I don’t know the answer, but you might want to check out the film “Good Kill” staring Ethan Hawk and Zoe Kravitz. Possibly Eye in the Sky as well, but I haven’t seen it.
It basically deals with the same themes.
Not to get into a semantic debate, but we do perform drone strikes on legitimate (ish?) terrorist targets overseas. I assume for the OP, the target is someone like an ISIS leader, not a head of state.
“Assassination” in that executive order and the ones succeeding it has a specific definition, and the order applies to intelligence agencies, and military strikes against targets during a military operation don’t fall under that definition. But a lot of people use the term ‘assassination’ much more broadly than said executive order, and apply it to any targeting of an officer and/or political leader by the military, like the killing of Bin Laden by Navy Seals, bombing palaces where Saddam Hussein was believed to be, or shooting down Admiral Yamamoto’s plane in WW2. I would presume the OP is using the broader meaning of the term, because using the narrow meaning breaks the story that he’s trying to tell.
In time of war, refusal to obey an order may be considered treason or cowardice (as mentioned above). Both bring heavy penalties, including imprisonment at Leavenworth, and forfeiture of all pay and allowances. Or death. If, in this scenario, the country is not at war but instead carrying out drone strikes as part of a cooperative mission, I think the line is grayer. This is an O-4 grade officer whose career, at the very least, would be over. Even if allowed to stay in the service, he would never see a higher rank and would likely time out before retirement; if you don’t advance, you are usually forced out. He would be shunned by the officer corps and would get assignments that no line officer would ever want to have.
Two somewhat aside comments - if you’re authoring or editing this play, don’t make the choice absolute. Moral ambiguity is reality.
Also, I worked with a guy who was a late Vietnam-era pilot who loved to fly so much he couldn’t stand to be on the ground. With 18 years in, one day he looked at his Century-series, realized all that beautiful machinery was designed to do nothing but kill, and resigned his commission. So it happens.
This certainly isn’t treason, since she’s neither giving aid and comfort to the enemy, nor waging war against the United States. The Constitution is quite clear about that point.
And you’d probably have a hard time arguing cowardice, too, given that a drone operator is never at personal risk, and so personal risk can’t be a factor in her decision.
Which is not to say she’d be let off scott-free, of course. I’m sure she’d be charged with something; I’m just not sure what the charge would be called.
The UCMJ does not prescribe minimum sentences. The concept doesn’t exist in military law. It could be a slap on the wrist or it could be jail. It depends on the circumstances and the severity.
As others have pointed out, “assassination” is often a weasel word. Did we “assassinate” Yamamoto in 1943? Or was he a legitimate battlefield target? Do we “assassinate” a Taliban member in Pakistan? Or is it that the nature of warfare has evolved beyond just shooting at infantry battalions, and network-centric warfare is the way of the future (whether you like it or not)?
If the target is a Bin Laden type out in the middle of nowhere, the character probably does not have any grounds to refuse the order. If the target is in the middle of a playground full of puppies and children, then the doctrines of necessity and proportionality come into play and the moral question becomes much more problematic. In the latter example, she would probably be treated with much greater leniency.
(FWIW, even a minor punishment like a memorandum of reprimand can be a career-killer, even if the officer is not actually prosecuted.)
It would depend on who is defining ‘aid and comfort’. By not killing a high profile target, are you not aiding the enemy? I think the case could be made, but probably would not be pursued.
In U.S. and most NATO military commands, deliberate target missions against targets that are identified beforehand go through several layers of review, including the G/J/CJ-2 sections (Intelligence) and a legal review from the command’s operational law attorneys. Ultimately, every relevant staff section gives their opinions about whether the target should be struck, but the commander makes the final call. However, if the Intel and/or legal representative is recommending against striking the target because of issues with lack of good intelligence about whether the target is present, whether there are civilians (and how many) that may be injured or killed due to the strike, and the overall legality of it, the commander would be risking their own career by proceeding anyway.
Dynamic target missions, which are incidents where a potential target presents itself in the moment without the benefit of being known beforehand and going through deliberate target review, are trickier but still must go through a (condensed) legal review if the circumstances do not involve self-defense or mutual self-defense of military personnel, equipment, or allied personnel/equipment.
If the OP’s play involves the U.S. military, they may want to look over Joint Publication 3-60, which is the joint targeting doctrine of the U.S. military and describes, more or less, the targeting process. It’s unclassified.