# My take on consciousness (rather long) **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [April 25, 2006, 7:27am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110 "2006-04-25T07:27:11Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 3
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 6, 2006, 11:07pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/41 "2006-05-06T23:07:08Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > We need not measure the likelihood we personally ascribe to a statement’s truth Then it’s called an intuition. A ‘likelihood’ is an estimation, expressed in quantitative or qualitative terms. > [@](#): > > Because a brain cannot be in two spatial (or temporal) locations at once: my brain cannot realistically _become_ yours - that’s just how spacetime is. You realize that this is not a proof, but a belief. Calling it “inevitable” assumes some sort of certainty. > [@](#): > > I don’t consider my lack of super powers a _problem_, just a fact of life. That’s because you have built your life around that lack. It depends on the situation. The invisibility of other consciousnesses is not a problem if I want to see if gravity still works on the pen on my desk. But not going back in time is a problem for accurate history, and the invisibility of other consciousnesses is a problem for a “science” of consciousness. > [@](#): > > Actually, I think the proper question is “could a biological computer operating such and such processes **lack** ‘subjectivity’?” We exist as conscious beings who encounter “biological computers” within our consciousness and ascribe them a certain essence. Your question puts the cart before the horse. > [@](#): > > I don’t think people who answer “_of course it could!_” really imagine _hard enough_. (Heck, the solipsist can’t even imagine it in other people!) Imagination is not the problem (that’s what a “Theory of Mind” is); the lack of knowledge is. ---
**Author:** ![tim314](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tim314/32/3468_2.png) [@tim314](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/tim314)\ **Post date:** [May 7, 2006, 12:42am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/42 "2006-05-07T00:42:08Z")
> [@Digital Stimulus](#): > > I don’t think that answers the question; it seems so evident to me that I’m trying to figure out where you’re coming from. Is there truly a difference (in _kind_) between the information associated with an “idea” versus information associated with “feelings”? What is it? How does one (infallibly) distinguish between them (from a third-party standpoint)? Are they not part and parcel of the same overarching apparatus? Well, my use of the terms “idea” and “feeling” may be a bit sloppy, but basically what I mean is this: Imagine how you would describe what it’s like to see something – perhaps something very simple, like a red square – to someone who had been blind their whole life. You could perhaps completely describe the information measured by your eyes with a bunch of sentences like “I am detecting light with a wavelength of X and an intensity of Y”, but do you think that would give the blind person the slightest idea of what the experience of seeing something red is like? Likewise, you could say, “I’m seeing the same color I see when I look at oxygenated blood, or when I look at a sunset,” but that isn’t of any use to someone who has never seen those things. It seems to me that regardless of how well we describe what “seeing red” _means_, we’re never going to convey the _experience_ of “seeing red.” The part of the experience which we’re failing to convey isn’t something about the way light interacts with a red surface and then interacts with out eyes; it’s something about the way our consciousness reacts to the sight of something red. Is this clear? What I’m calling the “feeling of seeing red” is the thing we can’t convey to the blind person – do you agree that such a thing exists? ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 7, 2006, 1:31am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/43 "2006-05-07T01:31:04Z")
> [@tim314](#): > > What I’m calling the “feeling of seeing red” is the thing we can’t convey to the blind person – do you agree that such a thing exists? I do, but as SentientMeat is likely to point out, Daniel Dennett [doesn’t](http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm). ---
**Author:** ![tim314](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tim314/32/3468_2.png) [@tim314](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/tim314)\ **Post date:** [May 7, 2006, 2:13am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/44 "2006-05-07T02:13:39Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > But Dennett _doesn’t try_ to convince you that feelings don’t exist, only that they don’t exist **independent of the brain**. It’s your reluctance to really try your hardest to go right ahead and _imagine_ that that brain activity – that processing of sensory signals in working memory – _is_ what “feelings” _is_. Again, look at what I said elsewhere about encryption. If we ever did make a silicon computer which convinced us that it was conscious, all we could phsycially see in _its_ chips and memory would be _electronic activity_. The impossibility of us **being** it itself is no more mysterious or fundamental a flaw to physicalism than not being