# Minds: Death, anaesthetic, babies, animals and Sonic the Camcorder-Doom player. **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [May 9, 2005, 10:10am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033 "2005-05-09T10:10:31Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 4
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2005, 11:14am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/61 "2005-06-03T11:14:12Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > But the life of an organism (or the computations of a computer) are _also_ private to that organism (or computer), yes? No. Barring a force, life is the label of that behaviour. > [@](#): > > I cannot _live the life_ (or _compute the computations_) of those things, I can only _observe_ those things. That’s to do with identity, not life. You can observe the life, not live it. But there’s no **advantage** to living that life, unless there’s a “force”. However, you can’t observe consciousness. because to observe consciousness, you _have to_ assume that identity, this is the crucial difference, between the two phenomenas. If you could assume the identity, you could verify is the consciousness contents were similar to yours. > [@](#): > > Exactly the same logic as you derive the assumption that Life–\>Behaviour, surely? But I don’t. Life is a term given _to_ arbitrarily-delimited behaviour. If there’s a “force” then I can’t have confidence in the delimiters (intuitive or otherwise). > [@](#): > > And _I_ (a computer) _process_ (what computers do) _sensory input in working memory_ (the phenomenon). The word ‘phenomenon’ seems to be at fault here. It doesn’t mean the same notion for constitutional-dispositional emergences as consciousness-type emergences. > [@](#): > > I had hoped we could talk about _cognitive science_ just as I had hoped you might at least allude to _biological_ science in your answers. If you can explain consciousness the phenomenon, please, by all means. > [@](#): > > Could it not be that _consciousness_ is such a wondrous _process_, despite having a physical _computational_ explanation, It is a wondrous process, but the mystery is logical, not wonder-maintained. > [@](#): > > _We_ are conscious, I don’t **know** if you are conscious. If I did, this debate wouldn’t be. > [@](#): > > Could a _cognitive_ scientist not similarly dismiss you “theoretical” deficienceis just as you do those of the vitalist? But I don’t dismiss the vitalist. There is no additional element that requires explaining beyond the physical observations. If there are, then vitalists have a point. Consciousness itself is an additonal **empirical** yet _privately empirical_ element. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2005, 11:34am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/62 "2005-06-03T11:34:15Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > life is the label of that behaviour. And consciousness is my label for _your_ behaviour. As you later say yourself: “I don’t **know** if you are conscious. If I did, this debate wouldn’t be.” > [@](#): > > You can observe the life, not live it. But there’s no **advantage** to living that life I don’t understand how “advantage” is relevant. > [@](#): > > However, you can’t observe consciousness. because to observe consciousness, you _have_ to assume that identity, this is the crucial difference, between the two phenomenas. I do not understand (is there any literature, say in the Stanford source, you can direct me to where this is explained, or is it your own personal formulation?) The “identity” of a thing is what it is. I cannot be what something else is - at the very least, the Pauli exclusion principle states that I cannot occupy the same volume of spacetime at the same energy level. I cannot have the identity of a rock any more than I can directly live its life or experience its consciousness. This still does not impugn the geological, biological or cognitive science of rocks. > [@](#): > > Life is a term given to arbitrarily-delimited behaviour. And why can I not give the term “consciousness” to similarly arbitrarily delimited behaviour given that I cannot experience something else’s consciousness any more than I can live its life? > [@](#): > > The word ‘phenomenon’ seems to be at fault here. It doesn’t mean the same notion for constitutional-dispositional emergences as consciousness-type emergences. Are you _asserting_ that the meanings switch or _arguing_ so? > [@](#): > > If you can explain consciousness the phenomenon, please, by all means. Just as a life scientist sets forth an explanation of life the phenomemon by reference to physical biological processes, a cognitive scientist sets forth an explanation of consciosuness the phenomemon by reference to physical computational processes, specifically the processing in working memory of sensory input via various cognitive modules shaped by evolution. > [@](#): > > It is a wondrous process, but the mystery is logical, not wonder-maintained. You are _asserting_ this distinction, not _arguing_ it. Can I not simply assert the opposite? > [@](#): > > There is no additional element that requires explaining beyond the physical observations. But there are _all kinds_ of things in life science which still require explanation - that’s why universities still have biology departments! ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2005, 1:13pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/63 "2005-06-03T13:13:10Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > And consciousness is my label for _your_ behaviour. Except consciousness is used to refer to something else, not the behaviour. The behaviour is taken as evidence of consciousness, but actually isn’t. > [@](#): > > I don’t understand how “advantage” is relevant. A new perspective is provided if you could observe my consciousness. No such advantage is forthcoming if you “live my life” (assuming consciousness isn’t part of that bundle). > [@](#): > > I do not understand There is no way for you to observe my consciousness unless you were me. You can observe my life, without being me, unless you believe life has a “force”. > [@](#): > > And why can I not give the term “consciousness” to similarly arbitrarily delimited behaviour given that I cannot experience something else’s consciousness any more than I can live its life? You just contradicted yourself. Your second use of the term is proper, refering to the phenomena, whilst the first instance, seeks to reassign its meaning. > [@](#): > > Are you _asserting_ that the meanings switch or _arguing_ so? Argument. > [@](#): > > Just as a life scientist sets forth an explanation of life the phenomemon by reference to physical biological processes, a cognitive scientist sets forth an explanation of consciosuness the phenomemon by reference to physical computational processes, specifically the processing in working memory of sensory input via various cognitive modules shaped by evolution. For the nth time, HOW??? > [@](#): > > You are _asserting_ this distinction, not _arguing_ it. Can I not simply assert the opposite? You already did, although disguised as a question to me. But I have given you the reason why your analog of life is different from consciousness. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2005, 1:17pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/64 "2005-06-03T13:17:09Z")
**Gyan** , I think the time might have come to draw this exchange to a close, since I’m afraid I still have no idea how I might _defend_ the cognitive scientific models and explanations of consciousness in the way you ask. It seems that to even _suggest_ what they might be is, according to you, to assume that they are correct. Indeed, I struggled to discern a promising approach even when _you_ took the role of an emergentist (albeit for a different emergent phenomenon), since instead of _explaining_ how, say, replication ultimately had a physical basis (_eg._ in the splitting of a spiral molecule called DNA each half of which subsequently attracts the necessary proteins to make it whole again), you simply stuck with _asserting_ that life is explained by physical mechanisms. In which case, attempting to explain memory formation in carbon computers in a similar manner to how I would explain memory formation in _silicon_ computers is, apparently, irrelevant from the very outset even if this _only the starting point_ of the scientific explanation of consciousness as a whole. It seems that I can only speak of the science of working memory if I first _agree_ with you that rocks, photons and corpses are conscious - propositions which I’m afraid I can only characterise as positively **lekatt** ian given that these entities show precisely zero _indication_ of possessing anything like what characterises an _insect_, let alone a waking _homo sapiens_ (be that life _or_ cognition). You even suggest that kites and robots are _alive_ since they _move_! Nor, apparently, can I even use the word “unconscious” when describing those so dosed with anaesthetic that they’re about to die from it, nor even “_less_ conscious” since dead and anaesthetised people are merely “differently conscious” (talk about PC gone mad!), despite the fact that they are _exactly the same matter_ in which activity is merely _absent_. (Quite _how_ that presence or absence of physical activity _causes_ a change in consciousness if consciousness is not physical is, by your reckoning, an “enigma” rather than a fundamental logical flaw). Nevertheless, thanks for your contribution here. I feel I understand the _direction_ you’re coming from a great deal more, if not some of the specific positions you hold. ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2005, 1:30pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/65 "2005-06-03T13:30:17Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > It seems that to even _suggest_ what they might be is, according to you, to assume that they are correct. Isn’t that why we believe whatever we do? > [@](#): > > Indeed, I struggled to discern a promising approach even when _you_ took the role of an emergentist (albeit for a different emergent phenomenon), since instead of _explaining_ how, say, replication ultimately had a physical basis (_eg._ in the splitting of a spiral molecule called DNA each half of which subsequently attracts the necessary proteins to make it whole again), you simply stuck with _asserting_ that life is explained by physical mechanisms. The exact machinations are irrelevant. Life is completely physical, as we both agree. Explaining life is a matter of filling in the details. What is the difficulty, sincerely? > [@](#): > > In which case, attempting to explain memory formation in carbon computers in a similar manner to how I would