# Minds: Death, anaesthetic, babies, animals and Sonic the Camcorder-Doom player. **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [May 9, 2005, 10:10am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033 "2005-05-09T10:10:31Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 5
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 4, 2005, 5:55pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/81 "2005-06-04T17:55:30Z")
[quote=Gyan] You haven’t explained why such activity and such activity **only**. OK - I’ll try from the other direction instead (AI) later in this post. > [@](#): > > You could argue why that belief is wrong. But I would be wasting my breath: the solipsist would simply retort at every turn that everything but himself just displays _behaviour_ rather than _concsiousness_, which only he has. > [@](#): > > Processing cannot **be** consciousness. It may give rise to it. So processing might _cause_ consciousness, yes? If consciousness is explained by physical _causes_, it is _itself physical_, yes? > [@](#): > > If you’re arguing that processing is it, then you’re arguing for panpsychism. Not just any kind of “processing”: only that of sensory input in _working memory_ (_ie._ via access to _past states_). It is this IF-THEN-ELSE kind of processing I was referring to. > [@](#): > > Your gestalt conscious experience is an emergence of all that constitutes you. Watch out with that word _emergence_: panpsychism and emergentism are _fundamentally opposed_, as the Stanford page on panpsychism makes clear. > [@](#): > > That emergence is less problematic than the arising of consciousness from non-consciousness, which is equivalent to Universe being created from Nothing. Well, I’d suggest that the equivalent is life from non-life, but we won’t go down that road again. > [@](#): > > Doesn’t matter. It’s all activity. Particles from one position to another, albeit in some co-ordinated manner. Quite! But I do not go on to say that just because particles are there makes _them_ conscious: only _certain arrangements_ characterised by working memory, just as some arrangements are computers or living things, and some aren’t. > [@](#): > > Go ahead. OK. In the sixties, [url=http://www.sri.com/news/releases/07-12-04.html]Shakey the Robot\*\* was essentially a computer attached to a video camera on wheels. It could identify boxes in its environment by processing the visual information into edges and contours and performing IF-THEN-ELSE rountines in the working memory in order to find the vertex of a corner. If a vertex was found, it would output “it’s a box!”, if not, “not a box”. Now, do we agree that Shakey’s visual recognition of boxes is a _purely computational_ process, no more mysterious than what the computer under your desk is doing? Of course, Shakey has not the cognitive modules _we_ have and so when _we_ see the box our experience is clearly _different_ to Shakey’s when he sees the box, and I doubt whether a robot will ever be built which has anything like a _human_ experience, but can we at least agree that Shakey does _see boxes_? ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 4, 2005, 5:57pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/82 "2005-06-04T17:57:06Z")
Sorry, Shakey the robot. ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [June 6, 2005, 10:14pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/83 "2005-06-06T22:14:51Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > But I would be wasting my breath: the solipsist would simply retort at every turn that everything but himself just displays _behaviour_ rather than _concsiousness_, which only he has. OK. Given that you agree solipsism is not falsifiable, you still reject it. > [@](#): > > So processing might _cause_ consciousness, yes? If consciousness is explained by physical _causes_, it is _itself physical_, yes? Only by extension. Our (humans, in general) current conception of physical entities assigns certain properties and essence to them. Location, mass, history…etc, but not mental attributes. If you extend physicalism to support mental attributes in certain configurations, then Yes. But in an intuitive sense, no. It remains nonphysical. > [@](#): > > Not just any kind of “processing”: only that of sensory input in _working memory_ (_ie._ via access to _past states_). It is this IF-THEN-ELSE kind of processing I was referring to. You haven’t shown what’s so special about such active physical arrangements that can loop back into a similar state, and why only such states. > [@](#): > > Watch out with that word _emergence_: panpsychism and emergentism are _fundamentally opposed_, as the Stanford page on panpsychism makes clear. Not really. The word ‘emergentism’ has been overloaded, to use programming language parlance. The emergentism of ‘liquidity’ from aggregation of H2O molecules is fundamentally different than consciousness from aggregation of neurons. I use ‘emergentism’ to mean properties that are evident only at different hierarchies, rather than within different realms. > [@](#): > > Well, I’d suggest that the equivalent is life from non-life, but we won’t go down that road again. Life and non-life both exist within the same realm. > [@](#): > > Now, do we agree that Shakey’s visual recognition of boxes is a _purely computational_ process, no more mysterious than what the computer under your desk is doing? Yes. > [@](#): > > but can we at least agree that Shakey does _see boxes_? Do you mean a conscious experience? If so, yes. Else, no. The word ‘see’ only holds meaning if ‘seeing’ is occuring. By which, I mean, we refer to a conscious modality. You’re extending the term to mean ‘_We_, **conscious beings** , \*\*observing \*\* responses to visual input, reminiscient of our own interactive behaviour, vis-a-vis visual input, if given a similar task’. