 18, 2002, 9:35pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/medieval-tactics/129792/70 "2002-10-18T21:35:29Z")
> [@](#): > > _Originally posted by Maeglin_ > **Oh? Do they cite any? My searches reveal that this phrase is only used in Vegetius, who discusses essentially Augustan military principles. I’d love to hear about some of the other literary references.** Foote and Wilson provide no citations for their claim of literary references to ‘wedges’ in either language, _svingylking_ or _porcinum caput_. > [@](#): > > _Originally posted by Go Alien_ > **The raider doesn’t look for a fight, he is basically just a well-armed bully. By being better armed and better organised, he is trying to intimidate the victim into giving up his cow, his money or his wife.** Is this list in order of desirability?😃 > [@](#): > > _Originally posted by drachillix_ > \*\*Well I don’t have the historical background that some of you do but I have been in an SCA battle and the use of a wedge for breaking a line seems pretty obvious to me. \*\* I was hoping a re-enactor would join in! When these wedges are used in battles, how does the defender react? In general terms, I refuse to believe in all-powerful wedges as this implies ‘line’ formation is no good, which means it wouldn’t be standard. So, from a re-enactment perspective, and setting aside all questions of historicity for the moment, what do defenders in these battles do prior to, during and after a wedge attack? And how many men would be involved in these reconstructions? > [@](#): > > _Originally posted by kilt-wearin’ man_ > **You mean besides Nigel Tranter? Tranter was a respected historian and based every event in his novels on known history (especially in the case of battles and other major turning points) and confined conjecture to minor details such as private conversations that were lost to history as soon as the participants parted.** No disrespect to Tranter is intended - I know he has a [huge following](http://cunninghamh.tripod.com/2001/menu.htm). But any further cites or quotes to support the idea that cavalry would charge (as distinct from maneuvering) in wedge formation would be greatly appreciated. > [@](#): > > _Originally posted by Maeglin_ > **No, hastening to engage William before the arrival of his entire feudal levy and not forcing him to winter for awhile amidst insignificant forage lost Hastings for Harold.** No, catching an arrow in the eye lost Hastings for Harold. It was more of a near-run thing than Waterloo! ---
**Author:** ![jiHymas](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/439d5e/32.png) [@jiHymas](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/jiHymas)\ **Post date:** [November 4, 2002, 4:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/medieval-tactics/129792/71 "2002-11-04T16:43:18Z")
As threatened, I am resurrecting this thread as I have received a new book (a book! I needed one of those): _The Rule of the Templars_, J. M. Upton Ward, Boydell Press 1992, ISBN 0-85115-315-1 (hardback) 0-85115-701-1 (paperback), with the appendix by Matthew Bennett, 1989, on “How to deliver a cavalry charge”. > [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Go alien \* > \*\*I remember a quote from the 19th Century of the description of a cavalry charge. I can’t cite it, unfortunately, as I can’t remember any other details. A cavalry trooper had been asked what a charge was like. He said it was like a handful of dried peas thrown at a window. First one hits, then another then more and finally the bulk of the handful followed by a few stragglers. The first man was usually seen struggling with his horse to slow it down, so as not to arrive unsupported and get himself killed. > \*\* Good memory, **Go alien**. This is from George Bernard Shaw, _Arms and the Man_. At any rate, all the evidence cited by Bennett supports the idea that cavalry always charged in line. There is too much material to quote here, but there are some juicy cites. Louis Edward Nolan, who is remembered by history chiefly for being the carrier of the misunderstood message that launched the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava, said: > [@](#): > > _L.E.Nolan, Cavalry Tactics_ > **A charge, even on good ground, is seldom executed by the whole line at once; the enemy is reached in succession by different points in the line more advanced than others. It is therefore of the greatest consequence that those detachments which reach the enemy first shall be compact, and go at him as one man, to burst through. > … > No distance can be laid down at which to charge, it depends on so many different circumstances. When the ground is favourable and your horses in good condition you can strike into a gallop sooner; but the burst, the charge itself, must always be reserved till within 50 yards, for in that distance no horse, however bad, can be left behind, nor is there time to scatter, and they fall on the enemy with the greatest effect, > … > If you succeeded in overthrowing the enemy’s line, your own will be in disorder. The _melee_ which ensues, soon, however, turns into a pursuit, and this affords the opportunity of destroying those who have turned; for the charge and the _melee_ do not last long enough to inflict or sustain heavy loss in men or horses…the pursuit must be kept up with vigour…This is not the time to stay the slaughter, but watch over the safety of the pursuers with your cavalry reserves till the flying enemy is entirely dispersed…Then rally.