MMT Economics

Politically, maybe, but not economically unless (as you note) they don’t have enough assets to make an escape strategy.

But they have other methods of controlling inflation, like paying a higher IoER or mandating higher reserve requirements for banks.

This is an utterly meaningless distinction. It could not be more off the point. You have said so yourself: our wealth is ultimately about putting people back to work.

If there are more dollars out there bouncing around quickly, instead of privately-owned low-velocity assets, those dollars will seek out investment and consumption opportunities. Those new dollars will not want to sit still. With inflation expectations, there’s the hot potato effect which drives the process. Never forget velocity! Moving dollars will raise asset prices, buy up idle resources, seek out the surplus of productive capacity now available, and put people to work. Money is the medium of exchange. It circulates through the economy in a way no other private asset can possibly manage.

And of course, you stop supplying this money when your nominal spending gets back on track.

I didn’t say it was advisable. I said it was possible. I said speaking of money as a function of government spending is incorrect, mistaking what normally happens with what must happen.

One of the chief effects of the central bank’s power is that the assets are never fundamentally worth what they pay for them. Never.

The central bank pays “market price”, sure, but that’s a market price conditional on the fact that this one special player in the game can buy whatever the hell they want. The latest rounds of QE have had the central bank buy up assets at prices that banks are willing to sell those assets, but the price itself is not a Platonic ideal. Already calculated into the price is the idea that the central bank can buy effectively anything. The yield curve has been flattening lately. Why? Some say it’s because the Fed has been making noise about shifting tactics, no longer increasing the size of its balance sheet but changing the composition of its balance sheet, specifically, stocking up on more long-term bonds.

The very fact that there is a player capable of doing this on such a massive scale has already pushed up the price of these bonds (and pushed down their yields). The US 10-year is near 2% right now, gobsmackingly low, not based on the Fed actively intervening in the market, but quite likely based in part on the expectation of future intervention. Their power to make money gives them the power to shape expectations. Thus setting expectations is one of their most important tools. This has always been true. Gold didn’t used to be worth $20 an ounce because that was its fundamental value. Gold was worth $20 an ounce because they dictated that it be so.

The key now is changing expectations, even if we lose the fundamental values of the assets it purchases.

First, I haven’t exactly argued that there is a money multiplier, at least not in the Wikipedia sense. (On double-checking the article, I see Wikipedia now has an entry on the “loans first” model, which is good, because that model happens to be correct most of the time. Loans do generally (but not always!) come before reserves with the way banks are currently set up.)

But your final clause there is a doozy. It seems equivalent to saying that the central bank has no power on its own, which is absolutely incorrect. The Fed has oodles of power, all by its lonesome, with no need for any help from Treasury.

There is a limit to bank lending based on the supply of base available (or naturally, the expectation of what will be available in the future) regardless of how credit-worthy the borrowers are. New money is extremely powerful in the short-term. If there were no limit, then the Fed raising interest rates, i.e. sucking monetary base out of the system by selling assets (and, as always, the expectation that they will do so), would have no real effects. That is entirely contrary to the functioning of the real economy. Central banks are powerful. They can push economies into recession with buttons on their computers. And they have done so in the past. The Volcker recessions were caused by the Fed deliberately in order to rein in inflation. And they succeeded.

When people come to realize the implications of the loans-first model of the money multiplier, they tend to drop the whole edifice, as if the central bank has no power at all, as if supplying and retracting the base (or the expectation to do so) is not so important. I have seen the total rejection several times before, but I can never understand it. It makes no sense whatsoever.

The ability to supply new base money is an amazing power.

There is little direct mathematical relationship here. But why would there be?

Look at that Swiss link I posted. Go back and genuinely look at that graph at the bottom, the Swiss/Euro exchange rate. And understand something about that: The Swiss bank did not immediately start supply francs in exchange for euros automatically. They simply said they would do whatever it takes to get the rate back above 120. If you look at their money creation, you will not see a perfectly correlated spike in the aftermath of their press conference. They had utterly no need to create so much base immediately. The exchange markets, armed with clear expectations from the central bank in the aftermath of a credible policy announcement, did the job all by themselves.

Eventually, the markets could decide that Swiss inflation is creeping up high enough that the central bank will no longer be willing to expand its balance sheet without limit to keep the exchange rate at 120. The bank might have to take some pains to get the target where it wants. Or, if the macro variables dictate, their central bank could even change its mind and let the exchange rate drop. But for now, the markets fully believe their willingness and ability to meet their target, and that allowed them to reach their target by merely saying some words.

You’re focusing on total deposit liabilities (fairly close to the M2 money supply). You can see the lines of your graph start out close, then get further and further apart, as if the money multiplier were magically expanded. That seems strange only if you believe the naive version of the multiplier. If you look at the M3 (or the shadow M, if it could actually be measured), you would see an even larger discrepancy, even more quickly growing with more volatility, between the supply of base money and total money stock. That is to say, you’d see an even bigger “money multiplier”.