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 7, 2005, 8:51am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/84 "2005-06-07T08:51:52Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > OK. Given that you agree solipsism is not falsifiable, you still reject it. I reject a whole host of positions which are not falsifiable largely _because_ they are not falsifiable, such as the existence of fairies. As I asked in the first few posts, “Because one can’t be _certain_ they’re not there” is **not** a very good reason to do believe in things, even things like consciousness in rocks, wouldn’t you say? > [@](#): > > Our (humans, in general) current conception of physical entities assigns certain properties and essence to them. Location, mass, history…etc, but not mental attributes. _Computational_ attributes have physical measures such as _rate_, [complexity](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computability/) and [number of connections](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/connectionism/), and psychological research abounds with _physical measurements_ of “mental attributes” such as reaction time and statistical memory accuracy. Humans _can and do_ assign properties to mental attributes. Heck, that’s what the science of psychology is _all about_. > [@](#): > > If you extend physicalism to support mental attributes in certain configurations, then Yes. But in an intuitive sense, no. It remains nonphysical. Please, can we stop with these “ifs”? I _understand_ what the options are: I’m asking **you** which options **you** choose, and why. In this case, I already _know_ that your intuition differs from mine. I am wondering _why_ your intuition is that explaining the physical causes of consciousness are not enough even in theory, rather than it being a case of “filling in the gaps”. > [@](#): > > You haven’t shown what’s so special about such active physical arrangements that can loop back into a similar state, and why only such states. Well, OK, let’s examine the _alternatives_: How _else_ could memories be formed, would you suggest? Are there even any _speculative_ mechanisms which **don’t** involve configurations of a physical substrate? I am suggesting that these IF-THEN-ELSE mechanisms (which we agree can be executed by _solely_ physical charges and gates) explains how these individual objects _behave_ (such as that ‘unmathematical’ motion which explains _life_) and thus are differentiated from things which _don’t_ show that behaviour, just as you label my consciousness “dead” or “alive” based on _my body’s_ behaviour. > [@](#): > > The emergentism of ‘liquidity’ from aggregation of H2O molecules is fundamentally different than consciousness from aggregation of neurons. I disagree. > [@](#): > > I use ‘emergentism’ to mean properties that are evident only at different hierarchies, rather than within different realms. Could you tell me what the difference is between a hierarchy and a realm? If the answer is “they just are”, colour me unenlightened. > [@](#): > > Life and non-life both exist within the same realm. Again, this seems dependent on consciousness being _defined_ as a “different realm”, whatever a “realm” is. Am I right? > [@](#): > > Do you mean a conscious experience? If so, yes. Else, no. So we agree that Shakey’s conscious experience is _explained_ by, is _caused_ by, the computational processing which is no more mysterious than that under your desk? ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [June 7, 2005, 9:30pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/85 "2005-06-07T21:30:54Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > I reject a whole host of positions which are not falsifiable largely _because_ they are not falsifiable, such as the existence of fairies. As I asked in the first few posts, “Because one can’t be _certain_ they’re not there” is **not** a very good reason to do believe in things, even things like consciousness in rocks, wouldn’t you say? On the contrary, it is a good reason to not be certain about your beliefs. > [@](#): > > psychological research abounds with _physical measurements_ of “mental attributes” such as reaction time and statistical memory accuracy. Humans _can and do_ assign properties to mental attributes. Heck, that’s what the science of psychology is _all about_. Those are physical properties of behavioural attributes. How much does consciousness weigh? Where is the perception of the things I dream about, located in physical space? > [@](#): > > I am wondering _why_ your intuition is that explaining the physical causes of consciousness are not enough even in theory, rather than it being a case of “filling in the gaps”. Because consciousness itself, is not physical. > [@](#): > > Well, OK, let’s examine the _alternatives_: How _else_ could memories be formed, would you suggest? Are there even any _speculative_ mechanisms which **don’t** involve configurations of a physical substrate? I am suggesting that these IF-THEN-ELSE mechanisms (which we agree can be executed by _solely_ physical charges and gates) explains how these individual objects _behave_ (such as that ‘unmathematical’ motion which explains _life_) and thus are differentiated from things which _don’t_ show that behaviour, just as you label my consciousness “dead” or “alive” based on _my body’s_ behaviour. First off, lack of alternatives, by itself, isn’t a reason to positively believe what you do. Second, we need to know what else possesses memories in order to demarcate commonalities. > [@](#): > > Could you tell me what the difference is between a hierarchy and a realm? If the answer is “they just are”, colour me unenlightened. Supplying the answer beforehand? Hierarchy just refers to a scale. An individual molecule is at a different level in the hierarchy of size from the aggregate it is a part of. Both exist within the same realm. A table exists in the ‘real physical world’ and its (putative) perception exists within a consciousness. Two different realms. > [@](#): > > So we agree that Shakey’s conscious experience is _explained_ by, is _caused_ by, the computational processing which is no more mysterious than that under your desk? If Shakey is conscious, and physicalism is true. I don’t believe the latter. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 8, 2005, 9:32am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/86 "2005-06-08T09:32:12Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > On the contrary, it is a good reason to not be certain about your beliefs. And I’m not, but I didn’t ask that question. I’m not asking whether we can be 100% (or 0%) certain of anything (and I agree we _can’t_, really), but whether that inability to be certain causes us to **believe** (_ie._ ascribe \>50%) in things. I assume that you, like me, _don’t_ believe in fairies despite not ascribing literally _zero_ probability to their existence. Again, “Because one can’t be _certain_ they’re not there” is **not** a very good reason to do believe in things, agreed? > [@](#): > > How much does consciousness weigh? Where is the perception of the things I dream about, located in physical space? Waves, or accelerations, or computer programs don’t necessarily weigh anything or have spatial co-ordinates either. I am suggesting that consciousness is, effectively, a running program. > [@](#): > > First off, lack of alternatives, by itself, isn’t a reason to positively believe what you do. See above. Is it not reasonable to keep _working consclusions_ in mind given an utter lack of alternatives? > [@](#): > > Second, we need to know what else possesses memories in order to demarcate commonalities. OK, what do you suggest, in your opinion, has _no_ memory? > [@](#): > > Because consciousness itself, is not physical…Two different realms…and physicalism is true. I don’t believe the latter. Forgive me for considering all of these “they just are” answers - I’ll try another tack: You said earlier that everything, including molecules, had a _mental component_. And so, presumably, the physical components of molecules of LSD or sevofluorane have effects on the physical brain, while the difference in _consciousness_ they cause is due to their _mental_ components. (And presumably, molecules of, say, _water_ have physical effects but **no** mental effects, and thus we could never decide whether water had any mental component at all.) You see, what I suspect is that what you call the “consciousness” of molecules is what I merely call their **potential** to _form part of a conscious system_, just as molecules _potentially_ form part of a living, climatic or computational system but neither of us call those molecules themselves “life”, “weather” or “computers”. And so when you call a dead body “differently conscious”, all you are doing is setting thresholds of “difference” where I set thresholds of “is/is _not_”. My “matter” versus “_same_ matter **+ _activity_** ” treatment might even convince you that one could reasonably label the dead body **less** conscious than the living one: my “is/is **not** ” threshold would then be comparable to yours of “is/is **less** ”. And _If so_, our positions would not really be so far apart after all, perhaps even as insignificant as our pronunciations of the word “tomato”. Do you think this is a fair (or even _interesting_:)) analysis? ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [June 8, 2005, 9:46am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/87 "2005-06-08T09:46:55Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > I am suggesting that consciousness is, effectively, a running program. Except that consciousness is tangible. A wave is a label given to a dynamic arrangement whose components are physical. Particles A, B, C in nodal positions or energy, D,E,F in antinodal positions, G,H,I somewhere in between. Consciousness may be caused physically, but none of its components are physical themselves, including the phenomenon. > [@](#): > > See above. Is it not reasonable to keep _working consclusions_ in mind given an utter lack of alternatives? Working conclusions define framework and narrow field of vision. > [@](#): > > OK, what do you suggest, in your opinion, has _no_ memory? I don’t know. > [@](#): > > You said earlier that everything, including molecules, had a _mental component_. And so, presumably, the physical components of molecules of LSD or sevofluorane have effects on the physical brain, while the difference in _consciousness_ they cause is due to their _mental_ components. (And presumably, molecules of, say, _water_ have physical effects but **no** mental effects, and thus we could never decide whether water had any mental component at all.) I’m not so sure, water has no mental effects. Depends on the circumstances. Even LSD does not provokes its characteristic reaction if taken continuously for 5 days in a row. > [@](#): > > You see, what I suspect is that what you call the “consciousness” of molecules is what I merely call their **potential** to _form part of a conscious system_, Only if I define a ‘conscious system’ as somehow isomorphic, even rudimentarily, to human consciousness. A conscious system is not the same as consciousness. This debate has gone on long enough, without any discernible breakthrough. It’s best if some lurking third-party can comment on our debate and clarify, if needed. Also, if Aeschines can be notified. A new pair of eyes might provide a new perspective. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 8, 2005, 10:16am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/88 "2005-06-08T10:16:12Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > Except that consciousness is tangible. I thought you said its whole mystery is that it _isn’t_, that you _can’t_ touch it or hold it? It sounds like your use of ‘tangible’ is different to mine. > [@](#): > > Consciousness may be caused physically, but none of its components are physical themselves And this is, ultimately, what I can’t understand. A _process_, such as a tree _falling_ or a computer _running_, cannot be picked up and weighed, and yet we still call them _physical processes_. > [@](#): > > A conscious system is not the same as consciousness. This is promising, I think. It sounds like we might debate whether physical _processes_ are **as** physical **as** objects on this basis (as I eventually convinced **other-wise** of, I think). Of course I agree that a falling tree is not the same as “falling”. > [@](#): > > This debate has gone on long enough, without any discernible breakthrough. It’s best if some lurking third-party can comment on our debate and clarify, if needed. Also, if Aeschines can be notified. A new pair of eyes might provide a new perspective. So be it, my friend. I hope I may have convinced you that skepticism regarding the explanations of consciousness provided by cognitive science does not _require_ you to call corpses and molecules “conscious” any more than skepticism regarding abiogenesis has you calling corpses and molecules “alive”. Indeed, like I say, it might well be that your “conscious/_differently_ conscious” (or “is/is _less_ conscious”) threshold is actually _equivalent_ to my “is/is **not** conscious” threshold, and we’re just using different words. Thanks again for your contribution. ---
**Author:** ![Hoodoo\_Ulove](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/58956e/32.png) [@Hoodoo\_Ulove](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Hoodoo_Ulove)\ **Post date:** [June 8, 2005, 1:23pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/89 "2005-06-08T13:23:35Z")
**SM** , does it _feel_ like anything to be Shakey? ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 8, 2005, 1:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/90 "2005-06-08T13:43:31Z")
> [@](#): > > **SM** , does it _feel_ like anything to be Shakey? We must be very careful here. What it “feels like” to be _me_ depends on _my **human** _ cognitive apparatus which, at any waking moment, receives information from billions of nerves all over my body and involves feedback to and from emotional and analytical cognitive modules which were shaped by billions of years of evolution, all of which is absent from Shakey (or indeed _animals or babies_ at some arbitrary threshold in evolution or gestation). But to answer your question as honestly and forthrightly as I can, **yes**. I believe that on some rudimentary level, it does just about “feel like” something to be Shakey just as I suggest that it just about “feels like” something to be a honey bee, and I suggest that a virus is just about “alive”. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 8, 2005, 2:01pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/91 "2005-06-08T14:01:39Z")
And to clarify, only when Shakey is _switched on_ and thus the program comprising the activity in the chips and memory is _running_ (_ie._ causes him to continually ask the question \*is it a box? is it a box? is it a box? is it…) ---
**Author:** ![Hoodoo\_Ulove](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/58956e/32.png) [@Hoodoo\_Ulove](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Hoodoo_Ulove)\ **Post date:** [June 8, 2005, 2:20pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/92 "2005-06-08T14:20:16Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > . . . it does just about “feel like” something to be Shakey. “just about”? Huh? To me, this implies that it just about feels like something to be a thermostat, and by extension of the same principle that all matter sorta, kinda, in a way, _experiences_ stuff. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 8, 2005, 2:34pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/93 "2005-06-08T14:34:32Z")
> [@Hoodoo Ulove](#): > > “just about”? Huh? To me, this implies that it just about feels like something to be a thermostat, and by extension of the same principle that all matter sorta, kinda, in a way, _experiences_ stuff. Well, I 've said all along that the reason Shakey can _label_ things even when he’s _not looking at them right now_ is by storing those states in memory, to be continually processed while _other_ input comes in. It is this _working memory_ which I consider the crucial difference between the simplest examples of actual **cognition** (like, say, Shakey, the bee, or the 7 week foetus) and things which simply _react_ to their environment like molecules, amoebas, blastocysts and thermostats. Now, I’m happy to accept that “experience” might require _more_ than this (perhaps even some _emotional_ moderation which only occurs in the amygdala of mammals, say) just as I accept that viruses might not really constitute “life”. But labelling viruses “just about” alive does not have me saying that rocks or molecules are sorta, kinda, in a way, _alive_. We must all choose such arbitrating criteria if we are not to be pan_vitalists_, or pan_computationists_, or whatever. ---