explain memory formation in _silicon_ computers is, apparently, irrelevant from the very outset even if this _only the starting point_ of the scientific explanation of consciousness as a whole. Go ahead and explain it. Make sure you end with how consciousness arises. > [@](#): > > It seems that I can only speak of the science of working memory if I first _agree_ with you that rocks, photons and corpses are conscious - propositions which I’m afraid I can only characterise as positively **lekatt** ian given that these entities show precisely zero _indication_ of possessing anything like what characterises an _insect_, let alone a waking _homo sapiens_ (be that life _or_ cognition). You have paired life with consciousness. According to you, everything alive need not be conscious, need it? > [@](#): > > You even suggest that kites and robots are _alive_ since they _move_! Mischaracterization. I explicitly stated all that moves isn’t labelled life. The converse, actually. Also, I didn’t agree to calling robots alive, and I said that a floating kite might appear to be on the fuzzy threshold of life/non-life since it wouldn’t move predictably. Possibly to an animal, it might just lump it as alive, like birds. > [@](#): > > Nor, apparently, can I even use the word “unconscious” when describing those so dosed with anaesthetic that they’re about to die from it, nor even “_less_ conscious” since dead and anaesthetised people are merely “differently conscious” (talk about PC gone mad!), despite the fact that they are _exactly the same matter_ in which activity is merely _absent_. (Quite _how_ that presence or absence of physical activity _causes_ a change in consciousness if consciousness is not physical is, by your reckoning, an “enigma” rather than a fundamental logical flaw). But the matter’s not the same. The activity in a dead brain is not the same as in a live one (of course there is activity, motion still occurs). ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2005, 1:34pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/66 "2005-06-03T13:34:26Z")
**SentientMeat** , [ul] [li]you’re aware of the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness? What do you understand it to be?[/li][li]What’s the cutoff for consciousness? I suppose you believe that a rat is conscious. What about a squid? Insect? What’s your rough guess of a cutoff, on the plant/animal classification tree, at which, those above, are conscious, those below, aren’t?[/li][/ul] ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2005, 2:04pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/67 "2005-06-03T14:04:45Z")
> [@](#): > > you’re aware of the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness? What do you understand it to be? No problem at all: I say that the answer to the hard problem **is** the _collection_ of answers to the easy questions, that experience **is** what something has when all of those vastly complex cognitive modules are [connected together](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/connectionism/). > [@](#): > > What’s the cutoff for consciousness? I suppose you believe that a rat is conscious. What about a squid? Insect? What’s your rough guess of a cutoff, on the plant/animal classification tree, at which, those above, are conscious, those below, aren’t? Roughly, insect (carbon) or camcorder-Doom player (silicon). These are characterised by sensory input to _working memory_, which can _access past states_ and thus not behave _solely_ in reaction to its external environment, like an amoeba, plant, rock face or database must. > [@](#): > > Life is completely physical, as we both agree. Explaining life is a matter of filling in the details. What is the difficulty, sincerely? None, but then again I believe that consciousness has a physical computational basis whose explanation is a matter of filling in the details. > [@](#): > > Go ahead and explain it. Make sure you end with how consciousness arises. OK. Just as memory formation in silicon computers is a matter of sensory input being encoded by the configuration of a physical substrate, so could it be in some carbon lifeforms. Taking [visual processing](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=304969&page=1&pp=50) as an example, the filtering and memorising of the sensory input could _form the basis of_ “what it is like to see”. Now, of course, this bare bones of visual memory is _only_ the basis, perhaps corresponding to what it is like for, say, an _insect_ to see: vertebrates have vastly more cognitive modules **connected to** the visual cognitive modules, such as those which filter and memorise _other_ senses such as sound, vibration or molecular environment (smell). Mammals have yet more complex modules such as chemical emotional moderators (correlated with large amygdala), all of which are yet more computationally intractably interconnected with the others, giving rise to a consciousness which is _more powerful, intense_ or whatever superlative we might rather arbitrarily choose. Finally, a kind of ape might evolve the ability to associate memories with _sounds_ and thus necessitate all kinds of _analytical_ coginitive modules (or vice versa - an evolutionary ‘cat-and-mouse’ game of cognition growing more complex as the cognitive modules grow more complex and interconnected) until what _it_ experiences is _so_ incredibly intense and powerful that even educated, intelligent 21st Century humans cannot believe that it is fundamentally computational in basis since it is now so _unlike_ the digital silicon computation taking place under their desks. > [@](#): > > But the matter’s not the same. The activity in a dead brain is not the same as in a live one (of course there is activity, motion still occurs). But the matter is _irrelevant_ if consciousness is not physical, surely? ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2005, 2:15pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/68 "2005-06-03T14:15:52Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > that experience **is** what something has when all of those vastly complex cognitive modules are [connected together](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/connectionism/). > Roughly, insect (carbon) or camcorder-Doom player (silicon). Aren’t you just asserting here? > [@](#): > > These are characterised by sensory input to _working memory_, which can _access past states_ and thus not behave _solely_ in reaction to its external environment, like an amoeba, plant, rock face or database must. Are you claiming that humans aren’t completely a product of physical non-conscious laws? If so, how does couching the explanation in terms of memory, make a difference. It’s just physics, like that applicable to an amoeba. [quote] None, but then again I believe that consciousness has a physical computational basis whose explanation is a matter of filling in the details. > [@](#): > > Taking [visual processing](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=304969&page=1&pp=50) as an example, the filtering and memorising of the sensory input could _form the basis of_ “what it is like to see”. How? > [@](#): > > But the matter is _irrelevant_ if consciousness is not physical, surely? No. Matter seems to correlate. Think of it as a reflection in the water. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2005, 2:31pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/69 "2005-06-03T14:31:19Z")
> [@](#): > > Aren’t you just asserting here? No, because I explicitly admit that it _might be wrong_. If I was asserting, I would say that panpsychism _can’t be right_. > [@](#): > > Are you claiming that humans aren’t completely a product of physical non-conscious laws? If so, how does couching the explanation in terms of memory, make a difference. It’s just physics, like that applicable to an amoeba. Of course: I claim that amoebae **and** humans are _physical_, just that amoeba aren’t _conscious_. After all, _life_ is just physics too, but I can say that humans and amoeba are alive but robots aren’t. > [@](#): > > How? This is where, in my OP, I can only ask you to _use your imagination_, since the solipsist simply refuses to countenance the possibility that anyone or anything else can “see”. I can only ask you whether you agree that _having a visual field_, like even the insect or the camcorder-Doom computer, could be the _basis_ for “sight”. When we ask “_How_ do birds _see_?”, these are the kind of answers which cognitive science gives. > [@](#): > > Matter seems to correlate. Think of it as a reflection in the water. But reflections are physical processes in which photons of light are absorbed from one direction and re-emitted in others. How can consciousness even _correlate_ with physical processes if it is **not physical**? ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2005, 3:16pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/70 "2005-06-03T15:16:00Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > No, because I explicitly admit that it _might be wrong_. If I was asserting, I would say that panpsychism _can’t be right_. No, I meant that you didn’t provide an argument, but just said it is so. > [@](#): > > Of course: I claim that amoebae **and** humans are _physical_, just that amoeba aren’t _conscious_. Then, how do you figure that a physical memory substrate is necessary for consciousness? > [@](#): > > This is where, in my OP, I can only ask you to _use your imagination_, since the solipsist simply refuses to countenance the possibility that anyone or anything else can “see”. Despite this being GD, I have to say, you are trolling. The solipsist does not refuse to acknowledge the possibility or rather affirm the impossibility of other minds. Only that due to the nature of consciousness, other minds can’t be verified and hence solipsism is a valid belief, and someone may choose to adopt it. > [@](#): > > I can only ask you whether you agree that _having a visual field_, like even the insect or the camcorder-Doom computer, could be the _basis_ for “sight”. Of course, assuming I’m understanding the phrase “having a visual field” correctly. Because that’s a tautology. a ‘visual field’ is a conscious phenomena. > [@](#): > > When we ask “_How_ do birds _see_?”, these are the kind of answers which cognitive science gives. Cognitive neuroscience says photons hit the ocular surface, an action potential runs down the optic nerve, and a series of neural activity occurs in various parts of the CNS. Again, how do birds _see_? > [@](#): > > How can consciousness even _correlate_ with physical processes if it is **not physical**? Well, if it is not physical, it apparently does. Yes, but there appears to be no necessity. I’ve to assume that a physical world exists “outside” and that my conscious experience of it is representative. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2005, 3:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/71 "2005-06-03T15:38:41Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > No, I meant that you didn’t provide an argument, but just said it is so. _Proposed_ that it might be so, on the understanding that you can ask me why I do so. > [@](#): > > Then, how do you figure that a physical memory substrate is necessary for consciousness? In the same way that I figure that a physical cellular structure is necessary for life. > [@](#): > > Despite this being GD, I have to say, you are trolling. Duly reported. > [@](#): > > The solipsist does not refuse to acknowledge the possibility or rather affirm the impossibility of other minds. Only that due to the nature of consciousness, other minds can’t be verified and hence solipsism is a valid belief, and someone may choose to adopt it. And I _could not argue with them_. If one refused to believe that anything other than themselves had a mind, I simply could not see any approach whereby they might be convinced by anything in cognitive science. > [@](#): > > Of course, assuming I’m understanding the phrase “having a visual field” correctly. Because that’s a tautology. a ‘visual field’ is a conscious phenomena. Yet a camera also has a visual field, and most people (including me) do not ascribe consciousness to it even at the fuzzy borderline. I am setting forth how _processing_ of what is in the visual field might form the basis of experience. > [@](#): > > Cognitive neuroscience says photons hit the ocular surface, an action potential runs down the optic nerve, and a series of neural activity occurs in various parts of the CNS. Again, how do birds _see_? I am suggesting that this **is** seeing, for the bird, just as the cellular processes and motion _etc._ **are** its “life”. > [@](#): > > Well, if it is not physical, it apparently does. Yes, but there appears to be no necessity. I’ve to assume that a physical world exists “outside” and that my conscious experience of it is representative. Can you explain this again, another way? I don’t understand any of it. ---
**Author:** ![tomndebb](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/b9e5f3/32.png) [@tomndebb](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/tomndebb)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2005, 4:30pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/72 "2005-06-03T16:30:27Z")
> [@II Gyan II](#): > > Despite this being GD, I have to say, you are trolling. Find a better way to challenge your opponent, then, because accusations of trolling are not permitted in any Forum on the **SDMB**. If you differ on a definition, then challenge the definition or point out a reference that disproves the definition; do not assume (and do not accuse your opponent of) bad faith, particularly by claiming your opponent is trolling. [/Moderator Mode] ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2005, 4:34pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/73 "2005-06-03T16:34:06Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > In the same way that I figure that a physical cellular structure is necessary for life. What? If you delimit life to objects showing replication, then Yes. But you haven’t shown that consciousness is connected to the brain. > [@](#): > > And I _could not argue with them_. If one refused to believe that anything other than themselves had a mind, I simply could not see any approach whereby they might be convinced by anything in cognitive science. It’s not about _refusing_ to believe. It’s about not believing. May the nature of the universe change and prove me wrong. Most people who hold the world as real, do so without acknowledging it as an assumption. If they see it as an assumption, they don’t communicate it. It is the norm and hence taken for granted as “truth”. > [@](#): > > Yet a camera also has a visual field, and most people (including me) do not ascribe consciousness to it even at the fuzzy borderline. Everything’s a visual field, then. So, your use of visual field is different than I thought. > [@](#): > > I am setting forth how _processing_ of what is in the visual field might form the basis of experience. Labelling neurochemical activity “processing” does not make it so. Besides, I completely agree that neurochemical _might_ form the basis. You, as the physicalist, believe it _does_. > [@](#): > > I am suggesting that this **is** seeing, for the bird, just as the cellular processes and motion _etc._ **are** its “life”. We _call_ the cellular processes & motion “life”. We don’t call neural activity “seeing”, you call it that. We call the _experience of vision_, seeing. You are equating them. Rephrase of > [@](#): > > Well, if it is not physical, it apparently does. Yes, but there appears to be no necessity. I’ve to assume that a physical world exists “outside” and that my conscious experience of it is representative. If consciousness is not physical, apparently, it _does_ correlate with mental activity. But there appears to be no necessity that it should correlate. The physical world is assumed to exist independently of conscious experience of it, and that my conscious experience represents it. Clearer, I hope. ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2005, 4:37pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/74 "2005-06-03T16:37:59Z")
