If you to ask a person why they think our theorized prisoner should be executed, the following are qualitatively different answers:
“Because my blood cries out to see him die!”
“Because he killed fifteen people and was legally sentenced to death for it.”
See my post right above yours. After conviction, an inmate is typically entitled (in capital cases and in my state all cases) a direct appeal to the state supreme court. Then begins post-conviction relief before the trial court, then intermediate appeals court (in states that have those) and discretionary review with the state supreme court.
Then federal habeas review in the U.S. District Court, appeal to U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, and discretionary review by the U.S. Supreme Court.
So, after trial, one is looking at seven additional proceedings at most. Unless it is an atypical case, why does it take 30 years for seven hearings?
Well, again, look at Scott Peterson. He has yet to get one single ruling of a review of his conviction. Regardless of your views of the death penalty, even if it was a sentence of life in prison, nobody should have to wait 14 years and counting before a higher court rules on your trial conviction.
It is mostly judges who drag their feet (I am waiting now 2 1/2 years and counting on a particular post conviction ruling after all evidence has been submitted) while hammering us lawyers if we are a day late on something.
The system needs to work better and be coordinated from top down, especially in capital cases.
All you’ve said is that people expect the justice system to carry out whatever sentence is passed. What’s the relevance of that? How does it speak to what sentence is just and why it is just?
Sigh. I don’t care as much about this now as I did yesterday.
This debate presumes that executions are just. A recognition that the execution happening today is driven/supported by the same thing it was driven/supported by thirty years ago merely demonstrates that the ‘justness’ of it holds steady regardless of time. The justice system was (presumably) established for reasons of punishment or incarceration or whatever back in the day, but executions carried out now are supported ethically by the fact they are legal, and they’re legal because the court said that the guy in question was sentenced to die. Regardless of whatever else has changed in the years since then, the fact he was sentenced hasn’t - and neither has the ethical legitimacy of the execution granted by the sentencing.
I agree with you in part. Although I support the idea of the death penalty in the abstract, carrying it out 15, 25, or even 40 years after the crime makes no sense and serves no purpose.
Oh, but UltraVires, what about these guys exonerated after 20 years on death row? That is why I say the system needs changed. In capital cases, I think a defendant should have gold plated counsel, gold plated experts and forensic analysts. I think the Rules of Evidence should be all but eliminated for the capital defendant to tell the jury pretty much damned near anything he likes. Do all that is humanly possible to ensure a just verdict.
But after that, a deliberate and concerted appellate and post-conviction process which, in addition to its traditional function, reviews the evidence again to resolve any doubts in favor of the defendant.
After that, though, the date with the chair should come sooner.
The presumption is that executions are a just punishment for certain crimes, a premise that we have all agreed to stipulate for the purpose of this debate.
The OP asks then asks the moral question: if a capital crime was committed, is the death sentence still just when the perpetrator due to be executed has amnesia or dementia?
You think ethical justification derives from whether something is legal? In that case, I reiterate my prior objection to your comments: by this reasoning, slavery was once ethical.
You seem to be moving the goalposts to a factual question of whether it is technically legal to execute someone with amnesia. That is quite different from the ethical debate as to do with whether it is just to do so.
I support the workings of the justice system, not because I expect Justice with a capital J, but because without a justice system we’re back to blood feuds and clan warfare.
But of course this also means that the rabble has to believe enough in the justice system that they don’t take justice into their own hands. And so the justice system has to conform tolerably well to the expectations of the rabble, otherwise it won’t work. Or alternatively it is imposed by the authorities, and the rabble has to put up with it or get stomped.
So the justice system has to maintain its legitimacy. It can do that by superior force of the ruling class, or it can do it by a popular mandate, or varying proportions between the two.
So I can be in favor of carrying out whatever sentence is imposed by the court, even though on a single-case basis carrying out any sentence is counterproductive. Putting the killer in jail, or executing him, won’t bring back the victim. The point was deterrence, and now that deterrence has failed, actually carrying out the sentence is a failure as well.
The only thing is, it’s not a single case. We’re going to have more killers tomorrow and the next day, and so we have to carry out the sentence even though it literally serves no purpose any more for this case. It only serves a purpose for the next case.
Of course, so do I. My objection in the conversation with begbert was that this has nothing to do with the ethical question of what sentences are just. We can support the rule of law as it is, and also strive to evaluate its principles with a view to improving it.
Specifically, the execution *of the guy in question *was deemed to be just, as far as this thread goes. There is no ‘sometimes’ about it as far as this guy is concerned; there was nothing unjust about the execution ordered for him.
And the answer to that would necessarily depend on why the death sentence was ordered for this guy in the first place. Which I don’t for a minute believe is always driven by a desire for vengeance.
I think that the ethical validity of the execution, whatever validity it has via whatever source it derived that validity in the first place, is entirely dependent on the execution being a legal one. Which irrevocably ties the ethical merit of the execution to the conviction that ordered it and the associated legal determination that that conviction would be punished with execution.