able to **be** a single cell either – in both cases we can only observe _behaviour_ and make our judgements based on that alone. Hmm, it seemed to me like Dennett was going beyond just saying that these feelings are exist in the brain. It seems, and perhaps I’m misinterpreting, that he’s saying the notion that there’s some feeling (at least in the sense of an “indescribable sensation” – see my response to **Digital Stimulus** ) associated with seeing the color red or tasting a particular wine, is false. Upon preview, I see that **II Gyan II** agrees that Dennett is saying that such feelings don’t exist. My point is, if those feelings _do_ exist, then we run into the problem of explaining _why_ a physical system should have any such feelings at all. If an identical physical system that lacks those feelings (a “zombie”, I suppose) is impossible, then _how_ is it that that configuration of particles _causes_ a consciousness to experience those feelings? Even if I fully accept that feelings are caused by the physical state of the brain, and that a certain brain state must result in the experience of a certain feeling by a conscious mind, that doesn’t explain _how_ those physical configurations cause those feelings to occur. (And, as I suggested in post #31, I think this connection may be impossible to explain even in principle.) You might say that the brain state doesn’t _cause_ the feeling, the brain state _is_ the feeling. But I don’t buy it. If I describe the state of every neuron in my brain to a blind man, this doesn’t tell him what it feels like to see what I’m seeing. Even if the information is encoded in my brain state, you’d need some sort of key to decode brain states into the feelings associated with them – and if those feelings are indescribable, the key is equally so. And we’re still left wondering “Why _should_ this brain state correspond to this feeling, instead of that one?” E.g., Why should red look red to me, instead of looking like blue? Do you agree that _if_ such indescribable feelings exist, it poses a problem for physicalism? ---
**Author:** ![tim314](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tim314/32/3468_2.png) [@tim314](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/tim314)\ **Post date:** [May 7, 2006, 2:50am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/45 "2006-05-07T02:50:02Z")
> [@me](#): > > Hmm, it seemed to me like Dennett was going beyond just saying that these feelings are exist in the brain. Should read “… that these feelings only exist in the brain.” Incidentally, I stuck to the word “feeling” instead of “qualia” in the above post because I’m not sure if “qualia” implies a feeling not caused by the state of the brain. I’m trying not to assume these feelings aren’t caused by brain states, I’m only saying that if they _are_ caused by brain states it seems impossible to know how this causation works. (I.e., by what mechanism does the brain being in a certain state cause me to have a certain feeling – and why does that state have to feel that way, instead of a different way?) Of course this is meaningless if the feeling of “seeing the color red” simply means nothing more than “my brain is in physical state X”. (We can’t reasonably ask, “How does my brain being in state X cause it to be in state X?”) But there’s a difference between something that represents something else, and something that _is_ something else. E.g., the character 1 represents the number one. But the number one has a conceptual meaning, that isn’t conveyed by just seeing the character 1. Likewise, brain state X may _encode_ the feeling of seeing the color red, but it isn’t the _same_ as that feeling. Otherwise, describing precisely the state of your brain when you see the color red would suffice to make it clear to a blind person what it feels like to see the color red. I think it’s safe to say that it does not suffice. Likewise, saying “I see red”, or “I see light of such and such wavelengths,” etc., does not suffice. If this separate thing, this “sensation of seeing red” which we can’t express in words exists, then the question “How does the brain being in such-and-such state _cause_ this sensation,” seems like a legitimate one to ask. (I.e., if we’re making the physicalist assumption that the brain state _does_ cause it.) And if the answer to that question is unknowable, it seems like a problem. Dennett’s argument suggests that the “sensation of seeing red” is somewhat intertwined with the “sensation of remembering seeing red”, but doesn’t convince me that the sensation (which I have direct experience of right at this very moment as I look at my red shirt) doesn’t exist at all. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 8, 2006, 10:16am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/46 "2006-05-08T10:16:49Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > Then it’s called an intuition. Very well, my _intuition_ is that “I am not a special case”. I don’t see quite how that’s different to saying “I may be wrong, but I think it’s highly unlikely that I’m a special case”, but there, I hope my language is now acceptable. > [@](#): > > You realize that this is not a proof, but a belief. Calling it “inevitable” assumes some sort of certainty. Of course – I consider that [everything](http://www.simulation-argument.com/simulation.html) is ultimately a belief, since I believe that’s how brains _work_. > [@](#): > > not going back in time is a problem for accurate history, and the invisibility of other consciousnesses is a problem for a “science” of consciousness. I still don’t accept the “problem” label (there would be _no such thing_ as history or cognitive science if time travel and ‘public’ consciousness were possible!) , but that’s a useful analogue there. An inability to time travel doesn’t make historical study _impossible_: we use the evidence we _do_ have access to to make deductions and inductions about that which we _don’t_ (_ie._ the past). > [@](#): > > We exist as conscious beings who encounter “biological computers” within our consciousness and ascribe them a certain essence. No “we” don’t - I don’t believe in essence. > [@](#): > > Imagination is not the problem (that’s what a “Theory of Mind” is); the lack of knowledge is. I don’t think there’s any such thing as absolute knowledge. Again, if that’s a “problem”, then it’s not one we talking apes living in spacetime can do anything about. > [@](#): > > I do, but as SentientMeat is likely to point out, Daniel Dennett doesn’t. Hmm, I still don’t think this equivalence between “feelings” and **qualia** is very useful. He says that there’s no such things as qualia _as defined so in that essay_. He, and I, are merely suggesting that there’s no difference _between_ “the feeling of seeing red” and just _seeing red_. > [@tim](#): > > he’s saying the notion that there’s some feeling … **associated with** seeing the color red or tasting a particular wine, is false. Bolding mine. What’s the difference between just _seeing red_ or _tasting wine_ and “the feeling of” those things? I (and he, AFAICT) suggest that the feeling **is** the process. > [@](#): > > Even if I fully accept that feelings are caused by the physical state of the brain, and that a certain brain state must result in the experience of a certain feeling by a conscious mind, that doesn’t explain how those physical configurations cause those feelings to occur. Again, I think the vitalist analogy is useful: They do not accept that life is _caused by_ the physical state of the molecules, when you and I would say “Huh? What is there to _cause_? The life **is** the physical state **itself** – life and molecules _cannot be separated_.” And thus would I answer: “Those physical processes (_ie._ configurations _in time_) **are** the feelings themselves, with no separation.” > [@](#): > > If I describe the state of every neuron in my brain to a blind man, this doesn’t tell him what it feels like to see what I’m seeing. But neither does explaining a cell’s biology allow me to _live its life_, nor explaining a historical event to _time travel back there_, nor explaining how encryption works to _decrypt any message I like_. None of these fundamentally flaw biology, history or cryptography as academic pursuits. > [@](#): > > Even if the information is encoded in my brain state, you’d need some sort of key to decode brain states into the feelings associated with them – and if those feelings are indescribable, the key is equally so. Quite right, but I can’t read your credit details either. > [@](#): > > And we’re still left wondering “Why should this brain state correspond to this feeling, instead of that one?” E.g., Why should red look red to me, instead of looking like blue? If there were no such “correspondences”, it would be because of the _externally measurable_ element: the wavelength of the light. That’s what the “feelings” would **be** : the response of your visual cortex to that wavelength (ignoring optical illusions here). **tim** , I’ll repeat a point I made to **Gyan** : The solipsist tries to imagine “feelings” in other people, and fails. He sees only similar _behaviour_ (even down to the PET scan or fMRI level) in other brains, and does not consider the jump to positing similar “feelings” justified. We non-solipsists **assume** “feelings” in others _despite_ only being able to see behaviour – if that’s a ‘problem’ well, fuck it, better such an imperfect but reasonable alternative compared to the perfect absurdity of solipsism: We _use our imaginations_ ina way which the solipsist fails to do. Now, imagine somehow building a computer our of cells. A computer which could identify things in its visual field (ie. signals from a “retina”) and label them with sounds (“language”). A computer which could similarly process the signals from sensory organs like the basilar membrane or the biggest of all, the skin. A computer which, furthermore, could combine these labelled memories into logical structures and pass them through “logic gates”, yielding further outputs. Don’t let’s get hung up on _how_ we’re doing this with cells (since we can’t even do them with _silicon_ yet), let’s just imagine it’s magically produced by, say, millions of years of trial-and-error or something. The question is “Does this computer have ‘feelings’?” And we can answer that question only by _engaging our imagination_. This thing _has a visual field_. Its _skin can tingle_. It can _tell you things_. It can _think logically_. _How_ could all of these happen _without_ “feeling” them happen? If you can’t imagine such a feeling computer, then maybe I’m letting my imagination carry me away. Just remember the solipsist. ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 8, 2006, 11:10am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/47 "2006-05-08T11:10:18Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > Very well, my _intuition_ is that “I am not a special case”. I don’t see quite how that’s different to saying “I may be wrong, but I think it’s highly unlikely that I’m a special case”, but there, I hope my language is now acceptable. Because ‘likelihood’ is an estimation. Likelihood makes use of existing data to extrapolate - the likelihood that the sun will rise at least once more is 0.99999bar, but that’s derived from the regularity of past experience. “I am not a special case” has no base data to fall back on, hence ‘intuition’. > [@](#): > > No “we” don’t - I don’t believe in essence. Essence here simply means that the brain gives rise to the mind. > [@](#): > > I don’t think there’s any such thing as absolute knowledge. Again, if that’s a “problem”, then it’s not one we talking apes living in spacetime can do anything about. For a science of consciousness, you need to first demarcate what has consciousness and what doesn’t. When you can’t even observe that and need to assume, it’s premature to hope for a “science”. > [@](#): > > He, and I, are merely suggesting that there’s no difference _between_ “the feeling of seeing red” and just _seeing red_. What does the second phrase mean, and how is the presence of that activity determined? > [@](#): > > But neither does explaining a cell’s biology allow me to _live its life_ If a cell’s not conscious, there’s no such thing as to “live its life”. That’s the difference between life and consciousness ( **if** the original vitalists’ use of life was not synonymous with consciousness, although I’m unsure on this point). We non-solipsists **assume** “feelings” in others _despite_ only being able to see behaviour – if that’s a ‘problem’ well, fuck it, better such an imperfect but reasonable alternative compared to the perfect absurdity of solipsism: We _use our imaginations_ ina way which the solipsist fails to do. [/quote] Again, it’s an epistemological quandary, not a “problem of imagination”. The very fact that you frame it as a problem of _imagination_ means that you recognize that epistemology is the key here. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 8, 2006, 11:55am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/48 "2006-05-08T11:55:41Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > “I am not a special case” has no base data to fall back on, hence ‘intuition’. Well, I’d say that the base data here is that the natural laws of the universe apply to all of those _other people in the world_, and so to consider that they _don’t_ apply to me would require some special circumstance or mechanism. > [@](#): > > Essence here simply means that the brain gives rise to the mind. Then that’s a strange way to use the word [essence](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/species/#DeaEss) in a philosophical discussion – I’d suggest using “essence\*” in its place, with the asterisk denoting your _personal_ use. > [@](#): > > For a science of consciousness, you need to first demarcate what has consciousness and what doesn’t. When you can’t even observe that and need to assume, it’s premature to hope for a “science”. Hmm, I don’t think it _does_ need such a demarcation really – after all, biological exploration continues without necessarily having to demarcate precisely what’s “alive” and what isn’t. [Heterophenomenology](http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/JCSarticle.pdf) can _study responses_ regardless of what we _personally_ (you, me or the solipsist) demarcate as one thing or another. > [@](#): > > What does the second phrase mean, and how is the presence of that activity determined? “Seeing red”? What do you mean, “what does it mean?”? It’s what happens when, for example, a red light is shone in my eye: a signal is sent along the optic nerve, chiasm and tract, via the lateral geniculate nucleus to the visual cortex. Acitivity is thus observed in all of these neuroanatomical regions via, for example, fMRI imaging. My position, _which I am well aware that you don’t share_, is that this **is** what “the feeling _of_ seeing red” **is**. > [@](#): > > If a cell’s not conscious, there’s no such thing as to “live its life”. _It_ lives its life, regardless of whether it is conscious or not. _Another_ cell (or a bunch of them called “me”) can’t live its life since it is spatio-temporally distinct. > [@](#): > > Again, it’s an epistemological quandary, not a “problem of imagination”. The very fact that you frame it as a problem of imagination means that you recognize that epistemology is the key here. Here’s the deal: you call things whatever you like, and if I don’t call them similarly I say so. I cannot be _certain_ (_ie._ “know”, _ie._ be epistemologically “unquandarised”) that you are conscious, I simply _call you so_ based on your behaviour and my ability to _imagine_ that you are so. ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 8, 2006, 1:35pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/49 "2006-05-08T13:35:14Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > Well, I’d say that the base data here is that the natural laws of the universe apply to all of those _other people in the world_, and so to consider that they _don’t_ apply to me would require some special circumstance or mechanism. In solipsism, the objects representing “other people in the world” (and the world at large) have no referents. But let’s drop this talk about solipsism since the point I’m making has to do with the exclusive subjective experience of each consciousness and only that consciousness, not whether it’s the only one. > [@](#): > > Hmm, I don’t think it _does_ need such a demarcation really – after all, biological exploration continues without necessarily having to demarcate precisely what’s “alive” and what isn’t. Life’s just the label given to certain spontaneous activity. There’s no invisible element who presence is to be assumed. > [@](#): > > It’s what happens when, for example, a red light is shone in my eye You are describing ‘red’ by reference to your feelings - “_red_ light is shone in my eye”. Whereas your position is that “seeing red” is sufficient to determine the concurrent existence of “feeling of seeing red”. How do you know if someone “seeing red” is having the same “feeling of seeing red”? > [@](#): > > _It_ lives its life, regardless of whether it is conscious or not. What does it mean for a non-conscious thing to live “its” life? There’s no selfhood _there_. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 8, 2006, 1:59pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/50 "2006-05-08T13:59:06Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > In solipsism, the objects representing “other people in the world” (and the world at large) have no referents. Yes they do: “people” and “world”. > [@](#): > > But let’s drop this talk about solipsism since the point I’m making has to do with the exclusive subjective experience of each consciousness and only that consciousness, not whether it’s the only one. And the point _I’m_ making is that solipsism’s truth or falsity is only an “intuition” on behalf of each of us, personally - we cannot _demonstrate_ its falseness no matter how much we each reject it. This is well worth remembering in our attempt to study cognition scientifically: there is always a possible _solipsistic_ interpretation of any evidence, and it’s really only personal preference which leads us both to reject it. > [@](#): > > Life’s just the label given to certain spontaneous activity. I say the same of consciousness (and understand that you disagree). > [@](#): > > There’s no invisible element who presence is to be assumed. But I can’t _see_ the life itself either: it’s just what I _call_ that which I **can** see. > [@](#): > > You are describing ‘red’ by reference to your feelings - “red light is shone in my eye”. Oh, sorry - I didn’t mean to be so circular. OK: **for example** , what happens when a brake light is shone into my eye. > [@](#): > > Whereas your position is that “seeing red” is sufficient to determine the concurrent existence of “feeling of seeing red”. How do you know if someone “seeing red” is having the same “feeling of seeing red”? I don’t **know** they’re having any feelings _at all_ (and neither do you). It’s just my intuition that I’m not a special case in that regard. > [@](#): > > What does it mean for a non-conscious thing to live “its” life? There’s no selfhood there. For a period of time, the plant or cell (or whatever “it”), grows, moves, metabolises and replicates (or whatever). Thereafter, it doesn’t. _Its_ growth, movement, metabolism and replication **is** its “life”. The vitalist disagrees. ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 8, 2006, 2:28pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/51 "2006-05-08T14:28:11Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > Yes they do: “people” and “world”. The words exist. And they participate as nodes in a functional matrix. But there are no referents i.e. there’s no external world. > [@](#): > > But I can’t _see_ the life itself either: it’s just what I _call_ that which I **can** see. But there’s nothing to see, unlike consciousness (“_We non-solipsists assume “feelings” in others despite only being able to see behaviour_”) > [@](#): > > what happens when a brake light is shone into my eye. I don’t know. > [@](#): > > For a period of time, the plant or cell (or whatever “it”), grows, moves, metabolises and replicates (or whatever). There’s no “it”. The cell is a collection of smaller entities held together by forces, and which exhibit a surface reflecting certain spectra, generally in contrast to the “surroundings”, leading our brains to categorize it as a distinct object. There’s no “cellhood” except within our perceptual sphere. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 8, 2006, 2:48pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/52 "2006-05-08T14:48:04Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > The words exist. And they participate as nodes in a functional matrix. A [what](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matrix_(mathematics))? > [@](#): > > But there are no referents i.e. there’s no external world. So something must be in the external world to be a “referent”? If so, feelings aren’t referents either. > [@](#): > > But there’s nothing to see, unlike consciousness (“We non-solipsists assume “feelings” in others despite only being able to see behaviour”) Yes there is: the growth, motion _etc._ > [@](#): > > I don’t know. I wasn’t asking a question. You asked “What does _seeing red_ mean?” I answered “ieg.\* what happens when a brake light is shone into my eye.” > [@](#): > > There’s no “it”. Is too. I can point and say “look, there _it_ is”, and you can look **at** _it_. > [@](#): > > The cell is a collection of smaller entities held together by forces, and which exhibit a surface reflecting certain spectra, generally in contrast to the “surroundings”, leading our brains to categorize it as a distinct object. There’s no “cellhood” except within our perceptual sphere. What’s this “generally in contrast to” all about? So long as we’re “generally contrasting”, let me have a go: Consciousness is a collection of computational sensory and memory processes which don’t operate outside the device itself. ---
