That was still true at USNA when I was assigned there, so it may well still be true at USMA. The mids called the transition point “two for seven.” Two more years of schools for seven years of commitment (counting the two years of school as well—if one were then to go into the surface Navy or USMC Ground—there is a minimum 5 year active duty commitment post-grad).
ANNAPOLIS, Md. (Aug. 20, 2021) Midshipmen 2nd Class from the United States Naval Academy sign their “2 for 7” agreements, committing to seven years of service to their country: Two more years of a demanding academic schedule followed by five years in the Navy or Marine Corps. As the undergraduate college of our country’s naval service, the Naval Academy prepares young men and women to become professional officers of competence, character, and compassion in the US. Navy and Marine Corps. (U.S. Navy photo by Ensign Carlos E. Gallardo/Released)
Well sure… that’s what I said. I’m thinking that @Hari_Seldon’s brother was somehow confusing the idea that you owed a term of service if you made it past your second year at a service academy and that you would be compelled to do it as an enlisted person with somehow having a dual enlisted/commissioned rank.
Either that, or the fact that back in the day, reserve officers could be ejected subject to the needs of the service, while regular officers couldn’t just be shitcanned like that.
Tom Cruise turned 23 during the shooting of Top Gun. Him and pretty much all the pilot characters were too young to be senior Lieutenants that they were supposed to be.
So a nice symmetry. To old to be still a Captain. Too young to be Lieutenant.
Maybe not ejected, and certainly not “shitcanned,” but transferred from the active reserves to the selected ready reserve (who, as was a sore point in The Bridges at Toko-Ri, drill and draw pay for it but were not activated during much of the Cold War), or even the individual ready reserves (you’re in the reserves on paper, but absent activation your participation is negligible—but then for the Gulf War and Iraq the US started drawing on the reserves, including the IRR, in ways it never had before and people were surprised to actually be activated after they throught their active duty time was done).
Anyway, point being, there’s some nuances that are often lost in translation as servicemembers who were maybe never professionals themselves, but short term enlisted or draftees, describe their perceptions of a force reduction where, say, all the reserve officers being told they were going to be transferred to the inactive reserves translates to “all the reserves officers got fired while the regulars stayed” or something like that.
Too late to ETA: I should note that long-serving professionals themselves often don’t understand the nuances of some of these administrative policies. Up or out being a good example, actually. There is a general rule that a 2xFOS (basically, if you fail to promote to the next rank as an officer twice in a row) results in separation. But this comes up almost exclusively in the case of O3s failing to promote to O4. It’s very hard to not make it to O3 as it’s to the point that there has to be an affirmative reason to not promote someone to O2 or O3 (at least under current policies in the Navy—it used to be that there was a selection board for O3, and for all I know other services do have one, and in ten years who knows what Navy policy will be).
Anyway, 2xFOS and the related “up or out” would come up most commonly in that context of people failing to promote to O4 and getting separated. But few people realize that while 2xFOS could be a thing for O4s who fail to promote to O5, it’s often not the mechanism under which O4s are separated because there is a policy that allows almost all O4s to remain on active duty until retirement eligibility at the 20-year mark.
What this all comes down to is… there are so many nuances and caveats to how officers are promoted and/or retained that I suspect the idea of Maverick still being active as an O6 is borderline “not even far-fetched,” let alone the most problematic element of the story in terms of realism.
Happens enough to be not unusual in Special Forces. A Captain (18A) can only lead an ODA for a year or two and then it’s on to the B Team and Staff. But a WO (180A) can lead the team for much, much longer. I also saw a MAJ resign his commission because he wanted to deploy as a medic on an A Team instead of being the battalion surgeon. He went from O4 to E5 and got his wish.
This is one of those things I hear a lot about in stories, but wonder if it’s still possible now. Normally, an officer who separates from the military would be assigned an RE-code that would prevent their enlistment in the military.
But as a running theme that I will drive home (1) military bureaucracy is not so static as it might seem at first glance when looked at through a narrow (temporally speaking) window, and if anything they were arguably even less static in the past, and (2) there’s a waiver available for anything if the military needs/wants you bad enough, as it might just a skilled combat medical-type.
ETA: Interestingly, there is a provision of US Code that confirms enlistment after service as an officer (for prior enlisted, at least) is at least theoretically possible (not that I ever doubted it would be, it’s just always interesting to see what gets codified, and what is just a matter of service-level policy decisions):
Well, a lot of ‘strange’ things happen in special operations; going from surgeon to medic seems extreme but I briefly worked on an effort to develop highly portable vehicle extraction devices (think of the ‘Jaws of Life’ but capable of being carried in a medic ruck and powered internally by single use energetics) in which they would have a trauma physician and/or medical team deploy with Air Force Pararescue but I think that whole program fizzled out. I can believe someone someone resigning their commission to want to stay in Special Forces because once you get past Captain (O-3) it is pretty much all pushing paper and building PowerPoint decks.