**Author:** ![Hoodoo\_Ulove](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/58956e/32.png) [@Hoodoo\_Ulove](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Hoodoo_Ulove)\ **Post date:** [June 8, 2005, 3:29pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/94 "2005-06-08T15:29:49Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > Now, I’m happy to accept that “experience” might require _more_ than this (perhaps even some _emotional_ moderation which only occurs in the amygdala of mammals, say) just as I accept that viruses might not really constitute “life”. But labelling viruses “just about” alive does not have me saying that rocks or molecules are sorta, kinda, in a way, _alive_. We must all choose such arbitrating criteria if we are not to be pan_vitalists_, or pan_computationists_, or whatever. I agree that your functional criteria for cognition are reasonable. And I agree that cognition is a phenomenon arising from the configuration of neural systems. But . . . There’s still this puzzlement about experience. I’ve read Dennett, and sometimes I think, while I’m reading him, that I’m starting to get a feel for his argument. But so far, his intuition pumps haven’t generated sufficient pressure to flush the confusion from my system. Don’t you ever feel anything like this? Earlier, you expressed a wish to get into some of the scientific work about the nature of cognition. Could you give us a critical review of what you consider some of the most interesting stuff? ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 8, 2005, 3:47pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/95 "2005-06-08T15:47:53Z")
> [@Hoodoo](#): > > I’ve read Dennett, and sometimes I think, while I’m reading him, that I’m starting to get a feel for his argument. But so far, his intuition pumps haven’t generated sufficient pressure to flush the confusion from my system. Don’t you ever feel anything like this? Certainly I do. _Consciousness Explained_ is by no means an easy read. It is made out to be for the general public, but is actually far more geared towards Dennett’s peers: it first took me over a month and I’ve recently read it again in a similar time frame. Don’t forget that he is (bravely, or _recklessly_, YMMV) trying to take on **human** consciousness and **all** (or _most_ of) its myriad complexities. > [@](#): > > Earlier, you expressed a wish to get into some of the scientific work about the nature of cognition. Could you give us a critical review of what you consider some of the most interesting stuff? Don;t get me wrong, **Hoodoo** , I’m no expert! I can only point to a few interesting experiments and discuss their implications and interpretations, and I 've largely only read popular books which many others here have. Still, for what it’s worth, Stephen Pinker is rather easier than Dennett in that he leads us along an _evolutionary_ timeline, allowing an intuition that “I’ve got _more of_ what the bee’s got” to form more gradually. Jerry Fodor encouages similar gradual intuition from an AI perspective (and his _dis_agreements with Pinker are insightful themselves!) George Lakoff and his cognitive science of _mathematics_ is pretty much “cutting edge”, I think. ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [June 8, 2005, 8:10pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/96 "2005-06-08T20:10:32Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > I thought you said its whole mystery is that it _isn’t_, that you _can’t_ touch it or hold it? It sounds like your use of ‘tangible’ is different to mine. Tangible for the recipient, not the third-party. > [@](#): > > And this is, ultimately, what I can’t understand. A _process_, such as a tree _falling_ or a computer _running_, cannot be picked up and weighed, and yet we still call them _physical processes_. Because they are labels given to physical change. There are no privileged entities or processes associated with them. If you can theoretically describe all physical activity associated with those two events, you have described everything there is to know. Not so with a human brain. The phenomenal character of the neural activity is still missing. > [@](#): > > So be it, my friend. I hope I may have convinced you that skepticism regarding the explanations of consciousness provided by cognitive science does not _require_ you to call corpses and molecules “conscious” any more than skepticism regarding abiogenesis has you calling corpses and molecules “alive”. Not again. I’ve maintained that nothing, so far, _requires_ me to call anything as anything. Panpsychism is a _less arbitrary assumption_ than physicalism. That’s all. ---
**Author:** ![Aeschines](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/aeschines/32/16251_2.png) [@Aeschines](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Aeschines)\ **Post date:** [June 22, 2005, 9:24pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/97 "2005-06-22T21:24:08Z")
I hope you guys are still up for a debate, because I never saw this thread up. I am going to do the _right_ thing, take notes, and then come back and take numbers. 😉 Who knows, maybe **Gyan’s** having gone first all the way through will end up producing a better debate. I can clarify a few things about my position, though. I would say that the Divine is a principle within That Which Is/Reality/All Things; it is not merely equivalent to them. I would agree that my philosophy is monist, similar to that of Plotinus (though I would not claim to be well-read in his works). I also admire Avicenna and Averroes in certain respects (again, won’t claim to be well-read). Some Leibniz, too. Anyway, I’ll do some reading, and let the games begin again… tonight! PS–Thanks for the heads up, **II Gyan II**. ---
**Author:** ![Aeschines](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/aeschines/32/16251_2.png) [@Aeschines](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Aeschines)\ **Post date:** [June 23, 2005, 3:06am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/98 "2005-06-23T03:06:14Z")
OK, let’s do this. **Post #1:** Responses to **Sentient Meat’s** original arguments. Throughout I will paraphrasing closely for compactness. > [@](#): > > Let us hypothesise that at midnight on this New Years Eve, cephalic necrosis occurs and I am brain-dead, ie. non-alive… **1, 2, 3)** I contend that some transition in the status of my consciousness occurs at midnight: it becomes absent, diminishes to nothing. I agree that the status of your consciousness would change at midnight; however, it would not diminish to nothing, as there is life after death. In fact, according to NDExperiencers, consciousness _sharpens and