**Author:** ![Digital\_Stimulus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/aeb1de/32.png) [@Digital\_Stimulus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Digital_Stimulus)\ **Post date:** [May 8, 2006, 3:04pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/53 "2006-05-08T15:04:44Z")
> [@tim314](#): > > Imagine how you would describe what it’s like to see something – perhaps something very simple, like a red square – to someone who had been blind their whole life. So “what it’s like to see red” is a “feeling”. You’re asking if one can explain it to a blind person such that they understand that “feeling”. Doesn’t the same objection holds for the “idea” of red? What is the difference? > [@](#): > > Is this clear? What I’m calling the “feeling of seeing red” is the thing we can’t convey to the blind person – do you agree that such a thing exists? Do I agree that I experience “seeing red”? Yes. Do I agree that I cannot convey the “feeling of seeing red” to a blind person? Yes. Do I think that I can convey the “idea of red” to a blind person? No. I suggest that to think it is possible to do so is folly. Again, I see little difference in this sense between “ideas” and “feelings”. Let me cut to the chase, reiterating something I said earlier. “Are they [ideas and feelings] not part and parcel of the same overarching apparatus?” It seems to me that what you are characterizing as “ideas” are concerned with perceptual capacities (e.g., the apparatus that accepts input from an external source, such as light, and registers “seeing red”). It seems to me that what you are characterizing as “feelings” are concerned with reflective capacities (e.g., the apparatus that accepts input from an internal source, such as “seeing red”, and registers “experiencing seeing red”). Is that accurate? If not, could you clarify? I’ve gone back to the OP and re-read it to regain my bearings. My question for you is to elaborate on the statement: > [@](#): > > Here by “have consciousness,” I mean “it is consciously experienced by something,” in the sense of the conscious experience of which I’m directly aware. Whether that conscious experience is produced by the information processing system (e.g., my brain) is a separate question (which I discuss below). I have to ask for elaboration – what does that mean? What do you mean by “directly aware”? For that matter, what do you mean by “aware”? Is there a difference between them? Is there a difference between being “directly aware” of something and being “conscious” of it? About the assumed “separate question” of experience produced by the system – and please correct any faulty summarization on my part – you say: > [@](#): > > So far as I know there might very well be a system that is physically identical to me in every way but lacks a conscious experiencer…consciousness is unique in that I experience direct awareness of it not derived through physical senses, and so there’s no particular reason to believe that it is physically observable. As to the first, I would argue that it is, quite literally, nonsensical. That is, it’s an abuse of the word “identical”. As to the second, why are senses that accept input from an external source different _in kind_ from those that accept input from an internal source? I think **SentientMeat** just summed it up beautifully: > [@SentientMeat](#): > > Consciousness is a collection of computational sensory and memory processes which don’t operate outside the device itself. It isn’t clear to me why people arguing for the independent existence of _qualia_ insist that there is nothing observable about them. There seems (to me) to be a conflation of what it is that is being observed – for some reason, the physical description of “light enters the eye, hitting rods and cones” is an explanation for the process of “seeing”, but the physical description of “the activation of rods and cones (seeing) results in the release of hormone X” is somehow inadequate. Conversely, the “experience of seeing red” is ineffable, but the “idea of red” is somehow well defined and understandable. It seems to me that this is where the meaning of “aware” enters and causes all sorts of confusion. My definition of “aware” is simply being able to sense the status of an internal state. What is yours? Let’s put it this way, in an example. You place your hand on a hot stove and quickly pull it away. Prior to being conscious of it, you were _aware_ of the hotness in some way – there was a reflex action to an external sense. (How could you not be aware of it? Does not a reaction entail awareness? And yet, would you say that you were _conscious_ of the sensation?) Then, at a later point in time, you are aware of your awareness – the awareness of the internal state that registered the external input. Where is the issue here? ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 8, 2006, 3:28pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/54 "2006-05-08T15:28:18Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > A [what](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matrix_(mathematics))? A functional matrix or network; a ‘word’ derives its functionality from its relations with other words. > [@](#): > > So something must be in the external world to be a “referent”? If so, feelings aren’t referents either. For a solipsist, it’s all in the mind. So the word ‘persons’ doesn’t refer to actual persons, but to mental phenomena. > [@](#): > > Yes there is: the growth, motion _etc._ That’s visible to a third-party. I should have said, “what you see is all there is, unlike consciousness”. > [@](#): > > You asked “What does _seeing red_ mean?” I answered “ieg.\* what happens when a brake light is shone into my eye.” You’re the one who brought up two phrases “feeling of seeing red” and “seeing red” and equated them. So you should define precisely what the two mean, especially the latter. > [@](#): > > Is too. I can point and say “look, there _it_ is”, and you can look **at** _it_. Yes, it’s an object in your mind, e.g. a rope is made up of very many tiny interweaving threads (themselves divisible) and we assign that term to certain structures which satisfy a certain description. But there’s no ropehood, other than as a concept in our minds. Similarly, there’s no cellhood. A cell can’t live “its” life. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 8, 2006, 3:47pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/55 "2006-05-08T15:47:27Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > A functional matrix or network; a ‘word’ derives its functionality from its relations with other words. Yes, I heard you the first time. Is [matrix](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matrix_(mathematics)) the term you’re really searching for there, or is it another instance where an asterisk denoting your use of a _personal_ dictionary might be more helpful? You’re certainly not discussing _linguistics_ in anything like academic nomenclature. > [@](#): > > For a solipsist, it’s all in the mind. So the word ‘persons’ doesn’t refer to actual persons, but to mental phenomena. _ie._ it is a _referent_, yes? > [@](#): > > That’s visible to a third-party. I should have said, “what you see is all there is, unlike consciousness”. And, of course, my position is that there _is nothing more to see_ than neural activity in the case of consciousness, just like trying to decrypt the workings of an unfamiliar computer (wihtout having to _become_ that computer). > [@](#): > > You’re the one who brought up two phrases “feeling of seeing red” and “seeing red” and equated them. So you should define precisely what the two mean, especially the latter. I just did: “What happens when, for example, a brake light is shone in my eye.” Like I say, _of course_I understand that you _disagree_ with that definition. > [@](#): > > Yes, it’s an object in your mind Yes, and my mind is a _process_ in the _world_. > [@](#): > > there’s no ropehood, other than as a concept in our minds. Similarly, there’s no cellhood. Then there’s no _me_ either, and you’re talking to yourself. > [@](#): > > A cell can’t live “its” life. There’s the cell, over there. Its life is its growth, motion, metabolsim and repilcation. When those processes stop, the cells life stops. It stops living its life. ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 8, 2006, 5:46pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/56 "2006-05-08T17:46:51Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > is it another instance where an asterisk denoting your use of a _personal_ dictionary might be more helpful? Look up ‘[matrix](http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/matrix)’ in a regular dictionary, and adapt the meaning to this context. > [@](#): > > _ie._ it is a _referent_, yes? Yes, but not the referent assumed by a non-solipsist. > [@](#): > > And, of course, my position is that there _is nothing more to see_ than neural activity in the case of consciousness There is something more to see, but one can’t see it. I’ll repeat (“_We non-solipsists assume “feelings” in others despite only being able to see behaviour_”). In life, there is nothing invisible. > [@](#): > > Yes, and my mind is a _process_ in the _world_. But all you can know is your mind. > [@](#): > > Then there’s no _me_ either, and you’re talking to yourself. Except that by analogy to my own consciousness, I assume you exist. > [@](#): > > There’s the cell, over there. Its life is its growth, motion, metabolsim and repilcation. When those processes stop, the cells life stops. It stops living its life. This is pretty simple. We categorize certain stimuli as distinct objects, but as modern science shows, these are just arrangements; they don’t exist as ontological entities. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 8, 2006, 7:41pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/57 "2006-05-08T19:41:59Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > Look up ‘matrix’ in a regular dictionary, and adapt the meaning to this context. I’m afraid none of those entries make much sense, and I’ve never heard the term used in linguistics. Is it your very own (which would benefit from an asterisk), or can you cite somewhere more useful? > [@](#): > > Yes, but not the referent assumed by a non-solipsist. Again, is this your very own personal definition? If you’re going to use such, it would help enormously if you said so. If I depart from standard nomenclature, I try to point it out for clarity’s sake. > [@](#): > > There is something more to see, but one can’t see it. Then how d’you know it’s there? > [@](#): > > I’ll repeat (“We non-solipsists assume “feelings” in others despite only being able to see behaviour”). In life, there is nothing invisible. Except the life _separate from_ the stuff, which vitalists posit. Similarly, there’s no need to posit a consciousness _separate from_ the stuff either, in which case there’s nothing to “see”. > [@](#): > > But all you can know is your mind. Then solipsism is your lot: I prefer an external reality, personally. > [@](#): > > Except that by analogy to my own consciousness, I assume you exist. Your “analogy” being merely an “intuition”, of course. > [@](#): > > This is pretty simple. We categorize certain stimuli as distinct objects, but as modern science shows, these are just arrangements; they don’t exist as ontological entities. Just as consciousness can be an arrangement of computational processes, yielding a less bloated ontology _per_ Ockham’s Razor. ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 9, 2006, 11:11am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/58 "2006-05-09T11:11:02Z")
> [@](#): > > Then how d’you know it’s there? I don’t _know_. If I assume that other consciousnesses exist, then I know that I can’t see those, as you agree (“_We non-solipsists assume “feelings” in others despite only being able to see behaviour_”). > [@](#): > > Except the life _separate from_ the stuff, which vitalists posit. That’s not the life, that’s the solution - elan vital (“what drives the life?”) > [@](#): > > Your “analogy” being merely an “intuition”, of course. Yes, and which totally misses the point. I intuit that there’s something there, via analogy. The fact that it’s an intuition is irrelevant to this point. There’s no intuition for a cell, because characterizing it as alive is based totally on its visible behavior. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 9, 2006, 11:28am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/59 "2006-05-09T11:28:39Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > I don’t know. If I assume that other consciousnesses exist, then I know that I can’t see those, as you agree (“We non-solipsists assume “feelings” in others despite only being able to see behaviour”). But if behaviour is all you can see, why do you assume there is something more **to** see? When you play a computer game, there is nothing more **to** see in the computer than its \*activity[/]i, is there? > [@](#): > > That’s not the life, that’s the solution - elan vital (“what drives the life?”) The life **is** the _spirit_ – the _vital force_. That’s what life **is** to a vitalist (_eg._ [Georg Stahl](http://scienceworld.wolfram.com/biography/Stahl.html)). Matter in my body **contains** _anima sensitive_ (sensitive soul), which makes it separate in composition from nonliving matter. That _anima sensitive_ **is** my life, to a vitalist. > [@](#): > > There’s no intuition for a cell, because characterizing it as alive is based totally on its visible behavior. Yet you characterise _me_ as “conscious” based totally on _my_ visible behaviour. And you just agreed that _that’s_ merely intuitive. ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 9, 2006, 3:06pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/60 "2006-05-09T15:06:02Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > But if behaviour is all you can see, why do you assume there is something more **to** see? There is nothing more to see. There is something more, I assume, but it can’t be seen. And the assumption is derived by intuition, via analogy to my own Being. > [@](#): > > When you play a computer game, there is nothing more **to** see in the computer than its \*activity[/]i, is there? If it’s conscious, there is. If it isn’t, there isn’t. I don’t know which case it is. > [@](#): > > The life **is** the _spirit_ – the _vital force_. That’s what life **is** to a vitalist (_eg._ [Georg Stahl](http://scienceworld.wolfram.com/biography/Stahl.html)). Matter in my body **contains** _anima sensitive_ (sensitive soul), which makes it separate in composition from nonliving matter. That _anima sensitive_ **is** my life, to a vitalist. But the decision to demarcate life from non-life is entirely based on behavior (see [Vitalism Theory](http://scienceworld.wolfram.com/chemistry/VitalismTheory.html)). The sensitive soul is the life force, _contained within_ living matter. > [@](#): > > Yet you characterise _me_ as “conscious” based totally on _my_ visible behaviour. And you just agreed that _that’s_ merely intuitive. I _assume_ you are conscious, as you do of me. Because it’s analogous to my behavior. The analogy may not hold, as you agree. In short, 1)‘life’ is characterized, based on behavior. 2)consciousness is assumed, based on behavior. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110.md?page=2) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110.md?page=4)