# My take on consciousness (rather long) **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [April 25, 2006, 7:27am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110 "2006-04-25T07:27:11Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 4
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 9, 2006, 5:19pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/61 "2006-05-09T17:19:15Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > There is nothing more to see. There is something more, I assume, but it can’t be seen. Do you not agree that that violates Ockham’s Razor, since no more is _necessary_? > [@](#): > > If it’s conscious, there is. Why do you assume this? Surely the activity in a (somehow) conscious _silicon_ computer would be **fully explained by** the activity in the hardware? > [@](#): > > But the decision to demarcate life from non-life is entirely based on behavior (see Vitalism Theory). The sensitive soul is the life force, contained within living matter. Precisely! Like a non-physicalist’s view of consciousness. > [@](#): > > I assume you are conscious, as you do of me. And we both assume each other is _alive_, when the other might be a convincing non-alive robot who cannot grow, metabolise or replicate or whatever. > [@](#): > > 1)‘life’ is characterized, based on behavior. > 2)consciousness is assumed, based on behavior. And to characterise X as Y **is** to _assume X fits the definition Y_. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 9, 2006, 7:06pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/62 "2006-05-09T19:06:17Z")
_Erratum_:Surely the activity in a (somehow) conscious silicon computer **fully explains** the properties we ascribe to it? ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 9, 2006, 9:20pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/63 "2006-05-09T21:20:59Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > Do you not agree that that violates Ockham’s Razor, since no more is _necessary_? The consciousness itself is necessary. > [@](#): > > Precisely! Like a non-physicalist’s view of consciousness. Precisely the opposite! Let me illustrate with a somewhat bizzare analogy. I see various people and wonder what makes some people beautiful and some not. Ultimately, I hypothesize that gene X is responsible. Beauty = life; gene X = elan vital. Now some people may use the rhetoric of ‘gene X is beauty’, but this is just a way of saying that beauty supervenes on gene X. Onto the modern definition of ‘beauty’. Here the concept of gene X is done away with, but a set of other superficially visible criteria is used to precisely demarcate beauty: ‘perfect symmetry’, ‘right proportions’ …etc. Call this set Y. The advantage of set Y elements is that they can be precisely studied. Then I discover that a few people who don’t seem to look beautiful, also satisfy set Y with similar values as those I deem beautiful. Rationally, I wouldn’t now say that these people actually are beautiful. My hypothesis is wrong and/or incomplete. The decision of whether someone is beautiful or not is based on perception only. Now, if someone is convinced that symmetry/proportion indicates beauty necessarily, then they’ll start labelling all those with these properties as ‘beautiful’ and thus recalibrate what it means to be “beautiful”. Then people will start arguing that beauty theorists mean that “symmetry/proportion **is** being beautiful”. This is what’s happened with the word “life”. The candidate criteria hypothesized to describe life (‘growth’, ‘reproduction’) have now replaced the original (aesthetic) judgement of life to become the de facto **definition** of life. This bait & switch should not obscure that whether something is alive or not is a gut instinct or intuition. But if we stick with the modern definition of life (i.e. not synonymous with consciousness), then there’s no gene X to see, since that’s the _explanation_, not the beauty (life) itself. Set Y is also not an explanation but originally an attempt at delineation, and now fashioned as an explanation (“perfect symmetry confers beauty, no genetic explanation required”). Now, assume that you know from earlier testing that you have gene A. You also notice that you have blonde hair and have been led to believe that anyone else with blonde hair also has gene A. Except that you don’t have access to a lab anymore. You can’t really test whether your hypothesis is correct. Someone contrives that blond hair **is** gene A, or more charitably, blonde hair supervenes on gene A. The latter version may, incidentally, very well be true, but you can’t know this because you can’t know if another blonde does have gene A or not. This is the difference between the science of ‘life’ and ‘consciousness’. In the former, the symptom (life) was sought to be explained; in the latter, you are not sure **if the data available to you is a symptom in the first place** , of the target (consciousness) that you’re after. Even if it is, the symptom (blonde hair) is not what you’re after (gene A). This should hopefully elucidate quite clearly the disanalogy between consciousness and life. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 9, 2006, 9:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/64 "2006-05-09T21:43:48Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > The consciousness itself is necessary. Of course it’s an explicandum, but having it _distinct from_ the physical processes themselves is not necessary at all. > [@](#): > > This should hopefully elucidate quite clearly the disanalogy between consciousness and life. I’m afraid I don’t see it at all, but thank you enormously for putting in the effort to produce a full and interesting post. I haven’t time to respond until Friday, when I’ll explore this beauty/life/consciousness analogy thoroughly. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 15, 2006, 10:52am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/65 "2006-05-15T10:52:34Z")
After a trip to beautiful Estonia, let’s explore this “beauty” analogy, which I think unnecessarily complicated matters: > [@Gyan](#): > > I see various people and wonder what makes some people beautiful and some not. Ultimately, I hypothesize that gene X is responsible. [ul][li]Genes are responsible for the particular _arrangement of matter_ which one **labels** “beautiful” (_ie._ possessing “beauty”). X=Genes _themselves_ are not beautiful (_ie._ they possess no beauty) because they are not Y=(perfectly symmetrical). [\*]Genes are similarly responsible for the arrangement of matter labelled “alive” (_ie._ possessing “life”). Genes _themselves_ are not alive (_ie._ they possess no “life”) since they cannot Y=(grow or metabolise).[/li][li] (_My_ position is that) Genes are similarly responsible for the arrangement of matter labelled “conscious” (_ie._ possessing “consciousness”). Genes _themselves_ are not conscious (_ie._ they possess no “consciousness”) since they cannot Y=???. (My suggestion is Y= “behave as though they had processed sensory input in working memory”.) [/li][/ul] > [@](#): > > Beauty = life; gene X = elan vital. I disagree with this. I think the analogue of the elan vital has not yet been mentioned here. It would require someone to say that the matter as arranged over time by the gene has **nothing to do with** beauty, _ie._ that the stuff which ugly people are made of **lacks** this invisible, ineffable essence which renders the stuff comprising other people “beautiful”. This is called [essentialism](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/species/#DeaEss). _We_ both agree that both life and beauty only require an **arrangement of physical stuff** , and nothing more. We differ in that I think the same applies for consciousness. > [@](#): > > The advantage of set Y elements is that they can be precisely studied. Then I discover that a few people who don’t seem to look beautiful, also satisfy set Y with similar values as those I deem beautiful. Rationally, I wouldn’t now say that these people actually are beautiful. My hypothesis is wrong and/or incomplete. The decision of whether someone is beautiful or not is based on perception only. Now, if someone is convinced that symmetry/proportion indicates beauty necessarily, then they’ll start labelling all those with these properties as ‘beautiful’ and thus recalibrate what it means to be “beautiful”. Then people will start arguing that beauty theorists mean that “symmetry/proportion is being beautiful”. This is what’s happened with the word “life”. The candidate criteria hypothesized to describe life (‘growth’, ‘reproduction’) have now replaced the original (aesthetic) judgement of life to become the de facto **definition** of life. This bait & switch should not obscure that whether something is alive or not is a gut instinct or intuition. I have no substantial problem with any of this. The precise boundaries of the sets “beautiful” and “alive” are extremely difficult (if not impossible) to mark out to everyone’s satisfaction, and there will always be tricky cases falling on or near any boundary. The same is true for any attempt to define what counts as conscious and what doesn’t, hence this conversation. > [@](#): > > But if we stick with the modern definition of life (i.e. not synonymous with consciousness), then there’s no gene X to see, since that’s the explanation, not the beauty (life) itself. No, genes do _cause_ all the symmetry, growth, metabolism, replication in the stuff being studied: genes are still part of the **explanation** of beauty and life (and, say I, consciousness since the genes grow the brain and nervous system). The “invisibility” of beauty or life is really a mundane linguistic category error: we can only see _beautiful or living **things** _. We cannot separate the beauty or the life from the thing and just have a look at that alone. Again, my position is that consciousness is similar: it is a property of that _arrangement of matter_, and thus cannot be separated _from_ the matter. > [@](#): > > Set Y is also not an explanation but originally an attempt at delineation, Agreed > [@](#): > > and now fashioned as an explanation (“perfect symmetry confers beauty, no genetic explanation required”). Disagreed – the genes still explain how that matter came to be arranged either symmetrically or not (or arranged such that it grew, metabolised _etc._). > [@](#): > > Now, assume that you know from earlier testing that you have gene A. Don’t you mean gene X? I’ll continue assuming so, and invite correction otherwise. > [@](#): > > You also notice that you have blonde hair and have been led to believe that anyone else with blonde hair also has gene A. Except that you don’t have access to a lab anymore. You can’t really test whether your hypothesis is correct. Someone contrives that blond hair is gene A, or more charitably, blonde hair supervenes on gene A. The latter version may, incidentally, very well be true, but you can’t know this because you can’t know if another blonde does have gene A or not. This is the difference between the science of ‘life’ and ‘consciousness’. But it’s no difference at all, since the arrangement of matter labelled “blonde hair” **is** _caused by genes_, just like the arrangements of matter labelled “living matter” or “conscious brains”. The blonde hair might, indeed, have been caused by something other than genes (_eg._ peroxide), but the conscious brain might similarly be electronic. > [@](#): > > In the former, the symptom (life) was sought to be explained; in the latter, you are not sure if the data available to you is a symptom in the first place, of the target (consciousness) that you’re after. Even if it is, the symptom (blonde hair) is not what you’re after (gene A). > > This should hopefully elucidate quite clearly the disanalogy between consciousness and life. If anything, it _strengthens_ the analogy IMO. We cannot be _sure_ that the blonde hair (or beauty) is genetic in origin. We cannot be _sure_ that the growing, metabolising thing is alive. We cannot be _sure_ that the entity talking to us on the message board is conscious. All we can do is observe and label, perhaps inaccurately. Again, I think the introduction of genes was a blind alley. We both agree that 1) beauty and 2) life are properties of **arrangements of matter** , and that there is no _non-physical_ element required in either case (which 1) essentialists and 2) vitalists would disagree with). I consider consciousness to be a property of entities whose complex behaviour depends on processed sensory input, for which no more than physical hardware is necessary. I still don’t really understand why you think consciousness _cannot_ arise in purely physical devices (be they alive or not). I hope this clearly elucidates the difference in our positions. ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 15, 2006, 6:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/66 "2006-05-15T18:27:08Z")
Instead of providing a point by point reply, let me say how I should have said it in the first place: Beauty is in the eyes of the beholder. So is Life\*. There is no such thing as beauty or life “out there”. It is purely an aesthetic judgement. Consciousness, however is experienced i.e. an ontological phenomenon albeit restricted in terms of access. The evaluation of consciousness, is in the eyes of the beholder. This evaluation can be right or wrong. But an evaluation of beauty or life can’t be right or wrong, because it’s a judgement of aesthetics, not of truth value. \*assuming its meaning is not synonymous with Sentience/Consciousness ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 15, 2006, 7:48pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/67 "2006-05-15T19:48:52Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > Beauty is in the eyes of the beholder. So is Life\*. There is no such thing as beauty or life “out there”. It is purely an aesthetic judgement. Of course. There is just _stuff doing stuff_ out there, and we label it one way or another. When I say that a thing _possesses_ “beauty” or “life”, I’m effectively just characterizing it with a word of my choosing. It hasn’t actually _got_ something which is separable from the stuff doing stuff: only an essentialist or vitalist would say that. And I say that “possessing consciousness” is a rather misleading phrase too – just like life and beauty, you can’t have it _on its own_, **separate** from the physical processes you comprise. > [@](#): > > Consciousness, however is experienced And life is _lived_ - what of it? What we’re talking about here is what we (perhaps inaccurately) **call** “alive” (or “beautiful”, or “conscious”) when we observe **other entities**. My position is that “experience” is _itself_ explained by reference to physical entities, and so drawing the distinction “consciousness is experienced” is tautological (after all, how could you have consciousness which _wasn’t_?). And _beauty_ is surely “experienced” too, when I look