# My take on consciousness (rather long)

**URL:** <https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110>\
**Category:** Great Debates\
**Created:** [April 25, 2006, 7:27am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110 "2006-04-25T07:27:11Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 20\
**Page:** 5

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**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\
**Post date:** [May 19, 2006, 4:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/81 "2006-05-19T16:27:21Z")

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> [@SentientMeat](#):
>
> Thus, in order to remain consistent, vitalists had to (and has to) propose life in _everything_, since if the world was made of inorganic matter, organic matter couldn’t result _from_ it.
> 
> That’s my reading of the links I just provided - would you say it was fair?

I don’t see the assertion that ‘everything is alive’ in the links. In fact, as you originally said, it is stated that there are two categories of matter and it says so explicitly & unambigiously in the last excerpt I quoted. Do you have a cite for vitalism saying “everything’s alive”?

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**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\
**Post date:** [May 19, 2006, 6:33pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/82 "2006-05-19T18:33:08Z")

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> [@Gyan](#):
>
> Do you have a cite for vitalism saying “everything’s alive”?

[Animism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animism) is the position that everything contains the _anima sensitive_ mentioned in all those vitalism links. Like I said, the two categories of matter was a 17th Century categorisation which vitalists could no longer hold after proof of an ancient, fossil-free lower-layered Earth appeared. They opposed, and thus **oppose** , [emergentism](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/#5) with regards to life. How does one oppose emergentism but _allow_ a non-life to life _transition_, exactly?

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\
**Post date:** [May 19, 2006, 7:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/83 "2006-05-19T19:03:40Z")

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> [@SentientMeat](#):
>
> [Animism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animism) is the position that everything contains the _anima sensitive_ mentioned in all those vitalism links.

So vitalism = animism? Because animism is nowhere mentioned in your Wolfram links. Animism seems to be the same as panpsychism given the Wikipedia description: “_More simply, the belief is that “everything is alive”, “everything is conscious” or “everything has a soul”_”. So ‘life’ is being equivocated with consciousness, which I made clear, was the opposite of my assumption when I was arguing for the disanalogy between vitalism and anti-physicalism.

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**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\
**Post date:** [May 22, 2006, 8:58am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/84 "2006-05-22T08:58:14Z")

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> [@Gyan](#):
>
> So vitalism = animism?

= a subset of animism, yes - the _anima_ is the “life” in vitalism (based on Aristotle’s [_De Anima_](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-psychology/#2)).

> [@](#):
>
> Because animism is nowhere mentioned in your Wolfram links.

The Wolfram was just a quick Googled reference for Stahl - by “the links I just provided” I meant the _Stanford_ links in #77:

> [@me](#):
>
> There **is no** demarcation of life from non-life based on behaviour to a vitalist. Vitalists hold that [everything is alive](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animism#Animism_in_philosophy), even tiny individual bits of matter which don’t _look_ it (_eg._ little flakes of calcified rock brushed off a [sea urchin](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/#4.1)). It is fundamentally **opposed** to the [emergentism](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/#5) of life, _ie._ any kind of non-life to life _transition_. This is why it is so close an analogue to panpsychism.

Which you seem to agree with here:

> [@](#):
>
> Animism seems to be the same as panpsychism given the Wikipedia description: “More simply, the belief is that “everything is alive”, “everything is conscious” or “everything has a soul””. So ‘life’ is being equivocated with consciousness, which I made clear, was the opposite of my assumption when I was arguing for the disanalogy between vitalism and anti-physicalism.

Personally, I still wouldn’t say that panpsychism and vitalism are _identical_ any more than pansychism and pan **theism** are identical: Vitalists call the _anima_ the “life” element, panpsychists call it the “consciousness” element, pantheists call it the “god” element, hunter-gatherers call it the “spirit” element _etc._ But if you’re happy to accept the term “vitalist” to describe your position, great – I think that that might even be more useful to our audience than “panpsychist” in understanding your philosophy quickly and clearly in these debates.