** I recognize, of course, that Nolan’s experience was Victorian - but cavalry tactics changed little over the centuries. One might allow that the “50 yards” could be somewhat shorter in medieval times, as the horses would be carrying a greater weight and enemy projectile weapons would not be as effective at 50 yards in medieval times as they would be in Victorian. Ah, well - now off to Amazon, to see if Nolan’s _Cavalry Tactics_ is still in print! ---
**Author:** ![jiHymas](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/439d5e/32.png) [@jiHymas](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/jiHymas)\ **Post date:** [October 16, 2014, 2:43am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/medieval-tactics/129792/72 "2014-10-16T02:43:44Z")
I hope it’s not excessively bad manners to resurrect a thread after so long, but this thread remains one of my favourite internet discussions. Anyway, the book Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry 1880–1918 by Stephen Badsey contains the following in a [sample chapter posted online](https://www.ashgate.com/pdf/SamplePages/Doctrine_and_Reform_in_the_British_Cavalry_1880-1918_Ch1.pdf) by the publisher. > [@Stephen Badsey](#): > > The power of a mounted charge, whether knee-to-knee or in more open formation, came from a combination of the speed of the horses and the skill of their riders in maintaining a straight line, so that they all struck the enemy at once: about three quarters of a ton of horse and rider moving at a gallop of over seven yards a second (440 yards a minute in British regulations). This kind of charge, hard to learn and execute, was seen as the pinnacle of the cavalry’s achievements, and was critical to cavalry ethos and doctrine. ---
**Author:** ![Malthus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/85f322/32.png) [@Malthus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Malthus)\ **Post date:** [October 16, 2014, 2:06pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/medieval-tactics/129792/73 "2014-10-16T14:06:41Z")
Very interesting thread, worth resurrecting. My own thoughts on the wedge: 1. The objections to the use of the wedge I think fail to take into account two factors: (1) that not all warriors are alike and fungible; and (2) the moral effect of penetrating a line of battle. 2. The shield-wall derived its strength from co-operation: each neighbour protects the other. So in theory, it would work best if all were the same worth as warriors. However, some warriors were always going to be weaker, less experienced, less fearsome than others. Normally, those would go behind in the wall. 3. Using a wedge, one places one’s strongest warriors - most fearsome, most experiened - at the ‘boar’s snout’ - that is, at the front of the wedge. Then, have them aim for a perceived weakest warrior in the opposing shieldwall. This opposes your strenght to the enemy’s weakness. 4. If the “snout” breaks through, in theory it can be outflanked on each side - but that does not take into account the moral effect. If the shieldwall is broken through, the weakest will (in the assumption of the attackers) start to flee the line, leaving the strongest feeling vulnerable; also, there may be a reluctance to make a turn towards the invading “snout”, as this exposes the outflankers to being outflanked in their turn by the enemy’s advancing shieldwall. ---
**Author:** ![bob\_2](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/bob_2/32/3341_2.png) [@bob\_2](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/bob_2)\ **Post date:** [October 16, 2014, 4:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/medieval-tactics/129792/74 "2014-10-16T16:43:54Z")
I have been reading quite a lot about The Peninsular war lately. It seems that in general, Napoleon preferred the wedge or column approach and Wellesley (later Wellington) beat him almost every time with his troops in a line. Cavalry were dangerous but could always be stymied by forming a square. Napoleon’s tactics had served him well up to that point, and the sight of a solid, well armed column advancing in step with banners, drummers etc, must have half won the battle before it started. British (and eventually Portuguese) troops were made of sterner stuff, as well as being positioned on the high ground, and this turned the tactic against the French, with the troops at the rear being totally unable to engage the enemy. ---
