See what I mean? At one time the entire western world believed the Ruskies were intent on dominating the world and invading every single one of us. Now its “Muslims are crazy” which suits arms manufacturers just as well.
But, in the last 200 years how many times has Iran attacked a western country or meddled in our internal affairs?
Now, in the last 200 years how many times have western countries attacked or invaded Iran or meddled in their internal affairs?
And they are the bad ones?
Same with the Russians. We feel it is fine for America to claim a buffer or influence zone which reaches Vietnam and other parts of Asia. But God forbid the Russians could feel threatened by having American troops at their doorstep. That would not be logical.
That doesn’t seem to have really been a factor. The Soviet Union occupied countries like Germany, Hungary, and Romania - which were Axis nations that had invaded the Soviet Union - right alongside countries like Czechoslovakia and Poland - which were countries that had been invaded by the Axis just like the Soviet Union had. So the question of whether a country got occupied by the Soviets after the war seems to have been decided by a country’s physical proximity to the Soviet Union rather than a country’s wartime actions.
And the argument that today’s friend might be tomorrow’s enemy doesn’t really support the idea of leaving Russia alone. It really does the opposite because it says that Russia can justify war against another country even if that country is not doing anything to threaten Russia - all Russia has to do is argue that country might someday threaten Russia.
Nobody but you has said that. Nobody is saying Russia was planning on invading the entire world. In fact, people have been saying the exact opposite. What people have been saying is Russia was a threat to its neighbours.
Russia does not need to “justify” anything if it decides to start a war. The point is that if you identify correctly countries’ motivations you can better deal with them to avoid war. You can’t just go around the world making enemies, confronting everybody and trying to be the badass in the world. Well, you can and America does but it is stupid and a waste of resources. It is better to understand peoples and deal with them on the basis of that understanding.
After WWI the allies decided to teach Germany a lesson and humiliate it and make them pay reparations and make sure they were impoverished and could never raise their heads again. We all know how that turned out.
On the other hand, in a rare bout of magnanimity and common sense, after WWII the opposite tack was taken, the victors made sure the vanquished could rebuild their dignity and their countries and economic help was offered. That turned out much better but it required a degree of statemanship which is very rare and which did not prevail when dealing with the soviets.
Russia was not a threat to its immediate neighbors because they were already “under the influence”. In the west we believed the Soviets were threatening to invade western Europe and I believe that threat is very much exagerated. I believe they had no interest in Western Europe other than their safety so their only interest in Western Europe was neutralizing the threat they perceived. So I believe the world would have been better served if the west had made statements to the effect that we had no intention of attacking them but that was not in the interests of the military-industrial complex which profited from the tension.
On the other hand America felt threatened by any regime not under its control even if farther away and it intervened often in Latin America and Asia (not to mention Europe) to assure regimes that were friendly to America. So if America felt threatened by unfriendly regimes in Latin America or Asia I think we should be able to understand Russia feeling threatened by unfriendly regimes at their doorstep. Specially after they had just suffered untold millions of deaths in WWII.
Good argument. Except that it’s not what happened.
The terms imposed on Germany after World War II were much harsher than the terms imposed on Germany after World War I. So arguably the lesson to be learned is that the Treaty of Versailles was too easy on Germany.
Fair enough… I was thinking US, UK and Dutch weren’t conscripts and not really counting France.
Why not? They had the same doctrine, roughly the same amount of combat experience, were equipped with more or less the same equipment, and were both primarily composed of large numbers of ill-trained conscripts. Same thing applies using the Arab-Israeli wars as a proxy- every time, the NATO-style armies walloped the Soviet trained and equipped armies. It may not have been quite so lopsided, but it’s a safe bet to assume that NATO had the Soviets’ number as far as tactics and strategy went.
Plus, post-Cold War Russian military performance has been kind of lackluster, which makes me wonder if actual Soviet forces would have done any better.
What of their equipment was actually better? Even with the “monkey models” sold to other countries, the Israelis (and later the US) handed them their asses on platters.
First, the only “open” part would have been the part north of a roughly Bielefeld-Hanover line up toward Denmark. South of that, it’s pretty hilly and probably not good offensive ground. An armored thrust through there leaves itself vulnerable to being cut off from the south, so the Soviets would have had to try and attack across a broad front.
You’re totally disregarding the existence of POMCUS in Germany; the US had entire loadout of 5 armored and mechanized infantry divisions in tanks, APCs, etc… ready to go in rear areas in Germany. The plan was to ship 3 divisions via air in the first week and the next two in one week intervals.