As I say, I think our (or at least, my) confusion here regarding vitalism is caused by the _change_ in the hypothesis heralded by the [end](http://scienceworld.wolfram.com/chemistry/VitalismTheory.html) of vitalism as a viable philosophy in the 19th century. Vitalism _did_ posit non-living matter **until** it became clear from the fossil record that living organisms have not always been around, leaving two options:[ul][li]Life **emerged** from non-life, since life is effectively physical processes comprising a spatio-temporal arrangement of matter, energy and forces. This option remains the unanimous consensus in science and philosophy save for a tiny handful of eccentrics.[/li][li]Life has **always** existed, even in the fossil-free era, since what vitalism previously considered non-alive (_ie._ rocks, sunlight _etc_) actually **is** , _even if_ it doesn’t grow, metabolise or do anything we usually think of living things doing.[/ul]Thus, when I said whay back in #29 that “[Vitalists] certainly wouldn’t say that plants and amoebae (nor probably even chimps) were _conscious_” I now realise that I was only referring to those pre-19th century vitalists, not the few eccentrics who remained thereafter by denying emergentism.[/li]  
So, thank you **Gyan**. In this thread you’ve forced me to learn more about vitalism and how it was forced to _change_ when fossil-free lower strata were discovered to become even closer an analogue to panpsychism. Am I to assume that it thereafter became _so_ close that you would even describe _yourself_ as a vitalist? You know, of course, that I’d consider that something of a _Reductio Ad Absurdans_, but I think it would nevertheless help others understand where you’re coming from.

Furthermore, just out of interest, would you accept equivalence between vitalism and other canons of animism, such as pantheism or re-incarnation?

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\
**Post date:** [May 22, 2006, 6:53pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/85 "2006-05-22T18:53:47Z")

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> [@SentientMeat](#):
>
> Personally, I still wouldn’t say that panpsychism and vitalism are _identical_

Like I said, the Wikipedia entry for animism equivocates life with consciousness; in which case, they are identical.

> [@](#):
>
> Vitalism _did_ posit non-living matter **until** it became clear from the fossil record that living organisms have not always been around

That, technically, shouldn’t be a problem, as entities with “anima” could simply have been introduced afterwards.

Anyway, it did not _posit_ non-living matter. It demarcated non-living matter, based on behavior. Here’s the quote again with my emphasis: _The proposed **explanation for the difference between** organic and inorganic compounds was the Vitalism Theory_.

> [@](#):
>
> Life has **always** existed, even in the fossil-free era, since what vitalism previously considered non-alive (_ie._ rocks, sunlight _etc_) actually **is** , _even if_ it doesn’t grow, metabolise or do anything we usually think of living things doing.

Then what does it mean for those things to be alive?

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**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\
**Post date:** [May 23, 2006, 9:05am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/86 "2006-05-23T09:05:35Z")

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> [@Gyan](#):
>
> Like I said, the Wikipedia entry for animism [equates] life with consciousness; in which case, they are identical.

Yes, but like _I_ said, that page also equates life and consciousness with the _soul_, which lives on in heaven or via reincarnation, or the _spirit_ in primitive everything-has-its-own-little-god animism common to hunter-gatherers. Do you subscribe to them too?

> [@](#):
>
> That, technically, shouldn’t be a problem, as entities with “anima” could simply have been introduced afterwards.

No, I don’t think they could from a naturalistic perspective (of course, you can introduce _God_ here but even then, he’d have to be creating things _continually_, even now!). Do have a read about [emergentism](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/#5), to which (your?) vitalism and panpsychism are **fundamentally opposed**.

> [@](#):
>
> Anyway, it did not _posit_ non-living matter. It demarcated non-living matter, based on behavior.

How can one demarcate something as Y without positing Y?

> [@](#):
>
> Then what does it mean for those things to be alive?

If _everything_ is alive, no meaning need be proposed – after all, I could ask _you_ what it means for rocks and sunlight to be _conscious_. This is what confused me about your position before: You said that you ascribed consciousness to me because I was, somehow, “analogous to you”. But under panpsychism, _everything_ is “analogous to you” – rocks, corpses, atoms, the lot! I would have understood your position much more quickly if you’d said “I ascribe consciousness to you because I ascribe consciousness to _everything_”.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\
**Post date:** [May 23, 2006, 10:01pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/87 "2006-05-23T22:01:56Z")

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> [@SentientMeat](#):
>
> Yes, but like _I_ said, that page also equates life and consciousness with the _soul_, which lives on in heaven or via reincarnation, or the _spirit_ in primitive everything-has-its-own-little-god animism common to hunter-gatherers. Do you subscribe to them too?

Those terms are ill-defined. I’m only pointing out that animism is vague enough that it could be identical to panpsychism depending on which statement is considered as definitional (“everything is alive”, “everything is conscious”, “everything has soul”). If these terms are considered equivalent, as they seem to be, then **to be alive** is **to be conscious** is **to have a soul**. In which case, animism [is](http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2003/00000010/00000003/1333) panpsychism. Vitalism, OTOH, divides stuff into two categories.

