I respectfully disagree.
The Luzon straits, the Formosa straits, the Malacca straits, and the Java Sea, Sulu Sea, all are/have narrow choke points surrounded by, or easilly within range of, many airfields.
I agree the lack of a focus on airborne radar helped the US, but the Japanese had respectable maritime patrol aircraft in the Nell, Betty, Mavis, and Emily types, all with good range, and enough payload to mount a threat on a diesel submarine.
Impressive rebuttal, moreso since you in fact go on to address each comment individually.:rolleyes:
Which means what, exactly? I guess you didn’t read since I pointed out to you that the US Navy used Nouméa, New Caledonia as its main base of operations during the Solomons campaign. It didn’t need Pearl Harbor to operate out of, and while Pearl was convenient for moderate repair work, most major repair work was done stateside in any event.
There is no perhaps; again I guess you in fact did not read what I wrote. Those carriers were already under construction. To reiterate, there were more Essex-class fleet carriers under construction when war broke out as a result of the Two Ocean Navy Act than there were carriers in the entire Japanese navy. You clearly have not been reading either what others have written or the links I’ve provided, as the inability of Japan to produce skilled pilots in any appreciable quantity during wartime has already been noted by both TokyoBayer and the link I’ve cited.
Please feel free to give what I wrote an actual first reading. Had things gone far worse for the US from Pearl Harbor to mid-1943, even had the US lost catastrophically at Midway, the end result would have been exactly the same.
Japan attacked Pearl Harbor only after an assurance from Hitler that he would declare war on the U.S. afterward. And he did, four days later, December 11, 1941 (that, above all else was the deciding factor for Japan’s attack, and, IMO, the result of the war). No Hitler, no assurance, no attack.
No way Hirohito would have expected his forces to defeat the combined, unencumbered forces of America and England (and there would have been more) at the time without the considerable force and empowerment of Germany.
[quote=“nevadaexile, post:23, topic:687213”]
[li]A Japanese victory at Midway - American naval aircraft lucked out and found the Japanese during the Battle of Midway. Had they run out or fuel or turned back sooner, it’s likely that the Japanese would have won that battle and thus forced an American counter-attack after Pearl Harbor to early 1943 or later.[/li][/QUOTE]
It sounds like you’re forming this opinion based on the movie Midway which is skewed to treat its viewers with drama to make it interesting.
One really cannot blame the Japanese for seeking to expand beyond their borders considering how all the western powers had been doing the same. Look at the US for example. We helped the Philippines achieve independence in 1898, but then we went in to become their new landlords. Prior to that in the 1850’s Japan had been a nation content within its own borders until the US forced them to open up. A military expedition to Korea in the 1870’s did the same to them. Japan had also become embroiled in the Opium Wars started by Great Britain in China around 1900. GB 100 years earlier had taken over Australia and New Zealand. In fact every European power; Germany, the Netherlands, and France all had Asian colonies.
So looking at the region its no wonder Japan wanted in before they were cut off and maybe colonized themselves.
Now throw into that many “colonies” had strong forces pushing for independence.
It was a very volatile coming so yes, war would have come sooner or later.
Japan didn’t seek or get assurance from Hitler that he would declare war on the US if it attacked Pearl Harbor; Hitler had no idea Japan planned to attack US and British possessions on Dec 7, 1941 until after it happened. Neither was he obliged to declare war in support of Japan, the Tripartite Pact was a defensive pact, which is why Japan was not obliged to declare war on the USSR when Germany invaded it on June 22, 1941. From wiki on consequences of the attack on Pearl Harbor:
Hirohito was not at the center of the planning for the war, and in fact his constitutional role was to “accept the advice” of the cabinet.
His decision to impose his will and force the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War and the cabinet to surrender was actually beyond his constitutional role.
In reality, as I noted several times in this thread, local commanders were making decisions and taking actions which placed Japan in war with various countries. Feel free to direct any comments to those posts.
To further your comments with something which others may not know, this directly led to the Second Happy Time in which the U-Boats made hay while the sun shined.
The US stupidly failed to take basic steps such as coastal blackouts, run convoys and such.
As a point of reference, Allied submarines sank about 5 million tons of Japanese shipping during the entire war.
By 1941 there was zero chance of Japan becoming colonized. Even by 1905 when they defeated the Tsar’s navy or by 1895 when they beat China the first time.
Actually, it was well before that, but that can be a different debate.
I’m not sure the reason for the double quotes around “colonies,” perhaps you could let us know what you mean. In the late 30s and early 40s, where there any “colonies” (with or without the double quotes) which had strong forces pushing for independence which contributed to Japan’s eagerness for war?
I don’t see the US declaring war on Japan, I see the US taking actions such as the oil embargo which then leads Japan to make the first move.