> [@tomndebb](#): > > Find a better way to challenge your opponent, then, because accusations of trolling are not permitted in any Forum on the **SDMB**. If you differ on a definition, then challenge the definition or point out a reference that disproves the definition; do not assume (and do not accuse your opponent of) bad faith, particularly by claiming your opponent is trolling. > > [/Moderator Mode] If you have followed this debate, you’ll know that we are retreading the same ground for virtually the entire thread (70+ posts). It is my sincere belief that I’ve been clear enough, and yet the same counterpoints abound. Either SM is stupid/dense or asserting beliefs as mine that I didn’t put forward. I don’t believe the former, so reasonable for me to believe that he’s trolling, even if he’s not. ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2005, 4:40pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/75 "2005-06-03T16:40:26Z")
Correction: If you have followed this debate, you’ll know that we are retreading the same ground for virtually the entire thread (70+ posts). It is my sincere belief that I’ve been clear enough, and yet the same counterpoints abound. Either SM is stupid/dense or just reasserting the same old. I don’t believe the former. He also ascribed beliefs to me, that if one has read the thread, one would know, aren’t true. It is a reasonable belief that he’s trolling, even if he’s not. ---
**Author:** ![tomndebb](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/b9e5f3/32.png) [@tomndebb](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/tomndebb)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2005, 5:44pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/76 "2005-06-03T17:44:24Z")
And the appropriate response to indications that a poster is trolling is to use the “report” button to notify the staff. The appropriate response to perceived deliberate mischaracterization of one’s own posts is (depending on one’s personality and patience) to either repeatedly point out the errors and mischaracterizations so that the folks at home can distinguish between what one has posted and what has been misattributed to one, or to note a clear example of mischarcterization with a declaration that one will no longer continue a discussion carried out in bad faith. One does not begin hurling names at the opposition in **GD** , particularly not “troll” but not to exclude “stupid” or “dense.” ---
**Author:** ![Hoodoo\_Ulove](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/58956e/32.png) [@Hoodoo\_Ulove](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Hoodoo_Ulove)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2005, 5:52pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/77 "2005-06-03T17:52:42Z")
The hard problem as stated by Chalmers: > [@](#): > > When it comes to conscious experience, this sort of [functional] explanation fails. What makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience - perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report - there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience? A simple explanation of the functions leaves this question open. Chalmers’ statement of the “solution” to the hard problem as posited by **SM** , as I read him. > [@](#): > > The second choice is to take a harder line and deny the phenomenon. (Variations on this approach are taken by Allport 1988, Dennett 1991, and Wilkes 1988.) According to this line, once we have explained the functions such as accessibility, reportability, and the like, there is no further phenomenon called “experience” to explain. Some explicitly deny the phenomenon, holding for example that what is not externally verifiable cannot be real. Others achieve the same effect by allowing that experience exists, but only if we equate “experience” with something like the capacity to discriminate and report. These approaches lead to a simpler theory, but are ultimately unsatisfactory. Experience is the most central and manifest aspect of our mental lives, and indeed is perhaps the key explanandum in the science of the mind. Because of this status as an explanandum, experience cannot be discarded like the vital spirit when a new theory comes along. Rather, it is the central fact that any theory of consciousness must explain. A theory that denies the phenomenon “solves” the problem by ducking the question. Does Chalmers treat your position unfairly? ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 4, 2005, 9:03am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/78 "2005-06-04T09:03:31Z")
