# Minds: Death, anaesthetic, babies, animals and Sonic the Camcorder-Doom player. **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [May 9, 2005, 10:10am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033 "2005-05-09T10:10:31Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 1
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 9, 2005, 10:10am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/1 "2005-05-09T10:10:31Z")
…or **Physicalism vs. panpsychism vs. pantheism: Death Match Doom** I’ve opened this thread primarily to _differentiate_ three of us: Myself, **|| Gyan ||** , and **Aeschines** , specifically on the subject of “mind”, “consciousness”, this “first person subjective experience” which all of us waking, mentally developed humans have (no solipsist I!), and maybe other individuals as well. For the purposes of this thread I am not distinguishing between the words _mind, consciousness, sentience, awareness, subjective experience, first person perspective, Point Of View_ or any other nominally similar term, unless there is some fundamental distinction anyone wishes to establish. I will try as best I can in my OP to summarise the three positions, as I understand them. If I misrepresent them in any way, I will happily stand corrected. Then, I will explore five different issues which I consider to be vitally important in _clarifying_ those three positions. [ul][li] **SentientMeat** is a [physicalist](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/). However, since panpsychism can _also_ be categorised as a form of “_dualistic_ physicalism”, in this thread I will refer to myself as a **supervenience physicalist** , or SP. This is a _monistic_ thesis, that _only_ physical things like atoms, waves/photons, fundamental forces and spacetime, and their necessarily accompanying spatial configurations or processes, are necessary. “Consciousness” is a **physical process** whereby atoms, waves/photons or forces are continually input to a certain kind of _cognitive apparatus_, itself made out of atoms and located somewhere in spacetime. Consciousness is _caused by_ those computational processes, and does not occur or exist without that cognitive apparatus.[/li] [li] **Gyan** is a [panpsychist](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/). His is a _dualistic_ thesis, that everything in the universe has a mental **and** physical component, and that that fundamentally distinct mental component can never be observed. [/li] [li] **Aeschines** is a [pantheist](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pantheism/). His is a _monistic_ thesis, that everything is God (or “the Divine”).[/ul][/li] I await any corrections or clarifications, but will press on to the five issues. I will ask you to number which of the 12 propositions of mine you **don’t** agree with (not necessarily _dis_agree with), in your opinion (_ie._ your _guess_, your _position_, your “If I had a gun to my head” _fence-jump_). [ul][li]_Death_: Today I am alive, not dead. I started being alive in 1973. Let us hypothesise that at midnight on this New Years Eve, cephalic necrosis occurs and I am brain-dead, _ie._ non-alive. My period of life would be 1973\t\>2005 I would be _non-alive_. Now, what about the _consciousness_? [/li]1) I contend that some **transition** in the status of my consciousness occurs at midnight. _Agreed_, **Gyan** and **Aeschines**? 2) I further contend that that transition is such that my consciousness is _diminished_ in my non-alive period. _Agreed_? 3) Indeed, I say that it _becomes absent, ie._ diminishes to _nothing_, when I am non-alive. Yes? [li]_Anaesthetic_: Let’s say that instead of undergoing cephalic necrosis at midnight, a quantity of [sevofluorane](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sevoflurane) is administered, and I undergo an operation. Again, I contend that some **transition** in the status of my consciousness occurs at midnight. It becomes _diminished_. I become _unconscious_. (I won’t say _completely_ **absent** at this point since some basic brain function is still extant).[/li]4) _Agreed_? [li]_Babies_: Just as midnight 2005 signalled some transition in my consciousness, so did the year 1973 (or, perhaps, the period 1973-1977, say).[/li]5) _Agreed_? 6) It _intensified_. 7) It **emerged where there was _none_ before 1973**. [li]_Animals_: I, an adult human, have this thing called “consciousness”. [/li]8) There are some things on [this list](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_evolution) whose consciousness is _different_ to that which we adult humans have. 9) Some things on that list have _diminished_ consciousness compared to us. 10)Some **don’t have any**. [li]_Sonic and camcorder-Doom_: I can control a bulldozer, a _real_ machine, in a _real_ environment. I can also control Sonic the Hedgehog on my computer screen: he is a _virtual machine_ which is **caused by** (not merely “correlated with”) the physical processes in the silicon chips and memory of my computer. Similarly, when I play Doom, the computer **causes** a _virtual environment_ to appear on the screen solely by physical processes. The computer can also “autoplay” these games, controlling those virtual machines (Sonic, or the gun-wielder) in those virtual environments. I could, conceivably, have a first computer building the virtual environment and a second, connected, computer running the virtual machine _in_ it. That virtual environment could be extremely detailed.[/li]11)_Agreed?_ I could replace the first computer with **a digital camcorder** (or even _two_), thus providing visual and auditory sensory input from the “real” world. 12) The second computer would then be **functionally equivalent to _some_ of the organisms on the [list](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_evolution)**.