increases_ in the Afterlife. > [@](#): > > Anesthetic: Let’s say that instead of undergoing cephalic necrosis at midnight, a quantity of sevofluorane is administered, and I undergo an operation. \*\*4)\*\*Again, I contend that some transition in the status of my consciousness occurs at midnight. It becomes diminished. I become unconscious. (I won’t say completely absent at this point since some basic brain function is still extant). Yes, that sounds right. > [@](#): > > \*\*5, 6, 7)\*\*Babies: Just as midnight 2005 signaled some transition in my consciousness, so did the year 1973 (or, perhaps, the period 1973-1977, say). It intensified, and it emerged where there was none before 1973. I would agree that the consciousness of the current you intensified during that period if you say so; I think that’s the general trend. It probably didn’t emerge out of nothing; it would seem that most of us transition from another existence to this world when we are born. I.e., reincarnation. > [@](#): > > Animals: I, an adult human, have this thing called “consciousness.” 8, 9, 10) There are some things in the history of evolution whose consciousness is different to that which we adult humans have, some things on that list have diminished consciousness compared to us, and some don’t have any. I basically agree. Caveats: Some animals may share a group soul, and some may be more highly self-aware than we are while not as intelligent. There are many possibilities. > [@](#): > > **11)** I could, conceivably, have a first computer build a virtual environment and a second, connected, computer run the virtual machine in it. That virtual environment could be extremely detailed. Sounds reasonable. > [@](#): > > **12)** The second computer would then be functionally equivalent to some of the organisms on the list of things in the history of evolution. No, this makes no sense whatsoever. A computer is a consciously created tool, and a living thing is not. And what does “functionally” mean in this context? **Post #8** : **Sentient** responding to **Gyan** : > [@](#): > > RNA molecules, or the stars and planets, are conscious? I must say, that’s quite a bullet to bite, and thanks for your honesty. **Gyan** said his understanding of consciousness was that it was universal. I think he’s right, but here’s the twist: The Universe as a whole is conscious, while at the same time there can be local pockets of consciousness. The base state of That Which Is is Sat-Chit-Ananda, or Being-Conciousness-Bliss. It is the One, equivalent to Nothing and Everything at once. This beer bottle here (empty: I drank the beer) is an unconscious part of Universal Consciousness. But remember: My hands are not conscious; my cerebellum is not conscious; even my brain cannot be conscious without my body. Yet all these things are integral parts of a conscious system. > [@](#): > > I would suggest that human consciousness is merely a different operation than that of other life-forms or the camcorder-Doom machine. I’m still not getting the especial value of the Doom analogy, but I basically agree with what you say here: Human consciousness is a type of pattern, or “operation” if you will. **Post #11** : **Sentient** responding to **Gyan** : > [@](#): > > We could conceivably anaesthetise a patient until they were very close to death in terms of brain activity. At the point of death, would the consciousness leap up from that diminished level to the “different” consciousness? Surely it would make sense to conclude that the consciousness, if anything, diminishes further at death? According to NDExperiencers, that’s exactly what happens: Once brain activity ceases they “leap up” into an out-of-body state characterized by acute mental clarity (but not everyone has an OBE; some remain in the “diminished” state). I think sleep is a better example. We get to experienced altered consciousness that way every day. In sleep the ability for self-reflection goes nighty-night (especially reflecting on our own thoughts–I call this a “loop,” and we can have more than one at one time. Sleep pretty much takes away the loop. High-level meditation can take it away too, but in the reverse direction). **Post #12** : **Gyan** responding to **Sentient** : > [@](#): > > What does “less” conscious mean? Consciousness isn’t the same, but what’s less and what’s more? I agree with this. I think differences in consciousness tend to be qualitative rather than quantitative. Sure, it’s not much of a stretch to refer to sleep as “diminished” consciousness, though it would probably be a mistake to think that the sleep state is brought about by a particular thing becoming less and less. According to what I’ve heard (and experienced), you pretty much snap right into a theta state, at which point you’re out, and then go on to delta and REM/dreaming. So I would say it’s a matter of all/nothing and not less/more. **Post #15** : **Sentient** describes his version of physicalism (I think **Gyan** proves nicely that this is not standard physicalism with his link): > [@](#): > > It takes what we (largely) all agree is physical, such as cells and computers, and asks whether consciousness might be explained using only these entities. In other words, this version takes everything that we know of, labels it “physical,” and asks whether there is another that we _don’t_ know about that could possibly explain consciousness. We don’t largely agree that cells and computers are “physical” unless there is something out there non-physical that makes the distinction worth making. **Post #15** : **Sentient** explains his physicalist interpretation of consciousness: [quote] here is no singular “physical theory of consciousness” as such, rather there are different variations on a mode of explanation. The general mode is that mind is a computational phenomenon, in which sensory input is processed in working memory via various modules shaped by evolution. If you can imagine that animals or Sonic the camcorder Doom-player have a “Point of View”, we can discuss which modules, and of what general kind, might be required in order for them to develop into what might approach waking human consciousness. [quote] In other words, stripped of the chrome and fins, “The brain does it.” Not that it’s not important work, but I’ll repeat what I’ve said many times: We are not even at the phlogiston-vs.