As what happens with any bank panic, you’d see those broader money supplies vanish in the wind, contract massively, in the wake of the bank run – the latest case being the run on repo and the collapse of many of those derivatives markets. The money is lent, the debt is created, far out of proportion to the productive capacity of the economy, and thus also out of proportion with the base needed to support it. The debt is called back, repo lenders demand redemptions, or larger haircuts on the collateral (equivalent to deposit withdrawals with a standard commercial bank). If it happens all at once, that means there is a bank run, and the bank doesn’t have enough money. The bank fails, the money supply collapses, the multiplier drops again.

The primary reason that the M2 didn’t collapse just as magnificently as the broader money supplies is deposit insurance.

But it’s not the “multiplier” per se that’s important. Central banks keep on eye on the money supplies, but they don’t care as much as you might think about multipliers. FRED doesn’t even keep track of the M2 multiplier (although it does have M1). As far as the Fed is concerned, banks can create as much money as they can, given their expectations about future central bank action. That’s not the central bank’s primary concern. The central bank wants financial stability, but at core they are trying to target macro variables.

Unfortunately, the Europeans chose the wrong variable.

The central bank obviously doesn’t work through a strict multiplier. It can’t. The legal enforcement of deposit reserves, at least in the US, isn’t nearly strict enough for that to work. And rightly so. The Fed works through a subtler mechanism based on expectations about macro variables. When the Fed was supplying enough money to allow nominal spending to increase at around 5% annually, the economy was good. The “multiplier” was growing, but that wasn’t the important part of the graph. The important part was the slow but steady increase in base, the Fed’s promise to offer more liquidity when it was needed. They didn’t need to keep up with the M2, they just needed to provide the expectation that they would be able to do so, if necessary, if they could also keep the big macro variables like inflation in place.

The macro variables are where it’s at. It was only when the Fed allowed the biggest drop in nominal spending since the Great Depression that we quite unsurprisingly had the biggest economic downturn since the Great Depression. They failed to pay attention to the right macro variable.

Contracts are typically written in nominal terms. People are typically paid in nominal wages. A huge chunk of our debt burden is a nominal burden. These are all nominal frictions, especially downward frictions. These numbers seriously don’t want to move downward. Wages are sticky, debt relief requires costly and time-consuming bankruptcies. When the total nominal output of our economy decreases, the friction from these burdens becomes incredibly severe. The solution is to relieve these nominal burdens and increase aggregate demand. The lack of credit-worthy borrowers is right now not a cause, but a result of these nominal burdens. If we were on the right macro track, our banking crises would be correspondingly less severe.

The most efficient way to relieve these nominal burdens is to create more money. Our traffic light for this money creation should be the future trend of nominal spending.

I’m on the verge of typing myself out here. I really don’t have anything more to say on this. Any more, and I’d be writing a macro/monetary policy textbook, and that would be rather excessive. If you have specific questions, I’ll try to answer them. But the main point you should take from this is that money is extremely powerful, despite whatever misconceptions might be floating out there about the money multiplier process. All of those high level money supplies come down, in the end, to a promise to back back monetary base on demand. If there is an expectation that there will be less money out there, and that it will be circulating less quickly through the economy, then lending will naturally contract and the money supplies fall. That’s one reason (among others) why the money supplies are unhelpful targets, as the original monetarists learned to their dismay.

You have to think about the economy itself, not just bank deposits.

I’m curious about IoER, because I don’t understand how that works. To my understanding the amount of excess reserves is determined by the Fed. You sometimes see references to banks failing to lend out their reserves, but banks - collectively - have whatever reserves the Fed provides - right?

I understand that, should the Fed decide to pay, say 5% on excess reserves, individually banks have little incentive to lend money out at less than that rate. Because individually, if a bank expands its balance sheet - relatively more than other banks - it will lead to a loss of reserves. If a bank can get 5% by not lending, therefore, there’s no reason for it to lend at a rate less than that.

So you have an increase in interest rates, which should translate into less borrowing, which translates into less money, which translates into less inflation… is that the idea?

That’s really a function of public expectations, isn’t it?

If there was, for instance, a high and unmet demand for the safest possible financial assets, dollars would tend to seek out those assets. In a situation where people were trying to net save, by paying down debt, dollars could also go in that direction, reducing debt/commercial bank deposits/money.

In other words, money could sit still, if people wanted safe financial assets or less debt rather than (or more than) they wanted to spend on goods or services or to invest. (And by “invest” I mean investments in the real economy, not merely bidding up the price pre- existing financial assets.)

**I’m out of time, for now.

The Fed has tripled its balance sheet over the last couple of years. Since most of its liabilities used to be US currency, reserves liabilities have gone from some very small number (something that looks like 0 on a graph) to $1.6 trillion.

Nevertheless, despite what seems like a fairly massive increase in base money, inflation (including food and energy) is running at 3.6% and the ten year - as you noted - is at about 2%. GDP is growing at a very slow rate, unemployment is high, and - other than Treasuries - asset prices are not going up.

I would argue that represents a high and unmet demand for the safest possible financial assets, and an attempt on the part of ordinary people to pay down debt.

