Mr. S.,
It is understandably hard to know what TVAA’s point is. I agree with you that not all of what he says is nonsense, but his valid points are buried in so much pretentious and arrogant claptrap that it is hard to find them. That and that he can’t seem to apply his own proposed standards and meanings consistently.
Let us take this particular op:
So his bones to pick are:
that mental illnesses implicitly accept that an individual functions (or fails to function) within a particular culture. True 'nuff. If everybody in a society believed that those who heard voices that others failed to hear were prophets or seers, instead of hallucinating, then schizophrenics might be revered instead of treated. It could be a functional, even an advantageous, state for life within that society. To me however this a throwaway point. These individuals are functioning in this society. Unless the option of existing in a society with markedly diffeent standards exists, it is the standards of current culture that need apply.
that the critera are too vague for his taste. True that these terms get fuzzy at the edges. But such is the means by which progress gets made. The DSM is not a final product; rather it is a work in progress. It is the right approach: create a dictionary so that researchers and clinicians are using the same word to mean the same thing. As research and practice comes along such that it is clear that terms need to be defined more precisely or differently, do so. It is far far from perfect either as is or more so as used. But it is the best thing going to allow scientific study of that which is difficult to quantify. (Remember a past discussion about science needing tools to quantify observations? And how the scientific theories and tols mutually drive each others development? The DSM is another example of this process in action.)
And his third point is just untrue for mental disorders in general. The general understanding today is that environment and biological predisposition usually both play roles in the expression of phenotypes, to various degrees depending on the condition discussed. Figuring out how they interact is the key.
Now how does he apply these standards?
Well autism, like schizophrenia and many other labels of the DSM, is indeed based on neurological dysfunction. But it is as subject to his critiques as any other label in the DSM.
It implicitly accepts that individuals function within a culture.
It has critera that are fuzzy at the edges. Qualitatively impaired socialization? Where do you draw the line on that item? Impaired verbal and nonverbal communication? How impaired does it have to be? Restricted patterns of interests and behavior? How restricted? A qualitative judgement.
There is no test for autism. There no single cause of autism: it is associated with multiple genes - some believe at least 10 if not 15.
There is no sharp edge, rather there is a greater appreciation of a broad autism phenotype. Most in the field beleive that the reported rise in incidence is in fact a function of greater use of the label as a result of greater awareness and the availability of less ineffective interventions if and only if it is diagnosed early. Clearly many of those labelled as autistic today would not have been so called 10 or 15 years ago. And the way to intervene is indeed environmental: speech language therapy both formal and home based, developmental therapy, OT, etc. Medications have a minimal role in treating the symptoms for a few.
How about for other mental disorders?
For many the evidence suggests that they are some kind of neurological disorder. Unfortunately, our knowledge of the brain and imaging technology isn’t sufficient to demonstrate exactly what the problem with the brain might be, or how the symptoms of the disorders relate to the problem. For many there are much better leads than for autism, certain alleles definitely associated with increased risk, etc.
Many may indeed end up being not single diseases but collections of phenotypes with commonalities. Some may have been functional in different societies at different times. Or the contributing genes may result in adaptive phenotypes even today but in combination become maladaptive. We have a way to go before we really understand all the neural dynamics involved in these very complex and handicapping conditions. When researchers portray the science as being more advanced than it is, when they imply that they really understand how and why these conditions occur, then they go beyond the knowledge. But when researchers state what is known about biological predisposition and environmental effects, about mechanisms and effective treatments based on label as accurate as today’s understanding allows, then they are being responsible scientists.