> [@](#):
>
> No, I don’t think they could from a naturalistic perspective (of course, you can introduce _God_ here but even then, he’d have to be creating things _continually_, even now!).

Why? God can do whatever it wants.

> [@](#):
>
> I could ask _you_ what it means for rocks and sunlight to be _conscious_.

Interiority, like ours. The contents are irrelevant.

> [@](#):
>
> You said that you ascribed consciousness to me because I was, somehow, “analogous to you”.

I’m presuming that if I were to meet you, I would see that you have a basic humanoid appearance with one or more eyes, ears…etc. Since I look in the mirror and notice isomorphic features in me, I assume that you also have a counterpart consciousness.

> [@](#):
>
> But under panpsychism, _everything_ is “analogous to you” – rocks, corpses, atoms, the lot!

Analogy has nothing to do with panpsychism. If consciousness is non-emergent, then everything is conscious. I only assume that rocks are ontological entities, and hence conscious, because they seem so in my consciousness.

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**Author:** ![ambushed](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/3bc359/32.png) [@ambushed](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/ambushed)\
**Post date:** [May 24, 2006, 3:36am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/88 "2006-05-24T03:36:22Z")

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> [@tim314](#):
>
> In the absence not only of any proof that consciousness is physically observable, but even of any _evidence_ that consciousness is physically observable, I presume that it isn’t. That is, I presume that there is no way to distinguish a conscious process from an unconscious one by means of physical observation. The only entity I can _definitively_ say is conscious is myself, because I have _direct experience_ of that consciousness, not derived through my physical senses.
> 
> Thus, it is impossible to determine if an entity is conscious or not, _except_ for the entity in question. (I.e., I can determine that I am conscious, but I can’t determine if anyone else is.) Because I believe consciousness can’t be physically observed, I believe it is not a physical property of a system. So, there’s nothing in the construction of my brain that produces consciousness. Rather, I believe that some external consciousness exists that happens to be experiencing certain thought processes in my brain. And I presume that other such non-physical consciousnesses exist and are experiencing thought processes in other people’s brains. (By physical, I suppose I mean physically observable. Something which can’t be physically detected even _in principle_ can’t exactly be said to have physical existence.)

But there _is_ utterly compelling evidence that consciousness **is** physical and that fact can be observed experimentally.

Probably the best examples consist of people who have undergone physical damage to parts of their brains and have thus lost or were otherwise effected in part – and only part – of their consciousness. These people continue to “_experience_” nearly all mental phenomena just as they’ve always done but with one or two notable exceptions. Consider, off the top of my head, the man who underwent some limited kind of brain damage and subsequently had no problem recognizing people except to insist that his parents were identical impostors merely pretending to be his parents (yet would recognize them as genuine when he talked to them over the phone). Or those suffering from what is called hemi-neglect wherein their consciousness alone precludes them from paying attention to what is on the non-dominant side of their visual field. That is to say that there is no damage to their visual systems that produce these effects and rather that they are purely a matter of consiosness.

Similar cases of brain damage leading to consciousness damage are far too numerous to downplay, and their significance is overwhelming: they are _proof_ that consciousness is physical.

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**Author:** ![ambushed](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/3bc359/32.png) [@ambushed](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/ambushed)\
**Post date:** [May 24, 2006, 6:52am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/89 "2006-05-24T06:52:01Z")

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> [@tim314](#):
>
> You might say that the brain state doesn’t _cause_ the feeling, the brain state _is_ the feeling. But I don’t buy it. If I describe the state of every neuron in my brain to a blind man, this doesn’t tell him what it feels like to see what I’m seeing…
> 
> Do you agree that _if_ such indescribable feelings exist, it poses a problem for physicalism?

Surely you don’t believe that “describability” is necessary, do you?

If we could hypothetically create some kind of vastly sophisticated electrochemical “cable” between the neurons (etc) of one brain and connect it to the appropriate neurons of another brain (and spinal chord, etc, etc, etc), I don’t see any reasonable grounds for doubting that that second brain would consciously experience pretty much the same things as the first with similar impressions of qualia and so forth. The second person could then experience the same “redness” as the first, even if that second person was blind.

Assuming for the moment that this is true, would that convince you of the physicality of consciousness?

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\
**Post date:** [May 24, 2006, 8:26am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/90 "2006-05-24T08:26:07Z")

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> [@Gyan](#):
>
> Those terms are ill-defined.