upon something which elicits the gut reaction you posit? It seems that whichever way you turn, your distinctions are no more substantial than their initial letter or number of syllables. > [@](#): > > evaluation of consciousness, is in the eyes of the beholder. This evaluation can be right or wrong. But an evaluation of beauty or life can’t be right or wrong, because it’s a judgement of aesthetics, not of truth value. Then how can you and I disagree so fundamentally on whether or not a [corpse, rock or photon](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=315717) is “conscious”? That’s every bit as contentious as whether a virus is “alive” or Pamela Anderson is “beautiful” (given that they actually _might or might not_ be alive or beautiful respectively). And is the _definition_ of “aesthetic” not “in the eyes of the beholder”? ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 15, 2006, 8:49pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/68 "2006-05-15T20:49:24Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > When I say that a thing _possesses_ “beauty” or “life”, I’m effectively just characterizing it with a word of my choosing. It hasn’t actually _got_ something which is separable from the stuff doing stuff: only an essentialist or vitalist would say that. And I say that “possessing consciousness” is a rather misleading phrase too – just like life and beauty, you can’t have it _on its own_, **separate** from the physical processes you comprise. a)we don’t know if consciousness can be had on its own, separate from physical processes. That’s an open question, but this point is irrelevant to mine… b)A conscious Being is conscious irrespective of my opinion of whether it has consciousness, but a Being is neither beautiful nor alive unless I think it is. These latter attributes are purely my judgements, and don’t exist within the thing itself. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 15, 2006, 8:54pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/69 "2006-05-15T20:54:47Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > )we don’t know if consciousness can be had on its own, separate from physical processes. And neither do we really _know_ if beauty or life can be “had” on its own, nor can you even know if I “have” it (and vice versa). I’m merely interested in why you draw distinctions for consciousness which you don’t (but essentialists and vitalist do, respectively) for beauty and life. > [@](#): > > b)A conscious Being is conscious irrespective of my opinion of whether it has consciousness, but a Being is neither beautiful nor alive unless I think it is. These latter attributes are purely my judgements, and don’t exist within the thing itself. Again, I don’t understand the distinction: I think corpses _aren’t_ conscious, you think they _are_, and we can’t both be right. Similarly, we might disagree on whether viruses are alive, or Pamela Anderson is beautiful. ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 15, 2006, 11:31pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/70 "2006-05-15T23:31:02Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > Again, I don’t understand the distinction: I think corpses _aren’t_ conscious, you think they _are_, and we can’t both be right. Agreed. > [@](#): > > Similarly, we might disagree on whether viruses are alive, or Pamela Anderson is beautiful. Yes, but neither of us is right or wrong. Either we agree on Anderson being alive or we don’t. Life is not a property of the matter that possesses it, but a concept in the consciousness of the beholder who judges it. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 16, 2006, 9:45am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/71 "2006-05-16T09:45:18Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > Yes, but neither of us is right or wrong. Then the same can be said of our judgement of corpse consciousness: We both happen to agree that corpses aren’t _alive_ (even though they **could be** if we set our threshold at the bacteria _in_ corpses). Conversely, we both _dis_agree in whether corpses are _conscious_. **Both** are ultimately personal decisions to label _that stuff doing stuff_ as one thing or another. I personally don’t understand _why_ you label corpses as conscious given their utter lack of what you might call “analogues to me”, but if you want to go ahead and use such a term, be my guest. You’re not _affecting_ the corpse in any way, any more than calling it “alive” or “beautiful” makes it so. I’m just suggesting that you let people know that you label corpses (or rocks, or photons, or whatever _that stuff doing stuff there_ happens to be) “conscious” early on in any discussion since otherwise they might find you personal terminology rather confusing. After all, if I labelled corpses and rocks “_alive_” I’d cause no end of confusion in discussions about “death”. > [@](#): > > Life is not a property of the matter that possesses it, but a concept in the consciousness of the beholder who judges it. Then so are **all** properties mere “concepts”: colour, size, motion, symmetry, “analogous-ness”. If they’re _nothing to do with_ the arrangement of matter and physical processes, then solipsism beckons once more. Again, you’re not really setting forth any distinction between third-person judgements **of** life or consciousness which have much substance or particular relevance. Of course I don’t deny that there _are_ distinctions (such as their number of syllables and qualifying criteria), but your answer to “how is a vitalist view of life different to the non-physicalist view of consciousness?” still seems merely to be “It just _is_.” ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 16, 2006, 3:40pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/72 "2006-05-16T15:40:52Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > Then the same can be said of our judgement of corpse consciousness No, it can’t. If you’re conscious, then you’re conscious irrespective of how I label you. Your consciousness exists. Only the _choice of labelling_ you conscious or not is subjective and mine. If I label you “beautiful”, then by definition, for me & me only, you’re “beautiful”. Others may agree or not. If most agree, then you may be established in memespace as beautiful, but this does not make your beauty an ontological property independent of our opinions, but a dependent property based on general consensus. It’s not coherent to say that you’re beautiful irrespective of whether anyone thinks so or not, but it is coherent to say that you’re conscious irrespective of what others think. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 18, 2006, 9:36am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/73 "2006-05-18T09:36:38Z")
> [@](#): > > No, it can’t. If you’re conscious, then you’re conscious irrespective of how I label you. And if you’re _alive_, my labelling doesn’t in any way affect your _life or death_. **We** agree that beauty is **solely** an aesthetic judgement on behalf of third persons here, but **essentialists don’t** - they think beautiful things **do** have an actual essence of beauty which exists therein _regardless_ of our judgements of beauty. Similarly, vitalists think that living things **do** have an essence of life _regardless_ of our judgements of life. My _entire point_ is that you’re saying that some mysterious essence of consciousness exists _regardless_ of our judgements or labels. In **all 3** cases, there is just **stuff doing stuff over there**. That stuff will do stuff over there _whether or not we’re looking at it_:[ul][li] If the corpse is symmetrical or whatever, I’d call it beautiful. If not, I wouldn’t, and the two cases are mutually exclusive. The essentialist **disagrees** , saying that beauty is something the corpse _has or not_.[/li][li]If the corpse grows, metabolises, replicates or whatever, I’d call it alive. If not, I wouldn’t, and the two cases are mutually exclusive. The vitalist **disagrees** , saying that life is something the corpse _has or not_.[/li][li]If the corpse has sensory processing and working memory, I’d call it conscious. If not, I wouldn’t, and the two cases are mutually exclusive. You **disagree** , saying that consciousness is something the corpse _has or not_.[/ul][/li]Surely you’re just _repeating_ the point upon which we disagree? You say vitalism and essentialism are _just different_ to your view of consciousness, I say they’re not. ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 18, 2006, 3:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/74 "2006-05-18T15:43:54Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > And if you’re _alive_, my labelling doesn’t in any way affect your _life or death_. **We** agree that beauty is **solely** an aesthetic judgement on behalf of third persons here, but **essentialists don’t** - they think beautiful things **do** have an actual essence of beauty which exists therein _regardless_ of our judgements of beauty. Similarly, vitalists think that living things **do** have an essence of life _regardless_ of our judgements of life. My _entire point_ is that you’re saying that some mysterious essence of consciousness exists _regardless_ of our judgements or labels. NOT AT ALL! We have been going through this again & again. The essence that vitalists believe that alive things have is the FORCE that provides life, not the life itself. It’s just a matter of SHORTHAND to say that elan vital “IS” the life. OTOH, with consciousness, the third-person judgement is trying to guess whether empirical activity visible to a third-party (behavior) corresponds to another **empirical phenomenon** which happens to be **restricted to the self that possesses it**. It’s not at all the same thing. This is a pretty elementary point. And you have already conceded it earlier (“_We non-solipsists assume “feelings” in others despite only being able to see behaviour_”) ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 18, 2006, 8:39pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/75 "2006-05-18T20:39:59Z")
