A revelation. Truly the word of genius. Why didn’t we think of that?
<QUOTE>The only axiom is that a reasonable justification is inherently better than an unreasonable justification, which is self-evident.</QUOTE> What makes it “inherently” better? To me, it sounds like you’ve made a moral judgement, valuing reason over non-reason. Do you see how it’s circular to put a moral judgement on your axiom for moral systems? You can judge a system of morality any way you want: fittest for survival, most rational, most reciprocal, greenest, prettiest, best smile…but your judgement hails from your own personal moral system. This, I think, is the circularity <B>kabbes</B> and <B>erislover</B> are trying to point out.
(I’m sorry if the coding looks like anus; I don’t think I’ve ever used it successfully.)
Dammit!
I can’t prove it, because it is possible for a society to survive with an inferior moral structure if other societal structures are extremely efficient/ruthless/whatever (1984 is an extreme example of this, or the USSR especially under Stalin, or Nazi Germany (ignoring the collapse of the latter two regimes)). It’s also possible for individuals in a society to function with an inferior moral structure if other factors protect/empower them (children are generally protected by their parents, and are given fewer responsibilities until their morality develops). I can no more prove that one moral system is better than another than I can prove that the metric system works better than the Old English system or than I can prove that Michael Jordan is a greater basketball player than I am. It ultimately comes down to reasoned justification, not proof.
The first step is “Reasoned justification is superior to unreasoned justification.” This is a critical step (and is also flawless from within the context of our language), and it is a performative contradiction to argue that language is meaningless. If somebody believes that morals do not help society function or do not help somebody function in society, then that’s their perogative – their worldview justifies their claim that “Morality is completely irrelevant, so it doesn’t matter whether our actions are moral or immoral.” If they manage to thrive with this worldview, then more power to them. If they find that they have a need to classify actions and persons based on intent, then they’ll have to dig morals back up.
Morals don’t have to be measured any more than anything else has to be measured, which is why moral claims only make any kind of sense within a societal context.
It’s your perogative if you don’t want measure the concepts of “intelligence” or “non-intelligence.” If you feel that you glean no benefits out of the use of the concept of intelligence (because it is too nebulous, for example), then don’t use it. The same holds true with any man-made concept, be it greatness, bravery, morality, volume, mass, etc.
We take our language on faith, first and foremost. With morality, everything else then follows. The pseudo-axioms that I adhere to may be different than the pseudo-axioms that Mr. X adheres to, so the conflict in pseudo-axioms is ultimately resolved (or not, in the case of severely contrasting worldviews, thick-headedness, or agreements to disagree) by resorting to the axiom “Reasoned justification is superior to unreasoned justification.” My pseudo-axioms such as “One ought to behave reciprocally” are not self-evident, but until I encounter a sound justification as to why this pseudo-axiom is invalid, or until I encounter a moral dilemma that cannot be resolved due to my use of this pseudo-axiom, then there is no reason for me to alter my worldview. Saying “But your moral system isn’t perfect!” is just preaching to the choir – my moral system has significantly evolved over the past ten years, primarily as a result of reasoned discourse over ethical theory in general or moral dilemmas in particular, and it will probably be different still in ten more years.
[q]Originally posted by Elusive
[q]The only axiom is that a reasonable justification is inherently better than an unreasonable justification, which is self-evident.[/q]
What makes it “inherently” better? To me, it sounds like you’ve made a moral judgement, valuing reason over non-reason. Do you see how it’s circular to put a moral judgement on your axiom for moral systems? You can judge a system of morality any way you want: fittest for survival, most rational, most reciprocal, greenest, prettiest, best smile…but your judgement hails from your own personal moral system. This, I think, is the circularity kabbes and erislover are trying to point out.[/q]
To “justify” something is to “offer reasons for” something. A reasoned reason is better than an unreasoned reason, by definition. All I’m claiming is that a reasoned justification is better than an unreasoned justification, which is self-evident. This is not a moral judgement – I’m not assessing the “wickedness” or “righteousness” of a justification, I’m only assessing the validity of a justification.
A reasonable justification is inherently better than an unreasonable justification because that’s what the terms mean.
Oh, totally! But what is important here is that justifications come to an end. Where these justifications end is, in matters of morality, ultimately a matter of personal views. I don’t know anyone who doesn’t use reason in order to think about morality, but a moral system doesn’t and cannot hinge on reason (often named the is-ought gap). Reason (by which I mean the rules of logical inference) is (more or less inevitably) an integral component of all “systems”, but this isn’t to say that fundamentals aren’t arbitrary.
Consider that we have one of two possible cases: good is a universal in a proper sense, an ontological existent (property) of actions, intentions, or objects (which dubiously implies the ontological status of the mind, but whatever); or, good is not a universal in the proper sense (an appeal to conceptualism with respect to morality). We know by inspection that we use reason to help us think about moral issues; now the question becomes: if morality is a matter of fact like logic is a matter of fact (as you would or probably should claim to remove the circularity Elusive is helping us point out [sub]Elusive… use square brackets, not the gt lt symbols![/sub]) then there is no separation available between logic and morality. As it stands an axiomatized logical system is prescriptive itself, outlining how one should [validly] infer and deduce propositions from initial ones; that is, logic defines and prescribes validity. When we couple logic with morality in the sense of making reason identical with logic then the entire system is objective, but then we come back to the beginning of this paragraph: is good objective in the sense of being a proper universal or is it merely a concept?