**Author:** ![Malthus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/85f322/32.png) [@Malthus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Malthus)\ **Post date:** [October 16, 2014, 5:18pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/medieval-tactics/129792/75 "2014-10-16T17:18:35Z")
> [@bob\_2](#): > > I have been reading quite a lot about The Peninsular war lately. It seems that in general, Napoleon preferred the wedge or column approach and Wellesley (later Wellington) beat him almost every time with his troops in a line. Cavalry were dangerous but could always be stymied by forming a square. > > Napoleon’s tactics had served him well up to that point, and the sight of a solid, well armed column advancing in step with banners, drummers etc, must have half won the battle before it started. British (and eventually Portuguese) troops were made of sterner stuff, as well as being positioned on the high ground, and this turned the tactic against the French, with the troops at the rear being totally unable to engage the enemy. In Napoleonic times the line had the additional advantage that every man in it could shoot at the enemy - in medieval times, in the shieldwall, aside from javilins and the like only the men in direct contact could fight. (Discounting here the roll of the bow, as bowmen typically did not stand in the shieldwall). ---
**Author:** ![Sailboat](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/sailboat/32/461_2.png) [@Sailboat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sailboat)\ **Post date:** [October 16, 2014, 9:33pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/medieval-tactics/129792/76 "2014-10-16T21:33:03Z")
> [@jiHymas](#): > > I hope it’s not excessively bad manners to resurrect a thread after so long, but this thread remains one of my favourite internet discussions. > > Anyway, the book Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry 1880–1918 by Stephen Badsey contains the following in a [sample chapter posted online](https://www.ashgate.com/pdf/SamplePages/Doctrine_and_Reform_in_the_British_Cavalry_1880-1918_Ch1.pdf) by the publisher. At the risk of contradicting Mr. Badsey…have you read John Keegan’s \*The Face of Battle? \* He makes a persuasive-sounding argument that cavalry “shock” was largely, perhaps almost entirely, \* moral \* in character. That despite the thrilling literature, cavalry seldom charged home with \* physical \* impact, and not galloping, either. Rather, according to Keegan’s interpretation, cavalry would typically advance at something less than full gallop, carefully observing the firmness of the opposing infantry, and only upon seeing weakness–Keegan’s memorable phrase was “a visible shiver” running along the line–would the cavalry make contact, entering weak points as terrified footmen faltered or fell back. He admits a few cases where a crazed or dying horse broke into a square like a physical missile, but notes that contempraries spoke of these as unusual events. You might find the book worth reading if you haven’t already. I apologize if I have overemphasized one aspect of your citation, and for not quoting my own, as I am posting from a phone at considerable challenge to my dexterity. ---
**Author:** ![bob\_2](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/bob_2/32/3341_2.png) [@bob\_2](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/bob_2)\ **Post date:** [October 16, 2014, 10:21pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/medieval-tactics/129792/77 "2014-10-16T22:21:08Z")
> [@Malthus](#): > > In Napoleonic times the line had the additional advantage that every man in it could shoot at the enemy - in medieval times, in the shieldwall, aside from javilins and the like only the men in direct contact could fight. (Discounting here the roll of the bow, as bowmen typically did not stand in the shieldwall). True - but not very accurately and quite slowly. Three shots a minute was considered reasonable. > [@](#): > > Napier witnessed volleys fired by British infantry (in Spain) where out of 300 musketballs fired none hit the target. > > - At Vittoria, the British infantry had on average 1 hit in 459 shots fired. I assume that the ratio for French infantry was lower, as they had much less training. > > - Hughes calculated for Albuera, for several volleys at 100 yards the British achieved 5 % ratio of casualties. > > - During one of the battles of the Revolutionary Wars, General Duhesme found his battalion firing at Austrian battalion at 100 paces. It was a lengthy firefight and Duhesme expected heavy casualties, he was however very surprised, there were only 3-4 men hit. > > - In 1813 at Gohrde, 66 French infantrymen fired at 60-80 paces at Germans hiting 27 Hannoverians and Bremen-Verden (40 % hits). In this case the count is only for one volley at close range. ---