> [@II Gyan II](#): > > The essence that vitalists believe that alive things have is the FORCE that provides life, not the life itself. It’s just a matter of SHORTHAND to say that elan vital “IS” the life. No, I don’t think you’re quite grasping what I said [here](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?p=7394931&postcount=65) in post #65. The _elan vital_ is **in addition to** that-stuff-over-there, whatever we happen to be calling the stuff-doing-stuff: a “force” is still very definitely within the realm of arrangements of physical matter (_ie._ an acceleration thereof). One individual cannot in any way observe, detect or acquire _another_ individual entity’s _élan vital_: it’s restricted to that entity itself. It is **nothing to do with** characterizing the stuff as “alive” or not, since it’s nothing to do with the stuff at all. To an essentialist, beauty is the same – the beautiful entity is beautiful whether or not I’m looking at it since it _possesses_ beauty, and another entity cannot access that mysterious essence either. To vitalists and essentialists, the empirical activity is **irrelevant** to whether a thing _actually has_ beauty or life. > [@](#): > > It’s not at all the same thing. I, elementarily, disagree. > [@](#): > > And you have already conceded it earlier (“We non-solipsists assume “feelings” in others despite only being able to see behaviour”) Of course – all I’m saying there is that I’m not a solipsist. And I’m, repeatedly, saying that I’m not an essentialist or a vitalist either: We non-essentialists ascribe “beauty” to faces despite only being able to see light reflected therefrom. We non-vitalists assume “life” in entities despite only being able to see growth, metabolism and the rest of it. I’m merely asking you why _you’re_ neither solipsist, essentialist or vitalist but you _do_ propose “consciousness” in things like corpses and rocks, which don’t display _any_ of the tell-tale signs which have you assuming “feelings” in _me_ despite only being able to see some shapes on a monitor. ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 18, 2006, 9:20pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/76 "2006-05-18T21:20:04Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > The _elan vital_ is **in addition to** that-stuff-over-there, whatever we happen to be calling the stuff-doing-stuff Exactly. It’s proposed as an explanatory entity for the stuff-doing-stuff. > [@](#): > > One individual cannot in any way observe, detect or acquire _another_ individual entity’s _élan vital_: it’s restricted to that entity itself. This doesn’t pose a problem. > [@](#): > > It is **nothing to do with** characterizing the stuff as “alive” or not, since it’s nothing to do with the stuff at all. Agreed. After demarcating life from non-life, it is appended ad-hoc to the elements in the former category. > [@](#): > > To an essentialist, beauty is the same – the beautiful entity is beautiful whether or not I’m looking at it since it _possesses_ beauty It ‘possesses beauty’ is another way of saying, ‘it is beautiful’. There’s nothing else that exists to see. And the thing is beautiful to me only if I think so. There’s no independently existing ‘beauty’. > [@](#): > > To vitalists and essentialists, the empirical activity is **irrelevant** to whether a thing _actually has_ beauty or life. Wrong. Organic matter was distinguished from inorganic matter, based on behavior i.e. empirical activity. So is beauty decided similarly, by looking at the face or whatever. > [@](#): > > We non-essentialists ascribe “beauty” to faces despite only being able to see light reflected therefrom. But the beauty is simply a label for certain arrangements of light. Similar for ‘life’. Have you ever seen the movie [Being John Malkovich?](http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0120601/)? ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 19, 2006, 8:43am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/77 "2006-05-19T08:43:41Z")
> [@II Gyan II](#): > > Exactly. It’s proposed as an explanatory entity for the stuff-doing-stuff. Hmm, again, I don’t think that’s quite true of the vitalist view of life or the essentialist view of beauty: The _elan vital_ is **nothing to do with** the stuff. It is a **nonphysical** ‘essence’. > [@](#): > > This doesn’t pose a problem. I take it you mean that this is not in any way a crucial distinction (or a distincion at all). If so, great - this ‘privacy’ aspect is IMO just as mundance and unmysterious as encrypted computer files. > [@](#): > > Agreed. After demarcating life from non-life, it is appended ad-hoc to the elements in the former category. Eh? Then I’m not sure what you’re Agreeing _to_. There **is no** demarcation of life from non-life based on behaviour to a vitalist. Vitalists hold that [everything is alive](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animism#Animism_in_philosophy), even