I was at that game too the city is stupid.
At least the streak is over, no?
Uh-oh…only 2.5 games back. Start winning again Reds!
This is the truth. The Reds should have buried everyone else in the division, but now the Pirates are only 2.5 behind. I for one am amazed that the pirates are staying in this, but I am thrilled! Im trying to temper my excitement because of the two decades of futility, but maybe… Just maybe the pirates will be a part of the post season.
The redsmlost their fourth in a row tonight, so a big shouting goes to the Brewers, who haven’t had the best year this season, but who have abused the Pirates just about every year. If the pirates win tomorrow and reds lose, we will be heading into the weekend only 1.5 back.
This is the best August I can remember in years! They are currently 16 games above .500. That’s rarified air they are playing in these days.
Surprising stat of the day: The Giants have scored 290 runs on the road this year.
That’s more than the Rangers, more than the Cardinals, more than the Yankees, more than any other team in MLB except the Angels.
But they have only scored 180 runs at home in their giant stadium. In 1 less game. That’s the 2nd worst in MLB.
They’ve got essentially the same differential for runs allowed: 165 at home, 275 on the road.
They play in a serious pitchers’ park, is all.
Nats keep winning, but Braves win too, still 4 ahead. I can understand why Davey decided to let Gio go for the complete game last night, given that he’d used 6 pitchers on Tuesday and 7 on Monday, but it got pretty hairy at the end there.
That’s past serious and into insane. That’s like the opposite of Coors Field.
FWIW, here’s a list (from a random message board, not checked) of the top 10 full-season winning percentage differentials:
Team W% PWL Difference
1905 Detroit Tigers .516 .420 +97
1981 Cincinnati Reds .611 .527 +85
1955 KC Athletics .409 .329 +80
1894 NY Giants .667 .587 +80
1943 Boston Braves .444 .366 +78
2005 Arizona D-Backs .475 .398 +77
1972 NY Mets .532 .455 +77
1918 Brooklyn Robins .452 .377 +76
1984 NY Mets .556 .482 +74
1994 Pittsburgh Pirates .465 .392 +73
1885 Providence Grays .482 .409 +73
Baltimore is currently at about +97, so they would be at the top of that list.
What is this Pythagorean you all are talking about?
It’s just a way of predicting how many wins and losses a team will have given their runs scored and allowed.
Originally it was runs scored squared divided by runs scored squared plus runs allowed squared equals winning percentage. Now apparently they find that an exponent of 1.83 works a little better than 2, but they’re close.
Teams that wildly under- or over-perform their Pythagorean record are usually just lucky or unlucky, and are likely to revert to the winning percentage you’d expect.
IIRC, Bill James said back in the 1982 Abstract that the 1.83 exponent was slightly more accurate.
It’s possible that a reality that fails to conform to a simple statistical model simply represents luck, even over most of a season, but that is *not *the best default assumption.
As for Showalter, I was of course referring to his turning his teams from mediocrity (or nonexistence, in the D’backs’ case) into winners over the course of *multiple *seasons. It does take a second full season for his methods and people to take hold, but that’s still damn fast. He does seem to wear out his welcome, though.
Going to baseball-reference, we see:
Yankees
1991 (pre-Buck): 71-91
1992 (Year 1): 76-86
1993 (Year 2): 88-74
D’backs (expansion, but he was running the baseball side and the minor league teams for a year prior)
1998: 65-97
1999: 100-62
Rangers:
2002 (pre-Buck): 72-90
2003: 71-91
2004: 88-73
O’s:
2009 (pre-Buck): 64-98
2010 (pre-Buck): 32-73
2010: 34-23
2011: 69-93
2012: 60-51 to date
See a pattern there?
And, his previous organizations have stayed strong since. Whatever leadership skills he uses, whatever baseball knowledge or intuition comes into play, he’s still the equivalent of a turnaround-specialist CEO.
It certainly is the best default assumption, because the overwhelming mountain of evidence over the course of more then a century of baseball history is that it is not a repeatable ability. It also isn’t something Buck Showalter, personally, has ever done before.
That isn’t true either. The Yankees have stayed strong since, to be sure, though I’m not sure how much of that credit needs to go to Buck Showalter. The Diamondbacks hit absolute rock bottom in 2004, and the Rangers didn’t even stay strong while Showalter was still there; they had losing records in his third and fourth years as manager, upon which he was replaced by Ron Washington.
As to the Orioles, I’ll hold back my enthusiasm for a team that’s playing .541 baseball as of early August. They aren’t exactly the '86 Mets just yet.
The thing about Showalter is that he doesn’t just manage the team. He manages the entire environment. That can help change a culture of mediocrity around. Some say he’s way too much of a micro-manager, but it seems to work for him.
For a limited time.
There have been other managers like that. Frank Robinson comes to mind, as does Billy Martin, although Martin usually turned a team into a winner right away. But the common thread is a fairly quick improvement based on a lot of intensity at what would turn out to be an unsustainable level, resulting in the quick loss of most of the improvement.
Well, that’s fine, though, isn’t it? The cool thing about managers is you can fire them. If in fact Showalter can turn a team around but not sustain it - and I think he has a little more to prove in Baltimore, but they must have hired him for some reason - keep him for a couple of years and then fire him. Then some other shitty team should hire him.