Plus, after that, they’d assuredly be loading the stateside NG units and non-POMCUS divisions into the fleet of transport ships crewed and maintained for that very reason- it’s not like there wasn’t a plan to get all that stuff across the Atlantic.
The other NATO nations had even shorter supply lines than the Russians- we’d be fighting on German soil, and the French, Dutch, Belgians and British are very close.
Beyond that, the NATO forces are fighting on familiar ground where they’d trained for decades. They almost certainly knew ALL the best ambush spots, firing positions, where to place minefields for best effect, etc…
Also, I’m not at all convinced that somehow getting convoys across the Atlantic against the Soviet Navy would have been harder than keeping the rail network from the USSR up and running in the face of determined NATO air interdiction strikes. If anything, the rail network would be more vulnerable, I’d imagine.
I do agree that the Soviets were merely frightened of another invasion like in World War II, and that NATO tended to antagonize them. However, it was with good reason; despite their abject fear of a Western invasion, the Soviet/communist rhetoric was very aggressive. Imagine if say… NATO bordered Iran, who is paranoid of an invasion and has built up their forces to prevent it, possesses lots of nuclear weapons, but keeps spouting Ahmadinejad-grade aggressive idiocy? That’s a LOT more threatening than Iran spouting some BS but neither having the border, military or nukes to back it up.
As to who would have won, given that it would have gone nuclear, it would have been South America, China, and India. Possibly apartheid South Africa and Rhodesia too, benefiting from lots of lovely white refugees.
Well, yes and no. After WWII Germany was occupied militarily and political regimes of the color chosen by the occupiers were installed. In that sense yes. Germany, both Germanies, lost their military and political independence for some years. But the Marshall plan assured economic development in West Germany while the economy of Germany after WWI was a disaster which only fueled resentment and which contributed to Hitler’s rise.
Yeah, I find it difficult to imagine any scenario where it does not go nuclear. Whatever side is being invaded starts the nuclear exchange and the other retaliates.
You’re misusing the 3:1 rule of thumb. A 3:1 advantage isn’t needed in overall forces along the entire length of the front, and isn’t what this rule of thumb refers to. The 3:1 ratio refers to what is needed to be amassed at the point of decision (schwerpunkt) to ensure a successful advance. The rule of thumb goes up to 9:1 against an enemy in prepared fortified positions, and the numbers refer to combat power, not the number of warm bodies. It’s further subject to force multiplying effects such as surprise.
As others have noted this isn’t true; universal conscription was the norm in NATO and Soviet tanks had laser rangefinders, ballistic computers, IR sights, and were the first to use DU penetrators. I suppose a lot of it comes from the US Army transforming itself from the mess it became by the end of Vietnam back to a professional force that coincided with the end of the draft, but I’ve never really understood where the impression that volunteer armies are inherently better than conscript armies comes from, or that they would by necessity be professional, better trained and more highly motivated. The wehrmacht was a conscript army. The Israeli Defense Force is a conscript army. Unprofessional, poorly trained and lacking in motivation aren’t words that comes to mind in describing either of them.
The Netherlands only ended conscription from 1991-96.
It’s highly unreasonable to come to any of these conclusions. Soviet forces were clearly better equipped than Iraqi forces, and Soviet losses in Afghanistan had been minimal compared to Iraqi casualties in the Iran-Iraq War, which had claimed ~1,250,000 lives. Iraqi forces have always been poorly motivated as well; their performance against Iran was lackluster at the best of times, and it had performed horribly against Israel in comparison to Syrian and Egyptian troops.
Only the US and Canada aren’t in Europe, and the US planned to have every active duty heavy division in the US Army (with the exception of the 24th Inf (Mech) which was the RDF’s heavy division) deployed to Europe within 10-14 days of the activation of REFORGER. The equipment was already stored in place in Europe in POMCUS (Pre-positioned Overseas Material Contained in Unit Sets) sites so all that needed to be done was to fly in the manpower to mate up with the equipment, which was practiced annually in REFORGER(REturn of FORces to GERmany). The Civil Reserve Air Fleet, i.e. pretty much every airliner operated by a US based company would be called up for this. The National Guard would take a lot longer to get there, but would also take a lot longer to mobilize and ready for battle. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm none of the NG round-out brigades for the regular army divisions sent to Saudi Arabia was ready to deploy by January 1991.
I’d recommend Ralph Peter’s Red Army for a less rosy view of how things might have gone. Both of them do have contrived ways of avoiding the fact that the war was almost certain to go nuclear though, and the once the djinn is out of the bottle it’s a very small step from battlefield use to a strategic exchange.