Of course, as noted, the execution in question is presumed to be definitively ethical, at least at the time of its implementation. If we’re going to talk about slavery in the same goalpost, we’d have to assume that it’s definitively ethical too.
There’s two ways to validly approach this question, neither of which you appear to be using.
What were the original justifications for the execution being ethical, and do they still apply?
Is the ethical validity of a punishment dependent on the current momentary state of the convicted?
Note that the second question has some merit to it - some punishments have this thing called “parole” which is allowed (or not) after a certain time to alter the punishment in established ways based on the convict’s state. Of course it’s worth noting that, by establishing a system for determining parole for some convictions, that implies that the court is aware that people change and that when parole isn’t allowed that means that the court has already considered and rejected the notion that changes in the convict’s status matter in the case in question.
Ok, I think we are out of the weeds on this. So, to clarify a couple of things:
Let’s be clear that it turns out neither of us is claiming this. It arose from misunderstanding of what I thought you were saying. So let’s set it aside.
What I have said is that punishment in our current justice system derive from some variable combination of factors, principally: sequestration, deterrence, retribution. And that of those, I believe that retribution is always unethical.
In fact this was the only issue I was debating earlier, since I thought this ethical question was the essence of the OP.
My position is that nobody ever “deserves” retributive punishment, since there is no free will. Punishment should be motivated only by any need to sequestrate the criminal plus the empirical question of whether a punishment is an effective deterrent to future crime.
So in the OP situation, the punishment is not justified by state of mind in the first place, there’s no state of mind that makes someone “deserve” punishment. So I’d argue that if execution for the crime in question is ethical, it is still ethical for someone with dementia unless the change in the criminal’s state of mind reduces the deterrent effect, which seems unlikely (but it’s an empirical question).
And I believe that there’s another factor - that “society in general” believes that there are certain correct responses to certain actions. Are these societal expectations always prudent? Probably not. But they’re doubtlessly a factor. It’s part of why some people get a little antsy when they hear about the wildly successful “treat prisoners great” policies some countries have, who have decided that reducing recidivism is way more important than deterrence - because prisoners being kid-gloved seems not right.
I consider it erroneous to just blithely label this as “retribution” and dismiss it as being as immoral as a vengeance killing. Entirely calm people can say that thieves deserve jail simply because they’ve committed theft, entirely independent of whether the incarceration reduces current or future crime in any appreciable way.
This sort of societal perception of justice isn’t guaranteed to produce optimal outcomes by any means, but I wouldn’t say that makes it immoral.
Back to the point, I’m of the opinion that death penalties are ordered entirely on rationales of these societal expectations - and vengeance, but the vengeance part probably doesn’t contribute much to the ethicality of it all. I don’t think that sequestration is even slightly a factor in them (since they could be imprisoned for life without parole instead), so I think that any and all references to sequestration in this argument are invalid. It wasn’t a factor in making the execution moral before, so it can’t be less of a factor now.
The degree to which executions have a greater deterrent effect than incarceration can be debated, but given that we’re apparently waiting until people are geriatrics before offing them, I suspect that the deterrent factor of killing them at that point is already comparable to just keeping them locked up.
I’m having a hard time resisting the free will debate you keep teasing me with.
In any case, I don’t think that sequestration and deterrence are the only ethical reasons to support a legal system. As has been mentioned, there’s also the question of what you’d have without the legal system. Our current legal system isn’t entirely based on sequestration and deterrence, but it’s still better to hew to it than to just abandon it, which ignoring the determinations of the court would amount to. This remains true even if the determinations of the legal system are largely based on societal expectations rather than figuring out exactly how deterrent or sequestrative this particular sentence will be in this particular case.
I’m still truly puzzled by what your suggesting here. You can’t justify something in this circular way.
To state the obvious, punishment means harming another human being.
You’re describing punishment that’s not justified as sequestration or deterrence; but it’s not retribution either. It’s just something we do because it feels like justice but we can’t explain why?
That’s not good enough! If you are going to harm another human being, you’d better be ready to explain why it’s justified, or stop doing it. It’s absolutely immoral.
Well, some punishments are just fines. Executions are pretty harmful though, I’ll give you that.
It’s moral to carry out a judgement levied against somebody because failing to carry out the judgements levied by the legal system reduces the credibility of the legal system in general, which incentivizes crime across the board. Consider the reaction to Trump’s pardons - their intent is to incentivize crime!
Of course things like parole hearings don’t cause this sort of outrage, because they’re built into the system. So I’d say that if the prospective executee is up for a parole hearing, then of course the parole board should take into account his inability to remember his past crimes. (And his habit of forming models of beheaded people out of toilet paper.) But if we’re talking extralegal methods for releasing people, I think they do more harm than good.
We may believe that there is a higher moral obligation to uphold the rule of law that overrides the fact that the justice system is imperfect. But that belief is not a moral justification for the imperfection.
I most certainly do not believe that the american justice system is perfect. However in this thread we’re conveniently given to assume that the initial death penalty is morally justified, which makes things so much easier. This particular ruling is indeed perfect! Or perfect enough, at least.