Which may be one reason the Japanese were as foolhardy as they were. But it’s more likely that they were simply fools.
How much “shared British technology” are you claiming for the “jump starting” the nuclear effort? Cite, please.
Ummm. No. Japan had not been creating a modern war machine for “decades.” Like the other powers, any of their planes and ships over a few years old were obsolete.
They did have the advantage of war experience in China and that no one was paying any attention to them.
However, if there hadn’t have been that Hitler thing going on to distract everyone, lots more countries would have been looking at their aircraft.
Japan was never going to get into a war with Germany. The comparison is meaningless.
Likewise, the battle with the USSR would primarily be on land. Naval power would not play a part.
The IJN could have beaten up the French navy a bit and would have done very well against the RN, but they would not have had the luxury of picking just one. Without a war in Europe, the French, the British and the US would have gotten involved.
Another thing to not overlook is the problem that the IJN had less than one year’s worth of oil reserves, and as they would not have been able to cease the DEI, there would only be a limited amount of action that those super battleships could have done.
Regardless of any initial naval successes they may possible have had against a set of non-distracted Allies, if they had any of significance the IJA did not have the capacity to defeat the British and French armies which would have been stationed in Singapore, Malay and Indochina.
In this hypothetical, either the US is more interested in Japan, in which the Philippines are better prepared and the IJA is unable to take it or it is less interested, in which the Pacific fleet is safely back in San Diago, and the US and Filipino forces fall back on their planned retreat to Baatan, but they would be more likely to have food supplies to hold out for the planned six months.
At either rate, along with cooperation with the other Allies, the US would be able to better withstand a Japanese attack.
(post shortened)
In 1940, Great Britain had the expertise and the desire to build an atomic weapon. What it didn’t believe it had was the time, money, and manpower. G.B. had a more pressing traditional fight on its hands. Sharing atomic programs and designs (The Rolls Royce Merlin engine was built in the U.S. by the Packard Motor Car Company) made wartime sense.
*Frisch & Peierls
In February 1940, Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls, working at the University of Birmingham in the UK, considered the possibility of fast fission in uranium-235. They estimated the critical mass of pure U-235 was only “a pound or two”, and that much of this mass would react before the rest was blown away by the explosion. They estimated the likely effects of the bomb, possible methods of assembly and made estimates on how feasible it was to separate the uranium-235. They prepared a memorandum, the Frisch–Peierls memorandum, on their discovery and gave a copy to their professor, Marcus Oliphant, who passed to Henry Tizard, the chairman of the Committee on the Scientific Survey of Air Defence, which was the most important scientific committee for defence in Britain.*
And then there’s MAUD.
*First meetings
At Tizard’s behest, the Maud Committee first met on 10 April 1940 to consider Britain’s actions regarding the “uranium problem”. A research programme on isotope separation and fast fission was agreed upon. In June 1940 Franz Simon was commissioned to research on isotope separation through gaseous diffusion. Ralph H. Fowler was also asked to send the progress reports to Lyman Briggs in America from that date.
The Maud Committee acquired its code name in July 1941 by the British Government. MAUD stands for Military Applications of Uranium Detonation, hence MAUD.
The MAUD Committee consisted of:
Sir George Paget Thomson, Chairman
Marcus Oliphant
Patrick Blackett
James Chadwick
Philip Moon
John Cockcroft
Although the original work had been done by Frisch and Peierls, one was German, one was Austrian and so were “officially” classified as “enemy aliens” and could not be a part of a wartime committee. (Later they both made significant contributions at Los Alamos as part of the British Mission.)*
(post shortened)
Decades = twenty or more years. Modern military buildups began again after WWI ended. (Except in the U.S…)
Obsolete is a relative term. Technology was changing quickly, but just like a street racer, a nation would run-what-they-brung when the bullets started flying and people started dying.
In this thread, the thing with Adolf didn’t occur. Imperial Japan began it’s current expansion in 1931. It’s unlikely that Imperial Japan would have attacked multiple colonies of different European powers, at the same time. If Germany had become involved or was thought to be standing in the way of Imperial Japanese expansion, it’s very possible that Germany and Imperial Japan would have gone toe-to-toe.
Unlike with Russia, which was still embareassed by it’s last dust up with Imperial Japan and Stalin was busy murdering Russian military and civilians.
The U.S. wouldn’t have been involved in an Asia-(insert European country name here) war unless someone began shooting at U.S…
No one, not the U.S. government, not the U.S. business establishment, not the U.S. workers, not the Allied powers, not the Axis powers actually understood how large the U.S. could build it’s military (from 500,000 in 1940 to 12 million in 1945) or how quickly the U.S. could build tanks, planes, firearms, ships, clothing, and still feed such a large, scattered force.