tiny individual bits of matter which don’t _look_ it (_eg._ little flakes of calcified rock brushed off a [sea urchin](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/#4.1)). It is fundamentally **opposed** to the [emergentism](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/#5) of life, _ie._ any kind of non-life to life _transition_. This is why it is so close an analogue to panpsychism. > [@](#): > > It ‘possesses beauty’ is another way of saying, ‘it is beautiful’. There’s nothing else that exists to see. And the thing is beautiful to me only if I think so. There’s no independently existing ‘beauty’. Again, you’re repeating that _you’re not an essentialist_. Again, I return a thumbs-up and say _Me neither_. > [@](#): > > Wrong. Organic matter was distinguished from inorganic matter, based on behavior i.e. empirical activity. So is beauty decided similarly, by looking at the face or whatever. No, again I don’t think you’re really getting it. Vitalism and essentialism _don’t_ posit any kind of emergentism - do have a read of those links of you have time. > [@](#): > > But the beauty is simply a label for certain arrangements of light. Similar for ‘life’. And, say I, the arrangement of computational processes called “consciousness”. > [@](#): > > Have you ever seen the movie [Being John Malkovich?](http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0120601/)? Yes. The portal between the floors is _magic_. Accessing the processes in the computer called ‘John Malkovich’s brain’ is _impossible_ due to the unique, strong cryptography of his 40-year environmental sequence. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 19, 2006, 9:24am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/78 "2006-05-19T09:24:25Z")
And I realise a sentence of mine which might have been rather misleading: > [@SentientMeat](#): > > Matter in my body contains _anima sensitive_ (sensitive soul), which makes it separate in composition from **nonliving matter**. That _anima sensitive_ is my life, to a vitalist. I’m not sure the bolded phrase would have any meaning to a vitalist whatsoever, since the _anima_ (as in [animism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animism)) is immanent in _everything_. ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 19, 2006, 3:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/79 "2006-05-19T15:27:41Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > I’m not sure the bolded phrase would have any meaning to a vitalist whatsoever, since the _anima_ (as in [animism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animism)) is immanent in _everything_. Doesn’t jive with your statement in #24: _The lan vital - the mysterious and unobservable “vital force” which permeates living things and is absent from dead things_ or with the statement in your link in #59: _Stahl believed living matter to contain anima sensitiva (sensitive soul), and therefore to be completely separate in composition from nonliving matter, one of the first statements of a principle of vitalism theory._ & from following the ‘vitalism theory’ link in that link: _The belief dating to around 1600 that matter was divided into two classes based on behavior with respect to heat: organic and inorganic. Inorganic material could be melted but could always be recovered by removing the heat source. Organic compounds changed form upon heating and could not be recovered by removing the heat source. The proposed explanation for the difference between organic and inorganic compounds was the Vitalism Theory, which stated that inorganic materials did not contain the “vital force” of life and lasted until the mid-nineteenth century._. Let’s clear up the thesis of vitalism before I reply to your earlier post. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 19, 2006, 3:41pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/80 "2006-05-19T15:41:15Z")
> [@Gyan](#): > > Let’s clear up the thesis of vitalism before I reply to your earlier post. Yes, I admit I’m not an expert myself given that vitalism has long been consigned to philosophy’s dustbin. I’ve already said I think post #59 was misleading, and I’ll add post #24 to that list. You must remember that Stahl lived in a time when the world and everything on it was thought to have been created in 7 days, such that life (whatever it was) had _always_ existed. Thereafter, scientific evidence for the vast age of the world and an absence of fossils in the lowest geological layers led to the inescapable conclusion that life **emerged** from non-life, which vitalists rejected. Thus, in order to remain consistent, vitalists had to (and has to) propose life in _everything_, since if the world was made of inorganic matter, organic matter couldn’t result _from_ it. That’s my reading of the links I just provided - would you say it was fair? [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110.md?page=3) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110.md?page=5)