> [@Hoodoo](#): > > Does Chalmers treat your position unfairly? Not _unfairly_, no - he, like **Gyan** simply **asserts** that consciousness _cannot be_ explained by connectionist functions, that it _just is_ different to the vital spirit. He says cognitive science ducks the question, when actually it is he who conveniently avoids all mention of the **alternative** : that rocks and corpses are conscious. All cognitive science can do is propose _an_ explanation of its emergence, and leave intelligent people to choose between it and the panpsychism which Chalmers advocates (although he never comes right out and _says so_ - like Young Earth Creationists, he does everything he can to ensure the conversation remains an _attack on the science_ rather than a _defence_ of the propositions which most philosophers consider absurdly ludicrous.) ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 4, 2005, 11:55am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/79 "2005-06-04T11:55:38Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > What? If you delimit life to objects showing replication, then Yes. But you haven’t shown that consciousness is connected to the brain. In all of these “ifs”, I am taking the position that the basis of consciousness **is** the processing of sensory input in working memory - that is how I’m delimiting consciousness. > [@](#): > > It’s not about refusing to believe. It’s about not believing. Very well, I could not argue with someone who believed only _they_ had a consciousness. > [@](#): > > Labelling neurochemical activity “processing” does not make it so. Can we agree that labelling the _electronic_ activity in the computer under your desk “processing” is a justifiable step? > [@](#): > > Besides, I completely agree that neurochemical _might_ form the basis. You, as the physicalist, believe it _does_. Excellent, I think we’re making progress. You no longer seem to be suggesting that processing of sensory information in working memory _cannot_ be what consciousness is, merely that you _prefer_ the option that rocks and corpses are conscious. Is this fair? > [@](#): > > We don’t call neural activity “seeing”, you call it that. We call the experience of vision, seeing. You are equating them. To clarify, it’s not _just_ the activity, it’s the sensory input (_ie._ the photons) as well that makes up the _process of seeing_. > [@](#): > > The physical world is assumed to exist independently of conscious experience of it, and that my conscious experience represents it. Clearer, I hope. But that doesn’t explain how a _mental_ (_ie._ not physical) entity can even possibly be **affected** by physical things like molecules (of _eg._ alcohol, LSD or sevofluorane). Consciousness must at least have a physical _element_ if physical things _affect_ it so drastically, yes? As for the rather unsavoury accustions, please, my friend, let us continue this in an amicable spirit. It may be that we must agree to disagree, and I’ll understand at any point if you wish to draw this to a close. I also apologise if I ascribed beliefs to you which you do not hold - I assure you I was only working from things you’d said, and I’m sorry if I misinterpreted them. Perhaps a new example might unravel a few knots, since going from the ‘top down’ (the biology and neuroscience) doesn’t seem to be getting us far? How about the ‘bottom up’ of Artificial Intelligence? Do you think discussing Shakey the Robot and his ability to recognise objects in his visual field would be worthwhile? ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [June 4, 2005, 4:54pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/80 "2005-06-04T16:54:40Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > In all of these “ifs”, I am taking the position that the basis of consciousness **is** the processing of sensory input in working memory - that is how I’m delimiting consciousness. You haven’t explained why such activity and such activity **only**. > [@](#): > > Very well, I could not argue with someone who believed only _they_ had a consciousness. You could argue why that belief is wrong. > [@](#): > > Can we agree that labelling the _electronic_ activity in the computer under your desk “processing” is a justifiable step? Yes. > [@](#): > > Excellent, I think we’re making progress. You no longer seem to be suggesting that processing of sensory information in working memory _cannot_ be what consciousness is, merely that you _prefer_ the option that rocks and corpses are conscious. Is this fair? SM, I already have had somewhat of a warning. Read my earlier posts where I agreed that physicalism might ultimately be true. You’re doing the same thing again. Although your phrasing is still wrong. Processing cannot **be** consciousness. It may give rise to it. If you’re arguing that processing **is it** , then you’re arguing _for_ panpsychism. > [@](#): > > To clarify, it’s not _just_ the activity, it’s the sensory input (_ie._ the photons) as well that makes up the _process of seeing_. Doesn’t matter. It’s all activity. Particles from one position to another, albeit in some co-ordinated manner. > [@](#): > > But that doesn’t explain how a _mental_ (_ie._ not physical) entity can even possibly be **affected** by physical things like molecules (of _eg._ alcohol, LSD or sevofluorane). Consciousness must at least have a physical _element_ if physical things _affect_ it so drastically, yes? Of course. Sounds like you’re confused about panpsychism. Panpsychism argues that physical entities have a mental component. Your gestalt conscious experience is an emergence of all that constitutes you. That emergence is less problematic than the arising of consciousness from non-consciousness, which is equivalent to Universe being created from Nothing. > [@](#): > > Do you think discussing Shakey the Robot and his ability to recognise objects in his visual field would be worthwhile? Go ahead. Note: I’ll be out of town till Sunday evening. So Monday afternoon (GMT) is when I’ll be back here. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033.md?page=3) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033.md?page=5)