[/ul]Please understand that I’m not out to … _A-HAA!_ … trick you with small print here. This is a genuine attempt on my part to pinpoint exactly _how_ we disagree: indeed, we may even find that we are, utterly trivially, using different linguistic referents for our cognitive outputs - _ie._ we’re saying the same thing with different words. I am, ultimately, trying to establish the _limits of your imagination_ - and I don’t mean this in any derogatory way. I am asking you to imagine “ **what it is like to be** ” a corpse, or an anaesthete on the operating table, or a newborn, or a chimp/bird/fish/bee/plant/amoeba/RNA molecule, or Sonic the Hedgehog playing camcorder-Doom (noting that the _solipsist’s_ imagination is so poor that he cannot even imagine consciousness in _other people_). I personally imagine that being some of those entails “nothing” by way of subjective experience, some “something”. We might explore my reasons after I have identified where we differ in those 12 propositions, but I suspect we’ll have enough to deal with in this thread just from the OP and a further thread will be necessary in due course. Anyone else who disagrees with any of the 12 can join in, too, but I will probably only have time to respond to my two friends **Gyan** and **Aeschines**. ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 9, 2005, 4:56pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/2 "2005-05-09T16:56:40Z")
You pre-empted my thread by a few days (I’m not complaining). I’m currently reading the Consciousness section from the latest edition of the reference work [Cognitive Neurosciences](http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?tid=10251&ttype=2) (III; Editor: Gazzaniga; [Amazon link](http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0262072548)). Now, I’m halfway done, have free time, and expect to be done by this weekend. Till then, I’ll remain dormant in this thread. Just a clarification: Pantheism and Panpsychism aren’t exclusive. You may put me down in the former category, as well. All these beliefs are tentative and subject to change, of course. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 9, 2005, 5:17pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/3 "2005-05-09T17:17:04Z")
Well, OK - just post whenever you can, of course. However, I suspect that that neuroscience book might be a little more advanced in scope than this thread, in which I’m simply trying to _ascertain_ our differences without necessarily _exploring_ them. I’d be very grateful if you could just provide even a vague idea of where in those 12 propositions you feel we diverge, if any. ---
**Author:** ![Hoodoo\_Ulove](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/58956e/32.png) [@Hoodoo\_Ulove](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Hoodoo_Ulove)\ **Post date:** [May 11, 2005, 1:46am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/4 "2005-05-11T01:46:41Z")
Mundane, Personal, [Relevant](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=315996) ---
**Author:** ![Jon\_the\_Geek](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/bbce88/32.png) [@Jon\_the\_Geek](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Jon_the_Geek)\ **Post date:** [May 29, 2005, 9:16pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/5 "2005-05-29T21:16:45Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > Anyone else who disagrees with any of the 12 can join in, too, but I will probably only have time to respond to my two friends **Gyan** and **Aeschines**. Well, I am neither **Gyan** nor **Aeschines** , and I’m only pretty sure that I’m a physicalist, so I’m not sure I can add what you want in the thread… but I think it can help me solidify some positions for myself, so I’m going to try to respond anyway 🙂 So, to the list: Agreed on all points. Your consciousness will cease to exist when you die. I’m not sure what happens to your consciousness (whether it is completely absent), because I don’t know exactly what happens when the anaesthetic is administered (in a purely physical sense). Your consciousness did not exist before you had a brain for it to exist in. As for the differences in consciousness for other orgranisms, I don’t _know_ that cyanobacteria don’t have consciousness, it just seems very, very, very unlikely that they do. To make my post more than just “Yup, you’re right,” and to attempt to determine if I’m _really_ a physicalist… What is a perfect equilateral triangle? I can describe one (it’s a figure with three sides that are exactly equal and three angles that are exactly 60 degrees), but I highly doubt that I’ve ever seen one. It also seems like this description–this essence, if you will–was a valid description of something before any human made it. Similarly, what is the number 7? 7 things were 7 things before we called them 7 things. You mentioned Sherlock Holmes as another example that you weren’t sure about over in the (badly misnamed) ["Ask the Creationist](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=316250) thread, but I’m comfortable that he had no existance (or even **Lib’s** “essence”) before Doyle created him, at which point he became a pattern in Doyle’s brain which has since transfered to paper, silicon, and cellulose (and, of course, other brains), but has always existed as a physical thing. Math, however, makes me wonder if _everything_ is physical. Feel free to point me to another thread if this sort of discussion has already occurred somewhere that I missed. ---
**Author:** ![Ludovic](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/7ab992/32.png) [@Ludovic](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Ludovic)\ **Post date:** [May 30, 2005, 4:28am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/6 "2005-05-30T04:28:33Z")
I’d consider myself a physicalist-deconstructionist. That is, every abstract concept or even entity that one can describe the world with is merely a placeholder for its sub-components. At some point, of course, one can come across basic particles and exchanges of information but the default is to assume that even these have subcomponents. But the premise of physicalism, that no non-physical entities need to be proposed in order to explain the workings of the universe, is unobjectionable to me. I believe that a lot of the disagreement about “what happens to your consciousness when you are under anaethesia” is a relic of constructing consciousness rather than continuing to treat it as a collection of processes and phenomena. Consciousness is the way in which we interact with the environment: our mental state is yet another part of our environment we must consider in making our decisions. So, when you come out of anaesthetic, you start to receive information from the outside world, and your neurons begin to process it. Even though your “consciousness” is interrupted, you may remember information from before the operation because your neurons saved information about it which did not disappear even when you were not interacting with your environment. Also, a trivial nitpick in that we don’t really know when consciousness starts: it could be way before birth for all we know: after all, it is still possible to interact with one’s own mental state and the state of the womb while still inside it. Similarly, I would agree with your proposition that consciousness in animals is similar to consciousness in humans, albeit with less reflection capacity. But similarly, when does this reflection capacity happen in humans? For all I know, IF we take the capacity for reflection and mental prowess to be the defining characteristic of a human, there might not be too much of a difference between killing a 6 month old child and killing a lower primate for food! ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 30, 2005, 5:09am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/7 "2005-05-30T05:09:26Z")
My turn… > [@SentientMeat](#): > > _Death_: Today I am alive, not dead. I started being alive in 1973. Let us hypothesise that at midnight on this New Years Eve, cephalic necrosis occurs and I am brain-dead, _ie._ non-alive. My period of life would be 1973\t\>2005 I would be _non-alive_. Now, what about the _consciousness_? > [@](#): > > 1. I contend that some **transition** in the status of my consciousness occurs at midnight. _Agreed_, **Gyan** and **Aeschines**? It would seem so, unless you branch off into an universe, where you remain alive, somehow. > [@](#): > > 1. I further contend that that transition is such that my consciousness is _diminished_ in my non-alive period. _Agreed_? I can’t assert this. Not an agreement here. > [@](#): > > 1. Indeed, I say that it _becomes absent, ie._ diminishes to _nothing_, when I am non-alive. Yes? Can’t say. No agreement. > [@](#): > > _Anaesthetic_: Let’s say that instead of undergoing cephalic necrosis at midnight, a quantity of [sevofluorane](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sevoflurane) is administered, and I undergo an operation. Again, I contend that some **transition** in the status of my consciousness occurs at midnight. It becomes _diminished_. I become _unconscious_. (I won’t say _completely_ **absent** at this point since some basic brain function is still extant). > [@](#): > > 1. _Agreed_? Unclear. If it’s not completely absent, you aren’t unconscious. Clarify. > [@](#): > > _Babies_: Just as midnight 2005 signalled some transition in my consciousness, so did the year 1973 (or, perhaps, the period 1973-1977, say). > [@](#): > > 1. _Agreed_? OK. So my memory would tell me, were I born in '73. > [@](#): > > 1. It _intensified_. Can’t assert. No agreement. > [@](#): > > 1. It **emerged where there was _none_ before 1973**. Can’t assert. No agreement. > [@](#): > > _Animals_: I, an adult human, have this thing called “consciousness”. If you say so 🙂 > [@](#): > > 1. There are some things on [this list](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_evolution) whose consciousness is _different_ to that which we adult humans have. _Prima facie_, yes, but can’t really tell. > [@](#): > > 1. Some things on that list have _diminished_ consciousness compared to us. Can’t assert. No agreement. > [@](#): > > 10)Some **don’t have any**. No. My current thinking is, consciousness is universal. > [@](#): > > _Sonic and camcorder-Doom_: I can control a bulldozer, a _real_ machine, in a _real_ environment. I can also control Sonic the Hedgehog on my computer screen: he is a _virtual machine_ which is **caused by** (not merely “correlated with”) the physical processes in the silicon chips and memory of my computer. Similarly, when I play Doom, the computer **causes** a _virtual environment_ to appear on the screen solely by physical processes. The computer can also “autoplay” these games, controlling those virtual machines (Sonic, or the gun-wielder) in those virtual environments. I could, conceivably, have a first computer building the virtual environment and a second, connected, computer running the virtual > [@](#): > > machine Was this supposed to be ‘environment’? > [@](#): > > _in_ it. That virtual environment could be extremely detailed. > [@](#): > > 11)_Agreed?_ Tentatively, yes, although I don’t like the ‘causation’ and the phrasing. But that’s for later. > [@](#): > > I could replace the first computer with **a digital camcorder** (or even _two_), thus providing visual and auditory sensory input from the “real” world. > [@](#): > > 1. The second computer would then be **functionally equivalent to _some_ of the organisms on the [ul](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_evolution)**.[/ul]. Not completely. They all operate in the same realm. You might want to rephrase this scenario, in case the language is bungling it up. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 30, 2005, 12:26pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/8 "2005-05-30T12:26:58Z")