-oxygen stage of understanding how the mind/brain works. BTW, the Sonic analogy is completely worthless for understanding mind. I might as well ask how the two Hungry Hungry Hippos feel about their struggle for marbles or what it’s like for Woody Woodpecker to live inside a cartoon. There is no evidence at all that the brain functions like a digital computer. In fact, since we know for a fact there are no transistors in it , we can conclude that it does _not_ function like a computer. We may imagine, if we like, that neurons are like semiconductor devices, but the evidence from cognitive science is that human cognition is not based on a digital model (holographic memory, etc.). We then start getting more and more into the nits of the debate. I was intending to write a GD post outlining my philosophy, but here are the basics as I see them vis-a-vis what has been discussed in this debate: 1. The rules of pattern and number are the foundation of the That Which Is. There is no personal “God” who created things at first (although intelligences later could and did [at least humans] create things). All things are derived from these principles; all things are pattern and number. 2. Mind and matter are also patterns. 3. We know some things about That Which Is, but this is just an infintissimal percentage of the knowable. Some things may be completely beyond the understanding of our minds. 4. Human consciousness is a semi-self-aware pattern. We know it depends on the human body and especially the brain for its existence, but we also know that it outlives the body. _How_ any of this is possible is unknown to us. We are not even at the stage where we know what we don’t know; we are merely assembling a few facts at a time in preparation for the next stage. Also, to clarify, I don’t call my overall philosophy “pantheism,” although that’s not too far from the truth. I call myself a pantheist on the Spirituality Axis in order to answer the question “Is there a God?” I say, yes, basically, the things people believe about God are out there, but they are contained by the whole Universe, not by a single being. ---
**Author:** ![Hoodoo\_Ulove](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/58956e/32.png) [@Hoodoo\_Ulove](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Hoodoo_Ulove)\ **Post date:** [June 23, 2005, 1:58pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/99 "2005-06-23T13:58:37Z")
> [@Aeschines](#): > > . . .all things are pattern and number. “All things are pattern” sounds tautological. “All things are number” sounds false. I’m not a number, as the song goes. Since this seems to be your core metaphysical position, some expansion seems in order. It seems the only testable, empirical consequence you’ve mentioned of your views is life after death. You seem in the past to have been ambivalent about literal reincarnation, that is, souls popping directly from the dying to the next born. Again, more detail is requested. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 23, 2005, 3:29pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033/100 "2005-06-23T15:29:22Z")
Many thanks for joining in, **Aeschines**. > [@](#): > > I agree that the status of your consciousness would change at midnight; however, it would not diminish to nothing, as there is life after death. In fact, according to NDExperiencers, consciousness _sharpens and increases_ in the Afterlife. OK, just for future reference, I’ll say what I said to **Gyan** : I _understand_ what the options are. Throughout, I’ll be interested in which alternative _you_ choose, and why. At any point, I’ll be happy to try and explain which gun-to-head fence jump _I_ would make. So, given all available evidence including the testament of these NDErs (and temporal lobe epileptics), do _you_ believe in a sharpened, increased consciousness after death? > [@](#): > > I think that’s the general trend. It probably didn’t emerge out of nothing; it would seem that most of us transition from another existence to this world when we are born. I.e., reincarnation. Given that there are humans alive today than at any other single time in history, and that a few billion years ago there was no life on Earth of any kind, surely _some_ consciousnesses must emerge from nothing? Or are there an infinity or near-infinity of souls waiting to be born, in your opinion? > [@](#): > > I basically agree. Caveats: Some animals may share a group soul, and some may be more highly self-aware than we are while not as intelligent. There are many possibilities. Could you possibly try and express your general feeling of where on the timeline of evolution the first individual conscious life-form appeared? (My own is roughly at the level of bees, which can process sensory information in working memory and “choose” to write the word for “near” or “far” on the honeycomb with their dance.) > [@](#): > > No, this makes no sense whatsoever. A computer is a consciously created tool, and a living thing is not. And what does “functionally” mean in this context? I don’t quite see why the mechanism for how the machine (be it silicon or carbon) is built is so fundamentally important. If the camcorder-Doom player processes sensory information via working memory in order to accomplish tasks essential for its survival (and crucially, _succeeds_), it is doing exactly what a squid, or an insect, or a lizard is doing, yes? If it were somehow able to _replicate_ itself, it