As are _all_ terms when one gets down to it – after all, what is a debate but a disagreement upon which entities fall within the bounds of a given label?

> [@](#):
>
> I’m only pointing out that animism is vague enough that it could be identical to panpsychism depending on which statement is considered as definitional (“everything is alive”, “everything is conscious”, “everything has soul”).

Yes, and I’m only pointing out that if one is cavalier enough to consider that vitalism and panpsychism are _identical_, there’s no reason not to consider other canons of animism similarly identical.

> [@](#):
>
> If these terms are considered equivalent, as they seem to be, then to be alive is to be conscious is to have a soul. In which case, animism is panpsychism.

As is polytheism and prehistoric spiritism, as that abstract states. Consider those positions “noble” if you like, but you would be way out on the philosophical fringe (not that there’s anything wrong with eccentricity, of course!).

> [@](#):
>
> Vitalism, OTOH, divides stuff into two categories.

Not any more, I’d suggest – the discovery of fossil-free lower strata and vitalism’s opposition to emergentism _changed_ vitalism irrevocably, IMO.

> [@](#):
>
> Why? God can do whatever it wants.

Because new [species](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/species/) are [still appearing](http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/faq-speciation.html). Of course God _could_ be continually creating them despite well understood [mechanism](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/life/#1) of genetic mutation, but to posit so would be to ignore Ockham’s Razor completely in favour of a much more bloated ontology. To oppose emergentism is to take the position that life could not naturally appear _from_ non-life.

> [@](#):
>
> Interiority, like ours. The contents are irrelevant.

Hmm, that sounds distinctly tautologous to me – surely a vitalist could similarly answer “to possess the _elan vital_, like we do”?

> [@](#):
>
> I’m presuming that if I were to meet you, I would see that you have a basic humanoid appearance with one or more eyes, ears…etc. Since I look in the mirror and notice isomorphic features in me, I assume that you also have a counterpart consciousness.

But if you assume _everything_ has a counterpart consciousness, it doesn’t matter _what_ I look like. Again, “analogy to you” is _irrelevant_ – you assume consciousness in me because under panpsychism it’s impossible _not_ to have it.

> [@](#):
>
> Analogy has nothing to do with panpsychism.

That’s what I’m arguing – it was a _non sequitur_ of you to bring up “analogy to you” in the first place given your panpsychist position.

> [@](#):
>
> If consciousness is non-emergent, then everything is conscious. I only assume that rocks are ontological entities, and hence conscious, because they seem so in my consciousness.

Rocks **seem conscious** to you? Surely you’re simply _defining_ rocks to be conscious, and whether they “seem” it is _irrelevant_?

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\
**Post date:** [May 24, 2006, 10:54pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/91 "2006-05-24T22:54:27Z")

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> [@SentientMeat](#):
>
> As are _all_ terms when one gets down to it

Yes, but the relevant terms are lot more “flexible” than the definition of “sphere” or “three”.

> [@](#):
>
> Yes, and I’m only pointing out that if one is cavalier enough to consider that vitalism and panpsychism are _identical_

Who’s equated them? I haven’t.

> [@](#):
>
> Consider those positions “noble” if you like, but you would be way out on the philosophical fringe (not that there’s anything wrong with eccentricity, of course!).

Don’t bring up these extranous points. I only linked to that abstract to show that animism and panpsychism are considered equivalent, not my endorsement of the abstract.

> [@](#):
>
> Not any more, I’d suggest – the discovery of fossil-free lower strata and vitalism’s opposition to emergentism _changed_ vitalism irrevocably, IMO.

Well, it’s not “vitalism” anymore. You were arguing for the analogy between the doctrine which opposed emergentism of life from non-life and that which opposes emergentism of consciousness from that without. The demarcation of life/non-life was based on observation; the demarcation of conscious/non-conscious is based on assumption; so the analogy doesn’t hold. Doesn’t matter what some academics include under the rubric of “vitalism” today.

> [@](#):
>
> surely a vitalist could similarly answer “to possess the _elan vital_, like we do”?

But we have experience of consciousness, not of elan vital, unless the terms are synonymous.

> [@](#):
>
> Again, “analogy to you” is _irrelevant_ – you assume consciousness in me because under panpsychism it’s impossible _not_ to have it.

Cart before horse. I assume consciousness in you because of analogy. I don’t see the case for emergentism, so I _then_ assume a panpsychist position.

> [@](#):
>
> Rocks **seem conscious** to you? Surely you’re simply _defining_ rocks to be conscious, and whether they “seem” it is _irrelevant_?