So long as the Fed restricts itself to purchasing only the safest possible investments, it can’t change the situation. It can swap one kind of safe financial asset (bank deposits) for another (Treasuries, and “safe” private assets) but it can’t change the net amount. Of course, it can always choose to purchase risky assets - like gold and stocks - but there are risks to doing that, and I suspect central bankers would never do it; at least not voluntarily.

I do understand that the Fed is powerful, and that its decisions about what and how much of a particular asset to buy affect the asset’s price. I also understand that the Fed can provide any amount of liquidity, at whatever price it wants, and that it can keep any particular bank afloat - so long as it’s willing to lend to that bank - or all of them together. IOW, so long as it’s willing to take action, it can prevent 1930’s style bank runs.

I’m arguing what it cannot do, on its own, is to create net financial assets in the private sector, without compromising its own balance sheet.

I understand you to be saying that changing the composition of financial assets in the private sector - so that there are more bank deposits and fewer Treasuries, for example - makes a substantial difference in the real economy. I’m arguing that - at least under the current circumstances - it makes little or no difference.

If people were trying, on net, to sell Treasuries to get money to invest in the real economy, that would be a different situation. That’s not what’s going on now.

I agree that the central bank can suck money out of the economy, by selling off assets that it owns, such as Treasuries, or anything else that it has. When the central bank sells off its assets, it deprives the banks of reserves that they need in order transact business, and (at least theoretically) to meet reserve requirements. That drives up the price of the reserves (the Fed funds rate) which in turn drives up bank lending rates, which reduces the demand for loans, which reduces the amount of bank deposits, all of which leads to less inflation and more unemployment.

So it has the ability to create unemployment and reduce inflation in an inflationary environment.

But does it have the ability to turn around a situation like the one we’re in now?

Pretty much. Reserves are base money in bank possession, in the vault (on the Fed ledgers) and that is the majority of base money, minus the cash in the possession of drug dealers and so on.

Yep, that’s the general idea. Just remember it’s not only an incentive against loaning money, but also an incentive against money moving at all. It can reduce both the money supply and velocity. Traditional loans are not the only option available to banks.

I’m personally uncomfortable with IoER because it’s so new, especially since it’s being used so ineptly at present, but if you combine a drastic reduction in the balance sheet, higher reserve requirements, and higher IoER, you’ll slow money down right considerable.

Paying off debt puts the base money back in the banks’ hands to invest again, with the important point that they’re no longer earning their interest payments. They can sit on it, sure, especially if the Fed for whatever godforsaken reason has decided to pay them for sitting on it. But they’re not going let the cash accumulate dust if they’re suffering a 3 or 4% loss in annual purchasing power.

They are in the business of yield, searching for their spread. Make it just a mite more painful to sit on the money, and the money will move. Change their expectations about the future, and they will respond.

The Fed can make these assets no longer safe.

There has been a flight to safety. Absolutely. But the only thing that causes cash to be safe is the (so far correct) presumption that central banks are stuck in their old gold standard mentality, and won’t be willing to do anything so drastic as to drop the peg – or in modern standards, to change their target.

They are trying to exit the storm by finding a safe harbor in cash. But the only reason it’s a safe harbor is that central banks are too god damn responsible to do the right thing. Make it hurt to be “safe”, and they will start seeking opportunities elsewhere. They are trying to leave the game for the present, but they should be gently shown that there’s no way to stop playing.

Obviously, the point of my posts so far is that I cannot disagree more with this. It is contrary to everything we’ve seen in the history of business cycles.

The difference between right now and FDR dropping the gold peg in 1933 is that their actions now have remained completely reversible, whereas dropping a peg can’t be taken back.

If a genie shows up and gives you a trillion dollar bill, that means absolutely nothing if the genie promises to make the bill disappear the moment before you try to spend it. That is where the system is right now with its 2% targets. They need to cross the Rubicon here, and make the markets realize they’re serious about it, as the Swiss have done. Paul Krugman refers to this as the need to “credibly promise to be irresponsible”. The credibility is everything. Shaping these expectations is everything. The banks don’t want to rely on this genie money that they have no reason will continue to be there the moment they most need to use it. That huge expansion of base can be reversed nearly as quickly as it was made. Not to mention, they’re paid extra cash right now if they just sit on the money like hatching an egg.

If we saw the Fed commit to 4% inflation, or to return to trend NGDP growth, you’d see a strong reaction in the financial markets immediately, and in the labor markets within a year. I’d prefer the latter target, because I don’t like inflation for its own sake. I want higher nominal spending to be the target, with as much as possible of that higher spending in real growth instead of price increases.

I would recommend Friedman’s Monetary History to you, if you have the time to read it. The old monetarist target of the M2 (or any other definition of the broad money supply that the Bank of England tried in the 80s) was deeply silly, for reasons that would take another too-long post to explain. But the basic ideas remain valid. I find it disturbing that so many central bankers are not only entirely ignorant of the standard Keynesian arguments, but also the most sophisticated conservative insights about money. It’s shocking how little they know of their own supposed intellectual tradition.

The core of what I’m saying isn’t new or revolutionary. It’s just remembering the lessons of the past.