could hold its own in the evolutionary fight for survival alongside its biological bretheren, could it not? I’m interested in the fundamental difference you are proposing between animals and machines. > [@](#): > > The Universe as a whole is conscious, while at the same time there can be local pockets of consciousness. Just to clarify, I agree that it is possible (but unlikely) that the universe is conscious (there’s no working, accessible memory in my book). Would you afford me the same courtesy and agree that it is possible that there are _only_ local pockets of consciousness? > [@](#): > > It is the One, equivalent to Nothing and Everything at once. (A&-A) is true? Perhaps it would be better to avoid this path for now. > [@](#): > > My hands are not conscious; my cerebellum is not conscious; even my brain cannot be conscious without my body. Yet all these things are integral parts of a conscious system. Note that, in that case, it might be said that all of those elements of the conscious system _are_ “a little bit” conscious. Like I said, we might all be saying similar things using different words. > [@](#): > > I’m still not getting the especial value of the Doom analogy, but I basically agree with what you say here: Human consciousness is a type of pattern, or “operation” if you will. Would you be willing to admit that human consciousness is a _process_, a _temporal arrangement_ of particles and forces entering a device which filters, memorises and sorts those inputs? > [@](#): > > According to NDExperiencers, that’s exactly what happens: Once brain activity ceases they “leap up” into an out-of-body state characterized by acute mental clarity (but not everyone has an OBE; some remain in the “diminished” state). But they’re not actually _dead_ then - the ECG’s are still registering massive brain _activity_. I’m asking about cephalic necrosis (which _nobody_ has ever recovered from) in which the brain activity utterly and irrevocably flatlines **after** that activity which characterises **Near** Death Experiences. In any case, surely I am also experiencing that acute state right now _in addition to_ my brain-activity correlated state? > [@](#): > > According to what I’ve heard (and experienced), you pretty much snap right into a theta state, at which point you’re out, and then go on to delta and REM/dreaming. So the theta state is one of diminished consciousness? Could we agree that this state of diminished consciousness is **caused** by inactivity in certain brain regions? > [@](#): > > We don’’t largely agree that cells and computers are “physical” unless there is something out there non-physical that makes the distinction worth making. Well, you think that there are _mental_ entities which are not physical. I’m simply asking whether such entities could result solely from physical processes. I’m not too concerned about what word we use to describe them if that’s the case. You can call cells and computer games “God” if you like - to me, that would just be to tomato-_tomahto_. > [@](#): > > In other words, stripped of the chrome and fins, “The brain does it.” Not that it’s not important work, but I’ll repeat what I’ve said many times: We are not even at the phlogiston-vs.-oxygen stage of understanding how the mind/brain works. As I asked **Gyan** , would you characterise biology as “the cells do it”? Again, what fundamental difference between cognitive science and biological science are you proposing? I assume you’re not a panvitalist either. > [@](#): > > I might as well ask how the two Hungry Hungry Hippos feel about their struggle for marbles I tried to avoid the word “feel”, since this may well require complex feedback with chemical glands connected to a significance-judgement module in the limbic system (which, of course, insects or the camcorder-Doom player simply don’t have). And the Hungry Hippo or Woody don’t process sensory information in a working memory, so I don’t consider them conscious either. > [@](#): > > There is no evidence at all that the brain functions like a digital computer. And all through the thread, I have continually made it clear that there are indeed powerful _dis_analogies. But they _are_ alike in that they process, filter and store inputs from the wider world, and can communicate with other devices via encoded messages. This is why I hope to start with a discussion of memories, and the evidence that memories _are_ stored via tiny changes in a physical substrate in both (silicon computer and carbon human) instances. Rather than chemists and phlogistons, I’d suggest that neuroscientists are like WW2 codebreakers studying the Enigma machine, examining the outputs given known inputs. > [@](#): > > all things are pattern and number. Mind and matter are also patterns. Could this not be paraphrased “All things, including mind and matter, are temporal arrangements of fundamental particles and forces in spacetime”? > [@](#): > > Some things may be completely beyond the understanding of our minds. Agreed, given that our mindbrains evolved in the region of the universe having three dimensions of space and one of time. > [@](#): > > We know it depends on the human body and especially the brain for its existence, but we also know that it outlives the body. And you know that we do _not_ “know” this. It is what you _believe_ based on the testament of others and the epiphanic outputs of your own limbic system (which I have _also_ experienced, you’ll recall). I could just as well say that we **know** that consciousness begins at some point after conception, disappears occasionally throughout life, and ends at cephalic necrosis. But I wouldn’t, because that would be unhelpful grandstanding. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033.md?page=4) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/minds-death-anaesthetic-babies-animals-and-sonic-the-camcorder-doom-player/303033.md?page=6)