Clarification: I said, “_I only assume that rocks are ontological entities, and hence conscious, because they seem so in my consciousness._” i.e. seem to be _ontological entites_, hence assumed as such, and hence conscious.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\
**Post date:** [May 25, 2006, 9:27am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/92 "2006-05-25T09:27:16Z")

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> [@Gyan](#):
>
> Yes, but the relevant terms are lot more “flexible” than the definition of “sphere” or “three”.

Is ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’ any _more_ flexible a term than ‘consciousness’ (especially under panpsychism), really?

> [@](#):
>
> Who’s equated them? I haven’t.

Then what did you mean by “the Wikipedia entry for animism equivocates life with consciousness; in which case, they are identical.”? Are you sure “[equivocates](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/equivocates)” was the correct word to use there?

> [@](#):
>
> I only linked to that abstract to show that animism and panpsychism are considered equivalent, not my endorsement of the abstract.

Then polytheism and reincarnation are considered similarly equivalent to panpsychism. You can hardly blame me for pointing out the status of those positions these days.

> [@](#):
>
> The demarcation of life/non-life was based on observation; the demarcation of conscious/non-conscious is based on assumption; so the analogy doesn’t hold. Doesn’t matter what some academics include under the rubric of “vitalism” today.

Unless, of course, one simply _assumes_ that everything is alive, like _modern_ vitalists. Again, it’s perfectly OK for you _disagree_ with academia today: after all, panpsychism is pretty much a dead philosophy there, too.

> [@](#):
>
> But we have experience of consciousness, not of elan vital, unless the terms are synonymous.

Consciousness **is** experience – like I asked before, could you be conscious _without_ experiencing it? That’s why I see a tautology – a vitalist could say “But we _possess_ elan vital”.

> [@](#):
>
> Cart before horse. I assume consciousness in you because of analogy. I don’t see the case for emergentism, so I _then_ assume a panpsychist position.

Ah, so you call me “conscious” based on observations of my _properties and behaviour_, and then (given your opposition to emergentism) assume that _everything_ must be conscious? That sounds _precisely_ like vitalism today, agreed?

> [@](#):
>
> i.e. seem to be _ontological entites_, hence assumed as such, and hence conscious.

So, like I asked, their behaviour or observed properties are _irrelevant_ (beyond their status _as_ sensoria), yes? You are defining the set of “conscious entities” to be “everything which I detec via my senses”, agreed?

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Digital\_Stimulus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/aeb1de/32.png) [@Digital\_Stimulus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Digital_Stimulus)\
**Post date:** [May 25, 2006, 10:42am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/93 "2006-05-25T10:42:22Z")

</div>

As this happens to be the current thread on consciousness, I figured this is the place to add an aside that might be of interest. I just came across a book review for Searle’s latest book, [Mind](http://mentalhelp.net/books/books.php?type=de&id=3120), which sounds excellent.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\
**Post date:** [May 25, 2006, 10:59am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/94 "2006-05-25T10:59:59Z")

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> [@Digital Stimulus](#):
>
> As this happens to be the current thread on consciousness, I figured this is the place to add an aside that might be of interest. I just came across a book review for Searle’s latest book, [Mind](http://mentalhelp.net/books/books.php?type=de&id=3120), which sounds excellent.

Hmmm, I’ll withold judgement until I’ve read it - saying on the first page that “all philosophies of mind are false” does not augur well IMO. It seems like he wants to propose problems (like his Chinese Room) but then, when eminently reasonable _solutions_ to those problems are set forth, put his fingers in his ears and say _la la la I can’t hear you_. I don;t know what it’s like to be a bat, but I’ve seen the Monty Python argument sketch plenty of times, thanks.

If you’re after a genuine, practical recommendation of mine, **Digi** , I’ve just read [Growing Up With Lucy](http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0753818051/104-4204915-6166324?v=glance&n=283155) by Steve Grand: an immensely enjoyable and readable journey into actual practical connectionism we discussed before. His robot orang-utan, Lucy, can _point at bananas_ without specific prompting, regardless of distance or orientation. Of course, those outside AI research mightn’t consider this to be particularly impressive, but I suspect you’ll be inspired by his innovative approach.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Digital\_Stimulus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/aeb1de/32.png) [@Digital\_Stimulus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Digital_Stimulus)\
**Post date:** [May 25, 2006, 11:14am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/95 "2006-05-25T11:14:35Z")

</div>

> [@SentientMeat](#):
>
> Hmmm, I’ll withold judgement until I’ve read it - saying on the first page that “all philosophies of mind are false” does not augur well IMO.