Many thanks for joining, friends. > [@Gyan](#): > > 1. I can’t assert this. Not an agreement here. OK, so upon the point of death, we become _differently_ conscious, not _less_ (or _non-_) conscious? You contend that the cooling cadaver on the surgeon’s table is _still conscious_? > [@](#): > > Unclear. If it’s not completely absent, you aren’t unconscious. Clarify. OK: Under anaesthetic, I am _less_ conscious. Agreed? > [@](#): > > 1. Can’t assert. No agreement. So, again, just as I am _as_ conscious after death, I was _as_ conscious before conception? > [@](#): > > 9)Can’t assert. No agreement. So bacteria or even RNA molecules are _as_ conscious as living me? > [@](#): > > 10)No. My current thinking is, consciousness is universal. RNA molecules, or the stars and planets, are _conscious_? I must say, that’s quite a bullet to bite, and thanks for your honesty. > [@](#): > > Was this supposed to be ‘environment’? No: one computer runs sonic the machine **in** the Doom environment supplied by the other computer. > [@](#): > > 12)Not completely. They all operate in the same realm. might “operation in that realsm” not be what consciousness _is_? I would suggest that _human_ consciousness is merely a _different_ operation than that of other life-forms or the camcorder-Doom machine. > [@Jon](#): > > Math, however, makes me wonder if everything is physical. **Jon** , thanks for your input: this is indeed a fundamental point, but perhaps a little too much to chew on here! I am currently reading “Where Mathematics Comes From” by George Lakoff and Ant Nunez - I heartily recommend it as the best $20 you will ever spend. It deals with the _cognitive science_ of mathematics and logic. > [@Ludovic](#): > > Also, a trivial nitpick in that we don’t really know when consciousness starts: it could be way before birth for all we know: after all, it is still possible to interact with one’s own mental state and the state of the womb while still inside it. Quite so, **Ludo**. A point I’ve made in other threads is that just because there is **inevitable** disagreement on what precisely comprises “life” does not mean that biology cannot _understand and explain_ life in terms of physical processes. ---
**Author:** ![Jon\_the\_Geek](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/bbce88/32.png) [@Jon\_the\_Geek](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Jon_the_Geek)\ **Post date:** [May 30, 2005, 3:52pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/9 "2005-05-30T15:52:42Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > **Jon** , thanks for your input: this is indeed a fundamental point, but perhaps a little too much to chew on here! I am currently reading “Where Mathematics Comes From” by George Lakoff and Ant Nunez - I heartily recommend it as the best $20 you will ever spend. It deals with the _cognitive science_ of mathematics and logic. Bought it, reading it, will likely be back when I’m done to start a new thread or resurrect an old one… 🙂 ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 30, 2005, 8:42pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/10 "2005-05-30T20:42:44Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > so upon the point of death, we become _differently_ conscious, not _less_ (or _non-_) conscious? Possibility exists. Not claiming it happens. > [@](#): > > You contend that the cooling cadaver on the surgeon’s table is _still conscious_? In some way, even if it’s not the same personal consciousness as earlier. > [@](#): > > OK: Under anaesthetic, I am _less_ conscious. Agreed? Apparently. > [@](#): > > So, again, just as I am _as_ conscious after death, I was _as_ conscious before conception? Possibly. The implicit assumption here is memory. If I don’t remember, two possibilities: it didn’t happen or I don’t remember. > [@](#): > > So bacteria or even RNA molecules are _as_ conscious as living me? I’m not sure what “as conscious” means. > [@](#): > > RNA molecules, or the stars and planets, are _conscious_? Yes. > [@](#): > > I would suggest that _human_ consciousness is merely a _different_ operation than that of other life-forms or the camcorder-Doom machine. So far I haven’t come up with a good definition of consciousness, such that it might resolve misunderstandings. So, I’ll give it a rough shot. **Consciousness** is the _domain_ within which all mental events occur. As per your physicalism, a rock possesses no domain, not just a blank one. Whereas for a group of a few billion neurons, arranged in some manner, a domain pops up to be filled up with activity. This may well be true, but is predicated on displayed behavior, as sole determiner of consciousness. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 31, 2005, 9:30am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/11 "2005-05-31T09:30:46Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > Possibility [of “different”, not “less or no” consciousness] exists. Not claiming it happens. Perhaps I could rephrase my question. Why don’t you think it _more likely_ that we become less or not at all conscious at death? > [@](#): > > In some way, even if it’s not the same personal consciousness as earlier. The dead body has a _different personal consciousness_: that would indicate that the function of the physical brain matter is crucial to us having _this_ personal consciousness when we’re _alive_, then? > [@](#): > > Apparently [Anaesthetes are _less_ conscious.] And yet you don’t say that dead bodies are _less_ conscious, only _differently_ conscious. We could conceivably anaesthetise a patient until they were _very close_ to death in terms of brain activity. At the point of death, would the consciousness leap **up** from that diminished level to the “different” consciousness? Surely it would make sense to conclude that the consciousness, if anything, diminishes _further_ at death? > [@](#): > > The implicit assumption here is memory. If I don’t remember, two possibilities: it [pre-conception consciousness] didn’t happen or I don’t remember. What’s your _guess_, your “gun-to-the-head fence jump”? > [@](#): > > I’m not sure what “as conscious” means. In the same way that you tentatively agreed that anaesthetes were _less_ conscious than waking humans, are RNA molecules _less_ conscious than waking humans, in your opinion? > [@](#): > > **Consciousness** is the domain within which all mental events occur. > > As per your physicalism, a rock possesses no domain, not just a blank one. OK, let’s work with this. Are you saying rocks _aren’t_ conscious, but RNA molecules _are_? > [@](#): > > Whereas for a group of a few billion neurons, arranged in some manner, a domain pops up to be filled up with activity. So consciousness **emerges** from _some_ specific arrangements of matter, but not others? ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 31, 2005, 10:48am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/12 "2005-05-31T10:48:34Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > Why don’t you think it _more likely_ that we become less or not at all conscious at death? Because I don’t know the nature of consciousness. I have to assume beforehand, that brain entirely causes the mind. > [@](#): > > The dead body has a _different personal consciousness_: that would indicate that the function of the physical brain matter is crucial to us having _this_ personal consciousness when we’re _alive_, then? I didn’t claim that the dead body would possess a different _personal_ consciousness, just that I would believe it to possess some different consciousness. > [@](#): > > And yet you don’t say that dead bodies are _less_ conscious, only _differently_ conscious. We could conceivably anaesthetise a patient until they were _very close_ to death in terms of brain activity. If there are non-physical factors affecting consciousness, then it stands to reason that as long as the physical substrate sustains activity, it reflects/correlates mental activity. Once the link is broken, only assumptions abound. > [@](#): > > Surely it would make sense to conclude that the consciousness, if anything, diminishes _further_ at death? This already assumes that brain causes mind. > [@](#): > > What’s your _guess_, your “gun-to-the-head fence jump”? The following is an intuitive belief which I won’t defend: Disconnect of memory. > [@](#): > > In the same way that you tentatively agreed that anaesthetes were _less_ conscious than waking humans, are RNA molecules _less_ conscious than waking humans, in your opinion? What does ‘less’ conscious mean? You have this spectrum of consciousness, and I don’t have an indication of the metric. > [@](#): > > Are you saying rocks _aren’t_ conscious, but RNA molecules _are_? No, I’m claiming both are. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 31, 2005, 11:30am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/13 "2005-05-31T11:30:23Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > Because I don’t know the nature of consciousness. I have to assume beforehand, that brain entirely causes the mind. Well, not if you _guess_ that one becomes less or not at all conscious after death. I was wondering why you _guess_ that neither of these occur. > [@](#): > > I didn’t claim that the dead body would possess a different personal consciousness, just that I would believe it to possess some different consciousness. Could you expand a little on the difference between “concsiousness” and “_personal_ consciousness”? I’m not sure how this thing _I’ve_ got, whatever it is, could ever have the “personal” removed from it without destroying the entire thing itself. > [@](#): > > Once the link is broken, only assumptions abound. Again, I’m trying to avoid _assumptions_ here and share what we _guess_ to be the case. My guess, which you appear to share, is that anaesthetes are _less_ conscious: this is not an _assumption_, merely a shared (if tentative) _agreement_. We might go on to exploring the _consequences_ of these agreements later. > [@](#): > > This already assumes that brain causes mind. And positing a jump from diminished-consciousness-anaesthetised back to _elevated_-consciousness-_dead_ “assumes” it _doesn’t_. Again, I’m just establishing _what_ your position is for now. _Is it_ your guess that such a low-to-high transition occurs at death instead of a low-to-_nothing_ transition? > [@](#): > > The following is an intuitive belief which I won’t defend: Disconnect of memory. Hmm, if you’re unwilling to defend it then I suppose I won’t get anywhere asking you _why_ you think there was a 13.7-billion-year conscious existence you’ve _forgotten_, rather than no such consciousness _at all_ for those billions of years? This was a question I was very interested in, unfortunately. > [@](#): > > What does ‘less’ conscious mean? You have this spectrum of consciousness, and I don’t have an indication of the metric. Again, I’m trying to gauge _your_ position as accurately as I can without you feeling like I’m manipulating