Me: it is a concept. I form the concept in several ways, one of which is inseparable from how I reference my own behavior; that is to say, ultimately, there is a component to morality which is not found “out there” in reality as a real property of [things]. I can use all sorts of justifications, but the justifications end at “Because I say so”, ultimately. I cannot demonstrate that something is or is not good in the same manner I can demonstrate that the derivative of x[sup]2[/sup] is 2x. Logic sets the stage for validity, but what is a valid moral statement? —one that follows from the axioms? Barring some well-formed exceptions the whole world recognizes the law of identity with respect to logic, implications, and several other tautologies. I think this is so because we don’t have any other choice (the world serves in many ways to shape the way we think about it; ultimately an appeal to naturalism which has found some favor in me). But here is the big “but”: it is not at all clear that societies must be the way they are. We can return to a point I made before here: sure, we all have a word for “murder” which is [logically] defined as “unjustified killing.” But what is justified? —no answer.
On the point of justification you note:
No, it just tries to push off the question. The question to the first claim is “Why is this action wicked?” The question to the second is “Why is malicious harm wicked?” You sink your ship here when you rely exclusively on logic because we have infinite recursion.
You: “A is good.”
Me: “Why is A good?”
You: “Because A is B, and B is good.”
Me: “Why is B good?”
You: “Because B is C, and C is good.”
… [and so on]
Along those lines, observe this quote:
Eventually we stop justifying moral statements; we do so when we reach an inter-subjective “floor” which was shaped in some ways by our culture, and in some ways by introspection (rather I should say “reflection” which seems to me to be more accurate).
Doing a bit of a snip job on you – not trying to misrepresent your statements, just trying to keep from unnecessarily doubling the size of my posts.
I’ll make the claim that moral rightness/wrongness is a property of actions, similar to greatness or bravery or whatever have you, but that this property does not exist outside of the context of language (or perhaps society) – there is no moral rightness/wrongness in a state of nature, so “natural rights” are bunkus – that that this property can be interpreted differently (to some extent) between cultures and between individuals. That is why it is analogous to “greatness” as it applies to basketball – subject A may think that rebounding ability is more important than layup ability while subject B thinks the opposite, but there is no question that both rebounds and layups are important (from within the context of knowledge of the game of basketball).
I’ll also make the claim that reason/rationality is the sole means of ascertaining the rightness/wrongness of an action. However, this is not rationality in the Kantian sense or the purely logical sense (i.e. based on a system of universal axioms), this is rationality as it exists in the context of one’s worldview. It’s not that morality alone requires rationality, it’s that rationality is the only was of ascertaining anything. A reasoned justification is always superior to an unreasoned justification.
The basis for objectivity is the similarities between everybody’s worldview. There are certain presuppositions that are absolutely vital to a successful worldview (A != ~A) (which is to say that they are present in all viable worldviews), which is why a self-contradictory moral system is always irrational. This is also why terms cannot be arbitrarily redefined – this violates the objectivity of language, rendering the rest of one’s arguments completely meaningless. This is why it makes no sense to use an argument that applies to all of human language in order to prove that certain terms are meaningless – it is a performative contradiction to use language in order to prove that language is meaningless.
There are differences between worldviews, sure, which is why there is no universal set of axioms that everybody can use at all itmes. Somebody may have the worldview that they are inherently superior to everybody else, that they do not have to follow the same rules as everybody else. This may or may not be an irrational worldview. If somebody really truly believes that rules that apply to others do not apply to them, then they’re being rational (and moral) from within the context of their own worldview. If, however, somebody violates the truly objective aspects of logic and language (by having a self-contradictory or otherwise inconsistent moral system, or by redefining terms at whim) in order to justify that they are inherently superior to everybody else, then their moral system is objectively flawed – a priori beliefs cannot always be justified, but posteriori beliefs can and must be justified. That is why, unless I really truly believe that I am a God of some kind, I am objectively wrong if I say “Everything that I do is morally correct because I say so” – I am redefining a term that means “Being in accord with standards of right or good conduct” to mean “Being that which I do.” In order for this moral system to be rational I must either have an a priori belief that I personally define the standards (being a God or whatever have you), or I must reject all of human language (if one term can be arbitrarily redefined, why not all terms?).
This is why morals are objective, but not universal. There are axioms that are true in all cultures, and there are still more axioms that are true for everybody who accepts the use of a language. These axioms do not define the entirety of that which is moral/immoral, but they nevertheless provide an objective grounding of morality.
With only logic, there’s an infinite recursion. That’s why morals only make any kind of sense within the context of a language (or perhaps society). Wicked means “evil by nature or intent,” and evil means “malicious, spiteful; causing ruin, pain, harm.” The answer to the question “Why is malicious harm wicked” is therefore self-evident from within the context of our language. Outside of that context, there’s infinite recursion.
At some point, we can only turn to our language and say “Look, it’s self-evident – once you understand the terms, you understand why this is so.”
Well, loinburger, I think I can safely say that we agree on much more than I would have thought earlier on, barring a few philosophical nitpicks.
Morality is objective in the sense that language is objective: agreed. Morality is a priori (or at least has a priori justifications in part) in the sense that it does not follow that something is bad on purely empirical content (something is bad only because I say it is bad—a sort of “pure” relativism).
However, I think you do extend the logical analysis a bit further than can be done. I don’t think morality is (or can be) purely analytical.
I agree that most people don’t need to be quite so analytical about their morals – they’re more or less able to do what feels right and not have it come back and bite them in the ass later on (since their emotions are fairly consistent or their intuition is fairly well grounded or whatever have you). In my particular case I need to be very analytical due largely to the fact that I have bipolar disorder – since my emotions go hog wild from time to time, I need to have something other than emotions to turn to when deciding the morality/immorality of an action. A moral system only needs to be good enough to work, though, and for most people this means that their emotions/intuition are sufficient for most dilemmas.