It occurs to me that a large part of the problem here is that people are judging the prisoner’s current execution as immoral based on standards that would also lead them to judge the original determination of punishment as immoral. To me that’s an invalid approach - we’re taking it as given that the original determination of punishment was moral, or at least moral *enough *that it’s reasonable to ask if it’s less moral now that the dude doesn’t remember his crime. My approach has been to examine the actual reasons that people who accept capital punishment use to justify their morality - reasons which others reject out of hand because of course in their opinion the punishment has no morality to lose in the first place (which axiomatically means it’s as moral now as it ever was).
But there’s another way to look at the question - a rather simple one I’m surprised I didn’t think of earlier.
The question is, if a prisoner forgets his crime does that mean he shouldn’t be punished for it. One way to answer that is with another question: is he being punished for remembering the crime? Because if he isn’t being punished for the act of remembering what he did, then forgetting it shouldn’t absolve him of punishment or in fact change anything at all.
The arguments that he’s now a harmless doddering old man and that incarcerating/executing him now are pointless are confusing amnesia with harmlessness - a point that has been made by pointing out that committing crimes while blackout drunk doesn’t absolve you of them. If the point of the punishment is to contain a dangerous person and the passage of time has rendered the person harmless, that’s fine - give him a parole hearing and if he passes release him. But being forgetful doesn’t render him harmless - it might happen at the same time as other changes which do render him harmless, but the forgetfulness itself doesn’t help at all, regardless of which approach you’re using to determine the morality of the punishment.
…unless your motivation for punishing them is to deliver cold revenge. Then, and only then, would there be merit to the argument that mere forgetfulness defeats the point of the punishment.
You are projecting about your own inability to assume the premise that the death penalty is sometimes just for the purposes of this debate. In fact, the stipulation that the death penalty is applicable to someone who creeps up behind a cop sitting in his car and shoots him in the back of the head is not a hypothetical for me. I do believe that this should be a capital crime. So I can’t possibly be making the error that you claim.
Are you serious? I have raised this exact point as the key ethical issue several times in the debate already. In each case, you read my comments and responded to them. Now they are your brilliantly inspired original idea?
[my bold in all quotes]
Right. Well then, let’s go - why is executing the friendly cop killer ethical, and what would/could change to make a delayed execution of him not be ethical?
Presumably you hope that executing him will deter others. Will it still deter them when we finally get around to offing him thirty years later and everybody has forgotten he exists?
Presumably you think that the dude’s state of mind makes him deserve punishment - specifically, sequestration, because the dude has shown that his mind includes wiring that makes him kill cops and sequestration will physically prevent him from acting on his state of mind. Would him getting old and forgetting that he committed the act be indicative that physically separating him from cops is no longer necessary?
There is a very large difference between your assertion that nothing about the state of the mind of the villain matters (which is absurd) and the recognition that memory, specifically, is irrelevant, as distinct from other aspects of the cognition which obviously are relevant (and, in fact, are the whole reason we worry about sequestration at all).
So no, you have not raised “this exact point”.
As for whether I’m brilliantly inspired, I’d say I took a hell of a long time to come up with this “brilliance”, but regardless of that it wasn’t inspired by your posts.
No thanks. I thought this was getting back to a productive discussion, but the course of this debate has been:
From the outset, I raised what I think is the core ethical issue: since I believe a perpetrator should never be punished as retribution for his state of mind in the first place, a change in his state of mind (such as dementia or memory loss in as in the OP) should not absolve him from otherwise just punishment, unless the changed state of mind affects the empirical effectiveness of the punishment for deterrence or sequestration.
We then got stuck in the weeds essentially because
(a) you were hung up on the idea of assuming any premises (death penalty, free will) in order to focus the specific question in the OP;
(b) you were conflating ought with is.
We managed to disentangle the mess somewhat, and now you’re repeating my original statement of the key ethical issue back at me.
There is no way in hell I am repeating back your assertion that the mind of the perpetrator doesn’t matter. That assertion is based on an incoherent misunderstanding of the concept of free will, and beyond that it’s an obviously false assertion.
For the benefit of any remaining observers who are not dwelling on strange ideas of why we are “stuck in the weeds”, here are what I see as the established facts.
There are a variety of reasons why we punish people for crimes. Some of them include the fact that many people (not Riemann) believe that it’s ethical to punish people for crimes - that actions have justified consequences, and that the mere act of committing a crime justifies punishment even before considering the societal side effects of the punishment. This sort of reasoning is (in my opinion) almost certainly the most significant reason by far why executions are still carried out in modern, civilized countries and are considered ethical by those who support them - most others would conclude that the (unmeasurable) increased deterrent effect of execution is probably not sufficient to justify having a government killing people.
The brain state of the prisoner can change in a lot of ways over time - forgetting past events, finding religion, discovering a love of show tunes. The only changes to their mental state that should effect their incarceration are ones that effect whether recidivism is likely for them (and even then, only if the reason for the punishment is to reduce recidivism rather than deterrence, vengeance, or societal expectation of punishment). That a convict has forgotten the details of his prior crime is not, by itself, a particularly good reason to believe it would be a good idea to set them free.