# Minds: Death, anaesthetic, babies, animals and Sonic the Camcorder-Doom player. **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [May 9, 2005, 10:10am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033 "2005-05-09T10:10:31Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 2
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 31, 2005, 2:58pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/21 "2005-05-31T14:58:14Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > Nice that you have an arithmetic of consciousness. I make no claims to its validity. Well, I’m trying to set forth the logical consequences of what you yourself have agreed in order to understand your position. I can see no way to escape the consequence that I have ‘dead’ consciousness **now** , _as well as_ 'live consciousness. That would lead inexorably to the conclusion that dead people are _less_ conscious than living ones, since living ones have the ‘dead’ arrangement **and** the live activity **as well**. Is there anything in this you object to? I’m trying not to do anything you consider underhand here. > [@](#): > > An enigma. Again, instead of positing such a baffling enigma, surely the _simpler_ explanation is that cadavers have not _plural_ consciousnesses (since **I** , a cadaver with _additional_ brain activity, can’t detect anyone else in here but me!) but _lesser or none_? > [@](#): > > Either no consciousness was present or no memory is retained. And I am exploring the consequences of the latter. What might my memory be retained _in_, do you think - what does birth _wipe_, exactly? Surely it is, again, far simpler to **guess** that there was no memory _apparatus_? > [@](#): > > No, just reinterpreted. What I thought was a bunch of dots, is polka-dotted dog. With sufficient changes, you may revert to the earlier interpretation. And what I interpreted as the ghost at the end of the bed? Some interpretations and experiential observations _are_ illusions. > [@](#): > > A tough one. Depends on whether neuroscience can indeed find a correlate for all activity. I’m sympathetic to vitalism, but don’t really adopt it. I hold that the boundary between life and non-life is fuzzy, and difference of a matter of degree, rather than kind. I appreciate your open-mindedness here, **Gyan**. Like I said, _I’m_ uncertain that cognitive science yet provides **the** explanation of consciousness in terms of computational entities, and the boundary between consciousness and non-consciousness will **inevitably** be as fuzzy as that between life and non-life. But the step you have made, considering cadavers, elementary particles and yourself in the 13.7 billion years before your birth as **conscious** , is as enormous a leap as calling atoms “alive”: it’s rather cutting off your nose to spite your face, philosophically speaking (and I won’t repeat the adjectives which even respected ‘awkward’ philosophers of mind like John Searle or Colin McGuinn use on the [Stanford](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/#5) page). Adhere to it as you will, but it is a poor substitute for mere _skepticism_ regarding the physicalist view, which I appreciate entirely. ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 31, 2005, 3:26pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/22 "2005-05-31T15:26:00Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > I can see no way to escape the consequence that I have ‘dead’ consciousness **now** , _as well as_ 'live consciousness. That would lead inexorably to the conclusion that dead people are _less_ conscious than living ones, since living ones have the ‘dead’ arrangement **and** the live activity **as well**. Is there anything in this you object to? I’m trying not to do anything you consider underhand here. Your line of questioning is trying to poke into nature of consciousness. My rejection of physicalism is predicated on a fatal explanatory flaw (of consciousness and supervienence). Not just as what I see as a current lack, but a fundamental divide. I haven’t really explored the phenomenon of consciousness speculatively in dead cadavers, and the like. > [@](#): > > Again, instead of positing such a baffling enigma, surely the _simpler_ explanation is that cadavers have not _plural_ consciousnesses (since **I** , a cadaver with _additional_ brain activity, can’t detect anyone else in here but me!) but _lesser or none_? We don’t know the nature of self and its generation, so “simpler” doesn’t hold much currency here. > [@](#): > > What might my memory be retained _in_, do you think - what does birth _wipe_, exactly?? A physical substrate. As per Hindu philosophy, there’s only one Self, which is replicated and embodied in different instantiations. The Self always exists, and is conscious. While I’m not sure I entirely agree with that, I sympathize. > [@](#): > > And what I interpreted as the ghost at the end of the bed? Some interpretations and experiential observations _are_ illusions. Can you falsify that? Be sure that what you _originally_ saw, wasn’t a ghost. > [@](#): > > Adhere to it as you will, but it is a poor substitute for mere _skepticism_ regarding the physicalist view, which I appreciate entirely. Like I said, there’s a fundamental flaw in physicalist theories of consciousness. I again ask you to present the physical mechanics of consciousness. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 31, 2005, 3:53pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/23 "2005-05-31T15:53:13Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > Your line of questioning is trying to poke into nature of consciousness. My rejection of physicalism is predicated on a fatal explanatory flaw (of consciousness and supervienence). Not just as what I see as a current lack, but a fundamental divide. OK, I’ll come to that later in this post. > [@](#): > > I haven’t really explored the phenomenon of consciousness speculatively in dead cadavers, and the like. Well, let’s do so here! > [@](#): > > We don’t know the nature of self and its generation, so “simpler” doesn’t hold much currency here. “Simpler” in tht it requires _fewer entities to be explained_ in an Ockham’s Razor sense, agreed? > [@](#): > > A physical substrate. Like _what_ in those billions of years before Earth’s formation? Hydrogen gas? > [@](#): > > Can you falsify that? Be sure that what you originally saw, wasn’t a ghost. There is no such thing as certainty. Are you saying there is no such thing as _illusions, ie._ it is _never_ the case that one’s experiential observations turn out to be utterly mistaken? > [@](#): > > Like I said, there’s a fundamental flaw in physicalist theories of consciousness. I again ask you to present the physical mechanics of consciousness. OK, the physical mechanism of consciousness is, at heart, that of [working memory](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=304969&page=1&pp=50). If we agree that _working memory_ is physical, we can move forward to consider what other “modules” are necessary to go from, say, “bee consciousness” or “robot consciousness” and approach _waking human_ consciousness, via all kinds of intermediary steps, any one of which the skeptic can shout “Halt!”. Again, I’ll try not to make any step without your explicit agreement. Can you _imagine_ that a bee or a robot is conscious? (For someone who imagines _photons_ to be so, it’s surely no big deal?) If so, what must cognitive science do in order to convince you that bee or robot consciousness is _explained_ by the sensory inputs to working memory and the processing therein? Perhaps it might model a bee or robot as accurately as it could, and make extremely specific predictions of the model which would be _absurdly_ unlikely to come true based on chance alone? This is how _other_ branches of science progress and demonstrate that they are not merely spouting hot air, such as molecular or evolutionary biology or (appropriately enough) climatology. Would this be good enough for _cognitive_ science as well, would you say? Or would you, like the vitalist, demand _more than_ such sciences can ever provide if they are to remain **scientific**? ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 31, 2005, 4:29pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/24 "2005-05-31T16:29:12Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > “Simpler” in tht it requires _fewer entities to be explained_ in an Ockham’s Razor sense, agreed? Not ultimately, as consciousness has yet to be explained. If you take as a given that physical entities are sufficient and necessary for consciousness, then Yes. > [@](#): > > Like _what_ in those billions of years before Earth’s formation? Hydrogen gas? Doesn’t matter. If carbon complexes can hold memories, don’t see a problem for hydrogen. You’ll probably bring up order and complexity. Maybe burning H2 appears chaotic only to us. It’s just molecules in motion, either way. > [@](#): > > There is no such thing as certainty. Are you saying there is no such thing as _illusions, ie._ it is _never_ the case that one’s experiential observations turn out to be utterly mistaken? As long as we can’t control time like we do a VCR or DVD, that statement can’t carry that weight. “I thought I saw a ghost; when I moved closer, turnd out to be X.” That relates experience of X few seconds later with the apparition of ghost earlier via the concept of common identity. If you assume common identity, then yes, that would describe an illusion. > [@](#): > > If we agree that _working memory_ is physical If it involves mental objects then of course not. ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 31, 2005, 4:41pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/25 "2005-05-31T16:41:42Z")