Yes, I should say that I disagree with Searle. However, he certainly is worth reading, if only to establish where it is one agrees or disagrees with him. Furthermore, it sounds like he covers huge amounts of ground in an accessible (and cohesive) way. I’m particularly interested in reading his refutations of materialism – as I’ve said before, I can never quite get those criticizing it to put their objections in terms I can understand. I’m hoping that the single author treatment at least means that the language and ideas expressed remain consistent throughout – too often, it seems to me, a major stumbling block is simply due to incompatible verbiage.

> [@](#):
>
> If you’re after a genuine, practical recommendation of mine, **Digi** , I’ve just read [Growing Up With Lucy](http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0753818051/104-4204915-6166324?v=glance&n=283155) by Steve Grand: an immensely enjoyable and readable journey into actual practical connectionism we discussed before.

Thanks for the tip; sounds like it’s right up my alley. I’ll obtain that one sometime soon.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\
**Post date:** [May 25, 2006, 11:31am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/96 "2006-05-25T11:31:39Z")

</div>

> [@DS](#):
>
> I’m particularly interested in reading his refutations of materialism – as I’ve said before, I can never quite get those criticizing it to put their objections in terms I can understand.

From that review, it seems liek he just trots out the same old thought experiments - Bats, Mary, Chinese Room _etc._ - in which the ‘problem’ is clearly that some part of the mind-computer is **disconnected** (A sonar sensor is not _connected_ to my brain, a red wavelength sensor is not _connected_ to Mary’s brain, there are no _connections_ between the Chinese symbol and the **associated memory or concept** ). A physicalist description of the brain processes called “consciousness” can hardly get very far if one insists on arbitrarily fucking bits of it up.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\
**Post date:** [May 25, 2006, 9:01pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/97 "2006-05-25T21:01:30Z")

</div>

> [@SentientMeat](#):
>
> Is ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’ any _more_ flexible a term than ‘consciousness’ (especially under panpsychism), really?

Yes, given that consciousness is known firsthand.

> [@](#):
>
> Then what did you mean by “the Wikipedia entry for animism equivocates life with consciousness; in which case, they are identical.”?

That animism = panpsychism, not vitalism = panpsychism. BTW, can you link to a description of the modern conception of vitalism?

> [@](#):
>
> Then polytheism and reincarnation are considered similarly equivalent to panpsychism.

No, polytheism is panpsychic, but it deals with other features as well. Animism simply says that everything is conscious, which is what panpsychism says. Where did you get that reincarnation includes panpsychism? Reincarnation is about continuation of the soul. Doesn’t necessarily mean that everything has a soul or is alive.

> [@](#):
>
> Unless, of course, one simply _assumes_ that everything is alive, like _modern_ vitalists.

It’s your choice if you wish to retain the term “vitalism” for the modern mutated descendents of vitalism, but vitalism is just the doctrine that life doesn’t emerge from non-life. The similarity between panpsychism and vitalism is the opposition of emergence. The difference is that “elan vital” is arbitrarily supposed, but consciousness is known firsthand.

Once the distinction between life/non-life became blurred, there were two options for vitalists,

decide that

1)everything is alive (due to elan vital)  
2)nothing is ‘alive’ in a metaphysical sense (& there’s no elan vital) but a subjective distinction is retained.

Modern Science went the second route. The same’s not possible for consciousness since its existence is not posited ad hoc, but is known.

> [@](#):
>
> could you be conscious _without_ experiencing it?

No. Exactly. So what would it mean to possess “elan vital”?

> [@](#):
>
> Ah, so you call me “conscious” based on observations of my _properties and behaviour_, and then (given your opposition to emergentism) assume that _everything_ must be conscious? That sounds _precisely_ like vitalism today, agreed?

Yes, except 1)what’s been discarded is old vitalism 2)elan vital is still ad hoc.

Above, you are arguing that panpsychism is as valid as (old) vitalism.

Actually, it is emergentism that is analogous to old vitalism. Here’s how:

There are 3 possibilities

1)Nothing is conscious  
2)Everything is conscious  
3)Some things are conscious

The first is false because I am conscious. Given that consciousness can’t be experienced, emergentism is arbitrary by picking the 3rd option, and saying

1)All processes are physical.  
2)Yet only some processes lead to experience (despite an emergentist being unable to observe experience in _anything_ else).