the debate underhandedly. You seemed prepared to agree that anaesthetes are _less_ conscious than waking humans without me supplying any definitions, metrics or the like. Would it be possible to continue without such rather distracting minutiae? > [@](#): > > No, I’m claiming both are. Ah, so when you said “As per your physicalism, a rock possesses no domain, not just a blank one. Whereas for a group of a few billion neurons, arranged in some manner, a domain pops up to be filled up with activity”, you were just describing **my** philosophy, not yours at all? If that’s so, OK - I was momentarily confused that you were espousing emergentism! > [@](#): > > This [emergentism] may well be true, but is predicated on displayed behavior, as sole determiner of consciousness. Hmm, I’m not claiming that emergentism (_ie. supervenience physicalism_) is **certainly** true - I’m rather asking why you think it’s _false_. Consciousness in cadavers, rocks and RNA molecules seems so _unnecessary_ an entity in an Ockham’s Razor sense that I seek to understand why you _propose_ them. “Because one can’t be _certain_ they’re **not** there” is not a very good reason to do so, wouldn’t you say? ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 31, 2005, 11:53am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/14 "2005-05-31T11:53:32Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > I was wondering why you _guess_ that neither of these occur. Because I don’t believe the brain to be a sufficient and causative agent. > [@](#): > > Could you expand a little on the difference between “concsiousness” and “_personal_ consciousness”? I’m not sure how this thing _I’ve_ got, whatever it is, could ever have the “personal” removed from it without destroying the entire thing itself. Depends on what happens to Identity. > [@](#): > > Again, I’m trying to avoid _assumptions_ here and share what we _guess_ to be the case. My guess, which you appear to share, is that anaesthetes are _less_ conscious: this is not an _assumption_, merely a shared (if tentative) _agreement_. What does “less” conscious mean? Consciousness isn’t the same, but what’s less and what’s more? > [@](#): > > And positing a jump from diminished-consciousness-anaesthetised back to _elevated_-consciousness-_dead_ “assumes” it _doesn’t_. Except I didn’t posit a jump back to “elevated” consciousness. Just that after death, only assumptions remain. Since I believe that consciousness is primary, consciousness is not extinguished. > [@](#): > > Hmm, if you’re unwilling to defend it then I suppose I won’t get anywhere asking you _why_ you think there was a 13.7-billion-year conscious existence you’ve _forgotten_, rather than no such consciousness _at all_ for those billions of years? Again, if consciousness is primary, memory would be the failing link, not consciousness. > [@](#): > > you were just describing **my** philosophy, not yours at all? If that’s so That’s so. > [@](#): > > Hmm, I’m not claiming that emergentism (_ie. supervenience physicalism_) is **certainly** true - I’m rather asking why you think it’s _false_. Because it’s arbitrary. > [@](#): > > Consciousness in cadavers, rocks and RNA molecules seems so _unnecessary_ an entity in an Ockham’s Razor sense that I seek to understand why you _propose_ them. Because physicalism supposes that behaviour is sole proxy for consciousness. Not logically sound. Emergentism, might be true after all, but it’s logically unsound and arbitrary. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 31, 2005, 12:33pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/15 "2005-05-31T12:33:12Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > Because I don’t believe the brain to be a sufficient and causative agent. And what is in a cadaver which _is_? > [@](#): > > Depends on what happens to Identity. In what way? I don’t wish to sound pushy, but more than single-line responses would be extremely helpful. What _do you think_ is the difference between “consciousness” and “personal consciousness” in a manner which is contingent (or not) on “Identity”? > [@](#): > > What does “less” conscious mean? Consciousness isn’t the same, but what’s less and what’s more? It sounds like you are _retracting_ that tentative agreement that anaethetised humans are less conscious than waking humans. Do we again merely agree that they are _differently_ conscious instead? > [@](#): > > Since I believe that consciousness is primary, consciousness is not extinguished. OK. There is a _transition_ between consciousnesses, we’ve already agreed. Would you say that these were _mutually exclusive_ in your opinion? That is, have I **now** got the consciousness I’ll have when I’m dead _in addition to_ this “living” one, or will the living one be _replaced_ by the dead one? > [@](#): > > Again, if consciousness is primary, memory would be the failing link, not consciousness. So I _had_ a memory for 13.7 billion years, which was somehow _wiped_ at birth, in your opinion? > [@](#): > > Because it’s arbitrary. Agreed. There is **no** _non-arbitrary_ philosophy. Panpsychism is _just as arbitrary_, with its contention of some additional indivisible thing called consciousness which every photon and elementary particle has. (An emergentist like me would say that a computer is an _arbitrating device_.) > [@](#): > > Because physicalism supposes that behaviour is sole proxy for consciousness. Not logically sound. “Proxy”? I don’t understand your use of this word in this sentence. Physicalism can be said to be [verificationist](http://www.trinity.edu/cbrown/language/verificationism.html) in its methodology regarding cognitive _science_, indeed science can **only** proceed according to what is falsifiable. You suggest that it is logically unsound for cognitive science to deal only with that which can be empirically verified, no matter how indirect (_eg._ statitistical psychological tests) those data might be? Again, I think you misunderstand physicalism: it does not _demand_ or _assume_ that everything be physical. It takes what we (largely) all _agree_ is physical, such as cells and computers, and asks whether consciousness might be _explained_ using only these entities. I can provide _an_ (maybe not _the_!) answer to the question “How does consciousness emerge from matter?” by reference to computational processes, just as I could answer the question “How does _life_ emerge from matter?” by reference to cellular and macromolecular processes. Does merely remaining _unconvinced_ by my answer really require you to start positing consciousness in photons? ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 31, 2005, 12:46pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/16 "2005-05-31T12:46:13Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > And what is in a cadaver which _is_? > In what way? A cadaver is still matter. If consciousness is universal, all matter possesses it. > [@](#): > > What _do you think_ is the difference between “consciousness” and “personal consciousness” in a manner which is contingent (or not) on “Identity”? Consciousness is just the phenomenon. Personal would be that associated with us. > [@](#): > > It sounds like you are _retracting_ that tentative agreement that anaethetised humans are less conscious than waking humans. Do we again merely agree that they are _differently_ conscious instead? Yes. > [@](#): > > OK. There is a _transition_ between consciousnesses, we’ve already agreed. There might be. > [@](#): > > That is, have I **now** got the consciousness I’ll have when I’m dead _in addition to_ this “living” one, or will the living one be _replaced_ by the dead one? I can’t select between the two, but I would go with the latter, as a pointed-gun guess. > [@](#): > > So I _had_ a memory for 13.7 billion years, which was somehow _wiped_ at birth, in your opinion? I certainly don’t claim it was a singular connected memory for those 13 billion years. > [@](#): > > Panpsychism is _just as arbitrary_, with its contention of some additional indivisible thing called consciousness which every photon and elementary particle has. Panpsychism is arbitrary in that it accomodates a separate physical world as the additional component. Consciousness as an indivisible thing is an experiental observation, not a postulate. > [@](#): > > Again, I think you misunderstand physicalism: it does not _demand_ or _assume_ that everything be physical. It takes what we (largely) all _agree_ is physical, such as cells and computers, and asks whether consciousness might be _explained_ using only these entities. The SEP entry disagrees with you. Read no further than the [first sentence](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/). Consciousness can’t be explained using only physical entities. I’m going ask you to now defend the physicalist theory of consciousness. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 31, 2005, 1:14pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/17 "2005-05-31T13:14:43Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > A cadaver is still matter. If consciousness is universal, all matter possesses it. And _I_ am that matter _now_. Yet, when I asked “have I got _that_ consciousness _now_, **in addition to** \* my current ‘live’ one?”, you answered > [@](#): > > I would go with the latter, as a pointed-gun guess. …_ie._ NO. Surely, if I am that _same matter_, I must have that _same consciousness_, yes? How, logically, could the ‘dead’ consciousness kick in where it _wasn’t_ before, given that it is the _same matter_? > [@](#): > > Consciousness is just the phenomenon. Personal would be that associated with us. But I **am** that same arrangement of matter. How could it be a _different_ consciousness (_ie._ associated with _someone else_)? > [@](#): > > Yes. [I retract agreement] OK. Again, how can I be _differently conscious_ (rather than _un_conscious) when under anaesthetic if I am the same matter? Where do I go? > [@](#): > > I certainly don’t claim it was a singular connected memory for those 13 billion years. I’m wondering why you claim _any_ memory, singular or plural. > [@](#): > > Consciousness as an indivisible thing is an experiental observation, not a postulate. And, as we all know, experiential observations can be illusory. > [@](#): > > The SEP entry disagrees with you. So be it. As I’ve said before on numerous occasions, I’m sanguine about being called a “_Meta_physicalist of the Gaps”, and every cognitive scientist whose work I’m familiar with is similarly averse to outright dogma: consider physicalism as _my and their_ gun-to-the-head fence jump. > [@](#): > > Consciousness can’t be explained using only physical entities. I’m going ask you to now defend the physicalist theory of consciousness. OK, I’ll do my best, referring whenever I can to results from the vast, interdisciplinary field of [cognitive science](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_science). There is no singular “physical theory of consciousness” as such, rather there are different variations on a **mode** of explanation. The general mode is that mind is a _computational_ phenomenon, in which sensory input is processed in working memory via various modules shaped by evolution. If you can imagine that animals or Sonic the camcorder Doom-player have a “Point of View”, we can discuss which modules, and of what general kind, might be required in order for them to develop into what might approach _waking human_ concsiousness. ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 31, 2005, 1:23pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/18 "2005-05-31T13:23:57Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > How, logically, could the ‘dead’ consciousness kick in where it _wasn’t_ before, given that it is the _same matter_? But it’s not the same matter. No pumping blood. Not a similar train of activity. > [@](#): > > But I **am** that same arrangement of matter. How could it be a _different_ consciousness (_ie._ associated with _someone else_)? I didn’t note “someone else”. I’m not sure whether the cadaver possesses a unitary consciousness, just because it did when alive. > [@](#): > > OK. Again, how can I be _differently conscious_ (rather than _un_conscious) when under anaesthetic if I am the same matter? Where do I go? Activity. > [@](#): > > I’m wondering why you claim _any_ memory, singular or plural. Only two things to be claimed. Either memory or consciousness. > [@](#): > > And, as we all know, experiential observations can be illusory. Reinterpreted, you mean. > [@](#): > > The general mode is that mind is a _computational_ phenomenon, in which sensory input is processed in working memory via various modules shaped by evolution. Hardly an explanation; also, doesn’t touch on consciousness, at all. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 31, 2005, 1:52pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/19 "2005-05-31T13:52:51Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > But it’s not the same matter. No pumping blood. Not a similar train of activity. So the pumping blood and the like is _crucial_ to this transition from the ‘live’ consciousness I have now to the ‘dead’ consciousness I _don’t_. But surely the ‘dead’ consciousness **is** what I have now, since I have **both** the matter in its ‘dead’ arrangement **and** the blood and stuff **on top**? If you removed from me the matter in its ‘dead consciousness train’, I would be _only_ a load of pumping blood and the like. > [@](#): > > I’m not sure whether the cadaver possesses a unitary consciousness, just because it did when alive. So it might posses _plural_ consciousnesses? But if so, how come **I** don’t _now_? > [@](#): > > Activity. Again, if activity is the difference, I effectively **am** “anaesthetic-conscious” and “dead-conscious” _now_ given that I have the same brain that the activity _takes place in_ and _becomes absent from_ upon anaesthesia or death. > [@](#): > > Only two things to be claimed. Either memory or consciousness. Why not _neither_? Why _must_ my existence in those 13.7 billion years be conscious _or_ memorised? > [@](#): > > Reinterpreted, you mean. Reinterpreted as illusory, then. I’ll give an example … > [@](#): > > Hardly an explanation; also, doesn’t touch on consciousness, at all. Well, OK, let’s take a similar track to what I’m doing with **other-wise** elsewhere. In the 19th Century, [vitalism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vitalism) was quite popular. Vitalists might point to the **explanation** of “life” in terms of cellular and evolutionary processes and say “I don’t mean just the _cells_ or the _diversity_, I mean the **life**!” They simply could not grasp that biology _explained_ life as a mechanism, a _process_, instead preferring to suggest that every organism (and in some formulations, indeed, every _fundamental particle_) was **alive** in some invisible distinct way. Sound familiar? So I ask: _Are you a vitalist?_ Do you accept that life is _understood and explained by_ modern life science in terms of mechanistic processes, or do you cling to an _elan vital_, a “spark of life” which is fundamentally distinct? ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 31, 2005, 2:29pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/20 "2005-05-31T14:29:46Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > So the pumping blood and the like is _crucial_ to this transition from the ‘live’ consciousness I have now to the ‘dead’ consciousness I _don’t_. Consciousness may be reflected by activity, yes. > [@](#): > > But surely the ‘dead’ consciousness **is** what I have now, since I have **both** the matter in its ‘dead’ arrangement **and** the blood and stuff **on top**? If you removed from me the matter in its ‘dead consciousness train’, I would be _only_ a load of pumping blood and the like. Nice that you have an arithmetic of consciousness. I make no claims to its validity. > [@](#): > > So it might posses _plural_ consciousnesses? But if so, how come **I** don’t _now_? An enigma. > [@](#): > > Why not _neither_? Why _must_ my existence in those 13.7 billion years be conscious _or_ memorised? I meant there are two possibilities to be inferred from lack of memories prior to birth. Either no consciousness was present or no memory is retained. Like how short-term memory discards the past and works only with the present, so _might_ memory in general. > [@](#): > > Reinterpreted as illusory, then. I’ll give an example … No, just reinterpreted. What I thought was a bunch of dots, is polka-dotted dog. With sufficient changes, you may revert to the earlier interpretation. > [@](#): > > So I ask: _Are you a vitalist?_ Do you accept that life is _understood and explained by_ modern life science in terms of mechanistic processes, or do you cling to an _elan vital_, a “spark of life” which is fundamentally distinct? A tough one. Depends on whether neuroscience can indeed find a correlate for all activity. I’m sympathetic to vitalism, but don’t really adopt it. I hold that the boundary between life and non-life is fuzzy, and difference of a matter of degree, rather than kind. [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033.md?page=2)