> [@II Gyan II](#): > > If it involves mental objects then of course not. Change: If it _contains_ mental objects then of course not. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2005, 9:36am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/26 "2005-06-01T09:36:51Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > If you take as a given that physical entities are sufficient and necessary for consciousness, then Yes. Note that you say you _do_ accept that physical entities are sufficient and necessary for **life** (since you _do not_ accept vitalism). And yet, life is not yet _fully_ explained physically (heck, that’s why universities still have biology departments!). Do those explanatory gaps mean that physical entities are **insufficient** for life, in your opinion? > [@](#): > > If carbon complexes can hold memories, don’t see a problem for hydrogen. You’ll probably bring up order and complexity. Carbon (and silicon) complexes can access _past states_, but only after evolution (or design) has brought about complex **structure** characterised by _working memory_. Hydrogen is _just a gas_. If you don’t see the problem, I’d suggest you don’t understand basic thermodynamics. > [@](#): > > If you assume common identity, then yes, that would describe an illusion. Well, I don’t know what ‘common identity’ means, but I’ll take it that you do agree that experiential obsevations can sometimes be illusions. > [@](#): > > If it involves mental objects then of course not. > Change: If it contains mental objects then of course not. And this is the nub of the …ahem… matter, isn’t it? You have _defined_ mental entities to be unphysical, and so when I present a physical mechanism for the formation of a mental object like a _memory_, you say “No it isn’t” in the manner of the Monty Python sketch where a man seeks an argument but finds only automatic _contradiction_. Memory and memory formation are perfectly well understood in **physical** _silicon_ computers, agreed? The question is whether memory and memory formation in _carbon_ computers can be said to be similarly physical. We might examine the very [molecules of the cerebellum](http://neuroscience.jhu.edu/molecules2memory.pdf) (PDF) when something was being memorised and find activity _which wasn’t there before_, and even identify the [memory molecules](http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2004/09/040924091050.htm). Of course, this doesn’t provide a comprehensive model and we could not determine _what_ was being memorised just from that activity alone (in the same way that the Enigma codebreakers required _known_ German signals to model _that **machine** _ properly), but it demonstrates beyond reasonable doubt that memory has **as** physical a basis as any other biological process, like cancer or anaesthesia. We could even write an [entire book](http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0716760371/102-3126873-3057767?v=glance) on the giant leaps in experimentally understanding memory from a **neurophysical** perspective of the past few decades. And still, like the vitalist who refused to accept that _life_ was physical, we might meet with simple Pythonesque naysaying in return. What _would_ convince you that memory was physical? ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2005, 5:02pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/27 "2005-06-01T17:02:51Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > Note that you say you _do_ accept that physical entities are sufficient and necessary for **life** (since you _do not_ accept vitalism). I did not imply that. What I meant was that life does not require any extra essence beyond that required by other “lifeless” physical matter. Life is an empirical phenomenon, consciousness isn’t. Life can be characterized by degrees. Consciousness can’t. Difference between Consciousness with a single object and No consiousness, is not the same as that between Nonlife and Life, which goes to the heart of the matter. BTW, I am not against vitalism. I, currently, don’t see the need for it. > [@](#): > > Do those explanatory gaps mean that physical entities are **insufficient** for life, in your opinion? They may be. But probably not. The crucial difference is that Abiogenesis can and has been **observed** , consciousness, and its genesis, can’t be. > [@](#): > > Carbon (and silicon) complexes can access _past states_, but only after evolution (or design) has brought about complex **structure** characterised by _working memory_. Hydrogen is _just a gas_. If you don’t see the problem, I’d suggest you don’t understand basic thermodynamics. Putting the cart before the horse. You have already assumed that gases can’t encode memory, hence the _a priori_ defining of criteria for memory, in terms that processes, non-analogous to life, don’t satisfy. > [@](#): > > Well, I don’t know what ‘common identity’ means Pretty simple. At time ‘t0’, you witness the apparition initially. You move closer, and at time ‘t1’, you scrutinize and notice that it was just a curtain. You conclude the apparition was an illusion. This requires that you assume that object examined at ‘t1’ be the same object as that at ‘t0’, i.e. they share a common identity. Else, the conclusion is invalid. Maybe the apparition was real and just disappeared quickly. Note that I’m not defending ghost sightings (I don’t believe in them), but elucidating an implicit assumption, which I uphold in pragmatic terms, in discovering ‘illusions’ > [@](#): > > so when I present a physical mechanism for the formation of a mental object like a _memory_ Except you haven’t. What you have shown is a mechanism that correlates to the appearance of the memory. Furthermore, this does not select between panpsychism and physicalism. Because the train of events would be the same in both cases. The only difference is that in the case of panpsychism, there’s the open possibility of other mechanisms for memory formation. So, one can disprove physicalism by noticing a new memory without changes in the physical substrate, but panpsychism can only be disproved by actually observing consciousness, which by its nature, doesn’t happen. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2005, 7:21pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/28 "2005-06-01T19:21:37Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > Life is an empirical phenomenon, consciousness isn’t. Interesting. Bearing in mind the vitalist’s objection, how do you know something is _alive_, may I ask? > [@](#): > > The crucial difference is that Abiogenesis can and has been **observed** , consciousness, and its genesis, can’t be. And yet you say _I_ and other waking humans are conscious, and dead humans are _differently_ conscious. Why is that? Are you not labelling these things this way based on your _observations_? > [@](#): > > You have already assumed that gases can’t encode memory No I’m asking you, who think they can, _how_ they could, given their entropy. > [@](#): > > Note that I’m not defending ghost sightings (I don’t believe in them) So people who say they see them are _mistaken_ in their experiential observations. > [@](#): > > Except you haven’t. What you have shown is a mechanism that correlates to the appearance of the memory. I hear the Monty Python theme tune again. I asked you what evidence _would_ convince you that memory formation had a physical mechanism. Note that if you answer “none”, you are not _debating_ but merely _asserting_. You said there was a ‘fatal flaw’ in physicalism, but all I have heard is automatic naysaying like that of the vitalist. > [@](#): > > only difference is that in the case of panpsychism, there’s the open possibility of other mechanisms for memory formation. Then tell me them, like I have told you. That’s a fair trade, is it not? > [@](#): > > So, one can disprove physicalism by noticing a new memory without changes in the physical substrate Requiring a “perfect” detector, of course, but yes, physicalism is _falsifiable_ in this way, and thus _scientific_. > [@](#): > > but panpsychism can only be disproved by actually observing consciousness, which by its nature, doesn’t happen. So you admit that panpsychism is _unfalsifiable_? ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2005, 8:50pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/29 "2005-06-01T20:50:03Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > Bearing in mind the vitalist’s objection, how do you know something is _alive_, may I ask? Depends on what I consider life. I would say, one requirement would be exhibition of motion (externally or internally) that is not (yet) reducible to a mathematically-expressed law. I don’t know if this law is sufficient. > [@](#): > > And yet you say _I_ and other waking humans are conscious, and dead humans are _differently_ conscious. Why is that? Assumption, for the sake of pragmatism. Solipsism would be the alternative. > [@](#): > > No I’m asking you, who think they can, _how_ they could, given their entropy. I don’t think they can, just I’m not sure they can’t. > [@](#): > > So people who say they see them are _mistaken_ in their experiential observations. That’s my working assumption. > [@](#): > > I asked you what evidence _would_ convince you that memory formation had a physical mechanism. Ability to experience other consciousnesses, or rather observe consciousnesses directly. That would be an alien mode of experience, so I’m not sure there’s any point speculating. > [@](#): > > Then tell me them, like I have told you. That’s a fair trade, is it not? No. If I could observe other consciousnesses in action, this wouldn’t remain a theoretical debate. > [@](#): > > Requiring a “perfect” detector, of course, but yes, physicalism is _falsifiable_ in this way, and thus _scientific_. Empirically-driven epistemology has limits. Popperism does not transcend Truth. > [@](#): > > So you admit that panpsychism is _unfalsifiable_? Yes, unless alien modes of perception arise, or some hitherto unknown aspects of nature are discovered. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2005, 9:34pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/30 "2005-06-01T21:34:21Z")
> [@](#): > > I would say, one requirement would be exhibition of motion (externally or internally) that is not (yet) reducible to a mathematically-expressed law. But, says the vitalist, motion is not _life_ - it is only the _observed behaviour of_ living things. Just because something moves ‘unmathematically’, like a robot, does not mean it is _alive_. > [@](#): > > Assumption, for the sake of pragmatism. So why not assume that photons _aren’t_ conscious, given that their observed characteristics tell us that they are no more _conscious_ than _alive_? > [@](#): > > I don’t think they can, just I’m not sure they can’t. I’m not _absolutely certain_ either, any more than I am _certain_ they’re not conscious. I am asking why do you _not_ think that they have memory, but you _do_ think that they have consciousness. > [@](#): > > Ability to experience other consciousnesses, or rather observe consciousnesses directly. Again, can we observe _life_ so directly, bearing in mind the vitalist’s objection? Can we _experience_ the computations occuring in the devices near which we sit? All we can observe directly is the flicking of the gates and charges in the chips and memory: does this mean that _computation_ is not physical? > [@](#): > > If I could observe other consciousnesses in action, this wouldn’t remain a theoretical debate. But you _do_: you see the people around you, to whom you ascribe consciousness, in action. > [@](#): > > Popperism does not transcend Truth … Yes So panpsychism is _pseudoscience_, or even _faith_, yes? ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2005, 9:45pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/31 "2005-06-01T21:45:01Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > But, says the vitalist, motion is not _life_ - it is only the _observed behaviour of_ living things. Then I don’t know what vitalists mean by life. Know a handy site? > [@](#): > > So why not assume that photons _aren’t_ conscious, given that their observed characteristics tell us that they are no more _conscious_ than _alive_? Life’s a matter of observation, consciousness isn’t. > [@](#): > > I am asking why do you _not_ think that they have memory, but you _do_ think that they have consciousness. I said “I don’t think they have”, not “I think they don’t”. I haven’t made up my mind of memory. > [@](#): > > All we can observe directly is the flicking of the gates and charges in the chips and memory: does this mean that _computation_ is not physical? If you’re ascribing a consciousness and self to those gates, then No, else Yes. > [@](#): > > But you _do_: you see the people around you, to whom you ascribe consciousness, in action. You just highlighted why I don’t. If I could observe their consciousness, I wouldn’t have to resort to _ascribing_ it to them. > [@](#): > > So panpsychism is _pseudoscience_, or even _faith_, yes? It’s not a faith for me, just less arbitrary. As per Popperism, it is a pseudoscience, but so is physicalism. ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2005, 9:49pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/32 "2005-06-01T21:49:15Z")
Some corrections and clarifications: > [@II Gyan II](#): > > I said “I don’t think they have”, not “I think they don’t”. I haven’t made up my mind of memory. of == about > [@](#): > > If you’re ascribing a consciousness and self to those gates, then No, else Yes. then Yes, else No ---
**Author:** ![Jon\_the\_Geek](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/bbce88/32.png) [@Jon\_the\_Geek](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Jon_the_Geek)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2005, 9:55pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/33 "2005-06-01T21:55:39Z")
Would this be fair to say, **Gyan**? You _accept_ the physical description of things, but think more _may_ prove necessary to fully describe the universe. Or do you have a particular example where you do not think the physical description of a thing will ever adequately explain that thing? ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2005, 9:57pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/34 "2005-06-01T21:57:49Z")
> [@Jon the Geek](#): > > Would this be fair to say, **Gyan**? > You _accept_ the physical description of things, but think more _may_ prove necessary to fully describe the universe. That’s fair, with the ‘may’ being a pretty strong ‘may’. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2005, 10:18pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/35 "2005-06-01T22:18:29Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > Then I don’t know what vitalists mean by life. Know a handy site? The Wikipage will do for now: they insist (for some reason I don’t understand) that life is _more than_ what we observe in those things to which we _ascribe_ life, just like you do (for some reason I understand just as little) with things to which we ascribe consciousness. In any case, _everyone_ (including, surely, yourself) agrees that life is not _just_ motion: it is just one observed characteristic of things which are _alive_. > [@](#): > > Life’s a matter of observation, consciousness isn’t. What’s the difference? > [@](#): > > I said “I don’t think they have”, not “I think they don’t”. What’s the difference? > [@](#): > > If you’re ascribing a consciousness and self to those gates, then No, else Yes. I am asking you to entertain the notion that processing of sensory input in working memory is the basis of what consciousness _is_. When I ask you what _would_ convince you of this, you suggest something we both _agree_ is impossible, namely “experiencing the computations in **another device** ”. You said there was a _flaw_ in the thesis that consciousness is based on the processing of sensory input in working memory, but when I ask you what is actually _is_, all I encounter is Pythonesque naysaying. Your argument is surely not “the basis of consciousness is not processing of sensory input in working memory because we cannot experience the working memory of a separate device to ourselves”? That would surely be a simple _non sequitur_. > [@](#): > > If I could observe their consciousness, I wouldn’t have to resort to ascribing it to them. But you see them _in action_. Again, you cannot directly observe their _life_ any more than their _consciousness_, and yet you don’t accept vitalism. > [@](#): > > It’s not a faith for me, just less arbitrary. I’m afraid I don’t understand how it’s _less_ arbirary to ascribe consciousness to photons despite no observed indications of such whatsoever. > [@](#): > > As per Popperism, it is a pseudoscience, but so is physicalism. But we just agreed that physicalism was **falsifiable** , and therefore _scientific_, did we not? ---