> [@](#):
>
> You are defining the set of “conscious entities” to be “everything which I detec via my senses”, agreed?

No. Every entity that exists, detected or not.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\
**Post date:** [May 26, 2006, 12:19pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/98 "2006-05-26T12:19:42Z")

</div>

> [@Gyan](#):
>
> Yes, given that consciousness is known firsthand.

But believers in souls surely say that they know they have a _soul_ first hand?

> [@](#):
>
> That animism = panpsychism, not vitalism = panpsychism.

And the _anima_ **is** the “life” in vitalism, and the “soul” in theism, and the spirit in primitive spiritism. I thought you agreed that these terms were equivalent to consciousness?

> [@](#):
>
> BTW, can you link to a description of the modern conception of vitalism?

[Here you go](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/#5).

> [@](#):
>
> No, polytheism is panpsychic, but it deals with other features as well.

Like what? How, and why, do you disntiguish yourself from a polytheist?

> [@](#):
>
> Animism simply says that everything is conscious, which is what panpsychism says.

And that everything is alive, and has a soul. Would you call yourself an animist?

> [@](#):
>
> Reincarnation is about continuation of the soul. Doesn’t necessarily mean that everything has a soul or is alive.

But since the soul under animism is _eternal_ and _non-emergent_ it **must** continue under pansychism, such that I will either wake up in heaven or be reincarnated as a conscious atom or something, yes?

> [@](#):
>
> It’s your choice if you wish to retain the term “vitalism” for the modern mutated descendents of vitalism, but vitalism is just the doctrine that life doesn’t emerge from non-life. The similarity between panpsychism and vitalism is the opposition of emergence.

Agreed. So would you call _yourself_ a vitalist?

> [@](#):
>
> The difference is that “elan vital” is arbitrarily supposed, but consciousness is known firsthand.

Could one not say that _consciousness_ is arbitrarily supposed, _ie._ it’s just **what we’re calling** these brain processes which processes sensory input in working memory?

> [@](#):
>
> Once the distinction between life/non-life became blurred, there were two options for vitalists,
> 
> decide that
> 
> 1)everything is alive (due to elan vital)  
> 2)nothing is ‘alive’ in a metaphysical sense (& there’s no elan vital) but a subjective distinction is retained.
> 
> Modern Science went the second route. The same’s not possible for consciousness since its existence is not posited ad hoc, but is known.

But you are one of only a tiny handful of eccentrics who don’t see a distinction between consciousness and **un** consciousness, as in a corpse or rock. Modern Science is near-unanimously **physicalist** regarding consciousness, _ie._ nothing is “conscious” in a **meta** physical sense – there are just computational processes in physical hardware and that’s _what we call_ “consciousness”, just as “life” is _what science calls_ other phsyical processes. Just because we agree that both life and consciousness are _explicanda_ (_ie._ “somethings”) doesn’t make either one _inexplicable_ by reference to physical processes.

> [@](#):
>
> No. Exactly. So what would it mean to possess “elan vital”?

Exactly! The vitalist would say it’s impossible _not_ to possess elan vital. Thus there is no substance in your distinction “Ahh, but consciousness is _experienced_ while elan vital isn’t”, since the vitalist could just as easily say “Ahh, but elan vital is _possessed_, see?”.

> [@](#):
>
> Above, you are arguing that panpsychism is as valid as (old) vitalism.

No, I’m arguing that they’re all as ludicrous as each other, but let’s continue …

> [@](#):
>
> There are 3 possibilities
> 
> 1)Nothing is conscious  
> 2)Everything is conscious  
> 3)Some things are conscious

Agreed, and the same three options apply to “alive”, “pink”, “British” or, indeed, any adjective whatsoever.

> [@](#):
>
> The first is false because I am conscious.

Agreed, just as I could say I am alive, pink and British and so 1) is false for those adjectives.

> [@](#):
>
> Given that consciousness can’t be experienced

(Tautologically) Can’t **not** be experienced, you just agreed …

> [@](#):
>
> emergentism is arbitrary by picking the 3rd option, and saying
> 
> 1)All processes are physical.  
> 2)Yet only some processes lead to experience (despite an emergentist being unable to observe experience in anything else).

Guess what? **All** adjectives are arbitrary – language is a **means of arbitrating**. If some things are “alive”, “pink” or “British”, it is **arbitrary** to suggest that some things are “dead”, “blue” or “Greek”. Most reasonable people look at the history of the universe and say “clearly, I was **not conscious** before my conception, and thus my consciousness **emerged over time** ”. I’m afraid I still don’t really understand why you _don’t_, but I’m all for diversity.

