The majority opinion basically held that the defendant’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause do not extend to the use of preemptory challenges to strike potential jurors on the basis of a general religous belief. They were pretty clear to draw a distinction between a general religousness and specific religious belief. In this case, the prosecution struck a minister and a Muslim, but did not strike either based on their specific religious beliefs. The appellate court felt that a general devout “religiousness” was not a legally cognizable group for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court cited Peoplev. Gilmore which held:
, but did not find that the striking violated specific religious principles. The holding was that specific religious beliefs was not the basis for the exercise of the preemptory challenge.
Which is one reason you should never rely on biased third persons account of what the court said. Here’s the quote that offended so many people in full:
It wasn’t a slam on religion, etc, as some would like to believe, but an explanation on why they were not a cognizable group.
FWIW, this area of the law is far from settled. As the concurring opinion stated:
. It may end up in SCOTUS sooner rather than later.
Anyone who is really interested can read: 63 ALR 5th 375, Annotation, Use of Peremptory Challenges to Exclude Persons from Criminal Jury Based on Religious Affiliation–Post-Batson State Cases.
True enough. I work in the humanities in a State University, though, and IMO there are some people here with strong opinions (radical feminist theorists, etc) that skew their thinking in much the same way as fundamentalism does.
So what are we going to do … exclude anyone with strong opinions? Yeah, those are the juries we want.
Thanks for the clarifications. Although I would agree the opinion is poorly written.
Don’t see the point of pre-emptory challenges at all. If you eliminate them from both sides, you don’t give either side the advantage, and “I bet the fat one would vote to acquit” never struck me as a good enough reason to get someone off a jury.
Pick the first twelve without prejudice, and let the chips fall where they may.
I don’t see, though, why there is the impression that people with religious convictions favor the defendant. It seems to me that certain religious fundamentalists would rather favor the prosecution. “Let’s rid the streets of all these unsavory sinner types of people.”
I can see the judges thinking about overtly religious people. THe bible says something about judge not lest ye be judged, the koran has a similar sentiment about how only Allah is fit to judge anyone. How can people who truly believe this stuff sit on a jury? Being on a jury and passing a judgement on someones guilt is in direct opposition with these beliefs. Then there are capitol cases where the death penalty is involved. Just about every major religion has something to say about not killing. How can people who believe that ever sentance somene to the death penalty? Then there is the real zealots like Pat Robertson, Jerry Fallwell and Fred Phelps. Do you realy want people who can blame atrocities on “Godlessness,gays and lesbians” sitting on a jury in the first place? I dont see how having such a narrow world view could make them impartial to the facts.
I was recused (if that’s the right word) from a jury once when I was asked whether I thought I could render a fair and impartial verdict in a seatbelt case. I answered that so long as the lady is peaceful and honest, she ought to be free to pursue her own happiness in her own way.
There was some discussion amongst the legal pubahs, and the judge asked me what that meant, and I said it meant that a law requiring someone to wear a seatbelt is unethical in its conception. He told me I could go home.
Nice generalization, Burner! But you do raise an interesting point: would it be improper to question veniremen as to their religious views, and on receiving an affirmative answer, ask something along the lines, “Would your religious views tend to bias you towards one side or the other as regards the case for which you’re on the jury panel?”
Thanks to Minty, Bricker, and Hamlet for discussions of the law underlying the question. Would any of you care to address the Constitutional point that Shodan made? Or is jury service not considered an “office or public trust”? Or is this one of the things applicable only to the national government and not to the states? (I’d object to that last stance, myself.)
I am unaware of whether the religious tests clause has been incorporated against the states via the 14th Amendment, although I would assume that you get to the same result via the 1st Amendment anyway. Nor am I aware of anything that says whether being a juror is “an Office or public Trust.” I doubt it, however, given that the clause expressly applies to members of the three branches of government:
Might have been interesting if the defendant had raised that argument–which, of course, he did not.
Also, Burner, it was not the task of the judges to evaluate whether the prosecutor’s rationale made any sense. All they had to do was determine whether the prosecutor had a reason other than race for striking the black guy. Doesn’t have to be a good reason, just a reason.
Please ignore that. Upon a moment’s reflection, it was an incredibly stupid thing to say, as the clause explicitly applies to state legislators, executive officials, and judges.
As minty pointed out, Article 6 c. 3 applies to most all office holders, regardless of federal or state. And the easy response is no, jury service is not an “office or public trust,” so it is inapplicable to the issue presented in this thread.
As an interesting sidenote, a while ago some litigants in an abortion case asked that a judge be recused from hearing the case because of his being a practicing Catholic. The judge refused to recuse himself, in part relying on this Article. I know it’s not relevant, but interesting nonetheless.