I don’t see anything wrong with the fact that managers can be good at helping a team at one point but not in another. You hire a guy who’s good with the kids like Bobby Cox to train them up, then hire Buck Showalter to get them over the hump, then hire a Cito Gaston type to get the veterans to pump out a few championships, and then get some more kids and fire Gaston and bring back a Bobby Cox type. If you’re really, really lucky, maybe you find a guy who can keep it going for years and years, but you probably won’t get lucky, so why not hire the management you need?
I use Cito Gaston as an example because he was what his team desperately needed when they gave him the job in May 1989, but he should have been fired a few years before he was because he was no longer needed. In 1989 the team was loaded with talent, great talent, and started 12-24 because the team was a disorganized, lifeless mess led by a terrible manager. You had to see it to believe it; Loss #24 was the last straw, they looked like they were trying to lose. Gaston was just the right guy for a team of skilled veterans; he was a player’s manager who put people in defined roles, never asked a player to do anything outside his comfort zone, and didn’t experiment, but he knew everything that needed to be known about constructing a 25-man roster and managing a pitching staff. For a veteran team with talent he was the right man, because he put things on a even keel and knew how to keep big egos happy but in check. They immediately became a championship-level squad.
When the needs of the team changed, Cito was lost. In 1994-1997 the team’s veterans stopped producing but kids were available who could have been groomed and turned into stars. He couldn’t do it; he failed. He didn’t know how to handle young, unproven players, and so talents like Shawn Green, Carlos Delgado and such were either chased out of town or lost a few years of their development. I went to a game in 1997 where Green hit two home runs. Within days, Gaston benched Green - who batted .287 that year and had the second highest slugging percentage on the team - to play Ruben Sierra, who had been available for free for a reason. Six weeks later Sierra was gone; he was useless, as anyone could have seen. It was horrible, but Gaston couldn’t deal with the struggled of a young player; his thing was to put the established veteran in there and manage from there.
The entire history of the franchise would be different had Gaston been fired after the terrible 1995 season, when he deserved to be, and a manager willing to work with youth brought in. Who knows what could have happened? They produced lots of talent but didn’t have the manager to develop it.
But make no mistake; had they not given the job to Gaston in 1989, I don’t believe they win the World Series twice. Not as likely, anyway. He was the right man then.
RickJay, you make me wonder who might have been a good choice to replace Lou Piniella when he left Seattle. Bob Melvin sure wasn’t the answer.
I like Eric Wedge so far.
This is all true, but I don’t think it has much relevance to Buck Showalter or Frank Robinson, or Billy Martin other than the years he got the Yanks to the Series. (Since winning the WS is the ultimate objective, it matters a bit less if you leave a team somewhat depleted in the wake of that achievement.)
The question is, are these guys genuinely strengthening the team, or are they just creating a one- or two-year bump in its W-L record that won’t help it win in the following years, regardless of who is managing? IMHO, Robinson in Baltimore in 1989, or in DC in 2005, didn’t improve the team in ways that someone else could have built on, he just made them play more intensely. And when they were unable to sustain that intensity, or when pitchers’ arms blew out, they were back to square one.
Similarly with Martin in Oakland, especially with respect to the pitching staff - though maybe there, if ownership had been smart enough to kick Martin to the curb after 1980, the next manager would have had a staff that knew they could win, but hadn’t had their arms blown out yet.
Showalter in Baltimore is winning not because the team can produce more runs, or reduce the number of opposition runs, but because of their astronomical success in one-run and extra-inning games. (29-7, if I dealt with the double count correctly.) Who are you going to replace Showalter with who can build on that? *It’s not an improvement in the underlying strength of the team. There’s nothing to build on. * Whoever the O’s are going to follow Showalter with, they should really have hired instead of Showalter to begin with. There’s no complementarity here.
Oh, I agree you may be right, I was speaking in generalities. While I think Showalter’s track record is generally positive - after all, he twice left teams that won the World Series the year AFTER he left, and then made the playoffs the year after that - he has proven nothing in Baltimore, and his performance in Texas was unimpressive; they had a winning record his second year but played poorly in his third and fourth years, and they have since improved *and maintained success *under a very different manager. The Orioles are a team short on talent and long on luck. I have no faith they will continue to play well. They MIGHT play well the rest of the way but I think it’s likelier they won’t.
When it comes to managing there’s so much we don’t know about that it’s very difficult to judge. Managing skill is hidden by player skill. If a few guys have huge years, was that the manager? The coach? The player? Why did Leo Mazzone fail in Baltimore when he was so successful in Atlanta - was that luck, was it that Mazzone was never that good, was it that his techniques weren’t supported right in Baltimore? It’s so hard to tell. I can tell with great confidence that Jose Bautista is a player of unusual skill and helps his team win games; I cannot say if Cito Gaston or Dwayne Murphy deserve any credit for that. I think they deserve some credit for it, but how much, and how to apportion it, I cannot say.
Player performance is 98% visible; manager performance is 98% invisible. What we can see managers do - fill out lineups, manage bullpens, call for bunts and such - they all do more or less the same way these days, anyway. What they’re doing in the clubhouse and during practice we generally can’t see and is a matter of personal interaction and human dynamics that does not lend itself to easy measurement.