> [@](#):
>
> No. Every entity that exists, detected or not.

And how do you ascertain whether or not something exists, if not via sensoria?

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\
**Post date:** [May 26, 2006, 12:34pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/99 "2006-05-26T12:34:29Z")

</div>

> [@Gyan](#):
>
> 2)Yet only some processes lead to experience (despite an emergentist being unable to observe experience in anything else).

And, of course, all kinds of things aren’t directly observable by third persons. Just because only some processes lead to, say, _encrypted computer files_, one doesn’t propose that **everything** has some fundamental essence of encryption, or something. Like I sadi, the ‘privacy’ aspect of brain function is really as mundane as our not being able to time travel, yet we can still _do history_.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\
**Post date:** [May 27, 2006, 12:06am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/my-take-on-consciousness-rather-long/354110/100 "2006-05-27T00:06:17Z")

</div>

> [@SentientMeat](#):
>
> But believers in souls surely say that they know they have a _soul_ first hand?

But I don’t know what they mean by soul, but ‘consciousness’ is pretty clear.

> [@](#):
>
> And the _anima_ **is** the “life” in vitalism, and the “soul” in theism, and the spirit in primitive spiritism.

But that doesn’t make vitalism = animism, anymore than it makes vitalism = theism.

> [@](#):
>
> I thought you agreed that these terms were equivalent to consciousness?

No, I said that the WP entry for animism equates them.

> [@](#):
>
> [Here you go](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/#5).

Not much of a description of modern vitalism. Any primary or focused sources?

> [@](#):
>
> Like what? How, and why, do you disntiguish yourself from a polytheist?

Everything can be conscious without having Godhood or causative powers.

> [@](#):
>
> And that everything is alive, and has a soul. Would you call yourself an animist?

If the terms are equivalent to consciousness, only then, yes.

> [@](#):
>
> But since the soul under animism is _eternal_ and _non-emergent_ it **must** continue under pansychism, such that I will either wake up in heaven or be reincarnated as a conscious atom or something, yes?

No. All panpsychism indicates is that everything is conscious. Other features are extranous to the definition.

> [@](#):
>
> Agreed. So would you call _yourself_ a vitalist?

I outlined the difference as well, so no.

> [@](#):
>
> Could one not say that _consciousness_ is arbitrarily supposed, _ie._ it’s just **what we’re calling** these brain processes which processes sensory input in working memory?

The term is arbitrary, the phenomenon is not. It’s **all** we are: conscious. How did you become aware that consciousness is a set of brain processes?

> [@](#):
>
> But you are one of only a tiny handful of eccentrics who don’t see a distinction between consciousness and **un** consciousness, as in a corpse or rock.

On the contrary, I see a distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness. Which is why I oppose emergentism. I don’t see a distinction between the consciousness _status_ of a rock and an alive dog because I can’t observe the consciousness or lack thereof, in either.

> [@](#):
>
> nothing is “conscious” in a **meta** physical sense

What does this even mean? Explain what it would mean to be conscious in a metaphysical sense.

> [@](#):
>
> Just because we agree that both life and consciousness are _explicanda_ (_ie._ “somethings”) doesn’t make either one _inexplicable_ by reference to physical processes.

And this is not the stated reason, so straw man.

> [@](#):
>
> since the vitalist could just as easily say “Ahh, but elan vital is _possessed_, see?”.

To which I repeat: _So what would it mean to possess “elan vital”?_. What it means to be conscious is direct knowledge.

> [@](#):
>
> (Tautologically) Can’t **not** be experienced, you just agreed …

Of **others** , not my own.

> [@](#):
>
> And how do you ascertain whether or not something exists, if not via sensoria?

I don’t need to ascertain anything. Anything that happens to exist, is conscious. I am not preparing a catalogue of existing things.

> [@](#):
>
> Just because only some processes lead to, say, encrypted computer files, one doesn’t propose that everything has some fundamental essence of encryption

Except that we consciously decide to create encryption algorithms and encrypt files, and thus label only those as encrypted. If we were to discover some unknown files from a salvaged hard drive, and then claim that only certain files are encrypted because their headers indicate encryption processes known to us; then that’s equivalent in one sense to the physicalist position. Other files may be encrypted, but we only call those files encrypted whose structure parallels the output of our known encryption methods (this is equivalent to the ‘consciousness in others by analogy’ test that I was referring to).

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