Indeed, although in 20/20 hindsight the picture in 1961 was rather skewed; it was due to decisions that had been made in the USA and USSR years earlier regarding ICBM development. In general, the USA made the decision to develop ICBMs of minimum size and weight, while in the USSR the decision was made to proceed with the development of the R-7 rocket, which by ICBM standards was incredibly crude: it used strap-on boosters in a 1 1/2 stage configuration to achieve intercontinental range, at the expense of being impossible to store in a silo or bunker. It was nearly a “zeroeth-generation” ICBM: a proof of concept, which was never deployed in more than tiny numbers. Whatever it’s shortcomings as an ICBM however, it was well-suited to launch satellites. The USA’s ballistic missile program sought technological sophistication while the Soviets went with crude bulk strenght. As a result, at a time when the USA was still struggling to adapt minimum-payload ballistic missiles as satellite launchers, the USSR had a multiton launcher.
In short, thanks to the R-7 the USSR effectively began satellite launcher development five years before the USA. But the USA caught up quickly: the payload gap was eliminated by 1965, when the USA launched it’s Titan 3 and Saturn 1 launchers, comparable to the USSR’s Proton launcher.
The same was essentially true of the SM-65 ‘Atlas’, save that instead of side-mounted boosters it used a pair of booster engines that were discarded, with a single sustainer engine retained throughout flight. (While the Atlas was technically stored in a silo, it had to be elevated to ground level and fueled prior to launch.) You are correct that the American focus on high efficiency and innovations to support refined flight controls led to longer development and test times, but it is also true that the Soviets, who took missile development very seriously in the post-WWII era, were well ahead of the United States in terms of capability and reliability until the deployment of the Titan II GLV.
True, and the Saturn I is notable for being the first SLV that was not immediately derived from an ICBM (although the tankage was borrowed from Jupiter and Redstone rockets, and the H-1 motor was derived from the Rocketdyne motor designed but not used for the Titan ICBM). The lack of Soviet progress was a combination of fiscal stagnation, political infighting, quality control problems, and the catastrophic failure of the N-1 program. But at the time of the inception of the Apollo program, the Soviets looked like hard competition to beat, and indeed, in many ways they accomplished substantially more (especially in their unmanned lunar exploration program) than the US did.
Von Braun initially favored Earth Orbit Rendezvous, but like Direct Ascent, it would have required a bigger rocket than Saturn. VB was disappointed when Nova was canceled, because it had more capability than Saturn to support his plans of space stations and further exploration. I don’t have the reference handy, but when Nova was canned, I believe he said something like “Now we won’t reach Mars in my lifetime”.
The interesting thing about Houbolt is that he wasn’t even a specialist in mission design - he was a loads and structures guy. Reading over the memos he sent about LOR, I am struck by two things: 1. He was no bit-twiddling technician - he had mature and well-expressed ideas, and 2. A guy like him today would never have a chance. He would quit NASA in frustration and go to med school or something.
The edit window is closed, but to expand on my previous post, the first orbital LV developed from Thor was actually Thor-Agena, which first reached orbit on 2/28/59. Thor-Delta first orbited on 8/12/60. In comparison, the first orbital Saturn I flew on 1/29/64.
I thought the higher payload requirements for EOR were met with multiple Saturn launches, not a bigger rocket. Two Saturns would be launched, rendezvous, and the joined craft would head to the moon.
You’re right in that the final two-Saturn EOR proposal would have used two launches (of a three-engine Saturn that was never actually developed). But there were other EOR proposals that would have used Novas. At the time these proposals were being made, the mission itself was in flux (how many astronauts, how long were they going to stay, would they bring stuff back, etc.) and it was not clear how much mass they were going to be sending to the Moon. For both the Saturn and Nova proposals the number and size of the boosters would vary depending on the mission.