**Author:** ![Malthus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/85f322/32.png) [@Malthus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Malthus)\ **Post date:** [October 17, 2014, 2:09pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/medieval-tactics/129792/78 "2014-10-17T14:09:01Z")
> [@bob\_2](#): > > True - but not very accurately and quite slowly. Three shots a minute was considered reasonable. True, accuracy for smoothbore muskets was miserable. But in a line vs. column, most of those shots were pointed at the front of the column as ‘converging fire’ - and as it moved towards the line, the shots got more and more accurate. The effect was that the front ranks of the column tended to get decimated, increasingly so as it moved into contact with the line. The physical effect was that, just when the column would want to move really fast (to smash through the line), the men had to somehow stumble over the bodies of those in front who were shot; and the moral effect was pretty natural - the men deep in the line, exposed by the deaths of those ahead of them, tended to flinch and hesitate as it came to be “their turn” to be in front! The effect was seen time and time again in the battles of the Penninsular War - the column tended to slow down just as it reached the true “killing zone” in front of the line, where the muskets (at last) tended to do real damage - and hang there, being shredded, rather than making that last rush that would push the column through the line and break it. Then, as casualties mounted, the morale of the column would crumble, and back it would go. ---
**Author:** ![Really\_Not\_All\_That\_Bright](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/e8c25b/32.png) [@Really\_Not\_All\_That\_Bright](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Really_Not_All_That_Bright)\ **Post date:** [October 17, 2014, 3:05pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/medieval-tactics/129792/79 "2014-10-17T15:05:29Z")
This thread is awesome. ---
**Author:** ![jiHymas](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/439d5e/32.png) [@jiHymas](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/jiHymas)\ **Post date:** [October 18, 2014, 11:45pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/medieval-tactics/129792/80 "2014-10-18T23:45:25Z")
> [@Malthus](#): > > Very interesting thread, worth resurrecting. Well, that’s a relief! I was afraid a Mod would lock the thread with a nasty remark. > [@Malthus](#): > > Then, have them aim for a perceived weakest warrior in the opposing shieldwall. That might be very difficult to do in the heat of battle. While your comments make perfect sense in theory, it is my view that the practical impediments are insurmountable; I haven’t seen any evidence that tactical wedges were ever used in practice. > [@Sailboat](#): > > At the risk of contradicting Mr. Badsey…have you read John Keegan’s The Face of Battle? He makes a persuasive-sounding argument that cavalry “shock” was largely, perhaps almost entirely, moral in character. That despite the thrilling literature, cavalry seldom charged home with physical impact, and not galloping, either. Rather, according to Keegan’s interpretation, cavalry would typically advance at something less than full gallop, carefully observing the firmness of the opposing infantry, and only upon seeing weakness–Keegan’s memorable phrase was “a visible shiver” running along the line–would the cavalry make contact, entering weak points as terrified footmen faltered or fell back. I confess that I haven’t read Face of Battle, but I will add it to the list! I will certainly agree that cavalry will not charge a well formed line of men. The horses will refuse, even if the troopers don’t! It is my conclusion, from a variety of sources (Verbruggen, _The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages_; and Smail, _Crusading Warfare 1097-1193_ are the ones I consider most academically sound, but there are many others) that charges were not employed against a well-formed shield-wall. First, the defenders had to be thrown into some kind of disorder, by either missile fire or maneuver, and only then would the cavalry attempt to exploit this weakness. Beeler claims (_Warfare in England, 1066-1189_) that, for instance Hastings was planned in exactly this manner: > [@John Beeler](#): > > It is evident from William’s order of battle that he had worked out a tactical plan consisting of three distinct phases. The action was to be opened by the archers performing much the same mission as modern artillery - to soften up the defence. After the preliminary barrage the infantry would advance and break the line; then the mounted arm would ride through and exploit the breaches, either breaking up the defense into isolated pockets of resistance, or pursuing a demoralized and broken enemy._(footnote provides three reference)_ In the end, the Anglo-Saxon line was thinned by poorly executed attempts to exploit defensive successes against the Normans (which led to the ‘Feigned Retreat’ narratives, which Beeler criticizes harshly) and this thinning allowed a double envelopment of the line. At some point I would really like to learn more about Guderian’s development of Panzer tactics in the 1930’s, because it strikes me that it all comes down to the same ideas as William’s original plan, which was mirrored throughout the medieval era. If I remember correctly from a biography I read a long time ago, Patton made the same arguments in the U.S. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/medieval-tactics/129792.md?page=3) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/medieval-tactics/129792.md?page=5)