**Author:** ![Bippy\_the\_Beardless](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/ac8455/32.png) [@Bippy\_the\_Beardless](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Bippy_the_Beardless)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2005, 10:21pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/36 "2005-06-01T22:21:34Z")
I wondered about anasthetic and how it relates to consciousness. One thought maybe worth considering is that anasthesia may just be the inability to write new memories to the brain. Full consciousness might remain, but without the ability to lay down new memories during that period it becomes impossible after that period to look back at what you consciously experienced during that period. This idea has some support when you consider dreams, that are ‘conscious’ activities that quickly dissapear as the memory of the dream fades becoming as if the dream had never existed. There is the conscious that we experience in the here and now, but any knowledge of a previous state of consciousness requires some reference to memories or other recordings of that previous state. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2005, 10:26pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/37 "2005-06-01T22:26:39Z")
> [@Jon](#): > > You accept the physical description of things, but think more may prove necessary to fully describe the universe. Heck, _I’d_ agree with that! Otherwise, universities could close all of their science departments because there would be nothing left to research. > [@](#): > > Or do you have a particular example where you do not think the physical description of a thing will ever adequately explain that thing? Unless I’m mistaken, he suggests _consciousness_ will never be explained by physical mechanisms (computational or otherwise), although this seems to be an _asserion_ rather than _argument_. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2005, 10:32pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/38 "2005-06-01T22:32:01Z")
> [@Bippy](#): > > anasthesia may just be the inability to write new memories to the brain. Full consciousness might remain How does this explain the utter lack of any _response_ to stimulus which a fully conscious person shows, or indeed the lack of _activity_ in the cognitive modules which light up like a veritable Christmas tree when we dream in REM sleep? Surely the obvious conclusion is that anaesthetised people are _unconscious_? ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2005, 10:48pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/39 "2005-06-01T22:48:12Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > In any case, _everyone_ (including, surely, yourself) agrees that life is not _just_ motion Unless you define life as a characteristic exclusive to conscious entities, life is just motion. In response to: > [@Gyan](#): > > Life’s a matter of observation, consciousness isn’t. > [@](#): > > What’s the difference? Should be clear now. In response to: > [@Gyan](#): > > I said “I don’t think they have”, not “I think they don’t”. > [@](#): > > What’s the difference? The first implies the absence of a positive thought, the latter the presence of a negative one. I don’t assertively believe that gases do or can encode memory. I just don’t rule it out. > [@](#): > > I am asking you to entertain the notion that processing of sensory input in working memory is the basis of what consciousness _is_. I can entertain the motion but it doesn’t hold up. Why this particular process? Why this threshold of complexity? Why only in certain arrangements? Unless you can explain this arbitrariness, physicalism smells of anthropocentrism, rather than rigor. > [@](#): > > You said there was a _flaw_ in the thesis that consciousness is based on the processing of sensory input in working memory, but when I ask you what is actually _is_ The production of phenomenon of consciousness itself. That’s what this all comes down to. > [@](#): > > But we just agreed that physicalism was **falsifiable** , and therefore _scientific_, did we not? Doesn’t make a difference. Scientific theories have privileged positions only if the object of inquiry is amenable to a scientific method. If consciousness in all its aspect can’t be dissected empirically by a third-party, it’s relegated to philosophy rather than science. ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2005, 10:50pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/40 "2005-06-01T22:50:16Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > Heck, _I’d_ agree with that! Otherwise, universities could close all of their science departments because there would be nothing left to research. **Jon** meant extraphysical entities, not more physical facts. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033.md?page=1) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033.md?page=3)