The main consequences of Versailles were the loss of some territory and reparations. After 1945, Germany paid higher reparations and lost more territory than they lost in 1918. Plus they were demilitarized much more thoroughly. And they faced occupation, war trials, and population resettlement - none of which was a significant factor after WWI. And while the Marshall Plan did put some money back into Germany, it was significantly less than the money taken out of Germany for reparations and occupation costs - and those costs were straight payments while the Marshall aid money was just loans that were supposed to be repaid. By pretty much any standard, the 1945 peace was harsher than the 1918 one.
FWIW, that’s where the idea that the Soviets might break through in the north between the Germans and British, and that the US forces would fight them to a standstill in the south, and counterattack back north came from.
The scenario I painted is pretty standard in fictional accounts- Gen. Sir. John Hackett’s “Third World War: The Untold Story” has NATO being pushed back, holding, and counterattacking, as does “Red Army” and “Red Storm Rising”. The main differences are that in “Red Army”, the Germans sue for peace and the other NATO units withdraw across the Rhine, and in “Red Storm Rising”, the Russians more or less collapse and negotiate, and in “The Third World War”, after a brief (Birmingham/Minsk) nuclear exchange, the Russian govt. collapses and the war ends.
It’s been a while since I read it but as I recall in Red Storm once it becomes clear to the Soviets that the conquering of NATO forces has failed the Politburo gets desperate and suggests to the commanding General if the ‘limited’ introduction of tactical nuclear weapons could turn the tide. The General is absolutely horrified at this suggestion knowing full well that it will inevitably lead to an all-out strategic exchange, but he keeps these thoughts to himself. He first plays along and insists that the weapons would need to be under his direct battlefield control. Once they agree to this he implements his actual plan which is to stage a coup and remove the hawks from the Politburo. Didn’t seem too contrived to me.
The only thing I found not believable is that after the ceasefire the West (the US) would agree to go back to established, pre-war borders between NATO & The Warsaw Pact. After a deliberate act of aggression like that the Soviets would have to give up some territory.
I doubt very much if the Polish, Czech, and Rumanian troops would have fought. the East Germans would, but many of the eastern Bloc had no great love for the Soviets.
As for how long such a conflict would last, it would end when the first nuclear bomb was dropped.
The Russians were not stupid-and perceived "gain"they might make would be more than wiped out.
I think they would have fought. They probably wouldn’t have voted for war if it was put up to a vote but there wouldn’t have been a vote. So it would have been a case of grumbling but getting on with the job.
Troops in general are trained to follow orders and ignore politics. The breakdowns of military units are usually caused by poor battlefield conditions not by outside politics. Military units seldom fall apart over political issues unless they get really extreme - like a revolution.
In “Third World War: The Untold Story” Soviet forces reach and conquer the Netherlands and is defeated as much by internal collapse as by events on the battlefield. It has an alternate ending resulting in a Soviet victory, and the non-alternate ending has forces that didn’t exist, such as a British II Corps. Unfortunately, he also relies a lot upon the writings of Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun (penname Viktor Suvorov), who was a bit of a sensation as a high ranking defector but a good deal of what he wrote has since come into question. For example he claimed the existence of a self-propelled AT gun using the 125mm gun of the T-64/72/80/90 series which didn’t exist. He’s also since claimed that Stalin was going to launch a surprise attack upon Germany on July 6, 1941 and Hitler barely beat him to the punch in Icebreaker, which has been thoroughly discredited.
The Politburo handing the nuclear keys over to a general who is about to stage a palace coup is contrived. See Dead Hand for a much more unsettling look at nuclear release protocol in the USSR; it’s a fail-deadly system to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike should the leadership who would normally grant nuclear release be killed in a decapitating first strike. In Red Army the surrender of Germany is contrived to end the war before it goes nuclear, in The Third World War: The Untold Story the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union after the nuking of Minsk in retaliation for the nuking of Birmingham is contrived to prevent a nuclear tit-for-tat from turning into an all out exchange.
YMMV, but I didn’t find Clancy that convincing describing ground combat as opposed to naval or air combat.
Or what? Again, the “or what” part is the bit that works of fiction need to contrive something to avoid the logical conclusion: nuclear war.
Why? You could only impose such a condition following a thorough defeat, that didn’t happen in your scenario.
I never really considered that, but thinking about it, I’m not so sure. Indeed how reliable would have been Eastern block countries’ armies? Would the leadership happily follow Moscow’s decision, to begin with? Would the rank and file be motivated enough to be considered reliable?